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ABSTRACT
structure and arguments
The main body of the thesis is divided in three parts, each comprising
two chapters. In the first part, I address the notion of scope from
the perspective of linguistic economy, by discussing the drawbacks
of an economy-based account of scope, and then I put forward an
alternative account. In the second part, I apply a similar strategy,
this time, with respect to binding. In the third part, I explore the
theoretical consequences of the standard economy principles for two
theses concerning, respectively, the nature of complex demonstratives
and the purported logicality of natural language.
Introduction
I start with an introductory study of the so-called trans-derivational
principles in generative linguistics. These principles are the prede-
cessors of economy principles. I then show how similar principles
emerge in more recent economy-based accounts, and point out that
the economy principles are meant to serve two main theoretical pur-
poses. They are meant to offer a novel general framework for thinking
about linguistic phenomena (such as binding and scope). At the same
time, some other theorists consider that the economy principles serve
the interface between syntax and semantics/pragmatics, being aimed
at harmonising certain syntactic and pragmatic requirements. I em-
brace both these theoretical purposes—generality and pragmatism—
and make them the desiderata for proper economy-based accounts of
scope and binding.
I rehearse other themes that will be important throughout the the-
sis. One such theme concerns the semantic values of expressions that
enter a binding relation. Any account that takes seriously economy
principles needs to posit that noun phrases have a denotation which is
more fine grained than individual referents. Thus, the proper denota-
tions of noun phrases should be guises, semantic values that contain
descriptive material and refer to objects in the domain through such
descriptive material. Another important theme, implicit throughout
the thesis, concerns the logicality of grammar. I thus devote a chapter
in order to spell out why linguistic economy implies logicality, and
why logicality is an important feature of grammar.
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Part I (chapters 1 and 2): Scope Economy
The two chapters of Part I deal with principles of economy governing
scope. Intuitively, the scope-property is what allows us to read the
sentence Someone loves everyone in two ways. One implies that there
is only a person who loves everyone; the other implies that there may
be several persons who, taken together, love everyone. A principle of
scopal economy decides which of the (in principle available) scopal
interpretations of a sentence are grammatical by putting the scopal in-
terpretations in competition with each other. According to a standard
principle of economy (Fox 2000), a scopal reading of a given sentence
should be discarded in case it does not say anything new in terms
of its truth-conditional content—i.e., in terms of what the world has
to be like for that sentence to be true—compared to its alternatives.
Further, a strong principle of economy is one that not only rules out
truth-conditionally vacuous scopal structures (or logical forms), but
also informationally strong scopal structures, i.e., structures that en-
tail the alternative scopal reading (Mayr and Spector 2010). In the
first chapter, I argue that this strong economy principle is problem-
atic from many points of view: it is based on problematic assump-
tions about the entailment patterns between the scopal readings, has
a host of counterexamples, and suffers from lack of conceptual moti-
vation.
However, the basic theoretical idea behind the strong economy ac-
count that there is a systematic relation between semantic strength
and scopal possibilities, is worth pursuing, and this is what I do in
the second chapter. There, I argue that the good predictions of the
strong economy account can be obtained pragmatically, by utilising,
inter alia, a mechanism geared towards discovering contradictions and
something along the lines of the cooperative communication maxims
advanced by Grice (1967/1989).
The most central maxim is the Gricean maxim of quantity. Very
roughly, the quantity maxim requires that if someone utters a sen-
tence which is ambiguous between a stronger and a weaker meaning,
what is in fact conveyed is the weak meaning taken together with
the negation of the stronger meaning. (An assertion is stronger than
another if it entails it.) Among the fruitful linguistic developments
based on the maxim of quantity is the notion of scalar implicature.
The basic idea of a scalar implicature can be illustrated by a simple ex-
ample. In saying Some students are in the classroom one usually implies
(viz. implicates), by default, that not all the students are there, and
thus conveys that some but not all students are in the classroom. Im-
plicatures are not categorical; they can be cancelled, as, for instance,
in case that the person above just wanted to draw a logical inference
from all students are . . . to some students are . . ., assuming that the for-
mer is true.
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My contribution is to propose a novel mechanism which is geared
toward checking contradictions, which, in turn, appear in the inter-
action between logically possible scopal readings and their scalar
implicatures. This amounts to offering an essentially semantic and
pragmatic implementation of the principles of scope economy (thus
pushing further several insights gleaned from Reinhart 1983a, 2006).
I shall also show that the general outlook of the resulting account
diverges in important respects from a pragmatic account relying on
cooperative communication.
Part II (chapters 3 and 4): Binding Economy
The next two chapters (chapters 3 and 4) focus on binding. In the
most standard form, binding is a relation of referential dependence
of pronouns on names, as e.g. in Sadie knows she is talented, where
she refers to Sadie in virtue of its referential dependence on the name
Sadie.
Part II has the same structure as the previous part of the thesis. In
the third chapter, I present the shortcomings of some representative
economy principles of binding, and, in the fourth chapter, I put for-
ward an account that is better than the standard economy-based ac-
counts in terms of the two criteria, generality and pragmatism. Thus,
I start by criticising previous uses of the interface principles of econ-
omy. I base my objections on two study cases consisting of extensions
of the interface economy principles (de se pronouns and copular sen-
tences), and argue that these principles of economy are problematic
because they are insensitive to semantic payoffs, and are prone to
overgeneration. I will also draw a more general sceptical conclusion
will. My contention is that the interface principles of economy have
not proven to be theoretically useful, since they seem to be explanato-
rily marginal, and they also lack pragmatic motivation. Therefore, the
economy principles fail on both (generality and pragmatic) counts.
In the fourth chapter, I adopt, and improve on, a semantic account
of binding, which is based on a principle of denotational (rather than
truth-conditional) economy called Non-Redundancy, due to Schlenker
(2005). An important intuition behind the denotational principle of
economy is that the economy ‘competitors’ are not propositions (viz.
the meanings of entire sentences) but the denotations of noun phrases.
Moreover, this principle is formulated only in terms of the mean-
ings/denotations (i.e. the semantics) of linguistic constructions real-
ising binding rather than in terms of both their syntax and semantics
(like its truth-conditional predecessors advanced by Fox 2000; Rein-
hart 1983a, 2006). I extend the data coverage of the semantic account
by handling (i) the ‘Madame Tussaud’ type of violations of Condi-
tion A of Binding Theory (see Jackendoff 1992), and (ii) phenomena
involving logophoric and de se pronouns. In particular, I shall extend
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the use of Fregean senses (or guises). Accordingly, I consider that
not only noun phrases can take guises as semantic values, but also
more complex expressions, such as complex predicates and clauses
(cf. Heim 1998). I thus show how to deal with the conditions A, B,
and C effects within the denotational account. I also come back to
the two case studies (de se pronouns and copular sentences), argu-
ing that if we assume that binding theory is not sensitive to the de
se/de re readings and give up an assumption about the difference be-
tween coreferential readings of specificational and predicational cop-
ular sentences, we get straightforward (semantic economy) analyses
of the two case studies.
Thus, the denotational economy account can be seen as a general-
isation of truth-conditional economy, but one that lacks the trouble-
some ‘interface’ characteristics.
The positive role of the first two parts of the thesis is to lay out
several descriptive hypotheses about some aspects of scope and bind-
ing, based on linguistic economy considerations and other natural
assumptions. I argue that the ensuing pictures are conceptually very
appealing and prima facie empirically adequate, although the explo-
ration of their full empirical consequences should be left for future
work.
Part III (chapters 5 and 6): Consequences on Definites and Logicality
The negative role of the first two parts of the thesis is to point out
the inadequacies of the interface principles of economy. However, I
do not mean to suggest that the standard economy accounts are com-
pletely misguided. Setting aside their ‘interface’ characteristics, the
standard principles of economy have some empirical success. They
also point to some fruitful explanatory strategies in theoretical lin-
guistics. Given these positive features of the standard economy prin-
ciples, and their legacy in the recent history of generative linguistics,
I claim that the standard economy principles lend some support to
theses about several, theoretically important, properties of grammar.
In particular, assuming truth-conditional economy, I argue, contra
Glanzberg (forthcoming[b]) and Szabo´ (2012), (i) that this principle
directly implies a close relation between logic and natural language,
and (contra a proposal presented by Dever 2001) (ii) that this principle
also undercuts what I shall call the argument from scope against the non-
referential views of complex demonstratives. (Non-referentialism is
taken to deny the direct reference thesis, which has it that certain
noun phrases refer directly rather than via a description.) I further
propose novel economy-based arguments for a non-referential con-
straint on the semantics of complex demonstratives (a constraint that
seems to be independently supported, cf. Elbourne 2008, 2013). Thus,
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if the linguistic economy thesis is on the right track, complex demon-
stratives (and other definites) are non-referential expressions; they do
not directly refer to individual objects.
The main purpose of these two chapters is to show that logical
properties of grammar, as well as the non-referentiality of definites
are both explanatorily desirable.
summary
My main contributions in this work are the following. In the first two
parts of the thesis, I criticise two accounts of the linguistic economy of
scope and binding, drawing attention especially to their conceptual
shortcomings. I further propose alternative accounts that overcome
the shortcomings of their predecessors. In particular, in chapter 2, I es-
tablish a novel connection between scope and scalar implicatures and,
in chapter 4, I develop a semantic account of binding by improving
the empirical coverage of the principle of denotational economy. The
main conclusion of the first two parts of the thesis is that we should
reformulate the accounts based on linguistic economy in terms of se-
mantic and pragmatic principles. If we do so, our accounts of scope
and binding will gain both empirical and conceptual advantages.
Finally, in chapters 5 and 6, I draw some substantive consequences
for the semantics of complex demonstratives (and other definites),
and also for the purported logicality of binding and scope construc-
tions, relying on principles of linguistic economy. More concretely, I
argue based on truth-conditional economy that complex demonstra-
tives are best conceived as non-directly referential. In the final chap-
ter I demonstrate that linguistic economy entails logicality of natural
language, and that the arguments to the contrary are faulty.
v
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0 INTRODUCT ION
0.1 outline
The main themes of this thesis are economy-based explanations and
the natural language constructions that are amenable to such expla-
nations. I call this type of enterprise philosophical linguistics, since
it looks at linguistic phenomena from a general conceptual perspec-
tive.1 I see the purpose of this broadly interdisciplinary work to be
ultimately systematic in nature, one that starts off by putting a spe-
cial emphasis on the nuances of language, and tries to work out the
high-level principles governing them.
I put forward several descriptive generalisations that concern the
interface between semantics and pragmatics and are meant to re-
place generalisations at the syntax and semantics/pragmatics inter-
face.2 The work is empirically driven insofar as it characterises lin-
guistic phenomena. It also proposes general directions—in particular,
it insists on pragmatics, logicality, and indirectly on a more practice-
based philosophical methodology—in the study of linguistic phenom-
ena. However, I am not engaged in a foundational project, since my
purpose is not to advance novel views about foundational notions of
linguistic theory (such as syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and so on),
and I shall in general rely on common usages of these notions. Thus,
I assume that syntax concerns the form (rather than the content) of
expressions, and their distributional properties. Semantics concerns
the truth-conditional content of sentences which consists of the situ-
ations that make sentences true and the way the situations are com-
posed. Finally, pragmatics concerns how the semantic contents are
enriched in order to facilitate an efficient or cooperative communica-
tion. To be sure, these distinctions are not as simple as my statements
1 However, this is not a standard linguistic work, since I take the liberty to analyse
and pull together a wide range of linguistic data at a more general level and without
offering either precise syntactic analyses or compositional semantic ones. Nor is this
a standard philosophy of language work, since my data set of linguistic construc-
tions and inventory of central notions overlaps to a greater extent with those found
in theoretical linguistics, and especially linguistic semantics.
2 Descriptive accounts are usually opposed to explanatory accounts. The notion of
explanation—and what distinguishes it from the notion of description—is a difficult
one, and it is understudied in philosophy of language and linguistics. While there
is some value in taking explanation as the aim of inquiry, we should better get the
descriptive generalisations right before engaging with the explanatory part of the
inquiry.
1
0.1 outline
could suggest, and further levels or ‘modules’ of grammar are con-
ceivable, and probably necessary. For instance, a key level for our
purposes is the semantics/pragmatics interface, which ensures that
pragmatics can partly supply the semantics with the objects it needs
in oder to get to certain semantic, truth-conditional contents. It is
difficult to say just by looking at a linguistic phenomenon whether it
belongs to the domain of syntax, semantics or pragmatics (or to some
interface between them). These aspects of language involve different
explanatory strategies in terms of specific rules and principles govern-
ing form, composition, or extra-compositional mechanisms. Locating
a phenomenon at one of these levels turns on how well those ex-
planatory strategies work, according to some standard theory choice
criteria (empirical adequacy, simplicity, conceptual naturalness etc.).
The latter observation holds, to a certain extent, of other fundamen-
tal notions that will be invoked throughout the thesis, specifically of
scope and binding.3
The thesis revolves around the idea of linguistic economy. The no-
tion of economy under discussion is a relatively ‘local’ notion and
concerns a stable state of the language of a competent speaker. By
these characteristics I mean the following. First, economy is not as-
sumed here to be the result of an evolutionary process, in which lin-
guistic principles are more and more refined in order to be able to
tackle, in an ideal (or optimal) manner, the specific computational
problems faced by language. Instead, economy is important for the
present study insofar as it can teach us something about the proper-
ties of the language of a competent speaker. In other words, I am in-
terested in linguistic economy as a synchronic rather than diachronic
notion. Second, economy, in the sense understood here, does not gov-
ern language as a whole—as e.g. the Gricean maxims of cooperative
communication, and the neo-Gricean principle of relevance do (Grice
1967/1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995)—but rather operates on a
comparatively restricted set of linguistic constructions. We can more
aptly see economy as a property of principles that have a very spe-
cific purpose, with a very limited memory (or search-space), and with
a high sensitivity to the syntactic and semantic characteristics of lin-
guistic constructions. Briefly put, the principles of economy are mod-
erately local. Locality is a matter of degree, and even stricter notions
of locality exist (I shall present one shortly). From the perspective
of a stricter criterion of locality, moderate locality will appear to be,
in fact, a global notion. But regardless of one’s perspective on the
3 What we take scope and binding to be is tied up with the linguistic phenomena that
we are uncovering using some theoretical apparatus or other. This is not, so to speak,
to deny the facts, but only to say that they are, to an important extent, sieved through
certain theoretical frameworks, and that alternative frameworks can change how we
take phenomena to be, or even what we take the phenomena to be. Although these
notions are theory laden, we shall provide relevant illustrations, and aim to state our
results even in the absence of an overarching account of the respective distinctions.
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locality of linguistic economy, linguistic economy principles are more
restricted than pure pragmatic ones. It is in contrast to these overar-
ching pragmatic principles that I find linguistic economy local, even if,
within this category, more or less local/global sub-categories may be
defined. Note that the two senses of economy just introduced over-
lap: moderately local economy is a synchronic notion. Henceforth,
linguistic economy (of any variety) will be always understood as local
synchronic economy. I shall use the “local” qualification of economy
in a more restricted sense, to refer to a species of locality, and I shall
oppose this species to another one, namely, ‘globality’.
The thesis is organised in three major parts, which deal with econ-
omy principles and linguistic economy phenomena, that is, natural
language sentences and constructions that manifest economy features.
In the first part I argue for a theoretical reorientation in the way we
conceive of economy principles that regulate scope. I propose that
these principles should be seen as partly pragmatic (or, as I shall put
it, semantic/pragmatic). A similar argument regarding binding will
be put forward in the second part of the thesis. In the third part
I exploit the standard economy principles and phenomena in order
to argue for two general claims concerning language. The first claim
concerns a particular type of noun phrase: complex demonstratives. I
argue that, in view of several principles of economy, complex demon-
stratives should be treated as non-referential. The second claim con-
cerns a structural property that (I argue) is implied by the principles
of economy. In this connection, I show that linguistic economy im-
plies that certain mechanisms at the interface between syntax and
semantics involve some substantial logical properties.
There are four main themes that can be distilled from the present
work. The theme that will be most prominent in the first part of
the thesis concerns the advantages of adopting a more pragmatic ap-
proach to economy phenomena. In the account of binding developed
in chapters 3 and 6, I shall posit that the semantic values of noun
phrases are guises, so the notion of guise also deserves a place in this
introduction. The third theme is the logicality of natural language
(argued for in chapter 5). The fourth theme concerns methodological
considerations in linguistic argumentation (covered throughout the
thesis, and especially in chapters 1 and 3). In what follows, I shall
introduce these themes, situating them in a wider theoretical context.
0.2 main themes
In what theoretical sense is a fragment of natural language economi-
cal? In answer to this question I propose that linguistic constructions
are economical in virtue of some linguistic property that is ranked
higher (according to a specific metric or scale) than other properties
3
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of alternative linguistic constructions. Perhaps an even more general
answer is that linguistic economy decides whether certain grammati-
cal properties hold of a linguistic construction by way of ranking this
construction relative to alternative constructions. In the next section I
illustrate the basic notions of economy, and discuss their methodolog-
ical role in linguistic theory. I then move to the other main themes
of the thesis: pragmatics, guises, and logicality. In order to situate the
inquiry into linguistic economy in the broader linguistic literature, I
shall also go through a series of important paradigms of linguistic ex-
planation. These will illuminate the key aspects of linguistic economy
phenomena that I shall try to refine in the rest of the thesis.
0.2.1 Economy: origins and methodology
Economy principles—or what I have called above local synchronic econ-
omy—originated as a specific type of constraint on grammars. Gram-
matical constraints can be relevantly divided into local and global
(which, in turn, are subdivisions within the larger category of local
synchronic economy). The local constraints concern rules and princi-
ples that apply within a single derivation or construction of a linguis-
tic unit (sentence). In contrast, global or trans-derivational constraints
concern multiple derivations. Global constraints are formulated in
terms of what alternative derivations look like. Thus, the grammati-
cal rules/principles governing a structure may depend on the inher-
ent properties of that structure (local properties), or on the properties
of other structures, perhaps relative to the structure in hand (global
structures). Hence, the intuitive idea behind the local/global division
is captured by the distinction between inherent and relative proper-
ties.
Economy principles were originally motivated primarily by appeal
to methodology (and, as we shall see in the forthcoming discussion,
they still should be methodologically motivated).4 That is, these
principles were initially supposed to render grammar more general,
more elegant and simple, less ad hoc and to make linguistic theory
more empirically fruitful and tractable. In more linguistic terms,
economy principles were originally designed to remove the need for
construction-specific rules, and to give instead structural accounts of
several phenomena that resisted systematic explanation. A structural
account appeals to the properties of a larger linguistic construction
(e.g. a sentence, or part of a sentence) rather than to the particular
lexical items (words) or sub-constructions making up that construc-
4 Independently of whether simplicity and generality were the initial rationale for
linguistic economy (a claim that needs more exegetical work than I’m able to pro-
duce here), it is incontrovertible that simplicity and generality are among the criteria
of theory choice more generally, so it is reasonable to assume the same criteria for
linguistic theory as well.
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tion. The structural accounts based on economy were put forward in
order to replace construction-specific rules, and to illuminate the rel-
evant linguistic phenomena in a way consistent with the theoretical
virtues of simplicity, generality, and so on.
How can an economy principle gain the required generality? Let
me illustrate with an important example from the recent history of
generative linguistics. An economy condition advanced in linguistic
theory in the ’90s is the Minimal Link Condition. The Minimal Link
Condition (MLC) requires that given two convergent (i.e. grammat-
ical) linguistic forms (or, in linguistic parlance, derivations) F1 and
F2 which are formed from the same set of lexical items, F1 will block
F2 if its ‘links’ are shorter. The links here may refer to the length
of movement or other operations/configurations that are intuitively
definable in terms of the distance between nodes in a linguistic tree.
Reinhart (2006, p. 15), drawing on Chomsky, presents a number of
examples in order to illustrate the main data that can be explained
by appeal to MLC. Chomsky (1973) introduced such cases under the
name superiority, which was meant to reflect the fact that only the
wh-expression that occupies a higher or superior position in the syn-
tactic tree (or the leftmost in the linear order of the sentence) can be
displaced.5
1. Superiority (case 1)
a) Who t discussed what with you?
b) ??What did who discussed t with you?
2. Superiority (case 2)
a) Whom did Lucy persuade t [PRO to visit whom]?
b) *Whom did Lucy persuade whom [PRO to visit t]?
These examples involve wh-movement, that is, movement of wh-
expressions such as what, who, how etc.. Movement is generally as-
sumed to leave behind traces (unpronounced items represented by
t), which mark the initial position of the moved phrase, as well as
the intermediary stopping or landing positions of the moved phrase.
These positions are relevant for how we interpret the questions. Wh-
phrases are one of the primary motivations for positing the move-
ment operation. For instance, What did Lucy see? is obtained, on
common theoretical assumptions, by moving the what from the object
position (after seen) to the front of the sentence; in doing that, we ob-
tain the right configuration for a grammatically correct question. The
movement analysis rests on the basic assumption that the underlying
structure of the previous question is Lucy did see what?. (Note that
5 I follow the conventional notation that represents the unacceptability of a linguistic
example with * and different degrees of deviance with ?, and ??.
5
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we can sometimes ask questions using the latter construction, thus
presumably using its underlying structure.)
As we shall see shortly, other expressions can also move. For now,
what is striking regarding wh-movement is that not all wh-expressions
can be freely moved, as shown by (1b) and (2b). We can explain why
the movement of wh-expressions is unavailable by appeal to minimal
links. They cannot move because their movement would be too long.
There are shorter links available from the same numerations (i.e., sets
of lexical items forming a given sentence), and only these links are al-
lowed. A natural way to think about how MLC is computed is as fol-
lows. We fix a numeration, e.g. the numeration corresponding to (1a),
and form a set of two linguistic forms realising different movement
operations. From this set—also called a reference-set—we choose the
linguistic form that realises minimal links. This implementation of
MLC is thus based on competition between linguistic forms.
It was suggested that MLC (or a similar principle) can explain the
behaviour of many other constructions consisting of wh-expressions.
3. Relativised minimality (Reinhart 2006, p. 19)
a) *Where findt Max will t the book. head movement
b) *Maxt seems [that it is certain [t to arrive]]. A-movement
c) *I wonder whatk you forgot from whomi you got tk ti.
A’-movement (wh-islands)
In these examples we observe the same tendency towards shortest
movements. In (3b), for instance, the noun phrase Max cannot move
on a longer path in order to satisfy the need for a subject in the main
clause leaving the expletive it satisfy the same role in the secondary
clause. That role can be fulfilled in the main clause only by the ex-
pletive. This has the effect of minimising the movement of the noun
phrase. The same tendency can be seen in (3c). There, the restriction
is on the movement of wh-phrases.
Another similar phenomenon can be noticed in the following ex-
ample.
4. Wh-islands (Carnie 2007, pp. 337-8)
a) I wonder whati John kissed ti.
b) Whok did you think tk kissed the gorilla.
c) *Whok did you wonder whati tk kissed ti.
The wh-expression what can move independently, as testified by
(4a). The acceptability of (4b) shows that the wh-phrase who can also
move independently. A problem appears in (4c) when we try to move
both wh-expressions. This problem can be traced back to the length of
movement, under a particular understanding of the notion of length.
More specifically, if we measure the length according to the number
6
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of potential landing sites for a wh-expression, then it follows that
who in (4c )is required to travel a lengthier path in order to front
the sentence in (4c). That is intuitively the reason why the resulting
construction is deviant.
We can thus see a common pattern in these examples. It is tempting
to try to incorporate these examples into the MLC, that is, the prin-
ciple of economy which prevents linguistic forms from manifesting
long movement. This is one of the economy principles that played,
and still plays, an important role in linguistic accounts. Other econ-
omy principles and corresponding economy metrics (apart from the
length of movement specific to MLC) have been suggested.
Another important principle is one that disallows a grammatical
operation from applying in case that operation is not necessary to
render the resulting construction, viz. the construction obtained as
a result of the application of that operation, grammatical. This latter
principle is called a least effort principle. The MLC and the least effort
principles are distinct in important respects. Only the MLC requires
competition between linguistic forms (or derivations). However, they
have something in common in that they minimise a certain grammat-
ical property (length of movement, number of operations). Moreover,
there are principles that inherit features form both types of economy
principles.
Two main principles of economy studied in this thesis—Scope Econ-
omy and Binding Economy—resemble the MLC in that they are based
on competition between linguistic forms. They also resemble the least
effort principles, as they are geared towards preventing the applica-
tion of a certain operation (or the presence of a certain grammatical
configuration) deemed to imply an unnecessary effort. Let me illus-
trate the main traits of these economy principles with the following
examples.
5. a) A student listens to every teacher.
b) If a student listens to everyone, hei must listen to himi.
The principles of economy require that certain grammatical opera-
tions apply only if some relevant effects are produced as the result of
their application. What are these operations? These operations can
refer to quantifier movement (as applicable to (5a)) or to an operation
that results in two coreferential noun phrases (as indicated in (5b)).
According to the economy principles, the grammar allows these op-
erations, and thus the resulting linguistic forms are grammatical, if
their effects on the meanings of these forms are significant. In other
words, these operations are allowed just in case they produce new
meanings, understood as truth-conditional contents.
To illustrate, note that (5a) can be read in two ways. According
to one interpretation there is only one student who listens to every
teacher. According to another interpretation, there may be several
7
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students who jointly listen to every teacher. The latter interpretation
is obtained by way of movement of the quantifier phrase every teacher
in order to take scope over the existential a student. (Much of the
recent linguistic research assumes such an operation, and I shall do
the same here.) Now, the principle of scope economy allows this
operation because it produces a new meaning. Clear evidence for
the existence of such a new meaning is the fact that the sentence
A student listens to every teacher can be taken to entail that there are
several students. Because such a new meaning exists as a result of
the application of movement, the principle of scope economy allows
this application and the resulting form.6
Take now (5b), and focus on its second clause: hei must listen to himi.
As it is standard, I take the index i on the two pronouns to represent
sameness of reference, or coreference (taken here as a broad and intu-
itive notion, unlike in chapters 3, 4, and 6). Thus, the two pronouns in
the second clause of (5b) refer to the same person, namely the student
introduced in the first clause of the same example. The patterns of
coreference and disjoint reference are the proper domain of binding
theory. From the perspective of the standard binding theory, the fact
that coreference is possible at all in (5b) is surprising. This is because
coreference is not generally possible. Notice that constructions such
as he likes him, which seem similar to (5b) in all the crucial respects,
are usually interpreted as referring to two distinct individuals, rather
than to a single one. (Cf. also *Hei told [a student]i to listen carefully).
However, there is an important detail in example (5b) which can
be used to explain the surprising behaviour of the pronoun him. The
Binding Economy principle was designed to make use of such a detail.
In brief, the coreference in (5b) is allowed because it produces a novel
meaning, and the availability of a novel meaning makes the sentence
economical, in a sense to be spelled out below. The basic factor that
underlies the novel meaning relies on the distinction between two
predicates: listening to him and listening to himself. These predicates
express two distinct properties, and it is the former that produces a
novel meaning relative to the latter.7 In virtue of that novel meaning,
Binding Economy allows the unusual coreference pattern, and the
corresponding construction in (5b) ends up being grammatical.8
6 We are omitting here the linguistic argumentation in favour of Scope Economy; see
Fox (2000) and Reinhart (2006) for extensive argumentation, and the second chapter
for an argument for an alternative version of Scope Economy.
7 Suppose that the student in 5b is Dan. What the second clause of 5b—viz., hei must
listen to himi—says is that Dan listens Dan. But note that both the above predicates
can be used to describe the same situation. It is thus important from a linguistic
standpoint that the properties instantiated by Dan in that situation may differ: on
the one hand, Dan may like a person who happens to be Dan, and on the other, Dan
may like himself.
8 Once again, I leave implicit the full argumentation, as well as the spelling out of the
main notions, behind Binding Economy. See the works cited in fn. 6, as well as the
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The original theoretical motivations for economy principles were
partly empirical and partly methodological. I focus here on the method-
ological motivations, since methodology will play a key role through-
out the thesis. In the minimalist programme, the economy principles
were meant to support a general and conceptually natural framework.
In that framework, it was proposed that the main principles of the
grammar should be integrated to a principle of economy akin to MLC.
As Noam Chomsky (1995, p. 161), one of the leading proponents of
the minimalist, economy-based framework, has put it, “we may hope
to raise these “least effort” [economy] guidelines to general principles
of UG [universal grammar]”. He goes on to point out that “these prin-
ciples have a kind of naturalness and generality lacking in the specific
principles of UG such as the ECP, the binding theory and so on”.9 It is
thus worth keeping in mind that theoretical virtues such as simplicity,
elegance, and generality are among the main desirable consequences
that the economy principles were designed to bring about.
This combination of theoretical desiderata is more widespread. Lin-
guistic economy considerations and the proclivity for simplicity are
not features that single out the minimalist programme. As many have
noted (cf. D. E. Johnson and Lappin 1999; Pullum 1996), the economy
principles originated in the now defunct programme called generative
semantics. Generative semanticists called these principles global or
trans-derivational constraints. Some of the generative semantics prin-
ciples resembled the scope and binding economy principles in that
they were sensitive to semantic interpretation of linguistic forms (see
Lakoff 1971). Moreover, simplicity was always a guideline for linguis-
tic theory10, and is, implicitly or explicitly, taken to draw a divide
between descriptive approaches and explanatory ones11.
Although simplicity is a complicated notion, it is crucial in linguis-
tic practice (and in scientific practice more generally). For this thesis,
the notion of simplicity is important because it gives us the means to
evaluate the economy-based accounts by their own lights, or, in any
case, by the lights of the conceptual and methodological ideas that
originally motivated the economy-based accounts. Since the econ-
omy principles were explicitly advanced in order to make grammar
simpler, I can use simplicity to evaluate the results of the economy-
based accounts. My main contention in the first part of this work is
that the economy principles do not bring about a simplification of
the grammar. Insofar as their empirical predictions can be obtained
in other theoretical frameworks, these alternatives are to be preferred.
However, I seek to preserve the insights of the economy principles,
overview of binding economy approaches in Nasta (2013). For a the development of
a pragmatic-based view of binding economy, see chapter 3.
9 Cf. Chomsky (1995, pp. 1,171,220,228)
10 Cf. Chomsky (1957, 1965, 1981)
11 See Safir (2004, p. 60) for an implicit endorsement.
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and that is why the alternatives that will be subsequently proposed
are still economy-based in important respects.12
The methodological virtues of generality and ‘naturalness’ of lin-
guistic hypotheses will also play an important role in chapter 4, where
it is argued that definite noun phrases are non-referential. Non-
referentiality allows us to see the important similarities between var-
ious forms of definite noun phrases, as well as to account for their
syntactic and semantic behaviours.
0.2.2 Pragmatics
Taking in consideration the syntax/semantic divide, we can classify
the previous principles under two types of economy principle. One
is purely syntactic; the original MLC was such a principle. The other
is not only syntactic but also semantic. In this work, I focus on the
so-called interface principles of economy, namely the Scope Economy
and Binding Economy.13 As we have seen, the effect that helps eval-
uate the economy properties of derivations (and grammatical oper-
ations) is in fact a semantic (and pragmatic) effect, since the truth-
conditional content of a derivation is essential in establishing whether
that derivation is grammaticaly licensed.
I submit that the semantic nature of the interface principles of
economy opens up an important theoretical possibility, a possibility
that has been so far relatively unexplored in connection to economy
principles. More to the point, since the standard economy princi-
ples are partly semantically and pragmatically motivated, our driv-
ing question is whether these principles can receive a purely seman-
tic/pragmatic articulation. There are two basic motivations for a
purely semantic/pragmatic account of economy phenomena. Firstly,
interface strategies—the economy computations at the interface be-
tween syntax and semantics—are computationally costly. Secondly,
the truth-conditional economy principles seem to be ad hoc and ques-
tionable from a theoretical point of view.
The pragmatic nature of the economy principles is most clear in
Tanya Reinhart’s work (see e.g. Reinhart 1983b, 2006). For her, the
pragmatic role of economy takes two forms. One relates to a general
theoretical motivation of economy. The economy principles have ulti-
12 The controversy-based account relies on a mechanism whose main components are
scalar implicatures, and the interactions of this mechanism with various pragmatic
factors. According to my denotational economy account in chapter 4, which draws
primarily on the account of Schlenker (2005), the key binding economy principle is
geared towards avoiding redundancy.
13 Fox (2000) motivates the reliance on semantics using a broader notion of linguistic
economy, namely, HEOC, which abbreviates the have-an-effect-on-the-output condition
(proposed by Chomsky (1995)). Consequently, in Fox’s interpretation, the sensitivity
to semantics reflects the need to make sure that grammatical operations have an
effect on the upstream structure, viz. on the semantic structure or truth-conditional
content.
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mately a pragmatic motivation, since these principles are, pace Rein-
hart, geared towards minimising the audience’s effort in interpreting
linguistic utterances.14 Both Scope Economy and Binding Economy
are motivated by appeal to a pragmatic principle that minimises the
interpretive options (i.e., the meanings corresponding to a particu-
lar utterance). Thus, in discussing quantifier scope, Reinhart (2006,
p. 103) points out that “when it comes to covert movement, special
attention is required to the context interface”. This is because covert
movement is “a powerful mechanism that can associate with each
single phonological representation several interpretations, obtained
by movement not recoverable from the phonological representation it-
self”. She goes on to say that “[t]his is an obvious area where an inter-
face economy requirement to minimise interpretive options would be
very useful”. Clearly, this last claim means that an economy require-
ment would be useful from the pragmatic perspective of the agent who
interprets the utterance (and the corresponding ‘phonological repre-
sentation’). Reinhart offers the same justification for her economy
principle governing binding (see ibid., pp. 185-6).
The other, more concrete, pragmatic role of economy concerns the
nature of the linguistic constructions that need to be explained in
terms of economy and, more indirectly, the nature of the linguistic ev-
idence needed to support the generalisations appealing to economy
ideas. Thus, it seems that economy principles explain phenomena
that essentially involve specific discourse (or communicational) aims.
For instance, recall our previous example (5b): If a student listens to
everyone, hei must listen to himi. Call the student Dan. I remarked that
the predicate listen to him conveys a different meaning than listen to
himself, and that due to this difference, the use of him should be pre-
ferred. The discourse aim of an utterance of (5b) would be to convey
that Dan listens to Dan in virtue of his being part of the relevant set
of people (the ones introduced in the first sentence, namely people
that Dan listens to). A use of the pronoun him picks out Dan as previ-
ously introduced in the antecedent clause, rather than as dependent
upon the referent of he in the second clause. This sort of ‘acciden-
tal’ reference is underlined by a specific discourse aim. The aim here
is to present Dan from a different perspective, thus predicating of
him what can be predicated of everyone else, and indirectly showing
that the same property applies to all the members of the domain in
question (people in the contextually relevant domain). This different
perspective is behind the bona fide pragmatic intention needed for a fe-
licitous utterance of (5b). Given this discourse aim, the economy prin-
ciple allows the (theoretically) unexpected referential pattern. More
generally, it is in virtue of discourse aims that the economy principles
14 Incidentally, Reinhart’s claim seems to contrast with Chomsky’s idea that the op-
timality of the grammar (if there is such) is an internal affaire, virtually separated
from how grammar is put to use in linguistic performance and communication.
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license linguistic constructions in a way that would be unexpected on
previous (non-economy-based) theoretical assumptions.15
It is worth stressing that the view of pragmatics assumed here
(and throughout the dissertation) has nothing in common with the
so called wastebasket pragmatics. Pragmatics is not (or should not be)
the place where all the ill-understood phenomena are pushed to, but
rather a principled set of rules that guide communication. In line
with such a view, pragmatics is, methodologically, on equal footing
with syntax and semantics. Therefore, I shall take pragmatics to be
an essential part of linguistic competence.
However, I do not aim to provide here a theory of pragmatic com-
petence. Instead, I am interested in the pragmatic motivation of lin-
guistic accounts. By pragmatic motivation I shall mean that the posits
about the interface between syntax and semantics/pragmatics should
not be pragmatically unrealistic, i.e., do violence to our pragmatic
data and intuitions. In other words, we should not posit a semantic
computation for which we do not have any pragmatic motivation, or
a computation against which we do have prima facie pragmatic evi-
dence. This desideratum comes from ensuring a smooth interface be-
tween pragmatics and other aspects of language, with minimal struc-
tural mismatches.
One crucial characteristic of pragmatic principles is their defeasi-
bility. They are not categorical, and admit exceptions. More specif-
ically, such principles can be overridden by other pragmatic factors.
If we pay closer attention to the economy phenomena, we can note
that they manifest just the required form of defeasibility. Scope econ-
omy can be trumped by prosodic factors and other pragmatic, truth-
conditional effects. Binding economy can be likewise overridden for
various communicative purposes.
The defeasibility of economy principles governing scope and bind-
ing brings to mind more familiar semantic/pragmatic phenomena
such as scalar implicatures and some forms of presupposition.16 A
scalar implicature, for instance, is the inference from Some swans are
white to Not all swans are white. Such inferences are very common
in natural language. While scalar implicatures are very robust in-
ferences, there are contexts where they do not hold. For instance,
someone may reason as follows. Some time ago biologists thought that
swans were all white, and naturally that swans in Britain were white; there-
fore, biologists thought that some swans (those in Britain) were white. It
should be clear that the thought reported in the last clause, to the
15 For similar points, see Reinhart (2006, pp. 189-90,210, 1983a) and Heim’s develop-
ment of Reinhart’s position, especially Heim (1998, pp. 222,236).
16 See Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2008), Horn (2004), and Reinhart (2006) for discus-
sion of the notion of scalar implicature, and Beaver (2001) and Beaver and Geurts
(2011) for introductions to the notion of presupposition. It is worth noting that not
all the accounts of scalar implicature and presupposition involve pragmatics (in a
crucial way), but some do.
12
0.2 main themes
effect that biologists thought that some swans were white, does not li-
cense the inference that biologists thought that not all swans are white.
This is a context where the usual scalar implicature some 99K not all is
somehow cancelled, or inactive.
I argue that similar cancellable inferences underlie scope and bind-
ing. First, with regard to scope, I contend that a defeasible mecha-
nism involving scalar implicatures determines (at least in part) the
availability of surface and inverse scope interpretations. Second, I
maintain that binding phenomena manifest defeasible tendencies to-
wards disjoint or identity of reference. Thus, She thinks Anne is smart
will be read by default as asserting that some person distinct from
Anne thinks of Anne as being smart, although this interpretation can
be cancelled in certain contexts. For instance, one may think of the
referent of the pronoun she under a particular guise, which does not
prevent Anne from being the referent of the pronoun. (See below for
more on guises.) In short, setting aside the specific details of the ac-
counts being proposed, the most general contribution in the first two
parts of the thesis is that I extrapolate from the remarks to the effect
that economy principles are partly semantic/pragmatic and partly
syntactic to a view that takes the economy principles to be entirely
semantic/pragmatic.
0.2.3 Guises
I submit that noun phrases—or determiner phrases—are best seen as
denoting semantic objects that are more fine grained than individuals
or entities. To show this I focus in this thesis on complex demonstra-
tives, expressions such as this cow, that man in black etc.. As I shall
argue in chapter 6, complex demonstratives have more fine grained
semantic values, and therefore do not refer directly but via a descrip-
tion of the object to which they are taken to refer. There are several
ways to define non-referential semantic values for complex demon-
stratives, and the most promising view, it seems to me, is to take
their semantic values to be guises.
It would be convenient to present a more specific theory of demon-
stratives, and for this task I choose the account put forward in El-
bourne (2008), which is couched in situation semantics.17 According
to Elbourne, who builds on Nunberg (1993), the meaning of a com-
plex demonstrative has the following structure: [DP[[that i]R] NP ].
The demonstrative determiner that takes as an argument an individ-
ual i, a relation R, and a property (the denotation of the NP), and
yields a guise or individual concept. An individual concept is a func-
tion from situations to unique individuals which satisfy (in that sit-
17 For our needs, worlds would do as well as situations, though, since worlds are
bigger situations ordered according to a part-of relation, and the part-of relation will
not be relevant for most of our uses of the notion of guise.
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uation) the property denoted by the NP and is in the relation R to
the individual i given contextually.18 As Elbourne (2008, pp. 430-1)
points out, a standard value for the composition of i and R is the
property of being identical to a particular person or thing (most of
the time i itself, but not necessarily so). For instance, if I point to Will
and say That man in black is funny, the individual concept (which is
the semantic value of the complex demonstrative) will be akin to the
description the distal person that is identical (= R) to Will (= i) and is a
man in black (= the NP-property). In this case, we can say that Will is the
referent (or content) of the demonstrative, as long as we do not forget
that the value of the demonstrative is in fact more fine grained.19
Note also that this account can distinguish between de dicto and
de re uses of demonstratives. It all depends on how we identify the
property derived from i and R, in particular on whether we derive
something like the property of being a person that bears R (e.g. is
identical) to i at the actual world (time or situation), or the property
of being a person that bears R to i at some possible world, namely, the
world of evaluation (whatever that happens to be). The former inter-
pretation freezes the referent of the demonstratives, which will then
be the same in any imaginable situation. Thus, we could consistently
assert That man in black could not wear black, as long as we understand
the complex demonstrative that man in black in a de re manner. On
the de re reading, the sentence says that the man who wears black at
a certain world wo (identified as the actual world of utterance) is a
man who does not wear black at a different world w1, which is pos-
sible relative to (or ‘accessible’ from) the actual world. In contrast,
on the de dicto reading, the sentence asserts that there is a possible
world (accessible from the actual one) in which the man in black fails
to wear black. Remote figurative interpretations aside, the de dicto
interpretation is contradictory.
Several features of guises will become important in the coming
chapters dealing with binding phenomena (chapters 4 and 6). Guise-
valued meanings can be attributed to other expressions, such as pro-
nouns and definite descriptions (see Elbourne 2005, 2008, 2013 for
details). For our purposes, the most important feature of guises is
that they can incorporate descriptive conditions via the linguistic or
extra-linguistic context. Thus, he can denote a guise akin to the de-
notation of the person that satisfies such and such a condition, where the
condition in question is given contextually, and it is presupposed that
the person referred to is a male.
18 As I suggested earlier, it is important that the principles I am proposing are prag-
matically motivated, and thus have an intuitive communicative purpose. In the case
of complex demonstratives, the relation R should be salient in the context.
19 The fine grained value of the complex demonstrative is, on the current account, a
guise, viz. a semantic value of type 〈s, e〉, rather than an entity, viz. a semantic value
of type 〈e〉.
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Another crucial feature of guises is that they can be generalised
from individual types to other types. We can thus think of guises of
properties—what I shall call, more generally, complex guises—functions
from situations to properties. Thus, the property of loving John and
the property of loving oneself may well be properties of the same
individual at a world, but not at another. This complex guise can
nevertheless be expressed by the same verb phrase, e.g. loves himself.
There are other kinds of guises. We may further think of special in-
dividual guises, mixtures of individual guises that merge and make
up other individual guises. Suppose I assume that two individuals
are identical. To take a famous example, say I make the assumption
that Lakoff (a person known to us) is Jesus, and then immediately
evaluate the statement he forgives his friends’ sins under that identity
assumption. In this context, the pronouns he and his may refer back
to a Lakoff-Jesus mixture, a guise that preserves both characteristics of
Lakoff and Jesus. As we shall see, certain apparent violations of bind-
ing theory can be solved by introducing these sorts of guises, and
re-defining the relevant binding principles in terms of them.
0.2.4 Logicality
Logicality is a property that follows from the structural properties
presupposed by economy principles. The structural properties on
which the economy computation is based are logical properties. As
such, economy phenomena are part of a larger set of linguistic phe-
nomena that appear to manifest logicality, and for which an explana-
tion in terms of logical properties seems to be particularly suited.
Let us see how logicality can enter the explanation of several con-
trasts, starting with but-exceptives. Notice the contrast in the accept-
ability of the two sentences in (6).
6. But-Exceptives (von Fintel 1994)
a) No one but John smokes.
b) *Someone but John smokes.
Von Fintel’s (1994) interpretation of exceptives has it that an excep-
tive statement asserts that (i) the relevant predicate (e.g. smokes) is
true of a set of individuals from which we subtract the exception e,
that is, the setD− e (in our case, e is John). Moreover, it should be the
case that (ii) if we are not subtracting the exception, the sentence pred-
icating the relevant predicate of the domain of individuals D (where
e ∈ D) is false. Then, on this account, the acceptability of exceptive
phrases depends on the compatibility of these two conditions. Let us
take a look at our examples and check whether the two conditions
are consistent.
In the case of (6a), both conditions seem to be satisfied, because it
is possible that (i) smokes is true of no one except John (that is, ∀x ∈
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D− e : x is a non-smoker), and (ii) if we leave John in the relevant
domain, the sentence no one smokes (that is, ∀x ∈ D : x is a non-
smoker) falls short of being true. So the two conditions are consistent
in the case of (6a). In contrast, the situation is different with (6b). Let
us assume that condition (i) is observed. Thus, in compliance with
(i), if we subtract John from the set of smokers (a vacuous operation),
the set of smokers remains non-empty (that is, ∃x ∈ D : x , e & x
is a smoker). However, condition (ii) cannot be fulfilled, because the
requirement amounts to saying that by not removing the exception
the resulting sentence (namely, ∃x ∈ D : x is a smoker) would be false,
that is, it would be false that someone smokes. That would mean that
there is no person who smokes. But this cannot be the case for in
(i) we assumed that there is a smoker in D. By making the second
assumption corresponding to the condition (ii) of the semantics of
exceptives, we derive a contradiction. Consequently, the explanation
goes, because of the contradiction, (6b) is ungrammatical.
Chierchia (2013), building on several previous proposals, offers a
similar explanation for polarity sensitive items (PSIs). In his view,
PSIs (e.g. any) involve a domain of quantification at least as large as
the other quantificational items such as some, a(n), and bare plurals.
7. Polarity Sensitive Items (ibid., 39ff)
a) There are (some) cookies left.
b) *There are any cookies left.
The core of the explanation involves an alternative-based semantics
alongside an exhaustive operator O akin to only. In particular, Chier-
chia assumes that the assertion in (7b) implies that there is a set of
alternatives to the implicit restriction of the PSI any, and that those
alternatives which are not entailed by the implicit restriction of the
PSI should be removed by exhaustification via O. At the same time,
he posits that the focal alternatives of a PSI are subsets of the domain
associated with the PSI in question.20
These assumptions about the semantics of PSIs entail a contradic-
tion in certain cases such as the one in (7b). Importantly, such contexts
are not downward entailing, i.e., they do not license subset inferences,
e.g. inferences from Every student at UEA is talented to Every female stu-
dent at UEA is talented.21 The contradiction is due to the fact that (i)
the assertion of (7b) entails that there are cookies left in the relevant
domain. But, (ii) the focal alternatives of the PSI any are cookies in
subdomains of the domain associated with that PSI, and these alter-
natives are not entailed by the previous assertion. This is basically
because There are cookies left in the kitchen does not entail that There
20 As Chierchia (2013) points out, this is the only stipulation needed to explain a range
of phenomena involving polarity sensitive items.
21 The downward and upward entailing contexts will be further discussed in chapter
1; see appendix A for definitions.
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are cookies left in the oven (where, naturally, the things in the oven are
a subset of the things in the kitchen). As I have just observed, such
subset-inferences are not warranted. Once again, none of the (sub-
set) alternatives of the polarity item is entailed by the assertion, and
hence all the alternatives are removed by exhaustification via O. This
means that the negation of each alternative is implied. That is, ac-
cording to (ii), the cookies are not in the oven, in the cupboard, on
the kitchen table, or any other place in the kitchen. However, on the
previous assumption, (i), the cookies are nevertheless in the kitchen.
But the cookies cannot be in the kitchen if they are nowhere to be
found! In other words, the assertion (i) together with the latter claim
(ii) are contradictory. Chierchia maintains that the logical property
of contradictoriness plays an essential role in the deviance of (7b).
(He points out that this is a species of contradiction, which he calls
G-contradiction; see §2.3 and conclusions for discussion.)
I have reviewed two instances where logicality plays an important
role in linguistic explanation, and therefore seems to support the view
that grammar is sensitive to logical properties. It is easy to see that
the principles of economy governing binding and scope phenomena
have a similar logical flavour. According to the truth-conditional prin-
ciples of economy, a logical form (LF) is licensed only if it enters in the
appropriate logical relation with another alternative LF. In particular,
the LF should be logically distinct from, i.e., not logically equivalent
with, its alternative. Going back to our previous example (5a), A stu-
dent listens to every teacher, note that in order to be able to establish
that the inverse scope of this construction is distinct from the surface
scope, we have to establish that the logical equivalence LFS ≡ LFI
does not hold. (The surface and inverse scope readings are those that
entail, respectively, that there is a unique student who listens to every
teacher and that there may be several students who jointly listen to all
the teachers.) Crucially, it is part and parcel of the economy principle
that the non-functional (non-logical) lexical items in (5a) have no role
in establishing whether the surface form is distinct from the inverse
scope form. Only the relative position of the quantifiers in their re-
spective logical forms matters. On reflection, the same remarks hold
true of the binding case in (5b). As I shall demonstrate in chapter
5, there are several logical implementations of the binding economy
principles, and there are ways to show that the logicality presupposed
by these principles is genuine, and theoretically desirable.
Therefore, it seems that economy principles resemble numerous
other linguistic accounts in making substantial use of logical proper-
ties, and offer further support for the thesis that language is logical.22
The main difference between the logicality involved in the economy
22 Some further examples of logicality-based explanations of linguistic explanations are
given in Chierchia (2013), Gajewski (2002), and Kratzer (2012), and, more relevant to
our concerns (pertaining to economy-phenomena) in Fox (2000) and Reinhart (2006).
17
0.2 main themes
cases, on the one hand, and the case of but-exceptives and polarity
sensitive items, on the other hand, is that whilst in the latter case con-
tradictions play an explanatory role, in the former case, it is the notion
of logical entailment that plays the explanatory role. More precisely,
in the standard economy cases, it is essential for the grammaticality
of the relevant (inverse scope or coreference) readings that mutual en-
tailment between them and their competitors does not hold. However,
other hypotheses based on grammar’s sensitivity to logic are possi-
ble within the linguistic economy framework, broadly speaking. In
particular, as I shall argue in chapter 2, a more pragmatic alternative
to the standard linguistic economy accounts of scope makes use of
contradictions in order to characterise scopal saliency.
Two final remarks are in order. First, I have pointed out earlier that
principles of economy are local and defeasible, and I implied that
these are legitimate characteristics of linguistic principles. I would
now like to qualify this implication. It is worth keeping in mind that
both locality and defeasibility features admit degrees.
By drawing on several specific cases, I argue that principles that are
local and defeasible to a high degree cause a number of methodologi-
cal issues. Indeed, I show that extreme forms of locality and defeasi-
bility clash with methodological principles of generality and non-ad
hocness. For such extreme cases shrink the domain of applicability of
linguistic principles to such an extent that it becomes impossible to
say whether the principles are really there in the ‘linguistic world’ or
not. As such, they become virtually impossible to disconfirm. Fur-
thermore, if we make these principles so local and defeasible as to
confine their domain to a singular phenomenon (or type of data),
then a contrary theoretical reaction becomes more appealing. More
precisely, it becomes more appealing to seek for more general princi-
ples that recover the very same singular phenomenon as a particular
case. So there is an increasing cost associated with making use of a
principle or explanatory strategy whose empirical content gets more
and more narrow over time. Theorists have to strike the right balance.
The second remark concerns an exegetical matter, with potentially
important implications. I have stated that I shall press two method-
ological points (or desiderata)—namely, generality and pragmatism—
against several linguistic economy accounts, and I also suggested that
these points were among the rationales for linguistic economy. I now
want to make it clear that these two desiderata didn’t come packaged
together originally, and were proposed by different theorists. (I cited
Chomsky 1995 as a representative of the generality desideratum and
Reinhart 2006 for the pragmatic desideratum.) One may object that
these desiderata are not even compatible. So I would like to state it
explicitly—though the issue may prove to be controversial—that, in
my view, the two desiderata are both necessary, since they guard us
from making the wrong theoretical investments, so to speak. In par-
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ticular, they guard us from making the dubious explanatory moves
pointed out in the previous remark, since, as I shall propose, pragma-
tism is an antidote to ad hocness, and generality of empirical claims
is desirable in itself (as long as the goal of generality is attainable
and offers any insight at all). In addition, I also claim that the two
desiderata are not unrealistic, since if we pick our linguistic economy
accounts well, we can meet both desiderata.
0.3 outlook
To sum up, economy principles and phenomena give rise to impor-
tant linguistic problems pertaining either to the interface between syn-
tax and semantics, or, as I shall argue, to the interface between seman-
tics and pragmatics. In this thesis, I approach these problems from a
philosophical linguistic point of view, aiming at a high-level descrip-
tion of the relevant phenomena. I propose a set of hypotheses that
develop several basic linguistic economy assumptions, and shift away
from others. From an architectural point of view, my claim is that the
economy principles are best conceived as belonging at the seman-
tics/pragmatics interface. I also draw several important implications
of economy principles for the semantics of definite noun phrases, and,
in particular, for the semantics of complex demonstratives. Further, I
argue that the structural properties of economy phenomena are gen-
uinely logical. Economy principles are structural conditions that in-
teract with a great variety of linguistic phenomena. Moreover, in
putting forward these claims, I shall address several independently in-
teresting linguistic topics such as identity statements, de se pronouns,
comparative constructions, modals, definites, and quantifiers. These
will stand proof for the wide range of implications of economy-based
explanatory strategies.
The thesis is divided in three parts (each consisting of two chapters)
dealing with scope economy principles, binding economy principles,
and their consequences, respectively. Each chapter looks at linguistic
economy from a different perspective, alternating positive and nega-
tive proposals. The first two chapters address the topic of scope. In
chapter 1, I present a scope economy principle (what I shall call strong
economy) and show that it has to answer a number of fundamental
challenges. In chapter 2, I develop an account of scope that meets
part of these challenges. The following two chapters, which are con-
cerned with binding, repeat a similar pattern: in chapter 3 I discuss
the shortcomings of binding economy proposals, and in chapter 4 I
develop an account that remedies some of these shortcomings. In
the third part of the thesis, I draw important consequences for the hy-
pothesis that grammar is sensitive to logical properties, and for the
semantics of definites. Accordingly, chapter 5 addresses logicality,
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and chapter 6 complex demonstratives (and other definites). In con-
clusions, I outline the general view of scope and binding phenomena
that follows from the set of hypotheses put forward in the thesis.
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Part I
ECONOMY-BASED ACCOUNTS OF SCOPE
1 STRONG SCOPE ECONOMYPROBLEMS
In the first part of the thesis I shall outline two competing views of
scope which rely on economy considerations. The two views give
a central role to semantic entailment, but otherwise differ in both
their detailed theoretical underpinnings and more general architec-
tural consequences. I seek to establish the merits and limitations of
the economy-based views of scope, and demonstrate the advantages
of one of them—the controversy-based view. In chapter 1, I focus on
the strong economy view, examining its explanatory potential, but also
its shortcomings. The controversy-based view is then developed in
the second chapter in order to show that it meets the desiderata on
account of which the strong economy view falls short.
1.1 introduction: scope and economy
Ambiguity is pretty common in natural language but not universal.
For instance, the sentence Everyone loves some movie has interpreta-
tions that are missing from similar subject-verb-object constructions
such as Everyone loves Titanic. Translating the two constructions in
first (or a higher) order logic yields two semantically distinct inter-
pretations for the former, and only one interpretation for the latter.
The natural language operators resemble well enough their logical
counterparts, and therefore we can take scope to be a property of
linguistic constructions.
It is not the task of this thesis to argue directly that scope is a real
linguistic property; scope is certainly a central notion in linguistic
theory, and I shall investigate one important semantic aspect of this
notion. Scope is one of the sources of structural ambiguity in natural
language, and is thus a source of semantic flexibility. Hence, out of
the two sentences above, only the former is said to be scopally am-
biguous, because it allows for a flexible interpretation. For instance,
someone asserting that everyone loves some movie may say that there
is a unique movie that everyone loves. This reading corresponds to
the only reading allowed by the second sentence (to the effect that
everyone loves Titanic). But the former sentence can be used to say
something that has no correspondent in the interpretation of the latter
sentence, namely, it can say that everyone loves a different movie.
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I am interested in how linguistic economy affects scope, and for
this purpose I shall assume a somewhat restricted interpretation of
economy. On this view, an economical language would allow flexibil-
ity at the level of form just in case such flexibility determines effects
on meaning (to accompany the effects on form). I shall study scope
as a way to understand the potential economy of language. The sco-
pal phenomena—along binding, which is discussed in chapters 3 and
4—have been the basis of some of the most convincing arguments for
linguistic economy. So if scopal flexibility is wide-spread in natural
language, can the same be said about linguistic economy in scopal
phenomena? How pervasive is linguistic economy in scopal phenom-
ena? To anticipate, my answer in this chapter will be that if we define
linguistic economy in a certain way, the economy of scope appears
to be very much restricted. Indeed, the economy of scope (on the
‘interface’ conception) will appear to be so restricted as to make us
wonder if the notion of economy can be applied at all to regulate
scopal flexibility in natural language.
However, even if I resist the notion of interface economy, I find the
idea of economy itself worth pursuing, especially in conjunction with
recent empirical hypotheses. In the recent literature, there has been
a growing interest in the notion of semantic strength and the related
notion of entailment, especially in connection to scalar implicatures
(see e.g. Chierchia 2004; Horn 2001, 2004; Levinson 2000; Sauerland
2004). At the same time, various notions of semantic strength have
also been invoked by a number of theorists as key to understanding
scopal relations, and, more precisely, as an alternative to conceiving
scope as being bound strictly to the special properties of the various
scope-taking operators (Fox 2000; Mayr and Spector 2010; Reinhart
2006).
In other words, these theorists proposed to look for a structural
account of scope rather than a (construction-based) account of scope
which depends on idiosyncratic properties of each scope-taking oper-
ator. The latter (construction-based) approach would require a sepa-
rate account for each functional item such as not, few, every, some, etc..
While such functional items do have some distinctive scopal proper-
ties, these functional terms also share some properties. It is in virtue
of these properties that more general, structural accounts of scope are
possible.1 In this chapter and the next, I shall bring together the two
theoretical strands just introduced, and discuss linguistic economy ac-
counts that relate more intimately the notions of scope and semantic
strength.
1 See e.g. Fox (2000), Mayr and Spector (2010), and Reinhart (1983a, 2006) for struc-
tural accounts of scope.
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Scope and economy
Our first step in developing a strength-based (semantic) account of
scope is to analyse what I call the strong economy principle, and its pro-
ponents, Mayr and Spector (2010), call the Generalised Scope Economy
Condition (GSEC). A way to think about the strong economy princi-
ple governing scope is that GSEC seeks to justify bringing into the
grammar principles that were traditionally considered part of prag-
matics.2 Grice (1967/1989), in his pragmatic account, proposed a
maxim of conversation that dealt with the informativeness of an utter-
ance along the lines of the dictum: “do not say more than is required”.
GSEC can be viewed as building that principle into the grammar—-
more specifically, at the interface between syntax and semantics—by
preventing the application of covert operations when they result in
strengthening the meaning of a sentence. The strong economy princi-
ple is in effect a stronger restriction on the generative mechanism than
its predecessor, Scope Economy (SE), since it can disallow more sco-
pal structures than SE (see Fox 2000).3 In what follows, I present the
strong economy principle and its advantages (§1.1), and raise some
empirical and conceptual difficulties facing this principle (§1.2). I con-
clude by proposing a better generalisation that can account for why
stronger scopes may sometimes be disallowed. The appendices dis-
cuss the notion of monotonicity needed to evaluate the principle of
strong economy (appendix A) and further counterexamples to strong
economy (appendix B).
The more immediate aims are first, to demonstrate that there are
important obstacles and limitations to a strength-based principle of
economy and, second, to establish a baseline, deflationary account of
the data that seem favourable to the strong economy principle. One
moral of the chapter is that it is difficult to achieve a general account
of scope. The breath of data discussed here is meant to highlight the
difficulty of understanding scope as a unitary phenomenon, on the
basis of a general structural (e.g. entailment-based) constraints on
scopal readings. Against this background, I shall advance in the next
chapter a hypothesis that articulates a more general and, at the same
time, plausible descriptive constraint on scope.
In evaluating linguistic economy accounts, I endorse several desider-
ata that were originally proposed as rationales for economy princi-
ples (see the introduction), but have also some independent legiti-
2 See Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2008) for a similar grammatical view on scalar
implicatures, one that moreover assumes that the computation is local; locality is
not part of GSEC assumptions, but grammaticality is.
3 GSEC constitutes in a sense a simplification relative to the economy principle, the
basic insights of which it inherits. Whilst the scope economy principle (SE) involved
checking for any two forms LFi and LFs related by movement or other covert oper-
ation whether LFi ↔ LFs, GSEC involves only checking whether LFi → LFs. If the
latter condition holds, no matter what the status of LFs → LFi is, the LFi is disal-
lowed, thence ungrammatical. Computationally, this is not a significant difference.
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macy. Such linguistic accounts should be based on general principles,
and avoid making assumptions that confine their empirical content
to a narrow type of linguistic constructions. Relatedly, they should
be simple in the sense of shunning unnecessary assumptions and ad
hocery. Finally, the economy-based accounts should rely on semantic
assumptions that have a plausible pragmatic rationale. To be sure,
since these criteria are matters of degree, arguments based on them
cannot do more than assess the varying costs that certain accounts
incur.
Strong economy
Mayr and Spector (2010, p. 1) advance a principle of economy that
they call Generalised Scope Economy Condition (GSEC). The GSEC can
be stated as follows:
gsec A covert scope shifting operation is blocked if the resulting
reading is equivalent to or stronger than (i.e., asymmetrically en-
tails) the reading obtained without its application.
GSEC is a strong economy principle, and henceforth I shall some-
times refer to it as ‘strong economy’. As the name of the principle
suggests, this is a generalisation of another principle of economy,
Scope Economy (SE) advanced by Fox (2000). (SE required that truth-
conditionally inert sentences, i.e., sentences whose scopal readings
are equivalent, should have unique, ‘surface scope’, logical forms.)
The generalisation underlying strong economy consists in the addi-
tion of the disjunct emphasised in the statement of GSEC above. Ac-
cordingly, not only does this principle rule out uninformative scopes
(as SE did before), but also strong scopes. The strength of a scopal
reading is given in terms of entailment, under the standard interpre-
tation of this notion. A form A entails another form B if and only
if it cannot be the case that A is true and B is false. Equivalently, a
form A entails another form B just in case the truth of B automatically
follows the truth of A.4
To support the GSEC, Mayr and Spector (2010, pp. 2–4) present the
examples below (the judgments on the right-hand side are theirs as
well). As for most of the examples in the present chapter, I use the
following annotations and notational conventions: the possible (or
relevant) scopal readings of the examples, as well as their degree of
acceptability, are represented on the right-hand side of the examples.5
4 The particular form of entailment that we shall end up with naturally depends on
how we carve out the logical space in the (semantic) metalanguage, i.e., on what we
take to be the possibilities we are describing and the set-theoretical relations between
them.
5 As usual, *, ??, ? represent degrees of acceptability from the less acceptable (or more
deviant) to the more acceptable (or less deviant). Where no such sign is present, the
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8. a) Every student of mine didn’t show up on time.
(¬ > ∀), (∀ > ¬)
b) John didn’t meet every student of mine on time.
(¬ > ∀), *(∀ > ¬)
9. A/one student of mine didn’t show up on time.
??(¬ > ∃), (∃ > ¬)
10. a) Many windows are always open in this building.
(many > ∀), (∀ > many )
b) Few windows are always open in this building.
(few > ∀), *(∀ > few )
11. a) More than three students are certain to pass.
(more > ∀), (∀ > more )
b) Fewer than three students are certain to pass.
(fewer > ∀), *(∀ > fewer )
12. a) A boy heard every girl sing. (∃ > ∀), (∀ > ∃)
b) Few boys heard every girl sing. (few > ∀), *(∀ > few)
As the right-hand side representations suggest, some of the above
examples are to be interpreted as having an important restriction on
their scopal flexibility. Meanwhile, the other examples are not so
restricted. For instance, on the GSEC view, in the first sentence in
(8), the negation can freely cross the universal quantifier every stu-
dent, since in doing so the resulting (inverse scope) form will not be
stronger, but weaker than the surface scope interpretation. That this is
so should be clear from inspecting the intuitive truth conditions of the
sentence. Under the surface scope reading (∀ > ¬), the sentence (8a)
says that no student of mine showed up on time. Under the inverse
scope reading (¬ > ∀), the same sentence says that not all students
showed up on time. The surface scope reading entails the inverse
scope reading, since if no student showed up it automatically follows
that not all students showed up—the latter is weaker than the former,
or, alternatively, the former is stronger than the latter. Since GSEC
requires that only the stronger inverse scopal readings be disallowed,
but allows weaker inverse scopal readings, the inverse scope of (8a)
(which is, as we have seen, the weaker scopal reading) is predicted to
be acceptable. This seems indeed to be the case. In contrast, on the
assumptions of the strong economy theorists, in the second sentence
in (8), the negation can no longer cross the universal to produce the
inverse scope reading—hence, the *(∀ > ¬) judgement—since such an
inverse scope reading is stronger. (The inverse scope reading of (8b)
corresponding reading is perfectly acceptable. The quantifier-symbol ∀ represents
the quantificational phrases all, every, and each, but also quantificational adverbs and
adjectives such as always and certain.
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amounts to saying that John didn’t meet any student of mine, which
is clearly stronger than saying that John didn’t meet every student.)
Therefore, the inverse scope reading is disallowed by GSEC, and, on
the strong-economy account, an unacceptability judgement ensues.
To take another example, consider (12) where the first sentence is
(intuitively) scopally ambiguous, whilst the second is not. On the
GSEC view, this is because the inverse scope interpretation of the
first sentence is not stronger than its surface scope. If a unique boy,
say, John, heard every girl (surface scope reading), it automatically
follows that every girl was heard by a boy (inverse scope reading).
That is, the surface scope reading of the first sentence is stronger than
its inverse scope reading, and the inverse scope reading is indeed
available (as strong economy requires). In contrast, the inverse scope
reading of the second sentence in (12) is stronger, and GSEC must
rule it out. So, if every girl was heard by few boys, say, by three
boys (inverse scope), a fortiori there are few boys—in particular, less
than three, if any—that heard all the girls (surface scope). But the
converse does not hold. If few boys heard every girl, this does not
imply that each girl was heard by few boys; she may be heard by
many or almost all the boys. (These boys—be they many or almost
all of the boys in the relevant domain—are not the same for every
girl.) Therefore, inverse scope is disallowed by GSEC, because it is
too strong.
The moral to be drawn from examining these constructions is that
downward entailing operators (e.g. negation, few, fewer than, less than)
cannot take inverse scope under universal quantifiers, but can freely
take inverse scope over universal quantifiers. (See appendix A for
an explication of downward entailing environments.) GSEC makes
these predictions because narrow scopings of downward entailing
operators produce semantically stronger logical forms, that is, logical
forms that asymmetrically entail the constructions from which they
are obtained by the application of a covert operation—quantifier rais-
ing (QR), quantifier lowering (QL), or reconstruction.6
I shall provisionally assume that these judgements of acceptability
are on the right track. However, the fact that these judgements are
nuanced should bear emphasis. To begin with, the starred (*) sco-
pal interpretations are marginally acceptable, at least under readings
with marked intonation; cases in point are (8b), (9), (10b), (11b), and
6 There are further example in the literature that seem to point us in the same direc-
tion, thus supporting the strong economy generalisation. Miyagawa (2011) (follow-
ing K. Johnson 2000) notes that negation blocks reconstruction of indefinites. For
instance, according to the judgements of these theorists, Some student or other hasn’t
answered many of the questions on the exam cannot be interpreted with negation scop-
ing over the indefinite phrase some student or other. The findings of Beghelli and
Stowell (1997) mostly corroborate GSEC. They remark that (i) QPs can take scope
above negation, unless they are indefinites or bare numerals (e.g. The students didn’t
read some books), and (ii) QPs always take scope above negation in the absence of
marked intonation (e.g. Some students didn’t read this book).
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(12b). Moreover, the corresponding inverse scope readings of the con-
structions with upward entailing operators are also marginal, or at
least less salient than the surface readings. See e.g. (8a), (10a). These
observations will become important in the following discussion, and
especially in the next chapter.
1.2 motivation for an alternative
In this section I raise several important challenges for the strong econ-
omy principle. I begin by discussing an assumption about certain
downward entailing determiners implicitly assumed in order to ar-
gue for GSEC. I show that the assumption is problematic. I then turn
to several more straightforward empirical problems facing the strong
economy hypothesis. These problems will provide motivation for an
alternative account.
1.2.1 Non-emptiness implications
Let me introduce a potentially problematic phenomenon that arises
from the downward monotonicity property together with further rea-
sonable assumptions about quantifiers.
1.2.1.1 My objections
Here is the problem, in brief. In order to argue that few takes scope
over a universal quantifier, as in (10)-(12), we need to assume that
empty sets count as having few elements, or, equivalently, that 0
(zero) counts as few. But many quantifiers, including, arguably, the
few-quantificational phrases, come with a non-emptiness—or, roughly
speaking, an existence—assumption.7 To take a simple example, imag-
ine that in talking about a blank page I say that few black spots are on
the page. My utterance would be clearly out of place on this occasion,
as I could have easily been more precise. This infelicity suggests that
few implies—implicates or presupposes—existence. Let us assume, to
a first approximation, that this implication is a presupposition in the
sense that a sentence cannot have a truth-value unless its presupposi-
tion is true. If this presupposition is at work, we have no warrant that
under inverse scope certain downward entailing quantifiers, such as
few-quantifiers, will denote anything at all. The inverse scope read-
ings will lead to presupposition failure (since there is no basis, in
general, for assuming non-emptiness of the relevant domain), and
the GSEC mechanism would not predict the desired result, contrary
to the claim made in the analysis of the examples in (8)-(12) to the
7 Hackl (2000, p. 157) also acknowledges (in passing) the existence implication of
fewer than determiners.
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effect that downward entailing operators can freely take scope over
universal quantifiers. This problem, albeit not insurmountable, will
motivate a more elegant and simple alternative framework for think-
ing about scope. At the same time, this problem raises important
issues about the potential interaction of the strong principle of econ-
omy with other grammatical principles.
In this discussion, I shall often talk about domains—the domains of
quantifying determiners. By domain here I mean the restrictor of the
determiner, or, more precisely, the intersection of the set expressed by
the restrictor and the set expressed by the nuclear scope (e.g. pred-
icate in the the object position).8 I understand the domain in this
more restrictive sense rather than the broad sense in which it covers
the whole domain of discourse. For instance, in the sentence Most stu-
dents left the campus, the domain of the quantifying determiner most
is the intersection of the set denoted by its restrictor students, viz. the
set of students (or perhaps the set of students at UEA, if we allow for
covert restrictors) and the set denoted by its nuclear scope left the cam-
pus, viz. the set of people that left the campus. The intersection forms
the set of students who left the campus. And this set is the domain
in our sense, rather than the whole universe of discourse, say the set
of people. The entire sentence will then say that a big proportion of
the students (say, more than half of them) are students who left the
campus.
As suggested, one of the main empirical arguments in favour of
GSEC proceeds from constructions containing downward entailing
operators (e.g. few) in object position. For instance, if every boy
saw few girls (say 3), then, the argument runs, a fortiori there are
few girls (6 3) that every single boy saw. This means that when
a downward entailing operator, e.g. the quantifier phrase few girls,
initially in object position at surface structure, takes wide scope at LF,
the ensuing proposition is weaker, since it is entailed by the surface
scope. But this reasoning entails that the domain of few can be empty.
Indeed, I take Mayr and Spector (2010, p. 4) to be implicitly rely-
ing on the emptiness assumption. Consider one of their examples,
namely the scopal construction of It’s always the case that few windows
are open, with the universal quantifier taking precedence over the few-
quantifier at surface scope. Mayr and Spector’s thought is that if for
each moment of time there is a low number k of windows open at
that time, then the number k ′ of windows permanently open (i.e.,
the number k ′ such that it is true that the same set of k ′ windows are
open at each single point in time) is going to be even lower than k (i.e.,
k ′ 6 k). This takes for granted that it is realistic to set the numeric
values k = 3 and k ′ = 0 in order to interpret the two scopal read-
ings. (After all, these numerical values satisfy the condition k ′ 6 k.)
8 In fact, for our purposes it will do as well to take the domain to be the restrictor of
the determiner.
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Of course, when k ′ is 0 the domain of few is empty. Let us call the
assumption that empty domains are generally allowed emptiness and
the assumption that they are not generally allowed non-emptiness.
I pointed out that the emptiness assumption is at odds with the
intuitive judgements about few and similar downward entailing oper-
ators. An example that illustrates the presupposition failure problem
due to the non-emptiness assumption is the following.9
13. Every class will send few pupils to the olympiad.
a) Each class will send few pupils to the olympiad. (∀ > few)
b) Few pupils in each class will be sent to the olympiad.
(few > ∀)
Now, the surface scope is as in (13a). The inverse scope is then
as in (13b). But is the inverse scope accessible? What is certain is
that GSEC needs the inverse scope to be accessible on pain of fail-
ing to compute the entailment relation, which (on the assumption
of the strong economists) will ultimately allow the inverse scope of
(13). However, reasonable assumptions about the set of pupils and
the classes in question make the existence of a set of pupils that be-
long to every class doubtful. The existence of the relevant non-empty
set of pupils is not warranted, and therefore the inverse scope read-
ing is pragmatically implausible. It is this very reading that the strong
economy predicts to be available all the while. It is worth stressing
that we have focused here on distributive readings, and disregarded
the collective readings, which are indeed more plausible. Neverthe-
less, it is sufficient for our purposes to show that, albeit they are bona
fide scopal structures, the distributive readings do not comply with
strong economy.10
For comparative purposes, consider how upward entailing opera-
tors, e.g. some, a etc., fare in inverse scope readings. In sentences
such as In every class there is a math geek (∀ > ∃), it is clear that the
inverse scope is not entailed by the surface scope interpretation.11 In
contrast, the situation is different with doubly quantified sentences
of the form (∃ > ∀), such as Some student attended every meeting. Al-
though this case involves the upward entailing operator some (rather
9 I focus here on the so called distributive readings of the quantifiers, rather than
on their collective readings. The distributive reading of e.g. three students from every
class should be interpreted as ‘distributing’ three students to each of the classes. This
means that the three students should belong to each single class (they belong to class
1, class 2, and class 3), rather than to one of the classes (e.g. student 1 belongs to
class 1, student 2 belongs to class 2 etc.) and collectively to all of the three classes.
10 In fact, we shall also show that the collective readings of downward entailing oper-
ators do not generally comply with strong economy either—see the analysis of (34)
and (35) below.
11 This so because quite generally under the distributive readings of quantifiers, the ∃∀
scopal reading is strictly stronger than ∀∃.
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than the downward entailing operator few), it is analogous to the dou-
bly quantified sentences of the form (∀ > few), since, on the strong
economy view, both are supposed to entail their inverse scope. But
whilst in the (∃ > ∀) case, the non-emptiness condition is necessarily
preserved (entailed) in passing from surface scope to inverse scope,
this is not the case with the (∀ > few) constructions. As I have pointed
out in discussing (13), this existence-preserving entailment does not
generally hold for the case of few in object position.
To clarify, I am not objecting to the availability of inverse scope
downward entailing operators in general, but only to the claim that
the inverse scope is entailed by the surface scope. Inverse scope may
well be available. The question I am asking—and contend it is to be
answered in the negative—is whether the availability of inverse scope
is regulated by strong economy, and, more specifically, by asymmetric
entailment. If the above entailment does not hold, strong economy
fails to predict the availability of the inverse scope reading, contrary
to the strong economists’ contention.
One line of response to the above predicament is to claim that quan-
tifiers (including few-quantifiers) can have empty domains, which
makes the inverse scope reading of (13) acceptable. But if we were to
make the assumption that empty domains are available, we get fur-
ther predicaments from considering examples with universals quan-
tifiers.
14. a) Every pupil has few pencils. (∀ > few)
b) Few tunes can be heard in every room. (few > ∀)
Suppose that, in (14a), we let the restrictor (or its intersection with
the nuclear scope) of every be empty. Note that on assumptions in line
with strong economy, we need to accommodate an empty domain
only at a level where the ‘economy’ properties of logical forms are
computed, that is, a level that precedes the semantic/pragmatic level.
If we let the domain be empty, it then follows, by reasonable logical
assumptions, that the statement (14a) is trivially true. After all, there
is no situation that can falsify the statement. No pupil is such that it
has less (or more) than few pencils. (In fact, it doesn’t really matter
what quantifier is in object position; “some pencils” or “three pencils”
would equally do, as long as we assume that the subject position
quantifiers admit empty domains.)
Moreover, under the same assumption—that we somehow accom-
modate empty domains—a similar reasoning will make the inverse
scope of (14b) trivially true. If there are no rooms (i.e., objects in the
domain) to falsify (14b), rooms in which more (or less) than few tunes
are played, then the inverse scope would always come out true. These
are the unwelcome consequences of admitting empty domains.
Not only are these consequences unintuitive with regard to the
readings of the above constructions, but they threaten any account
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based on semantic strength, including the GSEC one. On the strong
economy view, for instance, since the surface scope of constructions
with universals in subject position admits of a trivially true reading,
the inverse scope readings generated by these constructions will be
trivially true as well and GSEC should allow them contrary to the
very predictions of the strong economy theorists presented in (8b),
(10b), (11b), and (12b). Clearly, there should be a constraint on which
quantifiers are allowed to have empty-domain readings. Hence, an
urgent question for the strong economy theorists is why should the
determiner few be singled out in this way, and, more specifically, why
is it the only one which admits empty domains (putting aside no, for
the moment).
In fairness to Mayr and Spector (2010), they do postulate (p.4) that
the restrictors of universal quantifiers should be non-empty. How-
ever, they implicitly assume that few-quantifiers can have empty do-
mains. But, in neutral contexts, both universal and few-quantifiers
seem to presuppose non-emptiness, so there doesn’t seem to be any
basis for discriminating between the two types of quantifiers. More-
over, if the strong economy advocates stipulate non-emptiness for few-
quantifiers, this gives unintuitive results for these quantifiers when
they scope over universals under the inverse scope interpretation. In
such cases, as argued at the beginning of the section, it doesn’t seem
that non-emptiness can be assumed.
Moreover, assuming non-emptiness for universals and emptiness
for few-quantifiers cannot in general be the case, and positing a rift
between the two types of quantifiers is not theoretically appealing.
Consider the sentence, and its two (distributive) scopal interpreta-
tions.
15. Few students have sold all their belongings.
a) A group of students (of low cardinality) sold all their be-
longings. (F > ∀)
b) Each belonging is such that (a possible different) group of
students (of low cardinality) sold it. (∀ > F)
Let us focus on the surface scope reading, (15a). Note that the re-
strictor of the universal quantifier in object position depends (as to
its semantic value) on the few-quantifier, since the pronoun their in
the former is bound by the latter. It then follows that if the domain
of the few-quantifier is empty, the domain of the universal should be
empty as well. This is so because if there are no students satisfy-
ing the relevant property (viz. the property of people who have sold
their belongings), naturally, there are no belongings to speak of, and
thus the domain (qua restrictor) of the few-quantifier in the object po-
sition is empty as well. (We thus eliminate impossible worlds where
there are zero students, but these students possess nevertheless a non-
empty set of belongings.) We can thus see that positing emptiness for
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few-quantifiers and non-emptiness for universal quantifiers will not
do in this setting, and so is not an option in general. It seems more
natural to assume that, in general, both types of quantifiers imply
non-emptiness as a default, falling back on emptiness only when the
contextual information requires it.12
I tentatively conclude that the emptiness assumption is incorrect.
Then, the inverse scope few determines (something akin to) a presup-
position failure in neutral contexts, and thus the inverse scope cannot
simply be entailed by the surface scope. The strong economy advo-
cates need somehow to accommodate the non-emptiness assumption,
or, otherwise, argue for the emptiness assumption.
1.2.1.2 Potential replies
Let us evaluate more systematically the options available to the strong
economy theorists. The GSEC theorists can defend the thesis by mak-
ing one of the following moves.
16. reject non-emptiness for at least some downward entailing op-
erators.
17. assume non-emptiness, but at a level that does not interfere
with GSEC;
The reply (16), which rejects the non-emptiness presupposition (or
implication), might appeal to examples of downward entailing oper-
ators whose restrictors are empty sets. The most obvious example
is the negation operator, in one of its forms. Thus, for example, the
semantic value of no student can be built on the basis of an empty
domain (i.e., the intersection of the semantic value of its restrictor
student and its nuclear scope, e.g. is bald), thereby making the corre-
sponding utterance—for instance the utterance of No student is bald—
true. Now, it might be claimed that the other downward entailing
operators we have been considering are similar to negation in that
they are compatible with empty domains. But the negative quanti-
fying determiner always requires empty domains, whilst this is not
the case with other downward entailing operators. It is not clear
that quantificational phrases consisting of other negative determiners
such as few and less than three (which express downward entailing
operators) can always accommodate empty domains. For instance,
it does make sense to say things such as few if any, less than three
but non-zero, which suggests that there is a contrast to be drawn be-
tween the interpretation of these downward entailing operators (few,
12 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that there is no contrast in the intuitive
existence presuppositions of utterances consisting of all students and few students.
(See also the discussion below.) Furthermore, there is also perfect symmetry between
(15) and constructions that have the universal in the subject position and the few-
quantifier in the object position, e.g. Every male student sold few things that belonged to
him.
33
1.2 motivation for an alternative
less than three) and expressions indicating emptiness or null extension
(if any, zero). Of course, this does not hold for all the cases involving
downward entailing operators: less than 1 may very well imply zero in
contexts where rational number evaluations are excluded.13 However,
this is the exception rather than the rule, and in neutral contexts non-
emptiness implications seem to go through. Otherwise put, there is
a (cancellable) non-emptiness implication triggered by few, less than,
and other similar downward entailing quantificational determiners.
Another option is to say that few indeed requires a non-empty do-
main, but only after the application of the strong economy princi-
ple. This is the strategy of response (17), according to which the
strong economy computation is modular. This view can cast the non-
emptiness implication of few (and other downward entailing deter-
miners such as less) as scalar implicatures. On this view, these down-
ward entailing operators do not rule out the emptiness reading on
semantic grounds, but rather on pragmatic grounds. For instance,
if few were a scale-mate of the stronger operator no, a use of the
former would implicate that the latter shouldn’t be used. In other
words, few would implicate non-emptiness. As long as we assume
that the implicature mechanism and the economy principle regulat-
ing scope are independent, the predictions of strong economy should
go through. However, this strategy is not completely satisfactory, as
there are cases where scope does interact with implications (in par-
ticular, with presuppositions). For instance, Heim (2000) makes use
of presuppositions in order to knock out some scopal possibilities. In
other words, she uses the interactions between scope and presupposi-
tions. This suggests that presuppositions do interact with scope, and
thus we need an explanation as to why the interaction doesn’t occur
with the strong economy principle.
Moreover, once we allow for implicatures, it is not clear that the
inverse scope reading exists as an independent syntactic scopal struc-
ture prior to the computation of scalar implicatures rather than as an
13 The context sensitivity of few is a broader phenomenon. It’s interesting to note that
few functions awkwardly as a left downward entailing determiner, whilst, as a right
downward entailing determiner, it is much less problematic.
18. The inference fails more easily because the interpretation of few depends on
the linguistic contexts provided by its restrictors.
a) Few [UEA students]B are [philosophers]C.
b) Few [UEA students in room 01.07]A are [philosophers]C.
19. The inference seems acceptable, since the interpretation of few can no longer
be sensitive to the determiner’s restrictors, which are identical in the two
cases.
a) Few [philosophers]C are [students]B.
b) Few [philosophers]C are [UEA students]A.
To my ear, there still is a marginal interpretation in which few varies with linguistic
context provided by the expressions in the VPs of the constructions above. This
interpretation is not very salient though.
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interpretation that results from cancelling the non-emptiness scalar
implicature when the context requires it. It is simply unclear whether
the inverse scope few is really available. The argument in favour of
GSEC rehearsed above, by its very phrasing, just invites us to accom-
modate contextually the assumption that there might not be objects
in the domain of few. It amounts to saying something like the fol-
lowing: “but of course if there are few students in each classroom
that go to the olympiad, this entails that there will be even fewer
students—zero, at the limit—that are from all the classes and go to
the olympiad”. Once we make this assumption, we naturally get an
entailment that simulates the inverse scope. But the purported avail-
ability of the inverse scope seems to be a by-product of the contextual
setting, rather than a bona fide syntactically encoded scopal possibility.
Note also that there is a cost to assuming that there is a mismatch
between our clear intuitions about the scope and implications of the
determiner few and its assumed ‘modular’ characteristics. All things
being equal, such a mismatch just means a more cluttered grammar
of scope. But (17) is based on the assumption that there is such a
mismatch between the modular entailment available to the economy-
computation of structures containing downward entailing operators
of the few variety (that satisfy emptiness), and the entailment of the
few-operators that seem to be more generally accessible (and seem to
satisfy non-emptiness).
A related escape route for the strong economy theorist amounts
to saying that even if downward entailing operators such as fewer
than three come with a non-emptiness implication, the opposite im-
plication can be accommodated by the audience. This response is
attractive since it seems to fit the better understood case of doubly
quantified sentences with an upward entailing operator such as some
or a(n). Thus, when evaluating an utterance of Every tutor is impressed
by a student, the hearer may take for granted that the set of students
who impressed every tutor is non-empty, and this is presumably what
a principle of economy needs in order to allow the inverse scope of
the above sentence. But if we let accommodation enter the definition
of entailment that GSEC appeals to, this would trivialise the princi-
ple, since many other assumptions could then be accommodated. For
instance, we could accommodate the inverse scope of (∀ > ∃) which
is one of the (stronger) scopal possibilities that GSEC wants to rule
out. If one endorses the accommodation option, one needs to say why
some other quantificational phrases do not trigger accommodation.14
I conclude that the problems discussed above seem to have crip-
pling consequences for the strong economy account, since an impor-
tant part of its data set is based on sentences containing the deter-
14 Another issue is that accommodation should be properly argued for, and, a mech-
anism for triggering it should be spelled out. It is not clear that the sort of local
accommodation targeting the restrictor of the quantificational determiner really ex-
ists (cf. von Fintel 2004).
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miner few and other similar downward entailing operators in object
position.
1.2.2 Problematic predictions
For the purpose of systematically assessing GSEC, I shall settle on a
number of key guidelines. There are at least four types of claims that
can serve as counter-evidence to the strong economy principle. (One
may skip this classification on the first reading, as the counterexam-
ples are understandable on their own.)
• Downward entailing operators appear in two positions, as sub-
jects and objects, respectively. Each such position can project
stronger meanings, namely, when (a) a subject downward oper-
ator crosses a universal QP, and (b) when an object downward
operator crosses negation. Type 1 evidence
The type 1 evidence would amount to showing (a) that in the
first sentence negation can take scope under the quantifier phrase
each single point, and (b) that in the second sentence the down-
ward entailing few-quantifiers can take scope above negation.
18. a) John didn’t grant each single point that Mary did.
b) John didn’t invite few/fewer than three colleagues.
• Upward entailing operators can give birth to stronger mean-
ings too. Likewise, there are two positions in which upward
entailing operators can appear and generate a stronger mean-
ing under the inverse scope reading. Stronger meanings are
generated (a) when the subject upward operator crosses nega-
tive operators, and (b) when the object upward operator crosses
universal QPs. Type 2 evidence
Consider the following potential type 2 evidence.
19. a) All the boys didn’t leave.
b) Everyone loves someone.
If we can show that there are inverse scope readings for the
above sentences, we thereby show that stronger inverse scope
readings are possible.
• Operators that have none of the monotonicity properties above
can generate stronger (or weaker) meanings too, so they are
equally relevant to testing strong economy. When a non-monotonic
object operator crosses a universal quantifier, a stronger reading
ensues. Type 3 evidence
As is well known, quantifiers such as an odd number of cards and
exactly three cards are non-monotonic. Here is then a potential
type 3 counterexample to strong economy.
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20. Everyone saw exactly three cards.
If we can find a reading on which the same set of (exactly) three
cards was such that everybody saw these cards, it follows that
a stronger inverse scope reading of (20) is possible.
• Indirect evidence against GSEC can be obtained if the inverse
scope reading with downward entailing operators is awkward
even in the absence of strengthened meanings, or when the
strength or weakness of the generated scopal meaning doesn’t
appear to have anything to do with (i.e., doesn’t covary with)
the availability of scope. Type 4 evidence
I shall consider evidence of the following kind.
21. a) I thought your cookies were (/were not) fewer than
they were.
b) Every girl read fewer than three books.
Assuming that comparative constructions involve scope-taking
operators, we need to show (a) that the negation operator in the
first sentence does not have any effect on the scopal possibilities
of the sentence, and (b) that there is a potential inverse scope
reading of the second sentence which is weaker but nevertheless
unavailable.
By following these guidelines, I shall show that the GSEC has a
number of prima facie counterexamples of types 1–4.15 As we shall
see, there are several heterogeneous sets of data within each type
of example. Importantly, some counterexamples are stronger than
others; some of them are direct counterexamples and some others
pose only indirect problems for the strong economy account. Nev-
ertheless, these pieces of evidence jointly show the limitations of the
strong economy hypothesis.16
1.2.2.1 Economy problems
Since strong economy is based on Scope Economy (SE), it is worth
checking whether the strong economy inherits the problems of SE.
15 Mayr and Spector (2010) look at several examples of type 1a and 2a-b, but they
disregard data of type 1b, 3, and 4. However, I shall argue that these provide a
genuine testing ground for strong economy, and, in fact, disconfirm it.
16 As will become clear, there are many potentially relevant data, and in the interest
of keeping the chapter within a reasonable length, I shall discuss in detail only the
strongest and the most theoretically interesting ones. Some of the counterexamples
will be discussed only very briefly (e.g. counterexamples of type 2b) or not at all
(e.g. counterexamples of type 3 seem to me to be both self-evident and sufficiently
similar to the type 2b counterexamples to be passed over), and yet others will be left
for discussion in appendix A. Moreover, in appendix E I present an experiment that
supports—contra GSEC—the scopal flexibility of the constructions (8b) and (10b).
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The argument for (SE) was based on assuming the principle of par-
allelism. But this principle, as D. E. Johnson and Lappin (1999) note,
seems to fail in the following examples:
18. Data from D. E. Johnson and Lappin (ibid., pp. 43-44)
a) At least one Labour MP attended every committee meeting,
and Bill did too.
b) At least two cabinet members bear responsibility for each
government department, and Tony Blair does too.
c) At least one natural number other than one divides into
every prime number, and one does too.
It seems the inverse scope reading of the non-elliptical (first) clauses
are possible, despite the argument put forward by Fox (2000). These
data call into question, along with Parallelism, the principle of scope
economy itself. It may very well be that Parallelism works well, but
that the principle of economy fails altogether in such contexts.17 A
proper defence of the SE principle and, indirectly, of the strong econ-
omy principle needs to accommodate the problematic data above. I
assume for the moment that Parallelism fails for some (perhaps prag-
matic) reason in such cases, but that the economy principles are on
the right track. I note that the scopal possibilities in the first sentences
(in each of the pairs) are partially compatible with strong economy,
since their inverse scope readings are not stronger than the surface
scope readings. However, this is not always the case.
An economy-related (type 2b) problem of GSEC is that it doesn’t
account for the good predictions of the standard Scope Economy.18
Thus, on a reasoning based on the original scope economy account,
the construction (19)
19. Every tutor admires some student, and Mary does too.
(∃ > ∀), ??(∀ > ∃)
fixes the scopal structure of the otherwise ambiguous first clause
Every tutor admires some student by imposing upon it the parallel sco-
17 Perhaps such a conclusion is too hasty. One may hold that it is due to the failure of
Parallelism that these examples are not predicted by the two principles, Parallelism
and Scope Economy, taken together. I don’t know of any argument to this effect, and
until one is provided, it would be fair to say that Scope Economy is problematic. (But
I shall not defend the claim that the SE hypothesis is wrong, since there are some
data supporting it. Short of claiming without argument that the data in question are
noisy, we better not rule out SE for the moment.)
18 Strictly speaking, this is not a prediction that Fox (2000) makes explicitly, but it is in
the spirit of his account. See Fox (ibid., 109ff.) where, in dealing with the principle
of binding economy, Parallelism is formulated in terms of the notions of same de-
pendency relation or, importantly, in terms of the notion of identical reference (truth-
conditional content). Formulating Parallelism in terms of truth-conditional content
or entailment patterns (rather than in terms of a syntactic notion) is precisely what
we need in the present case.
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pal structure of the ellipsis sentence. But this amounts to a strength-
ening of the scopal interpretation of the first clause, which is precisely
what GSEC predicts cannot occur.
In fact, the economy case above points to an even simpler case that
doesn’t seem to be handled by strong economy:
20. Everyone loves someone. (∀ > ∃) (∃ > ∀)
If we consider that everyone and someone are proper scope-taking
expressions (as seems plausible), this simple construction is a clear
(type 2) counter-example to strong economy. Note that the inverse
scope reading, which entails that there is a person who is loved by
everyone, is stronger than the surface scope reading, according to
which everyone is loved by someone, but not necessarily the same
person. If the former reading is true, the latter is automatically true
as well.
Moreover, note the following contrast
21. Proper names freeze scope much more clearly than DE operators do
a) Some phd students admire every professor, and John does
too. *(∀ > ∃) (∃ > ∀)
b) Some phd students admire every professor, and few un-
dergraduates do too.
(?)(∀ > ∃) (∃ > ∀)
Let us continue to assume that Parallelism works well in most of
the cases, including the present one. Now, if subject position down-
ward entailing operators block the inverse scope over an universal
quantifier (due to the generation of a stronger scopal reading), then
the above contrast should be surprising on the strong economy view.
Even assuming that the inverse scope existential reading is rather
marginal in (21b), that reading is much better than the correspond-
ing inverse scope reading in (21a). I find the inverse scope reading
of (21b), in which each professor is admired by a group of phd stu-
dents or other and also by a group of few undergraduates, acceptable.
However, as standardly assumed, the inverse scope reading of (21b)
is clearly impossible. The contrast remains unexplained on the strong
economy view.
1.2.2.2 Antecedent contained deletion
Let us study the antecedent contained deletion (ACD) data. The
ACD constructions involve ellipsis, which is sometimes viewed as the
deletion of phonological material (or pronounceable phrases). The
deleted material is nevertheless crucial for the interpretation of the
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sentence. The following ACD constructions are direct (type 1) evi-
dence against strong economy. We adapt our examples from Pesetsky
(2000, pp. 33-38) by adding the negation operators.19
A caveat is in order before beginning. ACD constructions are com-
plex enough on their own, and, as far as I know, they haven’t been
considered in connection with scopally commutative operators of the
kind I am interested in. This is why I am uncertain as to the right ‘sur-
face scope’ reading of the ACD constructions.20 However, as we shall
see, the syntactically accurate representation of the ‘surface scope’ is
immaterial to the main purpose of the present argumentation. I am
primarily interested in the (uncontroversial) inverse scope readings,
and the controversial syntactic representations of the ‘surface scope’
will not play an essential role in my analysis of the ACD cases.
22. Mary didn’t invite everyone that I did ∆. (∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
a) [everyone that I invited t] [Mary didn’t invite t]. (∀ > ¬)
b) [Mary didn’t invite t] [everyone that I invited t]. (¬ > ∀)
Building on the ‘deletion’ assumption, if we add the phonologically
deleted material, (22) ends up saying something akin to the following:
Mary didn’t invite everyone that I did [invite everyone that I did in-
vite ...]. The ACD cases are interesting because, on the face of it, they
produce infinite regress. In (22), the VP of the main clause, invite
everyone that ..., contains the VP of the embedded clause, did invite
everyone that .... But the latter VP depends on the former VP (the
latter VP can be seen as a copy of the former VP), and therefore an
infinite regress is generated. (In other terms, the former VP is the an-
tecedent and the latter VP—contained by the antecedent—is deleted,
and hence remains unpronounced. This is why this form of elided
construction is taken to involve antecedent contained deletion.)
To avert regress, the standard way of representing the scope of
these elided sentences is with the universal quantifier taking prece-
dence over the clause which has Mary as subject, and thus over the
negation, as shown in (22a). This is precisely the reading that GSEC
disallows, since it’s stronger. Hence, we have another straightfor-
ward (type 1a) counterexample to strong economy. The other read-
ing, which we represented tentatively in (22b)—but very likely needs
revision—has negation taking scope over the universal. This reading
is allowed by GSEC, and is perhaps more salient than the previous
one.
19 The examples corresponding to my (adapted) (25) and (26) are credited to Kennedy
(1997) and Danny Fox (p.c.) respectively.
20 By ‘surface scope’ (in quotation marks) I mean that the relative positions of the
operators is as it appears on the surface, regardless of whether some transformation
applies to it at LF or not. So, I don’t mean that there is no covert movement (or other
transformation) involved in such constructions, but only that even if there were
covert movement, there would still exist a reading with the same relative position of
operators as the one displayed by the linear arrangement on the surface.
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The same pattern occurs with other ACD constructions.
23. John didn’t agree to visit every city Mary did ∆.
(∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
a) [John didn’t agree to visit t] [every city Mary visited t].
(¬ > ∀)
b) [every city Mary agreed to visit t] [John didn’t agree to visit
t]. (∀ > ¬)
24. John didn’t grant each single point that Mary did ∆.
a) [John didn’t grant t] [each single point that Mary did t].
(¬ > ∀)
b) [each single point Mary did grant t] [John didn’t grant t]
(∀ > ¬)
These sentences, as with the preceding one, admit two scopal read-
ings. The inverse scope reading, (23a), is available, contrary to what
GSEC predicts. According to the inverse scope reading, (23) entails
that each city is such that Mary wanted to visit that city, whilst John
refused to visit it. Perhaps this inverse scope reading is more clear in
(24) proposed above: John didn’t grant each single point that Mary did
∆. The inverse scope reading thus says that no single point that Mary
granted was also granted by John. Clearly, this is stronger than saying
that not every point that Mary granted was also granted by John.
Another similar case is given in (25).
25. Beck didn’t read a report on every suspect Kollberg did.
(∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
a) [every suspect Kollberg read a report on]x Beck didn’t read
a report on x. (∀ > ¬)
b) Beck didn’t read a report on x [every suspect Kollberg read
a report on]x. (¬ > ∀)
The stronger, inverse scope reading is available. Since GSEC states
that stronger inverse scopes are unavailable, the above construction is
another direct counterexample to strong economy. The inverse scope
of (25) says that Beck didn’t read a report on any suspect that Kollberg
did. The other reading is weaker. It says that Beck didn’t read a report
on every suspect that Kollberg did, but Beck possibly read a report on
some such suspects.
Supposing that the ambiguity of the following sentences is a matter
of scope, these sentences add up to the set of counterexamples to
strong economy.
26. a) Kollberg didn’t want every book that Mary wrote.
de dicto, de re
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b) Kollberg didn’t want every book that Mary did ∆.
only de re
Both (26a) and (26b) admit a stronger, inverse scope reading, namely
the de re reading of the universal quantifier (and in the latter the de re
reading is obligatory). According to the de re reading, every book that
Mary wrote (at the actual world) is a book that Kollberg refuses to
read. The contrasting, de dicto interpretation amounts to saying that
Kollberg refuses to read whatever book Mary writes.21
1.2.2.3 Comparatives and comparative quantifiers
Let us look at the interaction of comparative quantifiers and inten-
sional operators. Consider the ‘yacht’ sentences, inspired by Russell
(1905), which are of the form I thought your yacht is larger than it is.
27. You must have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
?( > ∃c),(∃c > )
28. The/some cakes you cooked could have been fewer.
?(^ > ∃c),(∃c > ^)
29. Some cakes you have cooked should have been fewer.
?( > ∃c),(∃c > )
30. You could not have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
?(^ > ∃c),(∃c > ^)
31. You should not have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
?( > ∃c),(∃c > )
32. You had to prepare as many cakes as you did.
?( > ∃c),(∃c > )
33. You didn’t have to prepare as many cakes as you did.
?( > ¬),(¬ > )
In the examples where the strong (and sometimes necessarily false)
readings are associated with the inverse scope, we get clear coun-
terexamples to GSEC, since the strong readings under inverse scope
21 Mayr and Spector (p. 12) remark that the possibility of a de re reading is problematic
only if we keep fixed the extension of the relevant predicate, in our case book. It
seems to me that we can do that, and if we do, we get a counterexample. Moreover,
on reflection, it doesn’t seem to exist any real contrast between interpreting the
sentence in (26a) under the assumption of a fixed domain of books as opposed
to interpreting them under the assumption of a variable domain. Just consider a
context where both Kollberg and Mary are concerned with the set of books that
Mary authored and are on Kollberg’s shelf. Then contrast this with a context where
Kollberg is wrong about which book Mary authored; in this context the set of books
that Mary authored at the actual world and Kollberg’s bouletic worlds have distinct
extensions.
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are still acceptable, even if non-salient. Such counterexamples are
(28)-(29), and (30)-(31).
To illustrate, (28) seems to admit the wide scope modal reading,
which says that it is possible for you to cook fewer cakes than you
cook. (29) says that the same situation must—rather than can—be
the case. Of course, the proposition that these readings find possible
and necessary (respectively) is contradictory, so both modal readings
are necessarily false. These readings seem to me to be available—I
can definitely see them used as grammatical jokes. But if such read-
ings are in effect available, they constitute type 1 counter-evidence to
GSEC, because necessarily false sentences asymmetically entail every-
thing modally contingent.
Moreover, consider the same sentences except that we introduce
a negation in the scope of the modal (so that the cakes in question
mustn’t, couldn’t . . .). In this case, the propositions in the scope of the
modal become necessarily true on the inverse scope modal reading
(therefore as weak as we can get). Yet, the inverse scope readings
are not more (or less) salient than under the previous condition. This
shows that the strength of the scopal readings of comparative quan-
tifiers under modals has no influence on scopal accessibility, which
constitutes another piece of type 4 data against strong economy.
An interesting pair of (type 4) examples is (32) and (33). The sur-
face scope reading of (32) is as weak as it can get, whilst the surface
scope reading of (33) is as strong as it can get. According to GSEC,
there should be a contrast in the scopal possibilities of the two sen-
tences. This is because a double-operator sentence which is neces-
sarily (and trivially) true under the surface scope reading is bound
to have a stronger meaning on its inverse scope reading. In contrast,
a double-operator sentence which is necessarily false (and thus triv-
ially false) under the surface scope reading, is bound to have a weaker
reading under inverse scope. However, there is no contrast between
sentences whose surface scope interpretations are trivially true and
trivially false, respectively. Both types of sentences admit a salient in-
verse scope reading, as clearly shown by the examples (32) and (33).
Thus, the scopal readings of these ‘yacht’ examples vary in ways
that are explanatorily independent from the GSEC mechanism.
We move now to the interaction of comparatives with non-intensional
operators. This requires some background on the semantics of com-
paratives.
There are two basic approaches to comparatives: the A/¬A (e.g.
Schwarzschild 2008; Seuren 1973) analysis and the maximality anal-
ysis (e.g. Hackl 2000; Heim 2000; von Stechow 1984). On both ap-
proaches, comparatives involve operators (a negation or a maximal-
ity operator) that are capable of entering into scope relations with
other operators. As Alrenga and Kennedy (2014, pp. 4-5) remark, if
the comparative constructions involve operators that engage in scopal
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interactions, these scopal interactions should manifest properties that
resemble the scopal properties of non-comparative constructions. It is
then worth checking whether the scopal interactions of comparatives
abide by strong economy. In the following discussion, I am focusing
on the second approach, which appeals to a maximality operator.22
On the maximality approach, comparatives consist of two quanti-
fiers, a degree quantifier and a definite quantifier. The definite quan-
tifier fixes a set of degrees whose maximum is to be compared to the
maximum of another set which is the restriction of the degree quanti-
fier. For instance, we can analyse the comparative sentence More than
two students came to the party, by comparing the set of students who
came to the party with the set of two people. The comparison will
be in fact between the maximums attained by the above sets. It is
convenient to assume an abstract unit for measuring the cardinality
of the sets; for this purpose, we use degrees. Thus, the comparative
quantifier will compare the degree 2 (two) expressed by its restriction
(the set of two students) with the degree of the set determined by
the definite (the set of students who came to the party). The compar-
ative quantifier will yield truth just in case the latter set, the set of
students who came to the party, is associated with a degree higher
than two, the degree associated with the former set, namely the set
of two students.
On these plausible assumptions, GSEC encounters what is called
in the literature van Benthem’s problem (see Hackl 2000, 162ff.). The
problem is that if we are assuming that the definite quantifier has the
scopal flexibility standardly assumed for quantifiers, then, in certain
circumstances, we obtain a weak scopal reading which is unattested.
34. Unavailable weak inverse scopes (van Benthem’s Problem)
Hackl (ibid., p. 162)
a. Fewer than three students came to the party.
b. JaK = 1 iff ∃X[max {d : X is a d-numerous set of students} <
max {d : d = 3} & X came to the party ]
c. There is a set of students (X) whose cardinality is smaller
than three and that came to the party.
Thus, in constructions where the definite quantifier (part of the
comparative constructions) combines with a decreasing operator, we
get a wide scope definite reading. This reading is the weakest possi-
ble reading for this construction, and is hence predicted to be avail-
able by strong economy. However, the reading is clearly not accept-
able. The sentence Fewer than three students came to the party cannot be
judged true simply because we can pick out a set of less than three
students who didn’t come to the party.
22 However, strong economy is challenged by any account which endorses Kennedy’s
Generalisation, including the first account—see Alrenga and Kennedy (2014) for a
review of the relevant data, as well as our discussion at the end of this section.
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Many theorists (irrespective of their particular approach to com-
paratives) accept what Heim called Kennedy’s Generalisation, to the
effect that a quantificational phrase which contains the trace of a de-
gree quantifier also contains the degree quantifier itself (Alrenga and
Kennedy 2014; Heim 2000, 2006). Now, as Hackl (2000, 174ff) pointed
out, this generalisation entails that fewer than degree quantifiers can-
not take scope outside universal quantifiers.
35. Decreasing comparative quantifiers in object position do not out-scope
universal quantifiers (Hackl (ibid., p. 175))
a) Every girl read fewer than three books.
*(fewer > ∀) (∀ > fewer)
b) Every girl read fewer books than journals.
*(fewer > ∀) (∀ > fewer)
Imagine that someone utters (35a) about a situation in which there
are two girls who read two different books each, and thus four books
in total—we set up the context so as to use the collective reading: the
girls collectively read four books. There are two (logically possible) in-
verse scope readings corresponding to the distributive and collective
readings.23 According to the first inverse scope interpretation, the
utterance would be false in the envisaged situation, because it’s not
true that the girls read fewer than three books (by hypothesis, they
read four books altogether). Yet, intuitively, (35a) cannot be judged
false in such a situation. A different problem occurs with the second
(distributive) inverse scope interpretation of (35a). That interpreta-
tion would be true in a situation in which one of the girls read four
books but the greatest number of books that each of the girls read is
less than three. However, we don’t get this reading from (35a).
These inverse scope readings should be nonetheless available by
the lights of strong economy, since these readings are weaker than
their surface scope alternatives. As we have seen in the analysis of
their main supporting data (8)–(12), strong economy theorists have
it that downward entailing operators (e.g. negation, few etc.) in ob-
ject position can freely cross universal quantifiers, in contrast to the
universal quantifiers in object position which cannot cross downward
entailing operators. But in the above examples, we see that the down-
ward entailing fewer than three books cannot take scope above the quan-
tifier.
23 Here are the representations of the two unavailable, inverse scope readings of (35),
as put forward by Hackl.
36. Every girl read fewer than three books. Hackl (2000, p. 175)
a) *max{d : ∀x[girl x→ ∃Y[Y is d-many & ∀y[y ∈ Y → x read y]]]} < 3
b) *max{d : ∃Y[Y is d-many & ∀y[y ∈ Y → ∀x[girl x→ x read y]]]} < 3
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The key problem is that strong economy clashes with Kennedy’s
Generalisation and the standard semantics for comparative quanti-
fiers. This is a serious problem, since comparative quantifiers, and, in
particular, monotone decreasing comparative quantifiers were among
the data that motivated GSEC in the first place. I have already ob-
served that the distributive readings of few are problematic for strong
economy, and now we see that the collective readings give rise to
problems too.
More generally, it is clear from the statement of Kennedy’s Gener-
alisation that this principle crosscuts strong and weak scopes. Since
the generalisation is not formulated in terms of entailment-related se-
mantic properties of operators, it is to be expected that both strong
and weak scopes will be (dis)allowed, in ways that do not correlate
with strong economy. This property effectively makes the data gov-
erned by Kennedy’s Generalisation type 4 counterexamples to strong
economy.
As we suggested, comparatives are problematic on any of the two
mainstream accounts. In particular, the results of the two accounts
of comparatives match in that they need a special stipulation to rule
out a scopal reading (see Alrenga and Kennedy 2014, p. 13). Both the
A/¬A and the maximality accounts have problems with constructions
such as John is taller than each of his students. These accounts predict
that the inverse scope reading is possible. That is, they do not rule
out the reading according to which John is taller than the smallest of
his students. This reading is clearly unavailable for our example, but
strong economy predicts it should be available. The only available
reading is one on which John is taller than the tallest of his students,
and thus he is taller than each of his students.
Tellingly, van Rooij (2008) tries to solve this problem by ruling out
the weaker meaning. To this effect, he adopts a principle called the
Strongest Meaning Hypothesis. Although this principle has to meet
several challenges (see Alrenga and Kennedy 2014, pp. 10-1), for our
purposes it is important to note that the Strongest Meaning Hypothe-
sis is exactly the opposite of GSEC. It rules out the weaker meanings
and rules in the stronger ones. When we encounter two contradictory
principles dealing with the very same phenomenon, namely, scope,
we can be sure that we haven’t stated the right generalisations.
A further problem with GSEC, is that it doesn’t predict the inter-
pretations of the following sentences (from Bhatt and Takahashi (2011,
fn. 18) cited in Alrenga and Kennedy (2014, pp. 4,27)).
36. More students have read Lord of the Rings than have read every
other Tolkien novel.
(∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀) Alrenga and Kennedy (ibid., p. 27)
a) the number of students who have read LOTR exceeds the
number of students who have read all of the other Tolkien
novels. (¬ > ∀)
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b) the number of students who have read LOTR exceeds the
number of students who have read the most-read Tolkien
novel other than LOTR. (∀ > ¬)
The complete logical forms of these sentences are given in Alrenga
and Kennedy (2014, p. 27). Here we abstracted away from the syn-
tactic details, and captured only the relative positions of the negation
and universal quantifier. The negation is justified on their (A/¬A)
analysis since it means that there is a degree to which students read
LOTR such that that degree is not attained by students who read any
other novel. Assuming that this analysis is on the right track, the (36a)
reading is stronger than the (36b). For if a novel (namely, LOTR) is
read more than all of the other novels (N− LOTR), that novel (namely,
LOTR) is surely read more than the second most-read novel (which
is only a single novel among the N− LOTR novels).
Further examples problematic for strong economy are documented
in the appendix B.
1.2.3 Defence strategies and their key drawbacks
There are several lines of response to the sort of cases we considered
to be problematic for the economy principles (cf. Mayr and Spector
2010). We focus here on two such strategies.24
Mayr and Spector explain away some apparently recalcitrant data
by arguing that they involve overt movement, and, in particular, ad-
junction to the right edge. Their basic idea is that when the quantifier
in the object position is in the rightmost position (and there is no
other phrase, e.g. adjunct, that follows it), then that quantifier can
overtly take scope over the operator in subject position by movement
to the right. The position where the quantifier is thus moved is truth-
conditionally identical to the inverse scope reading, but is actually
obtained through overt movement. To argue for this, they demon-
strate a contrast between scopal constructions with relative clauses
vs adverbial phrases to the right of the quantifier in object position.25
24 There are several other problems of varying difficulty with GSEC. Many of them
are discussed by Mayr and Spector (2010), involving for instance the scope of ‘neg
raising’ intensional operators, indefinites. I haven’t relied on such cases in argu-
ing against GSEC, but the proposed solutions to these problems imply the same
methodological drawback implied by solutions to the problems I have pointed out.
The methodological problem is the lack of generality of strong economy (see be-
low for discussion). An important challenge not touched upon by strong economy
theorists has to do with numerical operators. For our part, we skipped over the
numerical cases (although we discuss a relevant case, (31), in the second appendix)
mainly because the semantics of numerical expressions involves a notion of entail-
ment that is more complicated and needs more spelling out than the non-numerical
cases discussed here.
25 For instance, notice the contrast between John didn’t meet every guest on time and John
didn’t meet every guest that came to the party, where only the latter makes available an
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The adverbial phrases block a reading in which the quantifier takes
scope over the operator in subject position.
However, this move seems to me suspect because the argument
from right edge adjunction can also be run with configurations that
(are traditionally taken to) give rise to inverse scope through covert
movement, e.g. Someone loves everyone (∃∀). Arguably, precisely the
same contrast between the addition of relative clauses vs AdvPs ob-
tains. Does this mean that the relevant movement of the universal
is in fact overt? Probably not, as the standard type of movement for
such constructions—covert movement—is sufficient to produce the
desired truth-conditional effect.26 If so, the difference produced by
inserting an AdvP, as opposed to a relative clause, does not need to
be indicative of right edge adjunction, as it also occurs with standard
covert movement constructions. Something more should therefore be
said in order for the argument from the right edge to go through. A
potential response to these challenges is to say that in order to avoid a
violation of GSEC, grammar deploys right adjunction as a ‘last resort’
to the same truth-conditional effect.
A related line of defence is to see strong economy in competition
with other grammatical constraints or principles, e.g. movement to
solve ACD, Kennedy’s Generalisation etc.. Accordingly, in order for
strong economy to license one of the competing LFs in the reference
set, the grammar must check that strong economy is not outranked
by other grammatical principles. This move further complicates the
grammar of scope, but it vindicates strong economy. While these
supplementary assumptions might seem sound, they imply that an
even more complicated computation takes place at the interface.
Perhaps the strong economy can be defended along the lines sug-
gested above. However, this is small relief to strong economy. There
still remain plenty of counterexamples that should be mitigated by an
adequately restricted notion of strong economy. Let us summarise the
genuine counterexamples to the restricted strong economy. To defend
strong economy we have to tackle the empty-domain problems noted
in §1.2.1. Furthermore, we have to accommodate the economy-related
problems in (18), (19), and (21), the type 1a and 2a counterexamples
in (30), the scopal behaviour of NPIs in (32), the definites and existen-
tials in predicative positions in (33) (see appendix B) , the type 4 prob-
lems in (27)-(31) and (33), the ACD (type 1a and 4) counter-evidence
in (22)-(26), and, finally, the comparative cases in (34), (35)-(36) and
(36).
A more general drawback is that each of the above argumenta-
tive moves makes the GSEC principle less general and thus theo-
inverse scope reading for the object position quantifiers. The contrast can be traced
back to the addition of AdvPs (e.g. on time) vs relative clauses (e.g. that came to the
party), because only the latter ensures that the quantifier is on the right edge.
26 Right edge adjunction would remove the sentence Someone loves everyone from the
domain of strong economy, which governs only covert movement.
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retically less interesting. As I suggested, generality was one of the
rationales for positing economy, and it is standardly taken as a the-
oretical virtue. To see why it is not justified to resist generality at
any price, notice that, at the limit, each new counterexample that we
may come up with can be mitigated by assuming that strong econ-
omy loses in competition with yet another grammatical principle or
constraint. This is problematic. For it is not clear which grammati-
cal principle can be said to compete with strong economy in each of
the above counterexamples (and the ones in the appendix). But more
importantly, if GSEC loses in competition with so many grammat-
ical constraints—some of which pull precisely in the opposite direc-
tions, e.g. Kennedy’s Generalisation—this is a good indicator that the
strong economy principle is no more than a descriptive principle that
applies to a very limited set of data, and thus needs to be subsumed
under a more general and explanatory principle.
1.3 conclusion: a deflationary solution
On closer analysis, strong economy is found to be wanting on both
methodological and empirical grounds. This constitutes strong moti-
vation to look for alternative accounts of scopal phenomena. In light
of the previous data, and in the absence of further argument, only
a weaker hypothesis is warranted. (A stronger, and more general,
hypothesis will be proposed in the following chapter.)
The weaker hypothesis is twofold: (i) when the inverse scope read-
ing of an utterance is stronger than the surface scope reading, and
we fixate on the surface scope, then the inverse scope reading can be
ruled out by a scalar implicature. Furthermore, (ii) when the inverse
scope (reading) is weaker, and thus entailed by the surface scope, it is
not possible, in light of standard assumptions about scales, to rule out
the inverse scope by scalar implicature. These two clauses produce a
contrast very much in the spirit of GSEC.
To illustrate, consider the sentence with the configuration (i): e.g.
Every teacher admires a pupil. If we zero in on the surface scope in-
terpretation (according to which there are possibly multiple pupils),
we can conclude that there are multiple pupils, by excluding via a
scalar implicature the stronger, inverse scope reading (according to
which there is a unique pupil). It seems to me that we often get pre-
cisely this sort of interpretation, drawing a (defeasible) inference to
the effect that there are multiple pupils that the teachers admire. On
the other hand, if we interpret a sentence with a type (ii) configura-
tion, say, A pupil admires every teacher, under the surface scope reading
(which is stronger than the inverse scope reading), no scalar implica-
ture can arise, so we cannot rule out the inverse scope reading on the
basis of the scalar implicature. Admittedly, we may have other better
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reasons for ruling out the inverse scope reading, which makes the
evaluation of the proposal difficult to test. My point is that, on the
assumption that these scalar implicatures interact with scope, there
may be a subtle distinction between sentences with configuration (i)
and (ii). In configurations of type (i) we have an additional reason
to remove the inverse scope (although there may be other reasons to
remove it, e.g. parsing considerations or background information).
Furthermore, the ruling out of the stronger, inverse scope read-
ings in constructions containing the downward entailing operators
few, fewer etc. (under distributive readings) can be construed as de-
pending on implicitly introducing a quantity implicature and on a
mechanism for removing inconsistencies. Recall the examples con-
sidered at the beginning of the chapter, (11b) and (12b). These have
basically the same structure as the scopal construction Few windows
are always open. Note first that the surface structure F∀ is compatible
with ∀M (where F = few and M = many), since even if (the same)
few windows are open at all times, it is still possible that at all times
many (different) windows are open. Secondly, the inverse scope struc-
ture ∀F implicates ¬∀M, which contradicts ∀M—a possibility that, as
we have seen, is left open by the surface scope reading. Hence, the
inverse scope reading, which produces the implicature that is incon-
sistent with the background assumptions, should be removed as long
as these background assumptions are salient.
However, note that the ensuing hypothesis is weak: in clause (i)
we say that it is possible to remove the inverse scope reading. This
possibility is realised only when the inverse scope reading is salient
in the context, and we already fixated on the surface scope. When
these two necessary conditions obtain, it is easy to see that the inverse
scope is indeed unaccessible. In neutral contexts, under the standard,
left-to-right, direction of parsing, the surface scope is the most salient
scopal reading. If we further think of alternative scopal readings, it
is natural to obtain the inverse scope reading, which becomes part of
the relevant scale and is then to be removed by implicature.
The possibility of removing the inverse scope reading is not al-
ways realised, as shown, for instance, in our discussion of the non-
emptiness assumption. If we set up a context in such a way as to
make it clear that the domain of the few-quantifier may be empty, the
inverse scope is entailed by the surface scope. What happens in this
case is that by accommodating empty quantifier domains we reverse
the relevant scale, and the inverse scope becomes weaker rather than
stronger (as in the general case, where non-emptiness would be as-
sumed).
This is, to be sure, a provisional solution. However, it is important
for our purposes to formulate a baseline hypothesis that partially
vindicates the basic intuition behind strong economy. In the following
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chapter, I argue for a more ambitious account of scope, within which
we can include the deflationary suggestion just introduced.
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A CONTROVERSY-BASEDPERSPECT IVE ON SCOPESAL IENCE
2.1 introduction: economy
This chapter argues that language is ideal or economical with respect
to scopal interactions, and gives a rationale supporting this hypoth-
esis. I build on the idea—already argued for in the recent literature
in e.g. Fox (2000), Mayr and Spector (2010), and Reinhart (2006)—
that scope-flexibility requires effects on meaning. The driving in-
tuition behind such accounts is that scope can receive a structural
treatment rather than a treatment based on the individual properties
of each scope taking element. In particular, I share with the strong
economy account (discussed in the previous chapter) the intuition
that the explanation of scope phenomena is structural, and, more-
over, that the relevant structural property is semantic strength (or
entailment). However, I depart from previous conceptions about the
economy of scope. My main claim is that the conception of broad
grammar (including semantics and pragmatics) becomes simpler and
more elegant if we put more weight on processing considerations and
pragmatic principles. The outcome is not only a more elegant divi-
sion of labour between syntax and semantics/pragmatics, but also a
view that fares better with respect to linguistic data concerning the
scopal behaviour of linguistic operators such as quantifiers, negation,
and modals. Were one to try to accommodate scopal data within
the strong economy approach, the economy-based account would be-
come not only unduly complicated, but also incompatible with the
original semantic/pragmatic motivation for positing economy princi-
ples.
The basic idea driving my proposal is that, if scope can affect en-
tailment and implication patterns, entailment should be able to affect
scope too.
I shall focus on contradictions in stating my pragmatic1 economy
account. But in contrast to several current accounts, I shall claim
that contradictions play a more positive (or permissive) role. It is the
purpose of this chapter to make more precise the permissive role of
contradictions in the grammar of scope.
1 The reader will be pleased to find out that I shall sometimes drop the ‘semantic’
qualifier from the somewhat irritating “semantic/pragmatic” label. This is not en-
tirely for aesthetic reasons, since it emphasises that my principle is better suited to
interact with contextual factors than its direct competitor.
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There are two more specific theses that may be advanced on the ba-
sis of the coming discussion: (i) A conspiracy of semantic/pragmatic
principles is better off than the strong economy principle (GSEC) both
empirically and conceptually. (ii) Any economy-principle governing
scope should be relegated to pragmatics. Note that (i) is compatible
with the existence of principles of economy other than strong econ-
omy. I am here defending the latter claim, (ii).2
My plan is as follows. In §2.2 I present a semantic/pragmatic al-
ternative based on a principle of economy that takes into account the
contradictions generated by scopal structures, and show how this ac-
count can handle, apart from the examples already covered by the
strong economy principle, many of the data which proved to be prob-
lematic for the economy principle. I then discuss (in §2.3) the concep-
tual advantages of the pragmatic account, and answer some of the
worries that might arise in connection with this account.
2.2 stronger pragmatics: scope admissibil-ity
For reasons that will be later discussed, I call the account advanced
in the present chapter the controversy-based (CB) account. The CB
account makes essential use of the strength or entailments of the sco-
pal readings. In particular, on this view, scalar implicatures affect
scope and, more specifically, scope-saliency. According to the CB
account, the pragmatic principles regulating the interaction between
scalar implicatures and scope are (i) an adequacy condition on admis-
sible scopes, i.e., scopes that can generate, via an implicature mecha-
nism, inconsistency or ‘controversy’, and (ii) a saliency condition that
assigns salience to scope possibilities depending on the level at which
inconsistency appears.3
2 The stronger claim (ii) is very appealing from the standpoint taken in this chapter.
More precisely, the view expressed by (ii) may take two forms, one of which is more
conservative with respect to mainstream assumptions (including assumptions about
economy), whilst the second is more radical. The conservative solution is that (a)
scope ambiguities are not constrained by Scope Economy, but by purely pragmatical
principles under syntactic (non-economy) constraints. The more radical solution is
that (b) scope ambiguities are not dealt with at LF, and, consequently, we don’t need
any principle of scope economy in the grammar.
According to (b) we need to disallow covert operations altogether, and deal with
scope-properties by semantic means. This comes to maintaining an underspecifi-
cation theory of scope. The idea seems to be in the minimalist spirit (cf. Rein-
hart (2006)). The main motivations for such an account are the following. Scope
phenomena—and the corresponding covert operations that give birth to scopal
flexibility—are very complex and unwieldy, and alternative ways of unifying the
scope-related phenomena are therefore particularly welcome.
3 This account makes use of broadly Gricean reasoning, especially reasoning based
on the maxims of quantity (Grice 1967/1989). I shall adopt further pragmatic con-
straints (beyond the quantity-like principles), more notably a principle along the
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The CB view accounts for the possibility of multiple scopal configu-
rations of a given (multiple-operator) linguistic construction through
the linguistic construction’s capacity for generating inconsistency. This
strategy is very effective in generating the predictions of Scope Econ-
omy, but it doesn’t account for the strong economy predictions. To do
that, I appeal to constraints on salience. The CB view further explains
the lack of salience of the inverse scope reading, as being mainly due
to (i) defaulting to the surface scope, taken together with (ii) the im-
pact of an interfering implicature and contradiction, and (iii) further
Gricean principles. The Gricean principles (iii) will have some local
significance in the present argumentation. Admittedly, these Gricean
principles are best seen placeholders for a more systematic pragmatic
theory, but for my purposes it is important that they offer some ini-
tial pragmatic motivation for our account (in accord with the second,
pragmatic, desideratum).
I think that factors (i) and (ii) have also independent plausibility.
Some well-supported processing-accounts show that we process sen-
tences left-to-right, thus advantaging the surface scope reading as (i)
would have it (cf. Phillips 1996). Moreover, there are further phenom-
ena where surface scope is favoured. Similarly to our pragmatic ac-
count, the principles of economy include a bias towards surface scope
in the sense that, most of the time, they impose criteria only on the
admissibility of inverse scope. Reinhart (2006) argues that we default
to the surface scope when the computation becomes intractable. This
is also in the spirit of the claim (i). So I take claim (i) to be a natural as-
sumption, and I shall employ it in the current account. However, it is
claim (ii) which is less explored and, at first blush, more problematic.
It is this claim that I shall develop and refine in what follows.
I begin with some basic definitions. Take the implicature class or set
of a linguistic construction to be the class of relevant, primary and
secondary, scalar implicatures associated with the logically possible
scopal readings of that construction. By primary implicature I mean
the standard case of scalar implicature, e.g. the implicature from
some (∃) to not all (¬∀). Secondary implicatures are implicatures of
an entailment of the surface/inverse scope reading or of a primary
lines of Grice’s maxim of manner, or Levinson’s M-principle (Grice 1967/1989; Levin-
son 2000), and processing constraints (cf. Reinhart 2006). The two principles are in
complementary distribution, and together cover a great many set of data (cf. Horn
2004; Huang 2004; Levinson 2000).
While this account involves scalar implicatures, it is not purely pragmatic. First, it
is plausible that scalar implicatures are triggered either purely semantically or at a
level of interface between semantics and pragmatics. Second, I am endorsing the
mixed strategy account, which accepts that important syntactic restrictions might
be in place. Note also that accepting syntactic restrictions on scope doesn’t mean
that scope is a syntactic phenomenon; scope may well be based on an interpretive
mechanism that interprets certain syntactic configurations in such a way that it gives
birth to purely semantic scope distinctions, i.e. distinctions that can be drawn only
at a semantic level. Thus, accepting syntactic restrictions on scope is in principle
compatible with a scope underdetermination account.
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implicature. For instance, Some t-shirts have few holes, viz. ∃F, (pri-
marily) implicates ¬∀F and the latter in turn implicates ∃M (which is
thus a secondary implicature of the initial logical form, ∃F).4 I am in
a position to define the following, communication-oriented principle:
admissible scope A linguistic construction is admissible if its im-
plicature class, its ‘in principle’ possible scopal readings and
their entailments form an inconsistent set.
For ease of exposition, I shall refer to the implicature class in an
extended sense, as comprising not only scalar implicatures but also
the scopal structures and their entailments.
Admissible Scope is descriptively equivalent to the (syntax/seman-
tics) interface principle, Scope Economy (SE), in that it disallows sco-
pally uninformative (in our terms, inadmissible) constructions from
manifesting scope-flexibility. Arguably, if two scopal readings are
logically equivalent, they won’t be admissible (see appendix C). Thus,
Admissible Scope can be seen as a semantic/pragmatic interpretation
of SE. It is crucial that the principle is formulated in terms of scalar
implicatures. In order to be able to use scalar implicatures, I need to
make a stipulation about the form these implicatures will take. I need
to stipulate that, as far as this computation is concerned, the speaker
has perfect information about the subject matter of the discourse (in
non-numerical cases). In other words, the implicature mechanism
works on the assumption that the utterer is omniscient.5
We get additional restrictions on scope by taking into account its
salience. Surface scope is by default more salient, but the inverse
scope becomes more salient as the contradiction can be derived more
quickly. The notion of salience (or admissibility) that follows from
Scope Admissibility is left at an intuitive level. I’ll refine it after I
introduce the relevant examples. Other syntactic or pragmatic restric-
tions can affect salience as well. However, my main focus here is on
semantic/pragmatic restrictions.
2.2.1 A pragmatic reinterpretation of the original ‘strong economy’data
In this section I discuss the examples that were originally proposed in
support of strong economy, as well as some of the counterexamples
to strong economy identified in the previous chapter. Insofar as the
4 Note that the primary and secondary implicatures as defined here are different from
the notions of primary and secondary implicature given in Sauerland (2004), which
essentially involve epistemic operators (see also fn. 5).
5 The speaker’s omniscience guarantees, for instance, that ∃ implicates ¬∀ rather than
a logical form that makes reference to the epistemic state of the speaker, e.g. ¬K∀
(which basically means that the speaker is not in a position to know that all . . .). I
hope to be able to show in future work that this omniscience stipulation becomes
unnecessary, once we get into the details of a theory of scalar implicature.
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original data in favour of strong economy are concerned, it should
be noted that I shall not take the original judgements of acceptability
of the scopal readings for granted, but rather I shall qualify them in
light of our account. I shall nevertheless cite the original judgements
of acceptability (on the righthand side of each example), for the sake
of continuity with the previous chapter and in order to explain how
my predictions differ from the predictions made by other theorists.
It is worth highlighting that from my own study of linguistic intu-
itions about scope, these judgements are highly variable, and context
dependent. A survey of linguistic intuitions about these sentences—
including proper contexts to trigger the scopal readings—is found in
appendix. I address the worries regarding the scopal acceptability of
these constructions for §2.2.3. 6 (However, I shall make clear which
of the judgements are problematic according to my findings.)
I begin with the contrast between the scopal possibilities of quan-
tifier first-, as opposed to negation first-, double-operator sentences
consisting of a universal quantifier and a negation. These construc-
tions are repeated here from (8).
37. a) Every student of mine didn’t show up on time.
(¬ > ∀), (∀ > ¬)
b) John didn’t meet every student of mine on time.
(¬ > ∀), *(∀ > ¬)
The starred judgement of accessibility in (37b) is not consistent with
my account. I shall first explain why, on the pragmatic account, (37b)
inverse scope is in fact allowed.
38. John didn’t meet every student of mine on time.
• surface scope: John did not meet every student of mine.
(¬ > ∀)
• surface scope implicature: John met some student of mine.
(∃)
• inverse scope: John did not meet any student of mine.
(∀ > ¬)
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and inverse
scope. ⊥
To a first approximation, the account of why inverse scope is not
allowed runs as follows. The most salient reading, the surface scope
one, has an implicature to the effect that John met some student.
6 Paul Elbourne and Yuri Cath expressed in personal communication the worry that
the judgements supporting my proposal are incorrect. However, as I shall argue,
the core judgements are correct, and the very few judgements that don’t seem to be
correct, can be handled by other means.
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Given that the inverse scope reading is inconsistent with this impli-
cature, the inverse scope is allowed, since the derivable contradiction
makes it interesting, in the sense of the CB account. Thus, there are
two important assumptions at play here. Firstly, in neutral circum-
stances (without contextual information), there is a privileged scope
with which we start out. Second, we test the inverse scope. If this
produces a contradiction, the inverse scope gains some salience. If
not, the inverse scope is not possible. According to the above compu-
tation, (37b) does produce a contradiction. Thus, we have shown that
this construction satisfies Admissible Scope, since the implicature set
is inconsistent.
I shall sometimes use another device in order to represent the im-
plicature mechanism. As shown in figure 1, the computation of Ad-
missible Scope can be represented using a ‘rectangle of oppositions’.
On the top (horizontal) layer, one finds the surface scope logical form
(SS), and its implicatures and entailments (SSIs), if any. On the bottom
layer, I represent the inverse scope logical form (IS) and its implica-
tures and entailments (ISIs), if any. A line connecting one of the nodes
in the two layers marks inconsistency between the logical forms oc-
cupying these nodes, if such an inconsistency is indeed found. Thus,
the rectangle of oppositions in figure 1, shows that the surface scope
∀¬ is inconsistent with the inverse scope implicature ∃.
SS: ∀¬ = ¬∃
IS: ¬∀ = ∃¬ ISI: ∃
⊥
Figure 1.: Contradiction between the surface scope and the inverse scope
implicature of a construction consisting of the universal and nega-
tion operators.
I turn next to the scopal flexibility of (37a), repeated here as (39).
39. Every student of mine didn’t show up on time.
• surface scope: no student showed up. (∀ > ¬)
• surface scope implicature: none (i.e. none of interest for
our purposes)
• inverse scope: not every student showed up (¬ > ∀)
• no contradiction yet
• inverse scope implicature: some student showed up. (∃)
• contradiction between inverse scope implicature and sur-
face scope ⊥
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A contradiction is derived, since the implicature set of (37a) is in-
consistent. As with the previous example, in line with Admissible
Scope, in both cases inverse scope is possible (on the right occasion
or using the right intonation), although it may be salient to various
extents, given other pragmatic factors. This is compatible with the
weaker economy principle, Scope Economy. I do depart from the
strong economy account, as I don’t find the inverse scope of (37b)
impossible.7
However, the case is more complicated. It should be mentioned
that the maxim of manner (or a similar pragmatic principle) might
play a decisive role in determining the salient scopal reading. The
maxim of manner can be formulated as follows. If we find a clearer
and less convoluted alternative way to express the same thing, say,
proposition p, the less clear and more convoluted form of expres-
sion will be taken to express something different from p, although, in
principle, it could have been interpreted as conveying the less salient
meaning p (Grice 1967/1989; Levinson 2000). In the present case, the
same proposition can be expressed in a marked way using the ∀¬
phrasing (Every student didn’t ...) and in a less marked way using the
¬∃ phrasing (No student did ...), so, according to the maxim of manner,
the latter should be preferred. The former involves two functional ex-
pressions (every ... not ...) where the latter utilises only one (no ...).
Consequently, this is a factor that can contribute to a less salient sur-
face scope, and may affect the outcome of the above mechanism.
So, it is to be expected that CB-salience (or admissibility) is not the
whole story about scopal salience. The salience of scopal readings is
a more complex pragmatic affair. I contend that the CB mechanism
interacts with further pragmatic factors in order to determine scopal
salience. Regarding the examples just discussed, it is crucial that the
two scopal readings are available, and this can be explained by Scope
Admissibility.8
Let us look at double operator sentences consisting of an existential
quantifier and a negation. The relevant construction is (9), repeated
here as (40).
40. A/one student of mine didn’t show up on time.
??(¬ > ∃), (∃ > ¬)
The consistency test for the inverse scope reading will run very
similarly to the tests above (since ∀¬ ≡ ¬∃):
7 I also depart from the acceptability judgements expressed in Beghelli and Stowell
(1997), but it should be noted that these authors expressly disregarded intonation.
Since I assume a broader notion of scope—whereby e.g. intonation uncovers scope—
this is not a strong difference. As I shall explain, this analysis is a consequence of
relaxing the definition of scope.
8 More speculatively, I would further claim that the manner implicature can be re-
moved by simply stressing the negation in the surface scope reading. If we do so,
the surface scope becomes the salient scopal reading.
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41. A/one student of mine didn’t show up on time.
• surface scope: there is a student who didn’t show up
(∃ > ¬)
• surface scope implicature: not all students didn’t show up,
i.e. some students did show up (∃)
• inverse scope: no student showed up (¬ > ∃)
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and inverse
scope. ⊥
The resulting inconsistency determines the possibility of the in-
verse scope reading of (40). So, both scopes are admissible. As
usual, there will be some parsing–related pressure to favour the sur-
face scope. Are there any other (independent) reasons to prefer one
of the scopal readings? This time our prediction based on the impli-
cature mechanism is compatible with the maxim of manner, because
the surface scope reading is not marked compared to other ways of
expressing the same proposition. If no reason for favouring the less
salient (in our case, inverse scope) reading is given, we fix on the
salient (in our case, surface scope) reading, and give priority to its
implicatures. But, once more, both scopal readings are admissible as
far as the CB account is concerned.
I should pause to say that this prediction is incorrect. Most native
speakers of English find the inverse scope of (40) extremely bad. I
discuss the significance of this fact in §2.2.3.
Let us now look at a set of quantificational sentences emphasising
the impact of downward entailing operators other than negation. As
usual, we consider sentences that were assumed to support the strong
economy principle. The example (10) above is repeated here as (42).
42. a) Many windows are always open in this building.
(many > ∀), (∀ > many )
b) Few windows are always open in this building.
(few > ∀), *(∀ > few )
Here the judgements expressed on the right-hand side are not mine,
but are rather the judgements as predicted by the strong economy ac-
count. My predictions are importantly different. By computing the
implicature-consistency test for these constructions, we obtain admis-
sible scopes for both.9
9 The relevant scope-saliency computations of (42a) and (42b), repeated here as (43)
and (44), are presented below in a more piece-meal fashion.
43. Many windows are always open in this building.
• surface scope: many windows are always open many > always
• surface scope implicature: not all windows are always open ¬ > ∀ >
always
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As the rectangles of oppositions in figure 2 show, the surface scope
interpretations and the inverse scope implicatures of both construc-
tions are inconsistent. Considering first (43), the inverse scope says
that at all the times many windows are open, which is different, and
in effect weaker, than saying that there is a low number of windows
(viz. few windows) open at all times. Therefore, the former impli-
cates the negation of the latter, which, in turn, is inconsistent with
the surface scope reading (to the effect that a low number of windows
are open at all times). Taking (44), we get an inverse scope reading
that amounts to saying that at all times a large number of windows
(viz. many windows) are open. Evidently, this is different, and in-
deed weaker, than saying that a large number of windows are open
at all times. In consequence, the latter, stronger reading should be
removed, and this gives rise to the inverse scope implicature. But the
inverse scope implicature is the negation of the surface scope reading.
Thus, we get a contradiction in the implicature set.
SS: F∀
IS: ∀F ISI: ¬F∀
⊥
SS: M∀
IS: ∀M ISI: ¬M∀
⊥
Figure 2.: Contradictions between surface scope and inverse scope implica-
ture of constructions consisting respectively of (i) few and univer-
sal operators, and (ii) many and universal operators.
So, on the CB view, both scopal readings are admissible, and equally
salient. If we consider that parsing constraints affect scopal saliency,
the inverse scope reading for the F∀ configuration should be over-
all less salient, unless other pragmatic factors intervene. Hence, in
contrast to the strong economy view, on my view there is symmetry
between the many-quantifiers in (42a) and the few-quantifiers in sub-
• inverse scope: always (at all the times), many windows are openalways
> many
• inverse scope implicature: not many are always open not many >
always
• contradiction: between surface scope and and inverse scope implicature
⊥
44. Few windows are always open in this building.
• surface scope: there are few windows which are always open. few >
always
• surface scope implicature: irrelevant for the computation
• inverse scope: always there are few windows open. always > few
• inverse scope implicature: it’s not the case that few are always open.
¬ > few > ∀
• contradiction: between surface scope and inverse scope implicature. ⊥
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ject position in (42b). Now, I contend that this is not a bad prediction.
To my ear, both scopal readings are possible for (42b): it can be inter-
preted as saying that there is a set of windows whose number is low
and which are open permanently (surface scope), but also as stating
that at each time possibly different sets of windows whose number is
low are open (inverse scope).
I have sketched how we can account for the scopal salience prop-
erties of several standard doubly quantified constructions within the
CB view. There are many other standard constructions that will re-
ceive a similar treatment (see appendix D for the computation of the
other standard cases). In what follows, I focus on several examples
that pose more serious problems for my view.
Several examples due to Beghelli and Stowell (1997), namely (43)–
(44), (see also fn. 6) exhibit a contrast in the scopal possibilities of
indefinites and bare numerals.
43. Indefinites or bare numerals under negation.
a) The students didn’t read some books.
b) The students didn’t read two books.
• surface scope: the students did not read 2 books
¬ > ∃2
• surface scope implicature: at most one book was read
1∨ 0
• inverse scope: two books were not read ∃2 > ¬
• inverse scope implicature: ∃x unread book x
• no contradiction, since all the assumptions are compati-
ble
44. QPs always take scope above negation in the absence of marked into-
nation.
a) Some students didn’t read this book.
b) Two students didn’t read this book.
• surface scope: 2 students didn’t read this book ∃2 > ¬
• surface scope implicature: ∃x student who read this
book x
• inverse scope: it’s not the case that two students read
this book ¬ > ∃2
• inverse scope implicature: at most one student read
this book 1∨ 0
• no contradiction
Let us focus here on the more interesting case of bare numerals.
What is distinctive of these cases is that in the absence of concrete
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information about the total number of books, it is impossible to reach
a contradiction. Thus, given that I assume Scope Admissibility, it
might appear that on my account these constructions are scopally un-
ambiguous. However, these sentences are clearly ambiguous (at least
if we take intonation into account). To find a solution to this problem,
consider the general case in which there are n books assigned to the
students and focus on the distributive reading of the n operator. In
(43b), the surface scope reading asserts that the students read fewer
than two books (0-1 books) whilst the inverse scope reading asserts
that the students read n− 2 books. It is easy to see how we could get
a contradiction if we fill in contextual information. There are many
possible values for n that would generate inconsistency. Let us as-
sume that there is a total of 5 books that the students had to read (so,
n = 5). The surface scope reading remains the same (fewer than 2
books were read), and the inverse scope reading now asserts that the
students read 3 books each. It is clear that these two propositions are
incompatible.
Simply positing that such constructions are scopally ambiguous in
virtue of arriving at a contradiction runs the risk of over-intellectualis-
ing the pragmatic capacities of the competent speaker. To be sure, it
is not necessary that the competent speaker make such inferences,
even if she is in the possession of precise numerical information. My
point is that it is nevertheless marginally possible for the competent
speaker to make such inferences, and her doing so makes salient cer-
tain scope possibilities (those predicted by our mechanism). In case
no relevant information is available, the scope salience of the numeri-
cal construction remains indeterminate.
A sceptic might insist that I put the cart before the horse, since I am
positing that the inverse scope of a construction is possible in virtue
of its inconsistent implicature set. However, the sceptical thought
goes, it is perfectly possible to see the inverse scope reading even
without being able to do the computation that derives a contradic-
tion. Although I agree that the thought is unintuitive, my answer is
that despite having a strong intuition that scope flexibility is possible
in the absence of contradiction, scope flexibility is possible in virtue
of a potential inconsistency in the implicature set. At the moment, I
leave unanalysed how exactly the generation of a contradiction makes
available scope-flexibility, and the relation between scope and incon-
sistency should be taken as a descriptive correlation between the two
grammatical properties. I return to this issue in §2.3.
Beghelli and Stowell (1997) pointed out that there is a contrast
between the scopal possibilities of (43)-(44). Only the latter needs
marked intonation in order to make available the inverse scope. This
seems to contrast with the controversy-based take on scope. Never-
theless, I can grant that the syntactic account of Beghelli and Stowell
(ibid.) is on the right track, and hence that the syntax of the above
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constructions will have different effects on the availability of the sco-
pal readings. The only proviso I need to add is that the different ef-
fects are still to be evaluated as determining the saliency of pragmatic
scope. My notion of pragmatic scope is distinct from the syntactic no-
tion (see also fn. 7). As I suggested, the syntactic restrictions under-
lying these constructions are just part of the constraints on pragmatic
scope, and can be overridden for semantic/pragmatic effects.
In sum, according to our semantic/pragmatic account there are
multiple factors that may be involved in establishing scope possi-
bilities. The defeasible bias towards surface scope is implemented
through the implicature mechanism: the less immediate the incon-
sistency is from a derivational point of view, the more salient the
surface scope becomes. From our controversy-based perspective, the
GSEC (or strong economy account) makes, in part, the right predic-
tions because it tracks the restrictions imposed by the consistency test
coupled with further pragmatic restrictions (e.g. Gricean manner-
implicatures). But since the CB account consists of non-categorical
principles, principles whose effects depend on the linguistic context,
the predictions made by GSEC are bound to differ from the predic-
tions of the CB account. Indeed, I argued that the strong economy
predictions fall short in several cases. I now turn to discuss the exam-
ples for which strong economy failed.
2.2.2 Extending the pragmatic account to the previously problem-atic data
2.2.2.1 More quantifiers
The most basic example that I discuss is the case of universally and
existentially quantified constructions such as (45).
45. Everyone loves someone.
The inverse scope reading of this construction is admissible (viz.
CB-salient) since we can derive a contradiction from its implicature
set. This prediction is borne out, but strong economy needs special
provisions in order to explain away such cases. (The inverse scope
is clearly stronger than the surface scope reading, and, as such, it
should be ruled out by strong economy.) The implicature mechanism
on which the pragmatic account relies is sketched in the rectangle of
oppositions in figure 3.
The surface scope logical form receives an interpretation to the ef-
fect that some person is such that s/he is loved by everyone. This
is stronger than saying that everyone loves some, possibly different,
person—the inverse scope reading. Therefore, the inverse scope read-
ing implicates the negation of the surface scope reading, and given
that this implicature will be in the implicature set along with the sur-
face scope reading, the implicature set will generate a contradiction.
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SS: ∃a∀b
IS: ∀b∃a ISI: ∀b∃a¬
⊥
Figure 3.: Implicature computation results in contradiction between the sur-
face scope and the inverse scope implicature of a construction
consisting of a universal and an existential.
The contradiction is relatively easy to get compared to other cases,
and thus we expect the inverse scope to be moderately salient.
Other scopal readings may be unclear due to the lack of a proper
context that would generate the inconsistency required by Admissible
Scope. As we have seen, some cases will appear to remain scopally
indeterminate (see e.g. (43)-(44)). In this connection, let us look at
(46).
46. Al did not attend more than two meetings.(¬ > more than two),
(more than two > ¬)
My predictions are straightforward in such cases. In the absence
of any specific context, there is no resulting contradiction, so the sur-
face scope reading will be more salient. I treat the other examples
involving at least three, more than two in similar ways.
However, as I hinted above, the fact that no contradiction ensues
when contextual information is absent does not mean that contradic-
tion cannot be in principle obtained. It is easy to construct contexts
in which the information provided by the possible scopal readings
(and their implicatures or entailments) is inconsistent. For instance,
consider (46) in a context in which there are seven meetings in total.
The computation of the implicature mechanism will run as follows.
When negation takes scope over the numerical phrase more than two
(¬ > ∃>2), we get a reading according to which Al attended at most
2 meetings, i.e. he attended 0-2 meetings out of 7. Under the inverse
scope interpretation (∃>2 > ¬), there are at least 3 meetings Al did
not attend, i.e. he attended 0-4 meetings out of 7. A contradiction
follows from the implications of the surface scope and inverse scope
readings. This computation is sketched in figure 4. (In this particular
case, the leftmost SSI and the ISI represent implications of the surface
scope and inverse scope respectively, rather than implicatures.)
I want to suggest that the easiness (or difficulty) of getting at such
contexts has a systematic effect on the implicature mechanism’s ca-
pacity to ‘see’ the inconsistency that can be determined by the nu-
merical cases, and thus on the salience of the scopal flexibility of the
numerical constructions. Admittedly, in the numerical case (46), the
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SSI: ∃0−2/7SS: ¬∃>2
IS: ∃>2¬
SSI: ¬∃3−4/7
⊥
ISI: ∃0−4/7
Figure 4.: Contradiction in constructions with negation and more than-
operators under complete information
difficulty of getting the inverse scope of (46) might itself explain the
lack of salience of the inverse scope reading, without needing to in-
voke the implicature computation posited by the CB account. (This
notion of salience will be distinct from CB-salience, since it does not
have to do with how many steps in the implicature computation are
needed to obtain a contradiction.) However, the CB account may
trade on the difficulty inherent to forming the inverse scope as well,
because if the inverse scope is difficult to get, the implicature set will
be difficult to form, and, consequently, it will be hard to compute the
inconsistency test. But no matter how hard it is to get an inconsis-
tency, the inconsistency can obviously be obtained, and thus it still is
the case that the CB account predicts both scopes of (46) to be admis-
sible and salient.
I remarked earlier that GSEC assumes that few under inverse scope
works with empty restrictions. This was found to be problematic,
since, in general, few seems to imply non-empty domains (or exis-
tence). More precisely, it implies non-empty restrictors. How do I
handle the quantificational determiner few? As before, I focus on
the distributive readings of (47) below—rather than the collective
ones according to which the apostles owned collectively the things
in question—and apply the implicature mechanism.
47. Every apostle had few things.
• surface scope: every apostle had few things (∀ > few)
• surface scope implicature: there are no things that every
apostle had (¬∃ > ∀)
• inverse scope: there are few things that every apostle had
(few > ∀)
• inverse scope implicature: there are things that every apos-
tle had (∃ > ∀)
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and inverse
scope implicature ⊥
The result is that the inverse scope is available, but not for the rea-
sons advanced by strong economy (which has it that weaker scopes
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are always available). Since the quantifier presupposes non-empty do-
mains, the inverse scope is actually stronger than the surface scope.10
By the implicature mechanism, the inverse scope is admissible and
moderately salient, since it is relatively easy to get a contradiction.
Before going on, it is important to note that the CB account shares
a common wrong prediction with the strong economy account. The
wrong prediction involves the collective readings discussed in the
previous chapter—the example (35). Thus, the sentence Every girl read
fewer than three books cannot be true on an occasion in which each girl
read two books, and thus the girls read four books collectively. Yet,
if the inverse scope collective reading were available, the sentence
should have a true reading.
2.2.2.2 Modals and comparatives revisited
We turn now to the modal constructions (28)-(31), which, I claimed,
pose problems to the strong economy account. For the purposes of
this discussion, I shall disregard the effect of tense on scope, and
assume that, albeit important, the effect of tense on (the saliency of)
scope can be overridden by other factors that interact with scope,
especially by the consistency checking mechanism posited here.
48. a) The/some cakes you cooked could have been fewer.
(e.g. speaking about the chocolate ones)
b) Some cakes you have cooked should have been fewer.
(e.g. chocolate cakes are unhealthy)
c) You could not have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
d) You should not have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
The constructions (48a)-(48d) all have inverse scope readings stronger
than the surface scope one. The first two constructions are a bit awk-
ward, but I focus on their scopal readings. The latter two are com-
pletely acceptable, and will serve us very well in making the same
point.
49. Some cakes you have cooked should have been fewer. (=(48a))
a) surface scope: (some cakes)a  |possible cakes| < |(some
cakes)a|
(the number of possible cakes at some possible world wi
is less than the number of actual cakes)
10 How do we get the surface scope implicature? The surface form of (47) says that
every apostle had few, possibly different, things. Consequently, what is implicated
is that the speaker is in no position to assert that the apostles owned some of these
things (which indeed would be few, since their set is the intersection of the different
sets of few things owned by each apostle). Supposing that the speaker has the
relevant knowledge, the implicature is that no things are owned by every apostle.
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b) surface scope implicature: ¬(all cakes)a  |possible cakes| <
|(all cakes)a|
c) inverse scope:  |some cakes| < |(some cakes)| ⊥
(the number of cakes at some possible world is less than
itself.)
d) contradiction in the implicature set due to the inconsistent
inverse scope
Sentence (48b) receives the same treatment as (48a). Its inverse
scope is necessarily false (a number of cakes cannot be less than it-
self), and brings about a contradiction. This contradiction is obtained
very ‘quickly’, and we thus expect the inverse scope to be more than
moderately salient, albeit not salient for normal conversational pur-
poses. I can thus make more precise the saliency claims made so far.
Saliency in my terms depends on how quickly we can derive a contra-
diction.11 Some constructions, such as the one just reviewed, allow a
very quick derivation of a contradiction in the implicature class. Some
other constructions determine a contradiction more slowly. Most of
the cases discussed so far are in this latter category. And yet other
cases do not produce contradictions at all. These are precisely the
cases that do not have truth-conditionally different inverse scopes,
and are disallowed by every existing principle of economy, e.g. Every
tune was heard by every guest. Thus, all other things being equal, a con-
tradiction obtained at the level of surface/inverse scope will render
a more salient scopal flexibility than one obtained as a result of the
incompatibility of a scopal reading and one of the implicatures in the
implicature class.
Similar treatments will be given to the other modal constructions,
except that the inconsistency will be produced in other parts of the
implicature class, as shown in the following derivations and in figure
5. (The figure for (50b) will be similar to the one for (50a).)
50. a) You could have prepared fewer cakes that you did.
• surface scope: at some world, you prepare fewer cakes
than you do (^(|few cakes| < |few cakes|)). This is a
contradiction and hence necessarily false.
b) You must have prepared fewer cakes than you did.
• surface scope: as above, an contradiction is derived
from the surface scope.
The quickness of the contradiction is pictured more intuitively in
figure 5, where the usual rectangle of oppositions has been reduced
to a simple line.
11 In appendix C, I give a semantic interpretation of the ‘quickness’ of deriving a
contradiction in terms of the simplicity of a disjoint partitioning in the logical space
induced by the implicature set.
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SS: ^(c < c) = ⊥
⊥
IS: ca^(ca < c)
Figure 5.: Inconsistent surface scopes for constructions with modals and
comparatives
The surface scopes of (50a)-(50b) are absurd or necessarily false.
According to the above reasoning both scopes should be salient, but
there is a twist. The scope that is essential to the derivation of a
contradiction has some prominence over the one which doesn’t. Now,
normally, both scopes (or their implicatures) associated with a given
sentence are necessary in order to produce a contradiction, and this
makes the scopes equally salient, since they are both essential for the
derivation of the contradiction. But the examples just discussed are
special in producing inconsistencies that are essentially tied to only
one of the scopal readings. This distinction is potentially relevant for
explaining why although both scopes are admissible, the scopes that
are inherently inconsistent have a special saliency status. That is, I
propose that when the inconsistency in the implicature set depends
essentially on one of the scopal readings, that scopal reading will be
more CB-salient than the other. But what does it mean to say that an
inconsistent scopal reading is CB-salient?
I find myself in the predicament I alluded to above: the implica-
ture mechanism predicts that inconsistent scopes are salient, but on
an intuitive notion of salience—that is, assuming that the salient read-
ing is supposed to convey some useful information—only the weaker
(non-contradictory) scope will be salient, since only it will be nor-
mally noticeable in conversation. So there is a clash between the
controversy-based perspective on salience, and a conversational or
pragmatic perspective on that notion. Thus, to a first approximation,
we could say that a quantity-like maxim takes precedence over the im-
plicature mechanism and rules out interpretations that are either too
strong or too weak (i.e. are either contradictory or trivial).12 I also ap-
peal to a piece of intuitive phenomenological data: the contradictions
are just striking and once one gets an instance of inconsistent scope
(or more generally disambiguation) of a sentence, it is easy to see the
same pattern occurring in other sentences as well. I shall return to
this matter in §2.3.
12 That being said, there may be independent syntactic or semantic reasons (e.g. per-
taining to tense) for which the inverse scope reading is not available. For now, it is
important that we have a unitary constraint on the treatment of both the modal and
non-modal examples.
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2.2.2.3 ACD again
ACD data have been shown to pose problems to strong economy, as
they can produce stronger scopes. Consider (22)-(26), repeated here
for convenience.13 The fact that ACD cases involve covert movement
in order to avoid infinite regress does not seem to have any signifi-
cant effect on the way the implicature mechanism functions. So we
expect the same scopal possibilities as in non-elided cases involving
the same pairs of operators (e.g. negation and universal QP, as in
(51a)).
51. a) Mary didn’t invite everyone that I did ∆. (∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
• surface scope: not everyone that I invited was invited
by Mary (¬ > ∀)
• surface scope implicature: ∃x Mary and I invited x
• inverse scope: Mary didn’t invited anyone that I in-
vited (∀ > ¬)
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and in-
verse scope ⊥
b) John didn’t agree to visit every city Mary did ∆.
(∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
c) Beck didn’t read a report on every suspect Kollberg did.
(∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
52. a) Kollberg didn’t want every book that Mary wrote.
de dicto, de re
• surface scope: not every book that Mary wrote was
such that I wanted it (¬ > ∀)
• surface scope implicature: there were some books that
Mary wrote and I wanted
• inverse scope: I didn’t want any book that Mary wrote
(∀ > ¬)
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and in-
verse scope ⊥
b) Kollberg didn’t want every book that Mary did ∆.
only de re14
The surface scope readings are more salient, thanks to the results of
the inconsistency tests and the markedness of the inverse scope read-
ing for expressing the proposition it expresses (cf. using the more
natural anyone or any instead of everyone or every to express the in-
verse scope reading). However, under a specific intonation, we can
13 Perhaps an easier way to get ambiguities in (51a)-(51c) is by replacing the universal
quantifiers with existential ones (and in particular with someone, some).
14 I should remark that this ‘only de re’ judgement is not predicted by the CB account.
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get the inverse scope readings as well. The scopal readings are ob-
tained in these examples either by pulling only the quantifier phrases
out of their place (inverse scope reading), or by pulling the negation
too, landing it before the quantifier phrase (surface scope).15 As I re-
marked, if these scopal possibilities really exist (and this seems to me
plausible), they are counterexamples to the strong economy account,
but not to my pragmatic account. I predict the inverse scopes to be
admissible, because the corresponding implicature sets are inconsis-
tent.
2.2.3 Empirical issues
I have applied the implicature mechanism to the representative cases,
which is enough to give a sense of the explanatory possibilities of
the pragmatic account. Further examples and overall information
about the scopal readings, entailments and implicatures entering the
pragmatic computation is summarised in the table in appendix D. In
another appendix (C), I provide the definitions of the main notions of
the controversy-based account and prove the principal claims about
the admissibility of various types of scopal configurations. In the rest
of the section, I want to address some of the empirical worries some
readers may have regarding the scopal constructions just discussed.
The empirical domain of the present proposal is too large to allow
for a systematic defence in this chapter. However, I tested some of
the sentences that seem to set my proposal apart from other extant
accounts. Since, moreover, my judgements about these very sentences
seemed problematic to some theorists on their first encounter with
my analysis, I find it useful to summarise my findings here in order
to alleviate the worry that my scopal judgements are incorrect, and
thus do not provide support for my account. 16
To this effect, I gathered data from 30 native speakers of English for
sentences (37b), (37a), (40), (42a), (42b), (47), or, in some cases, very
close equivalents of such sentences. All the sentences are evaluated
by informants in specific contexts (given as one-paragraph vignettes)
on a scale from 1-7 according to how good the sentences appear to
them. I made it clear that matters of style and grammar learned in
school are not important for the evaluation. Rather, what’s important
is whether there is an interpretation of the sentences which is com-
patible with the context and, moreover, whether that interpretation is
15 One final note about the sentences in (52). Pesetsky’s predictions for the elided
sentences (52) make appeal to de re readings. I took these predictions to imply that a
de re reading of the relevant QP will be given by that QP taking scope not only above
the attitude verb want but also above the negation. This is reasonable, since the most
plausible landing site for the QP is Spec-CP (Spec TP is already taken).
16 Many thanks to Paul Elbourne and Yuri Cath for pressing me on this issue, and for
the suggestion that a linguistic survey is needed to support my thesis.
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informative enough and acceptable in regular conversation (further
details in appendix).
• (37b): nearly 30% of the informants find the inverse scope of
this construction good in context, i.e. informants give it grades
from 5-7, and 50% find it bad, i.e. informants give it grades
from 1-3. When ’all’ is used instead of ’every’ in (37b), 50% find
it good, and only about 15% find it bad. I contend that (37b) is
not problematic, given the high percentage of people who find
the inverse scope acceptable.
• (37a) more than 50% of the informants find the inverse scope
of this sentence bad, and 40% found it good. Thus, (37a) is not
problematic for our account.
• (40): more than 70% of the informants find the sentence bad,
and an insignificant percentage find it good. Thus, (40) is prob-
lematic for our account.
• (42a): more than 50% of the informants find the construction
bad under the inverse scope reading, and more than 30% find
it good. Since there is a high percentage of informants that get
the inverse scope reading, I consider that the present account is
not problematic in view of (42a).
• (42b): more than 75% of the informants find the construction
good under the inverse scope reading, and 13% find this bad.
From our standpoint, this is as expected.
• (47): while more than 50% find the inverse scope bad, 40% find
it good. Substituting ’all’ for ’every’, the situation is reversed:
nearly 50% find it good, and nearly 40% find it bad. Therefore,
we have reasons to think that the inverse scope interpretation is
available, in accord with other account.
There are many methodological issues that I skip over here, and
instead adopt the simplest view of the results. Namely, whenever a
reading of the sentence (e.g. the inverse scope reading) is grasped by
at least 30% of the informants, I take the reading to be available and
consider that the rest of the informants just missed that reading. From
this perspective all the constructions but one are compatible with the
present account. Furthermore, given that (40) is the only piece of data
in my data set that proved to be recalcitrant, I consider it appropriate
to hold onto my thesis, with the caveat that one-determiner phrases
should be accounted for by appeal to further restrictions. As I shall
suggest, these constructions are not the only ones for which we need
tools beyond my semantic/pragmatic mechanism. But this is not a
problem at this point of development, since the account applies well
to many other constructions.
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2.3 the controversy-based account
Scope Admissibility is the main principle that governs scope saliency.
Notably, this principle is an economy principle, since it assigns a
grammatical property (saliency) according to the result of a computa-
tion involving a set of logical forms. In this sense, Scope Admissibil-
ity is a global principle of economy, although its globality is very re-
stricted, and compared to pragmatic principles it appears to be fairly
local.
I should stress that the controversy-based account is here presented
as a theoretical possibility rather than an empirical claim. This account
can be viewed as a reinterpretation of the standard interface economy
principles in other theoretical terms. In this section, I shall try to
say more about the theoretical motivation of the controversy-based
account, and what distinguishes it from other principles.
2.3.1 The roles of contradiction
Contradictions play a central role in stating my pragmatic economy
account. But why focus on contradictions? Here, I shall introduce
some suggestive examples, as well as a related theoretical frame-
work, which suggest that contradictions may have an important role
in grammar.
When Russell (1905) introduced his celebrated yacht example—I
thought your yacht was larger than it is—he explicitly connected the in-
verse scope reading—according to which the statement asserts the
absurdity that the yacht is larger than itself—with its contradictory
interpretation. My purpose has been to exploit this fact. I have at-
tempted to connect inconsistency and scope in a systematic manner.
Inconsistency has been recently invoked in the linguistics literature
in order to rule out possible LFs (see Chierchia 2013; Gajewski 2002
and my discussion in the introduction). Here, by contrast, I invoke
inconsistency in order to rule in some pragmatically available—that
is, salient—scopal interpretations.17
Let me elaborate on these points. I start with the observation that
contradictions help the detection of structural ambiguities (including
scopal ambiguities).
17 In the philosophical literature, Brandom (2008) advances a more ambitious semantic
account in which contradiction plays a central role. His account is based on incompat-
ibility, which is a specific notion of contradiction. Brandom puts incompatibility at
the basis of his semantics, in the sense that the semantic values of sentences are de-
fined by way of this notion. Roughly speaking, in his holistic account, the semantic
value of a sentence is the set consisting of all the propositions expressed by sentences
incompatible with the sentence whose semantic value is being defined. The role of
contradiction in my account is more minimal, since I make only the scopal proper-
ties of a sentence dependent on whether it can generate a contradiction and on how
this contradiction is generated.
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53. Contradictions determine relatively more salient disambiguations of
structural ambiguities
a) i. He wishes he was taller than you.
ii. He wish he was taller than himself.
b) i. Oedipus thought that Jocasta was not his mother.18
ii. Oedipus thought that his mother was not his mother.
c) i. It is raining and it is not snowing.
ii. It is raining and it is not raining.
The basic intuition on which I build is that in each pair of construc-
tions in (53a)-(53c), the construction that can generate a contradic-
tion (i.e., the first construction in each pair) is more clearly ambigu-
ous than the construction that does not generate a contradiction (i.e.,
the second construction in each pair). Thus, (53(a)ii) may be inter-
preted in a contradictory way, as someone’s wish that his height h be
greater than h. But the same construction can be also interpreted as
expressing his wish to be taller than he is. Further, the construction in
(53(b)ii) may be used to attribute a contradictory thought to the effect
that Oedipus’ mother is not his mother, but also the coherent thought
that a particular person (Jocasta) is not his mother. The construction
in (53(b)ii) can also be interpreted as either asserting that at particular
point in time it is both raining or not raining, or as asserting the more
reasonable thought that at some point in time/space it’s raining, and
that at another point it is not raining. All these constructions make it
manifest that they can be interpreted in at least two ways, and they
make this semantic/pragmatic property (viz. structural ambiguity)
manifest more clearly than the similarly structured sentences in each
pair. The type of ambiguity with which I am concerned is scopal am-
biguity, but the correlation that I am positing holds more generally
about any type of structural ambiguity.
Examples such as (53(a)ii), (53(b)ii), and (53(c)ii) are common cur-
rency in the linguistic and philosophical literature, and are deployed
to make (and test) various points about the meanings of the con-
stituent expressions, as well as about the psychological attitudes of
the utterers (and hearers) of these constructions. But note that all
these theoretical remarks have something in common. They (implic-
itly or explicitly) rely on the structural ambiguity of the examples
(53(a)ii), (53(b)ii), and (53(c)ii). In contrast, they do not rely (or, at
least, they rely less often) on the ambiguity of constructions such as
(53(a)i), (53(b)i), and (53(c)i). The former type of example may be
taken as a heuristic basis for the claim that the latter type of example
is also structurally ambiguous. My key point is that there is a good
reason, originating in an essential property of language, for this the-
oretical methodology. The point is that contradictions make salient
18 Examples (53(b)i)–(53(b)ii) are from Reinhart (1983a).
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the different readings of linguistic constructions, including both the
contradictory and the non-contradictory readings.
This point may seem common-sensical. Of course, one might say, if
a cooperative hearer finds an utterance to be contradictory, she must
look for alternative ways of interpreting the utterance, and thus she
will be prone to discovering structural ambiguities. In contrast, the
same reasoning goes, there is no incentive for finding ambiguities in
utterances that are non-contradictory, but rather contingent. Thus,
from the perspective of rational and cooperative communication, it
might seem unsurprising that ceteris paribus contradictions disclose
ambiguities better than contingencies. However, while I agree with
these remarks, the correlation that I want to draw between contra-
diction and structural ambiguity is stronger. My contention—and at
the same time my speculation—is that it is because a construction can
generate a contradiction, rather than due to cooperativeness consid-
erations, that the construction has two (or more) salient readings.
I take a contradictory assertion to be an assertion which cannot be
true. So the sentences traditionally known as contraries—i.e., those
sentences that cannot be true together but can be all false—and con-
tradictories—i.e., those sentences that can be neither together true nor
false together—are both contradictions, in my terms.
Borrowing a distinction between types of trivial sentences from
Chierchia (2013, 49ff), it is worthwhile noting that these contradic-
tions are not strictly G-trivial, but are rather part of the larger category
of L-trivial sentences. L-trivial sentences are those that are true/false
in any interpretation of the lexical items, by attributing the same de-
notation to the lexically identical items. That is, L-trivial sentences
are true/false just in case we interpret the lexical items uniformly and
keep the meanings of the functional items fixed. G-trivial sentences
are a subset of the L-trivial sentences and are characterised by being
true/false irrespective of the (uniform or non-uniform) interpretation
of lexical items. In other words, a sentence is G-trivial even if we ran-
domly (non-uniformly) substitute the lexical items with other lexical
items.
Since I am here interested in contradictions, I focus on the two
types of triviality that produce falsehood under (uniform and non-
uniform) interpretations. This type of L-triviality is called L-contradic-
tion and corresponds to the broader notion of G-contradiction (ob-
tained by giving up uniformity of value assignment or substitution).
My claim that L-contradiction is correlated with ambiguity (and, in
particular, scopal ambiguity) suggests an interesting ramification con-
cerning the role of contradiction in the grammar. G-contradiction
has the negative role of ruling out logical forms as ungrammatical,
whilst L-contradiction has a permissive/positive role insofar as it de-
termines which logical forms (e.g. scopal readings) are allowed.
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So these are the roles contradictions may have in the grammar. It
should be stressed that my point is based on the correlation between
contradictions and structural ambiguities, rather than on the precise
implementation of such correlation. Although not itself a processing
account, the idea trades on a processing remark: the contradiction-
potential of an ambiguous structure makes the ambiguity (and thus
the possible readings that disambiguate the ambiguous construction)
more salient.
2.3.2 Pragmatism and Controversy
The sort of principles I have appealed to are sensitive to semantic
information, including information that is given contextually. These
principles are optional and defeasible. They can freely compete with
other principles, thus determining the salient interpretations. So, op-
tionality, competition, and information sensitivity are the criteria that
make our approach semantic/pragmatic. I say that the CB account
is semantic/pragmatic, rather than pragmatic, because I do not want
to prejudge the linguistic nature of scalar implicatures—which are
part of the mechanism.19 I shall call the controversy-based account
pragmatic, insofar as the relevant comparison class consists of the
interface economy principles, rather than Gricean principles. How-
ever, the difference between controversy-based principles and other
economy principles should not be inflated.
The CB account is close to what Reinhart (2006) called interface
strategies. Their underlying principles are competing with each other,
and thus are optional rather than obligatory. Interface strategies are
also permeable to contextual factors. Still, the present proposal differs
from Reinhart’s in that, according to my view, the pragmatic prin-
ciples ultimately concern the salience of semantic/pragmatic struc-
ture (scope) rather than syntactic structure, and salience may be af-
fected by pragmatic factors beyond contextual information (e.g. by
the Gricean maxim of manner, or a similar principle). Thus, this ac-
count can be seen as a semantic/pragmatic reinterpretation of the
extant principles of economy. It offers the resources to alleviate some
of the problems faced by strong economy, whilst preserving the main
insights of the standard principle of economy, and, to a lesser extent,
the predictions of strong economy. I made a prima facie claim that this
account can deal better with many of the problematic cases and thus
can throw new light on the nature of linguistic economy.
One important feature of the present account is that it exploits the
potential interactions between implicatures (and other implications)
19 Hence, I remain neutral on whether scalar implicatures are semantic, as argued in
Chierchia (2004), or pragmatic, as argued in Sauerland (2004). As I suggested above,
I shall likely obtain more constraints on my account once I consider more in detail
the linguistic nature of scalar implicature.
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of scopal readings and the availability or accessibility of those scope
readings. Thus, the key idea is that some implicatures have direct
or indirect consequences on scope possibilities, in a similar way that
entailments sometimes do.20 On the CB view, the interactions be-
tween implicatures (or other implications) and scope are mediated
by contradictions. This is explicit in the way the implicature sets are
formed, since these sets contain both the scopal logical form and the
entailments and scalar implicatures of these forms. There is yet an-
other important constraint on the way the potential inconsistency of
the implicature set affects scopal saliency.
I have implicitly assumed all along an ordering on the implicature
sets given by Scope Admissibility, an ordering that I shall call Grad-
ability. The basic idea of Gradability is the following. Scope is a pro-
cessing phenomenon: the more difficult it is to get the inconsistency,
the more difficult it is, ceteris paribus, to obtain the corresponding
scopal reading.21 Thus, if the contradiction is at the level of the entail-
ments or primary implicatures of an inverse/surface scope reading,
then the scope should be readily available. Scope will be less salient if
the inconsistency appears only at the level of secondary implicatures.
The limiting case is where the inconsistency never appears, and con-
sequently the inverse scopes are never allowed. However, some of
these distinctions may be too fine-grained to see directly and thus to
have a perceivable effect (e.g. distinctions between contradictions ob-
tained from primary implicatures and those obtained from secondary
ones), but the extreme cases should be clear.
But what is the rationale for constructing inconsistent sets that allow
scopal structures? In other words, why are inconsistencies of impli-
catures and other forms important for scope flexibility and salience?
A general pragmatic motivation for Admissible Scope may be that
the inconsistency potential of a logical form is an indicator of a real
possibility for taking sides in a conversation, debate, or controversy,
for deciding who is right (by finding counterexamples), or for elimi-
nating falsehoods (in case there are assumptions that you take to be
right). It is a way of establishing the potential positions one may take
in a conversation, or, otherwise put, a way to orient oneself in the log-
ical space opened up by the implicature set of a given sentence. The
aim of a participant in a conversation is to find disjoint partitions in
this logical space—viz. to work out which positions are inconsistent.
Thus, the constructions that can create controversy are valued and
20 It is well known that some inverse scope logical forms are entailments of the surface
scope under particular assumptions, and this suggests the possibility of two-way
interaction between scope and entailment.
21 For any scopal structure formed from two linguistic operators O1O2, we get sym-
metrical results regarding the two possible scopes. This is because the two scopal
readings and their implicatures will form identical sets of propositions, and conse-
quently their consistency status will be the same. See the appendix C for demonstra-
tion.
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endowed with scope flexibility and salience. Otherwise put, only the
scopal readings that can generate fine partitions in the logical space
(viz., the common ground of a conversation) are conversationally at-
tractive.
As I pointed out, there is a tension between allowing scopes that
can determine ‘controversy’, and the usually assumed pragmatic pres-
sure to remove trivial and contradictory scopal readings (see e.g. the
comparatives under intensional operators above). This is a tension
between the principles of controversy (Scope Admissibility and Grad-
ability) and a principle of charity or the Gricean norms of cooperative
communication. The latter are supposed to apply pressure towards
removing assumptions that introduce inconsistency in the system.
There are ways to alleviate this tension. One is to take the tension
as a contingent fact about the cognitive system. We can see the ten-
sion (e.g. the one produced by the modalised comparative cases) as a
limit case of the interaction between the principles of controversy and
cooperativeness. That is to say, the two principles work well together,
except for cases where one of the scopes is trivial or contradictory.
When this happens, charity wins. (Even for those who cherish de-
bates, it is not rewarding to get into debates with persons behaving
irrationally.)
Another—for all intents and purposes equivalent—way out is to
restate our controversy principles, and in particular Gradability, in
order to build into the definition of Gradability the effect of charity or
cooperativeness. Then, Gradability need not be interpreted as a linear
curve of positive slope, in which salience decreases as the contradic-
tion is derivationally more remote. Rather, we can take Gradability
to have something like the shape of a bell curve, where constructions
with moderately accessible inconsistencies manifest the most salient
flexible scopes (the pick of the curve), and the rest of the cases, which
involve the quickest contradictions or no contradictions at all, have
less saliency or no saliency at all (the two tails of the curve).
We can see now that the controversy-based account is not just an
extravagant restatement of the Gricean principles of informativeness
(that govern cooperative communication). Looking at the great ma-
jority of the examples surveyed here, one might reason as follows. Of
course, if the scopal readings of a given construction are informative,
we are bound to get a contradiction out of their entailments and scalar
implicatures (see the appendix C for a proof of this claim). Therefore,
according to this reasoning, the two accounts are formally equivalent.
Nevertheless this reasoning cannot be entirely correct. Whilst it is
true that the controversy-based account is equivalent to some Grice-
inspired account over a broad range of data, the two accounts are not
equivalent over the cases that generate contradictions at the level of
the scopal readings, and certainly they don’t have the same rationale.
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As we have seen, the accounts are distinct in how they treat, for
instance, the ‘modal comparative’ construction I thought Paul cooked
fewer croissants than he did. This modal comparative sentence can be
interpreted as expressing an absurdity to the effect that I thought it
possible for a number of croissants—cooked by Paul—to be fewer
than itself. This reading is not ‘cooperative’ in the Gricean sense,
and something else should be said about what is going on in such
cases. One possibility is to explain away such cases: the interpreter is
just failing to be cooperative in zeroing in on the absurd scopal read-
ing. But another more interesting possibility is that such cases are
underscored by the controversy-based principle, according to which
getting contradictions has in general a good value and thus should
be encouraged. On the face of it, an interpretation geared towards
inconsistency is very different from one geared towards cooperative-
ness.
Thus the semantic/pragmatic role of contradictions should be sep-
arated from cooperativeness. Contradictions are detectable even if
their utility in communication does not rely on cooperativeness, which
suggests that their semantic/pragmatic role is different from that of
maximising the rationality and mutual-understanding of the relevant
parties in a communicational exchange. Their role may be ‘spectator’-
oriented rather than speaker- or audience-oriented (though both the
speaker and the hearer can play the role of spectator to their own
utterances). By spectator I mean here the rational agent who weighs
the possible interpretations and implications of a certain utterance,
and, in the case of controversy or debate, thinks about possible ways
of construing the logical space generated by the utterance in favour
of the speaker or in favour of the hearer.
Contradictions are particularly relevant in case of controversy and
debate, since (i) they draw a line between the different opposing posi-
tions to be taken as a result of interpreting a given utterance, and (ii)
they can be used to attack, ridicule, and confound the opponent. Of
course, trying to score points by minimising the rationality of a per-
son cannot be effective in the case of grammatical inferences (since it’s
petty, narrow-minded, and naive to insist on contradictory interpreta-
tions when grammar makes available consistent interpretations), but
can be seen as a reflection in the grammar of a more general, rhetoric
practice.22
Several further remarks concerning salience are in order. I specu-
lated that it is in view of finding contradictions that competent speak-
ers can distinguish between the saliency of scopal readings. As I
22 This proposal is related to the view that logical deduction developed as a form of
dialogical reasoning between opponents—see e.g. Dutilh Novaes (2013)—since the
role of contradictions fits very well within such a story. However, here I do not
purport to argue that the controversy-based account and the attendant notion of
contradiction tell us something about how the notion of scope is learned/discovered
by the competent speakers.
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pointed out earlier, a contradiction in the implicature set can be gen-
erated either by putting together two logical forms which are inconsis-
tent or by an inherently inconsistent logical form. In the former case,
when two logical forms are essential for contradiction, both scopal
readings (corresponding to the two logical forms) are equally salient
according to the CB account. But in the latter case, when a single
logical form is essential for contradiction, the scopal reading corre-
sponding to the logical form is more CB-salient.23 Crucially, we have
direct evidence only regarding the latter case. This is because the in-
consistent scopal readings have a clear phenomenological character,
which makes them noteworthy or salient.24
However, CB-salience (or admissibility) is not to be identified with
this phenomenological character, since we would like to attribute CB-
saliency to scopal readings which lack this character. Moreover, I
proposed that the controversy-based account targets CB-salience (as
a theory-internal notion) and suggested the present account needs
not assume that CB-saliency is all there is to scope. Hence, I left
open whether the grammaticality of scopal possibilities depends on
CB-salience. This being said, it is a further decision point whether
we should entirely do away with an additional grammatical notion
of scopal possibility, and posit that CB-saliency is the unique relevant
grammatical property of scope. For reasons of simplicity, I am in-
clined to reduce scopal possibilities to CB-saliency, but the arguments
in this chapter are neutral on this matter.
2.3.3 Implementations and Challenges
Scope is standardly treated in the syntax, or, on an economy-based
approach, at the syntax/semantics interface. Here I shifted the per-
spective, by building more into the pragmatics and processing, un-
burdening the computations realised by the narrow grammar (viz.
syntax). Moreover, although my account is not syntactic, I assume
the desirability of a ‘clean’ syntax. I would like to keep the syntac-
tic theory as simple as possible (and computationally efficient), and
relegate principles based on competition to semantics/pragmatics in-
23 What do I mean by a scopal reading corresponding to a logical form in the implicature
set? As skeched in many of the rectangles of opposition, the logical form of a scopal
reading may generate entailments or scalar implicatures which are further logical
forms associated with a scopal reading. So, when by logical forms corresponding to
a scopal reading, I mean any of the logical forms associated with a scopal reading:
the logical form of the scopal reading itself, or the logical forms of its entailments
and implicatures. In terms of the rectangle of opposition, the nodes in the two
horizontal layers will host logical forms corresponding to the surface scope reading
(the top layer) and inverse scope reading (the bottom layer).
24 The salience of inconsistent scopes can be observed both intra-sententially (when
compared to the salience of the alternative scopal reading) or extra-sententially
(when compared to the scopal readings of another sentence, namely, readings that
correspond structurally to the inconsistent one).
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terface. This is because we already know that competition-based prin-
ciples are standard within pragmatics, and so our pragmatic theories
should be in a better position to incorporate the particular economy
principles regulating scope (and other phenomena) with minimal the-
oretical assumptions.
A key role is played by the derivation of inconsistency, which af-
fects, within specified conditions, the interaction between scope, im-
plicatures, and other implications. But there is another characteristic
of inconsistency in the interaction between scopes and scalar impli-
catures that we should be able to integrate in the CB-account. Recall
that in the previous chapter, in an attempt to offer a more seman-
tically and pragmatically motivated account of scope in the spirit
of strong economy, I offered a minimal account of how the inverse
scope can be removed via scalar inference. To integrate that minimal
account in the present proposal, we need to add a new layer to the
controversy-based mechanism.
As I have already proposed in this chapter, one layer is devoted
to CB-saliency or what I have called admissibility in the CB account:
saliency due to generating the required inconsistency. The novel layer
is what we might call contextual saliency, that is, saliency due to the
fact that one of the logical forms in the implicature set is indepen-
dently at issue, for reasons external to the implicature mechanism. If
there is (independent) pragmatic reason to make salient one of the
scopal readings, the removal of the opposed scopal reading is guar-
anteed just in case it is stronger. On the minimal account of the previ-
ous chapter, the stronger scopal reading is removed because a weaker
scopal reading implicates the negation of the stronger one, which, ob-
viously, is inconsistent with the stronger scopal reading. This com-
putation reflects a different role that the implicature mechanism can
fulfil, and, at the same time, a different role for contradictions. Their
additional role is to make more salient the weaker scopal reading.
The account that follows is better motivated from a semantic and
pragmatic perspective in the sense that we have independent reasons
to think that the scalar implicatures and scopal readings are already
present in the interpretation of a sentence.
The second layer, and the corresponding role for contradictions, is
a natural extension of the CB account, but, as I pointed out, it may
be a restricted part of the mechanism since it requires special circum-
stances in order for the removal of stronger scopes to take place. In
sum, on the current view, contradiction plays a double role. One is
to decide scopal possibilities (according to Scope Admissibility). The
other is to contribute to the salience of weaker readings, along the
lines of the strong economy proposal.
I find the current account, although perhaps not less theoretically
adventurous than previous accounts, more elegant, conceptually more
natural, and general than the alternatives. From my perspective,
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strong economy builds the strengthening specific to scalar implica-
ture—adding the negation of the stronger scalar item, viz. the stronger
inverse scope—in the grammar, at the interface between syntax and
semantics, as a syntactic constraint, and then has to deal with coun-
terexamples by adding further constraints and restricting the princi-
ple’s domain of application. Some of these constraints and restric-
tions are stipulative, inelegant, or simply appear to lack motivation.
Moreover, an interface principle of economy must assume a feedback
mechanism that sends information back and forth from the seman-
tics to the syntax. No such inelegant assumptions are needed ac-
cording to the current hypothesis. First, Scope Admissibility and
Gradability do the theoretical job properly and elegantly at the se-
mantic/pragmatic level, thus covering the empirical domain of the
original Scope Economy principle. Secondly, in some restricted situa-
tions, the second layer of the controversy-based mechanism removes
strong scopal readings, thus doing part of the job of strong economy.
A concern about my account is the precise ‘implementation’ of the
implicature mechanism. I cannot offer a satisfactorily solution to this
problem here, but I shall at least introduce two potential strategies
for implementing the controversy-based pragmatic principles, and re-
spond to some immediate worries that might arise from these op-
tions.25
I envision the following strategies or implementation possibilities.
54. On-line processing: in order to settle on scope salience, the sur-
face and inverse scope implicatures are computed (either locally
or globally) and a consistency check then establishes the possi-
ble scopes and their saliency property. On this implementation,
one should expect interactions between these implicatures and
other implications or contextual information.
55. Off-line principle: the effects of implicatures are built into the
pragmatic competence, e.g. through learning or some other sort
of assimilation. The process of assimilation yields an ‘equilib-
rium’ state for the scopal readings. This equilibrium might be
broken by further syntactic and pragmatic constraints.26
It is not clear how to decide between the two strategies, and I
shall limit myself to some indirect remarks.27 It might seem that
25 Note that in order to benefit from the explanatory effects of the present pragmatic
principles, we don’t need to commit to any such option, since the principles can be
evaluated independently of implementation. However, in the long run something
more precise has to be said about their implementation.
26 Note that this is not particularly in tension with the online implementation. Rather,
it presupposes that some invariants of the online processing are built into the lin-
guistic system. Alternatively, we might remain agnostic about the relation between
the two, and offer the latter strategy as an abstract description of grammar.
27 The linguistic constructions that might be relevant for empirically distinguishing be-
tween the two implementation strategies are the numerical cases such as (46). These
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the computation of the consistency test is too difficult to be part
of the linguistic system. However, firstly, this is no more difficult
than the computation usually assumed in the interface economy ac-
counts, where mutual entailment should be tested in order to deter-
mine whether a given potential logical form can be licensed or not.
Secondly, we should be uneasy about assessing what form of com-
putational complexity can a human being bear, since we don’t have
an established tractability metric or a direct way to fathom our com-
putational powers. It might turn out that things that seem difficult
to us from a theoretical perspective take much less time to process
online, and, conversely, seemingly simpler things are more difficult
to process. More importantly, from our theoretical—as opposed to a
practical—perspective, it is generally better to have a computationally
burdensome mechanism that is conceptually adequate, rather than
one that is not conceptually adequate but otherwise computationally
more tractable. Therefore, unless we have an equivalent alternative,
we seem to be entitled to endorse the online processing implementa-
tion of the pragmatic principles.
However, the online processing implementation is not the only op-
tion. It is true that in this chapter I have talked as if the the account
concerned online processing, and I have also appealed to some as-
sumptions common to processing accounts (e.g. by my use of terms
like mechanism, computation etc.). However, such talk is not neces-
sary, and the current processing account may take more subtle forms.
The pragmatic mechanism can provide the rationale for economy-
like pragmatic principles. The pragmatic competence may type the
linguistic operators according to their monotonicity and contain (de-
feasible) generalisations as to which types of operator can or cannot
cross each other. On this implementation, the scopal possibilities and
their salience properties can be stated without appeal to the notion
of implicature and consistency, but are nonetheless the result of the
processing geared towards inconsistency, as spelled out by the CB
account.
In other words, we can see the interface principles of economy—
scope economy and generalised scope economy—as a (rough) reflex
of the proposed controversy-based mechanism, but the CB account is
distinct from the interface economy accounts, since the CB account
is essentially semantic/pragmatic rather than syntactic. Moreover, as
we have seen, the CB account covers data that are problematic for the
strong economy principle.
constructions seem to allow for scopal readings even in the absence of concrete in-
formation conducive to inconsistency in the relevant implicature set. This possibility
favours the second (off-line) strategy over the first (on-line) strategy. On the second
strategy, the inconsistency is to do more with the aetiology of scope, or perhaps is
just a purely abstract proposal independent of any implementation, along the stan-
dard ‘competence’ models in theoretical linguistics.
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I used the notion of scope in the broadest sense possible, but many
theoreticians see this notion as much more constrained. Thus, on the
view put forward here, scope is not attributed to quantifiers only, but
extends to other operators, such as intensional operators, bare plu-
rals, and numerical quantifiers. In particular, scope does not depend
on a restrictive definition of quantifier phrases, one which would not
include e.g. indefinites. Indefinites enter scope interactions as well,
since, in some cases at least, they have the same kind of intuitive
truth-conditional effects as quantifiers.28 Moreover, I have assumed
that focus uncovers scopal possibilities. I have not argued for this
more liberal notion of scope, but there is reason to think that my pro-
posal will be relevant on other ways of drawing the boundaries of
scope. As I remarked, the controversy-based account can be gener-
alised to other types of structural ambiguities. Thus, even if we were
more accurate in what we identity as scope,29 the present pragmatic
account would arguably remain in place, since it is primarily sensi-
tive to truth-conditional properties and entailment patterns, rather
than to the specifics of potential definitions of scope.
I made a first case for the difference between the extant economy
principles and the CB account in terms of the general assumptions
about explanation and their distinct predictions. To be sure, we have
to devise new ways to compare and distinguish the economy princi-
ples by further linguistic tests. It would be also helpful to sharpen
the account of the interaction between the pragmatic principles and
other syntactic and semantic principles, e.g. by taking a closer look at
the relation between intonation, focus and scope possibilities. In ad-
dition, the CB account needs development in order to pin down the
rationale for having such a mechanism at the linguistic system’s dis-
posal. I cannot hope to cover all the scope data with the controversy-
based account, and many of the examples discussed in the previous
chapter remain still to be accounted for (e.g. the collective readings
of few in (35), and the ACD example (52b)). However, I can give a
coherent analysis of the cases that seem to be covered by both the
original and the generalised (strong) economy condition, and then of
some constructions that are problematic for those principles.
To be sure, syntactic constraints should definitely be taken into ac-
count, since scope seems to be dependent on such constraints. There
28 However, note that indefinites played only a minor role in our discussion. In par-
ticular, I haven’t relied on data involving indefinites in arguing against strong econ-
omy in the previous chapter. Furthermore, I am aware that the constraints on the
scope of indefinites are significantly different from those of other operators, and
thus that my account cannot satisfactorily cover indefinites in the absence of further
constraints. Quite apart from direct constraints on scope, indirect constraints such
as specificity–as e.g. proposed in Hawthorne and Manley 2012, p. 93—should be
taken in consideration in order to make the rigtht predictions about the scope of
indefinites.
29 See Szabolcsi (2010, 83ff) for an argument to the effect that scope is indeed a very
broad and diverse phenomenon.
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are well-known cases where truth-conditionally identical and neu-
trally marked sentences have different scopal properties.30 It remains
to be seen how best to conceive of the interaction between the CB ac-
count and the categorical syntactic constraints on scope. Whilst I do
not deny that there are syntactic constraints on scope, I contend that
they are not best seen as interface economy principles. Otherwise put,
economy principles are better seen as a reflection of our pragmatic,
controversy-based principles: Scope Admissibility and Gradability.
This completes the first part of the thesis. So far I have been con-
cerned with the explanatory potential of the views of scope that give
pride of place to economy considerations and entailment in gram-
mar. I have found that a semantic/pragmatic account is more natural
than the syntactic/semantic one, although it is clear that the precise
form of the latter remains to be refined. It is thus a good idea to
invest our efforts into exploring the empirical potential of the seman-
tic/pragmatic account, by further examining (i) the role of contradic-
tions in disambiguating scope, as well as (ii) the purported relation
between scope and scalar implicatures. Even if the controversy-based
account, in the present form, might not earn its explanatory keep, I
think that the two independent ideas on which it is based are worth
exploring, especially in the current research context where more and
more refined theories of scalar implicatures and logicality of gram-
mar are being developed.
In the next part of the thesis, I turn to the other area where econ-
omy principles seem to do a substantive explanatory work—the the-
ory of binding. As in this part, I shall end up on the side of the
semantic/pragmatic camp. But before reaching that point of the ar-
gumentation, we need to see why—and how—is economy supposed
to answer binding problems.
30 There are cases that suggest that important syntactic restrictions on scope are in
place. The following example from Aoun (1985, p. 164), credited to Noam Chomsky,
is a case in point.
56. a) Someone expects that everyone will be elected. *(∀ > ∃)
b) Someone expects everyone to be elected. (∀ > ∃)
This contrast reflects the sensitivity of scopal possibilities to the type of clause (com-
plementiser phrase) in which the universal quantifier is embedded. The syntactic
constraint against inverse scope seems to be categorial and non-negotiable. How-
ever, our liberal account of scope is also compatible with having the syntax impose a
strong, but non-categorical, constraint on the pragmatic scopal possibilities. Syntax
will impose costs for specific scopal readings, but these costs can be traded off, and
thus the syntactic constraints can be, at least sometimes, defeated or obviated.
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Part II
ECONOMY-BASED ACCOUNTS OF B IND ING
3 B IND ING ECONOMY PROBLEMS
3.1 introduction
3.1.1 The basic argument
This is the first of two chapters dealing with aspects of binding theory.
In this chapter, I present a general methodological outlook on binding
and set the stage for the positive account of binding phenomena that
I will present in the next chapter.
At the most general level, the thrust of the argument is that in-
voking a two-sided communication between ‘modules’—specifically,
syntax and semantics/pragmatics—is too costly as long as other mod-
els resting on one-sided communication are in view. From a design-
perspective, any feedback from semantics/pragmatics to syntax im-
plies that the entire, two-module, system has to do more work, be-
cause one of the modules has to do its work twice. This is not so
on a standard, one-sided informational model. Further, the less two-
sided informational transfers are documented empirically, the more
problematic it is to posit an instance of such an informational trans-
fer. Naturally, the usefulness of a given mechanism increases with
its wider applicability in the system, but if the economy mechanisms
are claimed to be just ‘exceptions’ they appear not to be very use-
ful after all. As I shall make clear, the economy-computation seems
rather marginal, even by the lights of their advocates. I think that we
can eschew the suggested pitfalls of the standard economy accounts,
and in this part of the thesis I seek to show that there is no need for
positing a two-sided communication between the syntax and seman-
tics/pragmatics, since accounts that assume a standard (one sided)
informational link between the two ‘modules’ are equally appropri-
ate for the main explanatory tasks.
In order to argue that the explanatory strategies in terms of in-
terface economy have significant conceptual limitations, I shall take
a distinctive methodological stance, and I shall stress the virtues of
simplicity, economy, and non-ad hocness of an explanation over the
virtues of another respectable theory choice criterion, namely, empiri-
cal adequacy. As far as this chapter’s negative argument is concerned,
I do not pretend to offer conclusive arguments against interface econ-
omy principles, but just to show that they are problematic in a way
that cannot be offset by their current empirical success. Moreover,
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things will look significantly different for the prospects of the, cur-
rently dominant, interface economy accounts in case we could argue
for a positive view that takes up their explanatory task.
This chapter and the next constituting the second part of the the-
sis share some structural and thematic ideas with the previous two
chapters (making up the first part of the thesis). Just as in the case of
scope phenomena discussed in the first part of the thesis, I shall start
out by presenting the problems of interface economy, and then move
to a more promising, pragmatic account that can deal satisfactorily
with these problems. An important difference in the theoretical set-
ting is that here I’m concerned with binding. This is not the place to
review the vast literature on binding, but I shall present just enough
to have a picture about the relevant explanatory problems, and how
linguistic economy is supposed to tackle these problems.
3.1.2 Binding and economy
In stating the so-called binding theory, Noam Chomsky (1981) unified
previous theoretical hypotheses about binding, and the resulting the-
ory has ever since been considered one of the landmarks of syntactic
analysis. As we shall see, this theory has far reaching implications
in terms of the meaning of noun phrases such as pronouns, proper
names, definites, etc., implications that can be drawn out by carefully
studying the anaphoric relations between noun phrases.
The binding theory consists of three general conditions on the pos-
sible referential dependencies of noun phrases, that is, on how the
referent of one expression depends on the referent of another. Thus,
John likes himself and John likes him will, on the binding theoretic view,
introduce contrasting referential dependencies. Himself depends as
to its referent on the referent of John, whilst him needs to refer to a
person other than John. These are the basic consequences of the principles
A and B of binding theory. Moreover, the Principle C of binding the-
ory disallows referential dependency in constructions such as He likes
John, positing that proper names are always referentially independent;
consequently, John cannot be understood as depending referentially
on he. The relevant principles (or conditions) of the binding theory
can be summarised roughly as follows.
56. The three principles/conditions of binding theory
• Principle A: a reflexive should be bound in its domain.
• Principle B: a pronoun should be free (i.e., not bound) in
its domain.
• Principle C: referential expressions (e.g. proper names, def-
inites) should be everywhere free.
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However, Gareth Evans (1980) demonstrated that some initial ver-
sions of the binding principles have clear counterexamples, and, ar-
guably, his counterexamples carry over to Chomsky’s statements of
the binding principles as well. Several other counterexamples have
been acknowledged since the very beginning of the binding-theoretic
approach. At the same time, in the linguistics literature, Tanya Rein-
hart (1983a) tried to accommodate some of these difficulties by ap-
pealing to a certain division of labour between syntax and seman-
tics/pragmatics. In this part of the thesis (and especially in the next
chapter) I shall build on the tradition initiated by Reinhart, trying to
explore a general semantic/pragmatic solution to binding theoretic
problems, such as the Evans-type counterexamples and many other
interesting, but less well known cases, which so far seem to resist a
unitary account.
In the present chapter, I start with the exposition of two economy
principles (§§3.2.1–3.2.2.) and argue (in §3.3) that they suffer from
lack of conceptual and methodological motivation, mainly because
they are not in line with the fruitful role the economy principles
were designed to have in the binding-theoretic framework broadly
conceived. This shows that, from a broadly explanatory perspective,
the truth-conditional (interface) economy principles provide ‘dimin-
ishing returns’.
In making my methodological claims, I assume two desiderata for
an economy based account. These desiderata are distilled from the
original motivation for positing linguistic economy principles, as for-
mulated in the initial economy-based frameworks. Firstly, the overall
aim of economy principles was to secure a unification and simplifica-
tion of the grammar, and to generalise over a vast array of linguistic
phenomena (Chomsky 1995, cf. Chomsky 1981). Secondly, the econ-
omy principles have semantic/pragmatic motivation, as argued most
forcefully in the leading account of binding economy phenomena due
to Reinhart (1983b). (See chapter 1 for a more precise articulation
of these two desiderata.) Within the mainstream economy-based ac-
counts, these desiderata appear to be inconsistent, but, in fact, they
can be met within a non-standard account. After showing that some
recent uses of the economy principles fall short of these and other re-
lated methodological standards, I explain why the two desiderata are
important, and, in the next chapter propose a general economy-based
account of binding that meets both of them.
My critical discussion is based on two study cases, both of which in-
volve principles of truth-conditional binding economy. According to
our working definition of economy, a principle of economy regulates
the competition between two or more linguistic forms. The linguistic
forms entering the competition have to satisfy certain grammatical
requirements. The study-cases are formulated in terms of a particu-
lar type of economy principle, viz. truth-conditional economy. On
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the truth-conditional account of economy, the winning strategy has
to do with the ‘novel’ truth-conditions (or semantic payoffs) that a
linguistic form can bring. The novelty of the truth-conditions should
be assessed relative to the available alternatives, i.e., relative to the
truth-conditional meanings of the competitors. Naturally, in the con-
text of binding, the economy competitors will involve linguistic forms
that realise (or fall short of realising) a certain type of binding relation.
The truth-conditional economy principles are ‘interface’ principles be-
cause the syntactic well-formedness of linguistic forms depends on
some of their semantic properties. Therefore, in order to establish the
grammaticality of a certain linguistic form, grammar should consult
the interface between syntax and semantics/pragmatics.
3.2 binding economy: study-cases
3.2.1 Economy and the de se/de re distinction
3.2.1.1 De dicto vs. de re vs. de se
It is important, first, to settle on a working terminology regarding
some widely discussed notions in the linguistic literature, whilst re-
maining neutral with regard to how best to conceive of the syntax
and compositional semantics associated with these notions. To begin
with, I distinguish between de re, de dicto, and de se interpretation of
linguistic expressions. These notions are tied up with the possible at-
titudes one might have in using words with de re, de dicto, and de se in-
terpretations. In this chapter, I am concerned with attitude ascriptions
or reports rather than with the psychological attitudes themselves, as
only the former are linguistic phenomena proper. A de dicto interpre-
tation of an expression is given by what an attitude holder knows
about that expression, or, more precisely, by a description which un-
derlies the attitude holder’s interpretation of that expression. The
interpretations which are said to be de re are taken here to mean that
the corresponding expressions are directly referential and invariant
across possible worlds. Once the denotation of an expression is fixed,
the denotation of the expression will remain the same in all the possi-
ble situations in which we might use the expression. Let us illustrate.
57. De dicto vs de re
a) Helen believes that the student who got the highest mark is
the best.
b) Helen believes that Maria is the best.
The de dicto interpretation is obtained in (57a) in case Helen is re-
ported as thinking of the referent of the definite the student who got the
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highest mark through the descriptive condition student who got the high-
est mark. In other words, it is perfectly compatible with positing a de
dicto attitude that Helen does not know who the student in question
is. The student in question is whoever meets the descriptive condi-
tion. According to the de dicto ascription there may be many possible
referents of the definite as far as Helen’s beliefs are concerned. In
contrast, in the case of de re attitude ascriptions, Helen is reported
as referring to a particular individual, irrespective of the descriptive
conditions that particular individual satisfies. In (57b), the particular
person is Maria. De re ascriptions are not restricted to utterances con-
sisting of proper names, like Maria. For instance, we could say that
Helen believes that she is the best, as long as we make clear what the
referent of the pronoun she is, and, in particular, that the pronoun
refers to Maria. Likewise, a definite like the student who got the highest
mark can be also used to pick out in a de re manner Maria. But in
this case, as opposed to the de dicto reading which is intended for the
same definite in (57a), the descriptive condition is not essential: it is
just used in order to pick out a unique individual. When the speaker
ascribes a de re attitude whose embedded clause contains a definite
description (e.g. the student who got the highest mark), the descriptive
condition (in the definite description) fixes for the speaker/ascriber the
referent of the definite description.
De se expressions express first-personal attitudes. This amounts to
saying that, in using a de se expression, the attitude holders are well
aware that the attitude is targeting themselves, rather than some other
persons whose full identity is unknown to the attitude holders. Take
for instance
58. I believe I am the best in my class.
An ascription of de se belief asserts that not only I believe that a
particular person, Andrei, is the best in his class, but moreover that
I am aware (and thus also believe) that it’s me who is the best. The
crucial distinction can be presented by the direct discourse I’m able
to make in the context of the ascription in (58). I may be able to say
only That person is the best in my class, in which case I am ignoring the
identity of that person. This is a non-de se attitude. But I may be able
to say I am the best in my class, in which case I know the identity of
that person, and, crucially, I know that that person is myself. So a de
se attitude requires self-awareness and reporting that someone has a
de se attitude is also reporting that that person is aware that she (as
opposed another person that may share all the relevant properties) is
the object of the attitude.
Now, these are the intuitive distinctions between de dicto, de re, and
de se. It is possible to define these notions so as to have de se as a
species of de re, and de re as a species of de dicto. We use the appa-
ratus of centred possible worlds, pairs 〈w, x〉 consisting of a possible
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world w and an agent x who is the centre of that world. Any centred
propositional content p of a purely de re (i.e. non-de se) attitude is
such that it satisfies the triviality condition: 〈w, x〉 ∈ p iff 〈w,y〉 ∈ p,
for any world w and agents x and y. Otherwise put, de re contents do
not depend on the centre (agent), and thus are like propositions in the
possible worlds semantics, i.e., are sets of possible worlds (which can
be thought of as worlds where that proposition is true). A de se propo-
sitional content does not satisfy the triviality condition, and hence is
a more fine grained centred proposition in which the centre makes
a difference. For any trivial centred proposition there will be many
non-trivial centred propositions, and thus someone may believe the
former proposition without believing any of the multiple correspond-
ing non-trivial centred propositions. In a similar vein, we can ascribe
belief in the former without ascribing belief in any of the latter.
Furthermore, we can think of de re semantic values as actualised
de dicto. That is, for any expression e interpreted de re, the semantic
value of e across possible worlds is the semantic value that e has at
the actual world w@. The same expression e interpreted in a general
(non-actualised) de dicto fashion will have the same semantic value
at w@ (as the de re semantic value), but will have different semantic
values at other possible worlds.
The de re propositional contents (sets of trivial and non-trivial cen-
tred worlds) will be subsets of de dicto propositional contents, because
the former do not display the variability of the latter across possible
worlds. To illustrate, (57a), Helen believes that the student who got the
highest mark is the best, is a report of an attitude whose content is the
set of centred worlds p in case the attitude is de dicto and q in case
the attitude is purely de re. (I leave aside, for the moment, the irrel-
evant centre coordinate and look only to the world coordinate of the
centred possible world parameter.) Now, because the de re interpre-
tation of the description the student who got the highest mark refers to
a unique student s in all the worlds in which s exists, q will be the
set of worlds where s is the best. It is clear that p is a superset of q
since, according to the de dicto interpretation of the description, many
people (including s) may satisfy the description at various possible
worlds.1
Before examining our study-case proper, two specific terminolog-
ical points remain to be made. Firstly, logophoric or [log] elements
are those expressions that are automatically interpreted as referring
1 The semantics of attitude verbs is not my focus, but it is useful to know that such a
semantics is definable in terms of the notions just introduced. To believe a centred
proposition p is for each centred world compatible with one’s beliefs to satisfy what
is asserted in that proposition. In the pure de dicto and de re cases, the p should be
compatible with what the agent believes, i.e., the worlds compatible with what the
agents believes must be a subset of the worlds of p. A de se belief is a belief according
to which all the centred propositions 〈w ′, x ′〉 are such that x ′ is the attitude holder
(or its counterpart) in the belief worlds. Ascriptions of belief may be ambiguous
between de re, de se and de dicto.
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to the attitude holder of the main clause. Another notion that will
play a key role in the coming discussion is the notion of guise. For
the purposes of this chapter, I take guises to be disguised definite de-
scriptions, and I leave the nature of definite description unanalysed.
3.2.1.2 Economy of the de se and de re
Several theorists (e.g. Bu¨ring 2005; Heim 1998; Schlenker 2005) have
suggested that, for binding theory to become more empirically ade-
quate, we need to formulate the semantics of noun phrases in terms
of guises. As I shall show, guises play a crucial role in accommodat-
ing important counterexample to binding theory, if they are supple-
mented by the right principle of economy. Let us assume for the sake
of argument that the right principle of economy is one that imposes
the closest binding link (Fox 2000). For instance, when a pronoun
(e.g. me) appears in a sentence, linguistic economy requires that the
pronoun should ‘look for’ the closest binder (e.g. proper name, op-
erator etc.). The pronoun in question will take as its semantic value
a guise, viz. the descriptive designator under which the referent of
the pronoun is given (see §0.2.3 in the introduction). Against this
theoretical background, Anand (2007) suggests that even if guises are
in general available, in certain contexts they are not relevant for the
economy mechanism. More precisely, the thought is that the econ-
omy principle is insensitive to the distinction between de re and de se.
Let us look more closely at the role of the ‘insensitivity’ assumption
in analysing the target linguistic data. Anand contends—building on
observations by Chierchia (1989)—that a special operator, OPlog, is at
least some times responsible for the de se readings of pronouns such
as me in the example below. Anand’s data, with the binding items
(binder and bindee) highlighted in grey, are the following.
59. I dreamt I kissed me.
a) I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed me logx. non-local binding
b) I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed me logy. local binding
The construction (59) is part of a longer discourse to the effect that
Lakoff dreamt that he was Brigitte Bardot and that he kissed himself.
The dreamer as well as the reporter in this scenario is Lakoff (the
example was originally introduced by Lakoff 1972). The ‘local bind-
ing’ logical form (LF)—the LF in which the binder and the bindee are
linked at the shortest distance—violates the requirement that [log]
elements must be bound by the logophoric operator. Further, the
argument goes, the non-local binding LF won’t do either, since it
violates binding economy, which enforces local binding. If so, the lo-
gophoric expressions (pro and de se anaphors) cannot be bound by a
de re expression. The principle of economy coupled with an ‘insensi-
tivity’ assumption (to be spelled out below) explains a more general
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phenomenon that Anand calls de re blocking2: expressions with de se
denotations cannot be c-commanded by expressions with de re deno-
tations.3 The key idea is that there is a conflict between economy (qua
minimize the binding link) and the logophoric constraint (requiring
that logophoric operators bind logophoric pronouns) solved in favour
of economy under the assumption that economy does not see truth-
conditional distinctions. It follows that de re NPs cannot c-command
de se ones. The proposal seems to yield the right prediction, but, as
Anand is first to point out, there is a natural question we should ask
before endorsing the de re blocking account: Are we entitled to as-
sume that these two representations are economy competitors in the
first place?
As Anand remarks, the two—local and non-local—representations
are not truth conditionally or denotationally identical, so normally
they shouldn’t be competing with each other.
The local binding produces a de re reading and the non-local bind-
ing produces a de se reading. Lakoff’s dreaming that he himself was
kissed is different from dreaming that the individual who was kissed
is some some person who, unknown to the dreamer, happens to be
Lakoff. The dreaming agent may fail to know the identity of the per-
son in the latter case, whilst such misidentification is impossible in
the former case.
However, the explanation would work in case we posit that Binding
Economy doesn’t ‘see’ the distinction in truth-conditions (or denota-
tion), and rules out non-local binding. In the introduction I made
the distinction between syntactic and semantic principles of economy.
The principle of binding economy falls in the latter category. Con-
sequently, many would frown upon Anand’s economy based mech-
anism which fails to discriminate between the meanings of the two
logical forms. After all, the principle is a semantic economy principle
in virtue of its pursuing semantic payoffs. Anand proposes a fur-
ther hypothesis that makes the insensitivity assumption more palat-
able, namely that condition A—regulating the binding of reflexives—
manifests the same kind of insensitivity.4
For our purposes, the key feature of the first study-case is that
the principle of binding economy is claimed to show insensitivity to
some form of truth-conditional content. The economy computation
is thus modular, in the sense that it cannot be altered unless certain
2 See Anand (2006, p. 52, 2007, p. 10).
3 C-command is the standard structural restriction on binding. In particular, the
antecedent (binder) should be in a position that c-commands the bindee in the syn-
tactic tree. For a node A in the syntactic tree to c-command another node B, it should
be the case that the first branching node dominating A, also dominates B. In other
words, assuming binary trees (viz. trees in which at most two branches can branch
off a node), A is in a c-commanding position relative to B, if it’s B’s sister, or is sister
to a node dominating B.
4 I shall give a different justification of the apparent insensitivity of reflexives in the
next chapter, §4.4.1.
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semantic/pragmatic conditions are met. In the light of the original
pragmatic-based proposal behind the economy principles, this appeal
to economy seems to lack motivation, since it is not entirely clear
what pragmatic purposes such computation might fulfil. Indeed, it
seems that this computation can hardly fulfil any pragmatic purpose
whatsoever.
However, it might be argued that the proposal does make sense
from a syntactic and semantic point of view insofar as it covers some
data that were previously deemed to be problematic. Therefore it
is worth weighing the different aspects of the economy account in
order to see whether the previously mentioned failure is theoretically
acceptable after all. I shall turn to a full assessment of this use of
linguistic economy shortly, and in the next chapter I shall discuss the
same data from a different theoretical perspective.
3.2.2 Economy in copular constructions
3.2.2.1 Copular constructions and connectivity effects
There are several types of copular sentences, among which are the
specificational and predicational constructions. The distinction be-
tween specificational and predicational copular sentences is still un-
der debate. (See Mikkelsen 2011 for a good survey.) Broadly, pred-
icational sentences typically involve a referential or quantificational
phrase in the subject (pre-copular) position, and a (post-copular) pred-
icate complement expressing the property of the subject’s denotation.
In other words, the predicational sentences predicate something of
the subject. They assert that the denotation of the subject has a cer-
tain property, or, alternatively, that the denotation of the subject is a
member of a certain set of entities. Specificational sentences are used
to specify who (or what) something is; they are primarily meant to
identify the (denotation of the) subject rather than assert something
about it. As Mikkelsen (ibid.) suggests, we may think of the subject
of specificational sentences as introducing a variable whose value is
then provided by the post-copular phrase. By contrast, specificational
sentences identify two denotations (individuals, properties, or other
types of semantic value).
Sharvit (1999, p. 302) points out that a way to disambiguate the
specificational and predicational readings of a pseudo-cleft (copular)
sentence such as What John is reading is a book about himself is to ob-
serve the effects of conjuncts added in the post-copular phrase. Thus,
e.g., What John is reading is a book about himself and three other books
has a salient specificational reading, according to which the group
of books that John is reading consists of four books (one about him-
self and three other books). Note, in contrast, the salient reading
of What John is reading is a book about himself and a total bore entails that
John is reading only one book. The sentence asserts that this book has
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two properties: the property of being about John and the property of
being a total bore. This reading is the predicational reading.5
The second study-case involves binding economy in copular sen-
tences. To motivate this principle, let us look at the connectivity phe-
nomenon. Sharvit (1999) remarks that several binding constructions,
and in particular, specificational sentences, obey restrictions that, given
their grammatical configuration, they shouldn’t obey. In other words,
these specificational constructions behave as if they were in a differ-
ent grammatical position (in the phrase marker or tree) than the one
they are actually in. These are the so called Connectivity effects. Here
are a few examples.6
60. Bound Variable Connectivity (ibid.)
a) The woman no mani listens to are hisi wife and hisi
mother in law.
b) What no studenti enjoys is hisi finals.
61. Binding Theory Connectivity (ibid.)
a) What Johni is is a nuisance to himselfi/*j. Principle A
b) What Johni is is a nuisance to him*i/j. Principle B
c) What he*i/j is is a nuisance to Johni. Principle C
The problem raised by connectivity constructions is this. In order
to exhibit the binding patterns they exhibit, the specificational sen-
tences need to have the post-copular phrases in the place indicated
by the gap in the pre-copular phrase. By way of illustration, consider
the following sets of sentences, where (a) consists of a specificational
copular sentence that exhibits connectivity, (b) is a non-copular para-
phrase of the previous sentence in which the binding expressions (a
noun phrase and a pronoun) stand in the standard structural rela-
tion (viz. c-command), and (c) is a non-copular sentence where the
standard structural relation does not hold between the binding ex-
pressions.
62. Bound Variable
a. What [every superhero]i keeps an eye on is hisi arch-enemy.
5 To get to the predicational reading of e.g. What John is is a nuisance to himself, Sharvit
suggests, we need to take the free relation what John is to mean something akin to
being what John is, e.g. a perfectionist. According to the predicational reading of the
previous sentence, being a perfectionist (what John is) is a member of the set of
things that are a nuisance to John. In contrast, the specificational reading of the
same sentence has it that the property of being John is identical to the property of
being a nuisance to John.
6 As usual, I use indices i, j etc. in order to represent the binding relations: two
expressions are bound just in case they bear the same index. Stars * represent the
unacceptability or deviance of a given sentence, and, in this case, they represent the
unacceptability of a sentence bearing such and such indexation.
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b. [Every superhero]i keeps an eye on hisi arch-enemy.
c. *Before Spidermani took off, Gwen taught himselfi a physics
lesson.
63. Principle B
a. *What Spidermani did next was refer himi to some scien-
tific applications.
b. *Spidermani referred himi to some scientific application.
c. Before Spidermani took off, Gwen showed himi a nice
equation.
As can be observed in these examples, there is always a contrast be-
tween (a) and (c), whilst (a) and (b) pattern alike. It follows that the
pronouns within the post-copular phrases (the phrases which exhibit
connectivity) in the (a)-sentences above behave as if they realised the
structural relations in question; specifically, they behave as if they
were c-commanded by their respective antecedents in (62) and as if
they were not c-commanded by their respective antecedents in (63).
These structural relations seem to be missing from (a) but are cer-
tainly realised in (c). (Note that similar patterns occur with the prin-
ciples A and C of binding theory.)
We thus have to reconcile the binding patterns realised by the noun
phrases with their surface position, which, under standard assump-
tions, do not allow binding. Sharvit further observes that, in general,
only specificational, but not also predicational, copular sentences ex-
hibit Connectivity. The explanatory task is to explain why this hap-
pens. Why does connectivity correlate with specificational but not
with predicational readings?
64. Specificational and Predicational sentences show a contrast wrt Con-
nectivity (adapted from Sharvit 1999, 303, ex. 17)
a) *What hei is reading is a book about Johni and three other
books.
b) What hei is reading is (both) a book about Johni and a total
bore.
Assuming that the judgements of acceptability in (64) are correct,
the problem is how to explain the contrast between the specificational
construction (64a) and the predicational construction (64b). The con-
trast concerns the fact that only the former manifests connectivity.7
Connectivity is to be explained, on Sharvit’s account, by noting
the connection between ‘pair-list’ and ‘natural-function’ readings in
questions, on the one hand, and the corresponding specificational
7 This type of connectivity involves the familiar Principle C effect, in the absence of
the required structural relation. Similar contrasts can be formulated for the other
two binding principles.
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and predicational readings of the sentences in question, on the other.
Note the contrast between the possible answers to the question Which
woman does every man love?, on the one hand, and Which woman does
no man love? and Which woman do most men love?, on the other hand.
The contrast concerns the possibility of a ‘pair-list’ answer. Such an
answer can be given only to the first type of question, e.g. John
loves Mary; Bill, Sally; Chris, Sadie and so on until we list all the
men paired with women they love. The pair-list readings are not
available for the second type of question. However, natural-function
readings are available for both types of question. An appropriate
answer to such a reading of the questions is to give the name of
the woman whom no man (or most men) love. These are natural-
function readings because they are based on relative clauses denoting
a (natural) function e.g. from men to the women they love.
I shall omit here the details of the explanation, as they are not essen-
tial to how the economy principle is applied.8 The key point is that
the same kind of ambiguity is found with relative clauses (e.g. what
John is) in pseudo-cleft sentences, and that it is this ambiguity that
is responsible for the distinction between specificational and predica-
tional copular constructions.
3.2.2.2 A revised Binding Economy principle
Let us focus on the connectivity problem concerning the binding con-
ditions B and C. The contrast that needs explaining is the one be-
tween (65) and (66) below, where specificational constructions with
John coreferring with the pronoun is possible only in the former, (65).
(I take coreference to mean covaluation without syntactic binding,
that is, without coindexation—or an equivalent machinery—‘in the
syntax’.)
65. What John is shaving is a pet which belongs to him.
predicational, specificational
66. What he is shaving is a pet which belongs to John.
predicational,*specificational
The correct interpretation of these constructions is not obvious to
me, but I adopt Sharvit’s judgements, and focus on the economy as-
pect of the explanation.9
8 The natural function relative clauses give rise to specificational readings and the
pair-list relative clauses give rise to predicational readings. Bound variable connec-
tivity effects disappear from predicational (pair-list) copular constructions when the
quantifier in the relative clause has either empty or non-unique domains (as is the
case with no man and most men). Thus, among predicational constructions, only those
whose relative clause contains universal quantifiers exhibit connectivity. In contrast,
any quantifier in the relative clause of a specificational construction is compatible
with connectivity.
9 In the next chapter I shall find that we can formulate a more elegant account of
binding on the assumption that such contrast does not exist. However, these con-
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The key point is that in order to explain the Principles B and C
effects, Sharvit appeals to a version of the Rule-I, which is a princi-
ple of economy similar to the one invoked before (Grodzinsky and
Reinhart 1993; Reinhart 1983a).10 Recall that a principle of economy
involves competition between logical forms according to the truth-
conditional meaning they give rise to. In particular, the economy
principle favours bound readings over semantically/pragmatically in-
distinguishable coreferential readings. Sharvit puts forward a revised
version of the economy principle according to which (in my termi-
nology) special bound readings are favoured over indistinguishable
coreferential readings. Special bound readings are indirect binding
configurations obtained by replacing the name John with a pronoun
coindexed with the subject in the relative clause, and the trace in the
gap between the pre- and post-copular phrases with a double indexed
trace. This trace will indirectly bind the newly introduced pronoun to
the subject. These transformations produce a (bound reading) com-
petitor for the coreferential reading. For instance, by applying the
transformations to (66), we get: Whatj hei is shaving tji is a pet which
belongs to himi.
These readings are part of a reference set—set of competitors—that
is formed for the purpose of examining their ‘economy’ features, that
is, their truth-conditional contributions. So, in the reference set for
each of the (65) and (66), there will be a binding and coreferential
logical forms.
Sharvit argues that the specificational (natural function) corefer-
ence reading of (66) can be obtained via a minimally different indirect
binding mechanism, and thus this specificational coreferential read-
ing should be disallowed. That this is so can be checked by using the
following test.
67. What John/he is shaving is a pet which belongs to him and
three of Mary’s dogs. Bill is doing the same thing.
(Sharvit 1999, p. 333)
The first sentence should be disambiguated in favour of the speci-
ficational sentence, according to the disambiguation test above. This
sentence arguably has the configuration obtained by the application
of the transformations presented earlier, with the pronoun him bound
by the subject in the relative clause (John/he). An indication that this is
so is given by the interpretation of the second (elided) sentence. The
second sentence can be interpreted as saying that Bill is shaving a pet
structions are complicated. I had begun by failing to see any contrast here, and
several of my informants had not been able to see the contrast either. At a later stage
of drafting this thesis, I began to see the contrast. Now, I’m simply not certain. In
any case, see footnote 36 for a way to accommodate this contrast in our favourite
framework.
10 See also Cecchetto (2000) for a very similar economy-based approach to the interac-
tion between connectivity and the principle C effect.
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which belongs to Bill. (Assuming parallelism of structure between
the two sentences, it is plausible that the subject and the pronoun are
coindexed in the first sentence.) Therefore, we get a specificational
(indirect) binding reading that is intuitively equivalent to the speci-
ficational coreference reading (66), and, consequently, the economy
principle rules out the latter reading.
In contrast, the predicational coreferential reading is allowed, es-
sentially because pair-list operators are involved. The contribution of
a pair-list operator cannot be simulated by the special binding trans-
formations described above (whilst the natural function relative op-
erator is the usual lambda abstractor, which is present in the bound
reading).11 Hence, the following construction
68. What John/he is shaving is a pet which belongs to him and a
terrible nuisance, and what Bill is shaving too.
is the bound reading obtained by applying the special transforma-
tions to the predicational interpretation of (66) (and contains a further
conjunct to make salient the predicational reading). Now, the crucial
claim is that the logical form of (68) features a pair-list operator and
is distinct from the coreferential predicational LF in (66). To quote
Sharvit, the reason why (66) should be grammatically licensed is the
following.
The [natural function relative operator] is just a lambda-
abstractor, and is basically the same lexical item used in
‘individual’ relative clauses. But the [pair-list relative op-
erator] is a different lexical item – it combines with the
subject so as to extract a witness set from it ... In other
words, the pair-list (bound variable) LF of (106) [our (68)]
and the coreferential predicational LF of (103) [our (66)]
are not minimally different from each other. Therefore,
Rule-I does not rule out the latter. (Sharvit 1999, p. 334)
Notice though that the specificational reading of (66) and the corre-
sponding natural function reading—obtained by making the minimal
changes above—are not exactly equivalent. Hence, indistinguishable
interpretation should be read as “indistinguishable for all pragmatic
intents and purposes.” In Sharvit’s words,
If this approach is to be pursued, more changes are
needed in Rule-I. For one thing, we have to specify ex-
actly what we mean by “indistinguishable.” We do not
want this to mean “equivalent,” for the following reason.
11 I do not demonstrate the points made in the last three paragraphs, because they
would require to lay out the compositional semantics of specificational and predica-
tional. This would take me too far afield, but see Sharvit (1999) for a full discussion
of these points.
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We rule out the specificational reading of (103) [our (66)]
due to the existence of a corresponding functional reading,
which, as (110) [omitted here] shows is not equivalent. It
seems that we need to define “indistinguishable” in more
pragmatic terms. This is just one of the problems that
this approach faces, but the crucial point is that once we
are forced to give up the idea that only c-command rela-
tions give rise to Connectivity, we have to acknowledge
the fact that coreference phenomena require a theory of
Principle C phenomena which is different from the one
offered by the standard GB [Government and Binding] ap-
proach. (Sharvit 1999, p. 334)
We are now in a position to see the common pattern in the two
study-cases of economy-based explanations of binding phenomena.
The key point is that, similarly to the de se/de re cases above, the econ-
omy principle invoked here is insensitive to some truth-conditional
distinctions which would be in principle available (although it is
sensitive to other truth-conditional distinctions). As we have seen,
Sharvit acknowledges that the economy principle is problematic, but
suggests that a pragmatic motivation might be ultimately given for it.
Hence, in contrast to the previous economy-based analysis, here the
motivation for insensitivity is pragmatic rather than modular.12
In the following I argue that this application of the economy prin-
ciple is indeed problematic, and that it is not clear that a refinement
of the principle will do all the explanatory work Sharvit expects from
it. The problems with the notion of economy are much deeper.13
However, I’m sympathetic to the point she makes in the last part of
12 Were there some contextual, pragmatic motivation for distinguishing between the
two, Sharvit would predict that the specificational reading would be available. Since
I can see no contrast between the availability of predicational and specificational
readings of (66), I find it difficult to test this prediction, and I shall leave this pur-
ported pragmatic character of indistinguishability aside.
13 Since the following discussion will be conducted at a general level, let me register
here (without argument) the main problems that I find with Sharvit’s account.
A problem is that even if we find formal differences between the logical forms of
the predicational coreference and binding readings, these do not straightforwardly
translate to truth-conditional differences between the two kinds of reading. Further,
I think those differences cannot be found in the data: the two forms of predicational
sentences do not seem to differ in truth-conditions.
More importantly, if we consider purported difference between, on the one hand,
how the predicational coreference and binding readings truth-conditionally relate
to each other, and, on the other hand, how the specificational coreference and bind-
ing readings do, it is not clear that we can find a notion of indistinguishability that
would classify the former as distinct and the latter as similar. What is the evidence
for the claim that the pair-list operators produce pragmatically significant distinc-
tions between the bound and coreference readings? On the face of it, the purported
truth-conditional difference between the predicational coreference and bound read-
ings is similar to that between specificational coreference and bound readings. This
is reason to deny that there really is a contrast here between predicational and spec-
ificational readings with respect to coreference interpretations.
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the paragraph just quoted, to the effect that we need an approach to
principle C phenomena that is more flexible than the standard Gov-
ernment and Binding approach. (I shall defend such a position in the
next chapter.)
3.3 shortcomings of economy
In order to assess the two uses of economy principles, we need to
recall what theoretical purposes the economy principles needed to
fulfil. The economy principles invoked in the two case studies above
are truth-conditional, as they are sensitive to the semantic values of
entire logical forms (LFs) rather than to the semantic values of certain
non-sentential expressions.
The idea underlying the linguistic frameworks that utilised such
principles of economy—e.g. the minimalist program and, before
it, generative semantics—was to make these principles explanatorily
central. In this spirit, their contribution was to make the account sim-
ple and general. From a semantic/pragmatic perspective, the princi-
ples of economy intervened in the grammar in order to make the LF
of some utterances compliant with the discourse role of the utterances.
(Heim 1998; Reinhart 1983a). It is these two ‘original’ desiderata that
I take to be central to evaluating the explanatory role of more recent
principles of linguistic economy (see §0.2.1).
However, the role of economy principles has changed over time.
Starting with Reinhart (2006) they are explicitly seen as a sort of re-
pair strategy. When the communication between syntax and seman-
tics/pragmatics is less than optimal, the economy mechanism acts as
a fix. In Reinhart’s terms, “the repair strategies involve the applica-
tion of an illicit operation, which is only motivated by the fact that
the output representations of the CS [computational system/syntax]
are not sufficient for the interface needs” (ibid., p.6, cf. pp.37ff.). The
role of the economy principle is to ensure that the application of the
illicit operation (to obtain such and such logical form) is in effect the
best possible solution available.
A similar reasoning also seems to underlie other theoretical uses
of linguistic economy that are not explicitly stating economy as a
repair strategy (e.g. the account of Fox 2000 is based on a modular-
ity assumption which implies, as the repair strategy approach does,
that obviations based on economy are an exception due to truth-
conditional payoffs). I contend that using them as repair strategies
implies that they no longer play a central explanatory role, and they
appear to be explanatorily rather marginal. Moreover, as I shall ex-
plain, the economy principles are computationally and methodologi-
cal problematic. To support my claims, I rehearse the main features
101
3.3 shortcomings of economy
of the principles of economy, as applied in the previous study-cases
(de se pronouns and copular sentences).
We may think of economy principles as extra-constraints (of a more
global nature) on the outputs of syntactic derivation, whose main
goal is to avoid over- or under-generation, as the case may be. At
first glance, this seems to be a beneficial feature. From a formal and
computational point of view though, economy principles have very
strong generative power, as they can generate competitions in many
other parts of the grammar; they also risk becoming computation-
ally intractable.14 In other words, whilst the economy principles have
some prima facie benefits, they could spell trouble in other domains.
From a methodological point of view, the strength of economy makes
them basically fit to be applied everywhere. This is a dangerous prop-
erty, if they are taken to suggest tractable lines of research. Let me be
more precise about where the danger lies.
To begin with, I find problematic the theoretical effects of admit-
ting ‘repair strategies’ (and the related notion of ‘modularity’). The
use of linguistic economy principles as a ‘repair strategy’ has an epis-
temic (and explanatory) downside. An important feature of their ap-
plication so far was that the economy principles were invoked when
theorists had no other way to explain some data. But their success in
these cases comes as no surprise given their strong expressive power:
arguably, almost any logical form that we want ruled out or ruled in
will have a semantic contribution that may figure in the statement of
an appropriate principle of economy. I think that this great expressive
force and the accompanying epistemic downside are symptomatic of
our two case studies as well. In order to mitigate this apparent prob-
lem, interface economy principles were restricted by the following
constraint. It is only when the semantic payoffs of economy prin-
ciples could not be obtained by other grammatical means that they are
allowed to apply.
However, note that there is still something unsettling in the usage
of such a principle, (a) about the way semantic payoffs are invoked,
and, more generally, (b) about the counterfactual involved in the state-
ment of the principle (see the italicised phrase). I shall argue on the
basis of these two points, that this epistemic downside cannot be alle-
viated, and that ultimately several recent applications of the economy
principles appear to be ad hoc. Let us expand on each of these two
points.
Semantic payoffs?
The first point is relatively straightforward. The semantic payoffs
at the interface between syntax and semantics are elusive ‘creatures’.
14 See D. E. Johnson and Lappin (1999) and Potts (2001), but cf. also Chomsky (1995,
161,181,200ff) and Reinhart (2006, pp. 21-25,38-39)
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If we abstract away from the particular empirical roles of the econ-
omy principles and focus on their general explanatory role (across a
broader set of distinct phenomena), we get to the crux of the problem.
On the one hand, we invoke semantic payoffs when, according to the
standard economy view, no other grammatical trick could give such
payoffs, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to tweak the notion
of semantic payoff (or the insensitivity of economy to such payoffs)
when it doesn’t fit well with the data. That is, we modify what we
mean by indistinguishable interpretation as we go along, or, alterna-
tively, we freely modify the sensitivity of the economy-mechanism to
fit with the data.
In the original Reinhart-Evans examples, the economy principles
applied because a semantic and pragmatic payoff was in view. In our
two study cases, the economy principles apply in different ways, ba-
sically because they do not ‘see’ the semantic payoffs. Recall that in
the first study case, the blocking effect was explained in terms of an
economy-based competition where the economy principle was cru-
cially insensitive to the distinct meanings of the competitors. Like-
wise, economy does not ‘see’ semantic differences in copular sen-
tences. The specificational reading of the construction where the pro-
noun seems to antecede a pronoun is distinct from the specificational
reading of the corresponding construction with the proper name ante-
ceding the pronoun, but still the economy principle is not sensitive to
this distinction. Since the semantic payoffs cannot have an impact on
the way these principles act, no pragmatic payoffs are in view either.
But if the primary purpose of positing sensitivity to semantic pay-
offs of the economy principles in the first place was pragmatic—viz.
geared towards communicative purposes—then the sporadic blind-
ness of the economy principles seems to be suspect.
I don’t think that a proper answer to this objection is to ‘parametrise’
for semantic/pragmatic sensitivity, that is, to claim that there are two
disjoint cases where economy principles apply: those cases where
meaning matters, and those where meaning doesn’t matter. This, it
seems to me, makes the problem brought about by two case studies
more acute instead of mitigating it, because the very idea of economy
was motivated on grounds of semantic/pragmatic payoffs. It is worth
stressing, once more, that these payoffs were an essential part of the
data in the Reinhart-Evans cases: we could clearly see that a binding
principle is trumped for some communicative purpose, and this is
reason to believe that the competition between linguistic forms exists.
But if we lose track of such semantic/pragmatic payoffs, we remain
with no more than a mere theoretical possibility that competition be-
tween logical forms exists.
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The counterfactual and related problems
An equally problematic issue concerns the counterfactual underlying
linguistic economy. I should say up-front that the ‘counterfactual’ is-
sue is not entirely specific to the current case studies of linguistic
economy, but can be gleaned from other interface economy accounts.
Interface principles of economy risk overgenerating, since the coun-
terfactual leaves a lot of room for manoeuvre. It is very likely that a
different syntactic configuration (e.g. derived by applying a syntactic
operation) ends up having an effect on meaning (e.g. on structured
propositions). As noted above, the usual constraint on this otherwise
overgenerating idea of semantic-payoffs licensing syntactic configura-
tions is to say that the semantic payoffs must be uniquely obtainable
through a particular syntactic configuration or operation. Otherwise
put, a logical form is uniquely obtainable if its semantic effects could
not have been obtained otherwise. However, what it is for a con-
figuration or rule to uniquely determine a grammatical structure is
indeterminate. The recent uses of ‘unique determination’ in the two
study-cases above seem to lead us to a slippery slope. Recall that
the uniqueness of a structure is a relative notion: it depends on what
other structures can be part of the reference set. And the structures
that are in the reference set depend in turn on the grammatical trans-
formations that can be effectively applied to build these structures.
Let us pause to analyse this reasoning in more detail.
First, what are the admissible transformations that one can perform
in order to reach a semantic payoff? One worry is that there are many,
indeed too many, syntactic configurations/transformations (binding
by de se operators, minimal changes to get natural function readings)
that can bring about relevant semantic payoffs. So one problem with
the very idea of economy as offering semantic payoffs when nothing
else could is that the underpinning counterfactual can be made true
in myriad theoretical contexts. If we adopt some theoretical assump-
tions, that payoff couldn’t be derived otherwise, but on other theoret-
ical assumptions it could. E.g. the truth of the counterfactual varies
according to whether we assume that c-command is a constraint on
binding or not. One might protest that I am overstating my case on
the supposition that theory-relativity is problematic. Surely, it would
be nice to be able to uncover an ‘economy’ phenomenon that was not
theory-relative (e.g. the original principles of binding theory were
not theory-relative, or at least not to the extent the economy princi-
ples are). Still, perhaps the theory-independence desideratum cannot
be met under any circumstances whatsoever, so it would be better not
to dwell on this sort of consideration.
Even granting the previous point, the linguistic economy counter-
factual remains objectionable. To have a better grasp of the problem,
first consider constructions containing two adjuncts such as Gigi often
plays video games with his friends, or A nice serve with almost 200 kph.
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Different interpretations arise according to which of the adjuncts is
merged (combined) first with the verb play in the first sentence, or
with the noun serve in the second. Focusing on the first sentence, if
the adverbial adjunct often is merged before the prepositional phrase
adjunct with his friends we get a reading according to which there is
a set of events that occur often, and out of this set we identify (by
merging the other adjunct) those events in which Gigi plays video
games with his friends. If we merge the prepositional phrase first, we
get a reading on which there is a set of video game playing events
involving Gigi and his friends, and by later merging the adverb, we
assert that these (video game playing) events occur often. Suppose,
for the sake of argument, that there is a subtle difference in mean-
ing thanks to the two syntactic combinations.15 Should we then posit
that the purported difference in meaning is regulated by a principle
of economy? Nothing in the way the principles of economy are usu-
ally defined prevents us from positing an economy based explanation
of this purported phenomenon. I think nonetheless that the answer
to the previous question is no. Whatever difference in meaning there
is, it seems to be a matter of how syntactic structure (derived e.g.
by the optional ‘adjunct rule of the X-bar theory) gets interpreted
by the semantics/pragmatics. We need assume no economy-based
feedback mechanism from semantics to syntax (or ‘look ahead’ mech-
anism from syntax to semantics) for the purposes of licensing syn-
tactic forms, although, in principle, we could advance a principle of
economy that covers the previous data.
Moreover, even if there is no structural ambiguity in the previous
double-adjunct constructions, it doesn’t seem to be the case that we
need a principle of economy to rule out one of the syntactic struc-
tures obtained by different mergers of the adjuncts. If such a struc-
tural distinction does not make sense from a semantic point of view,
there is no antecedent reason to posit an interface (truth-conditional)
economy principle that governs them, as such a principle would be
explanatorily idle in the first place. (I shall qualify my remark about
explanatory idleness below.) I think that the two points made on the
basis of double-adjunct constructions generalise to almost any struc-
tural ambiguity in natural language. It seems to me worrisome that
the interface economy principles are implausible with regard to these
other types of linguistic constructions. The interface principles seem
unnecessary when judged from the perspective of how they would
generalise to other linguistic data. These shorcomings can be essen-
tially traced back to their high expressive power and computational
inefficiency (see also D. E. Johnson and Lappin 1999).
15 Indeed such ambiguities are pretty common. For instance, Carnie (2007, 178ff.)
points out that in effect such a difference exists. Bromberger (2012, p. 77) proposes
another similar ambiguity that easily gives rise to combinatorial explosion: Put the
book in the box on the table in the room next to the sink . . .
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As intimated earlier, a possible reply to this sort of objection is
that we left out important constraints on an economy-based solution.
Consider, for instance, the economy principle that requires locality
of variable binding. This principle governs the behaviour of semanti-
cally identical logical forms. But, the reply goes, there is a condition
on the functioning of the economy principle, namely, one to the effect
that only the semantic payoffs of certain types of syntactic configura-
tion enter the domain of application of the principle. For some other
types of syntactic configuration, we would get truth-conditional pay-
offs that are not available in case the principle is respected.
Now, the problem with economy is that the latter types of seman-
tic payoffs—the ones that do not count—seem to be ruled out by
stipulation, rather than by any principled means. Perhaps this stip-
ulation is necessary, and hence not vicious. Perhaps these principles
are really very restricted or modular. The only possible justification
for these principles is surely not their elegance, conceptual motiva-
tion or generality (since, as I shall claim, all these plead against the
economy principles). It is rather their empirical success in the long
run that confirm the interface principles. However, given that their
present applications fail more often than not—or, more neutrally put,
are heavily restricted,—one may well be sceptical about these princi-
ples, if their empirical success (over a restricted set of data) is all we
have to go on. To be sure, it remains to be seen if these principles will
stand the test of time. My key point will be that their modularity, as
well as their presumed ‘repairing’ role, lead ultimately to their being
explanatorily marginal.
To illustrate the pitfalls of modularity, let us consider the origi-
nal binding economy argument. Although the original argument for
economy (Fox 2000) is impressive in how fine grained are its predic-
tions, note that it does not lack a certain amount of stipulation. Here
are the relevant ‘Dahl’ data, representing four interpretations of the
elided construction Bill did too. Most theorists find the fourth inter-
pretation impossible.
69. Dahl’s Puzzle: one of the possible readings of the (second) ellipsis sen-
tence is not available (ibid., 109ff) [John said he likes his mother.]
Bill did too.
a) Bill said that John likes John’s mother. (strict, strict)
b) Bill said that Bill likes Bill’s mother. (sloppy, sloppy)
c) Bill said that Bill likes John’s mother. (sloppy, strict)
d) *Bill said that John likes Bill’s mother. (strict, sloppy)
The truth-conditional economy account assumes that, in the first
sentence of the Dahl puzzle configuration (69), the pronouns are
bound, whilst in the ellipsis sentence we can get coreference by Paral-
lelism. However, there is a tension between Binding Economy (bind
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closest) and Parallelism. This can be easily seen from the statement
of Parallelism: impose a structurally isomorphic logical form, that
is, impose the same binding relation or the truth-conditionally equiv-
alent coreference configuration in the ellipsis sentence (see Fox 2000,
pp. 115-6). But by simulating the binding relation in the first sen-
tence via a coreference relation in the ellipsis sentence we implicitly
assume that Parallelism doesn’t comply with Binding Economy. The
truth-conditional economy advocate might reply that this is in fact
the case, and there is nothing to do about it.
However, a question arises as to why the tension is solved in favour
of Parallelism. Why is Binding Economy trumped by other princi-
ples? The suggested answer is that economy is modular; it targets a
very restricted set of syntactic configurations. As we suggested, this
is similar to considering economy as a repair strategy, since it comes
down to saying that the interface economy patterns are the exception
rather than the rule. Otherwise put, interface economy principles
have a small domain of application, and can be trumped by other
grammatical principles (and sometimes by pragmatic factors as well).
In a nutshell, from an explanatory perspective, empirical adequacy
is preserved at the expense of generality and other epistemic virtues
such as simplicity, computational efficiency and non-ad hocness. Nev-
ertheless, there should be a trade off between empirical adequacy and
other epistemic virtues. Even if many epistemic virtues are said to re-
side in the eye of the beholder, we should not miss the general pattern
in the explanatory uses of economy. In the recent generative linguistic
history, as theoreticians seek to find new applications of the interface
economy principles, these principles are increasingly pressed into tax-
ing the elegance and naturalness of the linguistic explanation. More
direct evidence for the interface principles does not seem to be forth-
coming. Instead, new theoretical posits (e.g. insensitivity to certain
semantic outputs) are needed in order to secure the applicability of
such principles. It appears that this dynamics basically leads to the
explanatory marginality of the interface principles of economy.
To sum up, there are two weak points of truth-conditional econ-
omy: its notion of sensitivity to semantic payoffs and its reliance
on a counterfactual conception of what it is to create such payoffs
by other grammatical means. Regarding the latter, there are many
ways of counterfactually considering grammar so as to achieve se-
mantic payoffs. But then, the limits of what is counterfactually pos-
sible are fixed by stipulation (be it theory-internal or not, vicious or
non-vicious). Regarding the former, the ‘deus ex machina’ character
of economy principles—the fact that they sporadically miss semantic
payoffs—conceals the major problem, which can ultimately be traced
back to their high expressive power. A serious concern is the at least
apparent ad hoc character of the economy-based explanations in the
above study-cases. Their stipulative character paired with the actual
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marginality of the explanatory role of economy should make us wary
of considering them real linguistic constraints. (Later on, I shall ar-
gue that the good predictions of the most successful truth-conditional
principles can be obtained by other means.)
Before going any further, it’s important to be clear about the na-
ture of the case I am making. My sceptical argument is conceptual
rather than empirical. Meanwhile, it seems reasonable to assume on
empiricist grounds that ‘covering’ data is the main purpose of a lin-
guistic hypothesis, and thus that the theoretical usages of economy
principles are generally beneficial as long as they do their empirical
job. There are very compelling arguments for economy (e.g. Fox
2000) and this invites us to take them seriously. From this (empiricist)
standpoint, what I have to say against economy principles has limited
force in the absence of better alternative proposals for explaining the
relevant phenomena. In fact, I shall propose an alternative in the next
chapter, but the reason for suspicion still stands even in the absence
of an alternative.
There is something to be said in favour of a coherent motivation for
the linguistic mechanisms posited, however good they are in covering
certain data. For it may turn out that the empirically adequate pro-
posal is just a brute force regimentation of descriptive claims about
the linguistic phenomena under investigation or an unprincipled cov-
erage of the data. I think that it is in this latter respect that the the-
oretical uses of economy fall short. My principal claim is that there
is no coherent and natural motivation for the uses of economy, for
their role in the general architecture of the grammar. This is clear
from the two study cases: the first study-case takes economy to be
modular, whilst the second invokes some sort of pragmatic motiva-
tion (although it is not obvious what the communicative role of the
latter is). As their underlying rationales are not well-developed, these
two takes on linguistic economy may not even be opposed. Be that as
it may, this reinforces the point that we don’t have a consistent view
about the role of economy in linguistic theorising.
So, in essence, we ask why there should be interface principles of
economy (i.e., principles of economy at the interface between syn-
tax and semantics), and for what purposes. What is the theoretical
purpose of positing economy mechanisms? It serves our theoretical
purpose of understanding language to have a clean and unified idea
of what economy principles can do for us. It seems that there is no
good rationale behind the interface principles.
The key point is that the usage of economy-principles is not consis-
tent across the discipline,16 and that this is a problem if we take as ad-
equacy criteria some respectable ideas behind the original economy-
principles. As we have seen, their motivation was (at least in part)
semantic and pragmatic, and their goal was to confer generality as
16 It is hardly my intention to argue that any particular theorist is being inconsistent.
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well as explanatory ‘naturalness’ upon linguistic theory, and specif-
ically upon binding theory. The unnoticed drift away from both such
motivations is conceptually unfortunate. Whilst this may not affect
much the particular accounts that underlie the previous case stud-
ies (concerning essentially de se pronouns and copular sentences), the
‘marginal utility’ or explanatory fruitfulness of binding economy prin-
ciples is decreasing.17 At least some of the empirical results provide
no basis for thinking that linguistic economy is a property of gram-
mars.
3.4 conclusion
One may wonder how strong my conclusions are, and whether they
do not rest on a biased selection of the set of linguistic economy ac-
counts that served as my study cases. My answer, in brief, is that
there is no selection bias on my part, because the latter set of prob-
lems (including e.g. the ‘counterfactual’ problem) is a more general
one, and the case studies are well chosen. To start with the latter
point, the two case studies have been selected so as to have a repre-
sentative application for each of the two standard principles of econ-
omy (developed by Fox 2000 and Reinhart 2006 respectively). While
these applications are admittedly marginal in the respective theories
of de se pronouns and connectivity in copular sentences, they are not
at all marginal for a purported theory of linguistic economy. There-
fore, I take my sample selection consisting of the two extensions of
the standard economy principles to be representative of the problems
that I highlighted.
I would also speculate that the problems I uncover are representa-
tive of a larger trend in interface economy explanations. The trend is
that, over time, these principles have become explanatory marginal.
They become explanatory marginal because they seem to intensify
the limitations of the original principles, e.g. by failing to meet the
pragmatic and generality desiderata. More broadly, the reasoning
behind interface economy—to the effect that certain syntactic proper-
ties depend on semantic ones—almost invites further stipulation in
order to allign syntactic and semantic constraints, which usually pull
in different directions. Of course, I cannot rule out with absolute cer-
tainty interface economy principles, since I have not evaluated all the
extant economy principles, let alone the possible ones. However, I
think that my objections apply very widely, and so it remains to be
17 I acknowledge that science is opportunistic, and thus that the marginality of some
uses of the principles is not necessarily a problem. However, it is also true that
the economy-principles governing binding have been deployed to do patchwork for
purposes different from better understanding binding. The economy-principles are
deployed as ‘theoretical repairs’ for accounts that targeted phenomena that interact
with binding but are not primarily about binding (de se pronouns, connectivity).
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seen whether a different, success story can be told about the interface
principles of economy.
The negative emphasis should fall here on the interface and truth-
conditional character of economy, rather than on the idea of economy
itself. I propose a different view of economy that does not depend
on back-and-forth informational exchanges between syntax and se-
mantics. The general change in perspective that emerges from the
present discussion goes along the following lines. By giving up truth-
conditional economy we get two important improvements. Firstly, as
the computation involved in comparing grammatical forms is costly,
avoiding some such economy mechanisms will take some pressure
off the interface between syntax and semantics. Relatedly, we also
eschew the proliferation of vacuous competitions with competitors
‘failed’ for unknown (non-semantic and non-pragmatic) reasons. As
suggested, the principles of economy are often ad hoc devices whose
epistemic function is, in practice, to fix a linguistic account. By posit-
ing a pragmatically motivated economy computation, we also keep
away from these ad hoc theoretical moves, and, as I shall argue, shed
light on phenomena that were previously unexplained on the binding
theoretic view.
Thus, I shall henceforth assume that there is need to improve the
linguistic economy explanatory schemas in a way that is consistent
with the methodological preference for elegance, generality, and other
epistemic virtues. We have to restore the original foundational role
of economy principles to benefit binding theory more generally. I
see two ways to improve on the standard binding theory by giv-
ing pride of place to economy considerations: either seek to build
the economy-based account on syntactic principles (Reuland 2011;
Safir 2004) or build the relevant economy-principles in the seman-
tics (Andy Kehler 1993; Schlenker 2005). Both of these solutions are
advantageous partly because they are not based on interface princi-
ples, which require, as we have seen, complex mechanisms that are
not methodologically motivated. For reasons that will be discussed, I
endorse the latter, semantic-based economy account.
In the next chapter, I develop a semantic account of binding, which
has a more natural pragmatic motivation. This semantic/pragmatic
account will be showed to fare better with the two desiderata put
forth in this chapter. I shall also show, inter alia, how this seman-
tic/pragmatic account can deal with the phenomena in the two study-
cases discussed above, namely, with the binding of de se pronouns and
the binding patterns in copular (pseudo-cleft) sentences.
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4.1 binding economy
In the previous chapter, I showed that the application of economy
principles has become overly complicated and explanatory marginal
and that the generality with which the initial principles of economy
were endowed is now absent. Next, I develop an alternative bind-
ing theory based on a local, semantic principle of economy. This
chapter completes the wider argument of the first part of the thesis
for economy principles that are better motivated pragmatically and
more general than the extant ones. It is not my task to offer an empir-
ical demonstration, and only a weak claim of empirical adequacy is
being made. Rather, I would like to present conclusive evidence for
the superiority of the semantic denotational economy account over
the interface economy accounts. A secondary, but not less important,
aim is to make a case for a more general theory of binding based on
economy considerations. I shall put forward an account compatible
with the empirical findings about binding, and, in particular, with the
main generalisations of the traditional binding theory.
In developing the semantic economy account of binding, I shall
make use of a set of data—the ‘binding economy’ data in §4.2.1—
which will be instrumental in laying down the main assumptions of
the account (in §4.3). In §4.4 I show how this account can deal with
de se and copular constructions, which, as argued in the previous
chapter, are problematic for the standard economy accounts. I thereby
show the superiority of the semantic economy account relative to the
standard (interface, truth-conditional) economy accounts. I conclude
by outlining the view of binding on the semantic economy account
and discuss several lines of response to some challenges facing the
semantic economy account.
4.2 semantic-based economy: main assump-tions and data
There are several alternative approaches to the traditional binding
obviations (see below), which include the truth-conditional economy
view (Reinhart 1983a, 2006), the denotational economy view (Andy
Kehler 1993; Schlenker 2005), and the syntactic economy view (Safir
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2004). It seems to me that the syntactic and denotational accounts
share an important explanatory assumption,1 but, in the interest of
space, I shall not adjudicate between the two accounts, and leave this
comparative study for another time (see also fn. 4). The latter is
more in line with our pragmatic desideratum, for reasons that will
soon become apparent. I shall focus on the comparative merits of the
denotational principle and the more familiar truth-conditional princi-
ple.
The truth-conditional and denotational economy principles are sim-
ilar in that they involve a comparison—or, more neutrally, a ranking—
of linguistic forms according to semantic criteria. But the two types
of principles differ in important respects. Essentially, the former is
conservative with respect to binding theory, whereas the latter, in a
specific sense, is not. I advocate the latter for two basic reasons.
Denotational economy (or, equivalently, semantic economy) satis-
fies the two methodological desiderata implicit in the original account
of binding in terms of economy. It is (i) a more general account that
gives a more central place to economy considerations, and (ii) is prag-
matically better motivated. By embracing denotational economy we
eschew the problems encountered in the two case studies earlier. In
this chapter I shall argue for the two claims. I will show that our
preferred denotational economy account ranks better regarding the
second, ‘pragmatic’ desideratum, and make a case for the more ambi-
tious claim that our account meets the first desideratum to the effect
that an economy-based approach should provide a general account
of binding. With regard to the main data, I shall discuss—from the
denotational economy perspective—several binding patterns that are
problematic for the Conditions A, B, and C of binding theory. I shall
also look at logophoric pronouns, de se pronouns, and connectivity ef-
fects, thus revisiting, from a new theoretical perspective, some of the
examples presented in the two study-cases of the previous chapter.
It bears repeating that I won’t provide a theory of binding or even
of some aspect of binding. My approach will be mainly descriptive.
I shall reshape some of the basic assumptions of the extant denota-
tional economy account of binding, and show that the ensuing pic-
ture has a certain degree of unity—a feature lost on the competing,
truth-conditional accounts. As I stated in the last chapter, my convic-
tion is that there is no reason to split binding theory in two halves,
one in the syntax and one at the interface with semantics/pragmatics,
and this chapter is meant to support this idea. Additionally, I shall
provide a useful semantic typology for noun phrases that can be used
as a tool in approaching binding phenomena. I shall show how to in-
tegrate within the semantic-based framework both the well known
and the less well known data which do not fit well (if at all) with
1 See Nasta (2013) for a sketch of the main mechanisms underlying the syntactic and
denotational accounts
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the traditional binding theory. I shall insist that this framework is
based on general and conceptually appealing ideas, and that it can
also make sense of the problematic data.
4.2.1 Binding economy data
Let us review the core empirical data. The principal empirical mo-
tivation for economy principles comes from considering a few prob-
lematic cases. In particular, we need to articulate an account of the
following sort of examples involving binding patterns that resist in-
corporation into the traditional (non-economy-based) binding theory.
70. Principle A violations: a reflexive is not bound in its domain, contrary
to Condition A
a) When the Yankees accept the trophy, Jeter will represent
them. (Safir 2004)
b) Ringo saw his likeness in the wax museum. He considered
himself very impressive. (Jackendoff 1992)
c) This paper was written by Ann and myself. (Kuno 1987,
p. 119, credited to Ross)
d) Physicists like myself/*himself are a godsend. (adapted
from ibid., p. 123)
71. Principle B violations: the pronoun is not free in its domain, contrary
to Condition B
a) Oscar trusts nobody. — Not exactly, Oscar trusts him.(Safir
2004)
b) I know Tully, and I’m sure that guy is him/*he. (ibid.)
c) (Everybody hates Lucifer.) Only he (himself) pities him.
(Heim 1998, p. 212)
d) (Is this speaker Zelda?) She praises her to the sky. She must
be her. (adapted from ibid., p. 213)
e) (You know what Mary, Sue and John have in common?)
Mary admires John, Sue admires him, and John admires
him too. (ibid., p. 216)
72. Principle C violations: the proper name is not free, contrary to Condi-
tion C
a) Everyone hates Oscar. Even Oscar hates Oscar. Safir (2004)
b) Cicero turned out to be Tully. (ibid.)
c) He is Ralph. (Reinhart 2006)
d) The Yankees believe that Derek Jeter will be the difference in
the series. (Safir 2004)
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These examples are important because they resist incorporation
into the binding theory, and otherwise general theory supported by
very robust data. I pointed out in the previous chapter that sen-
tences such as John likes himself should get covalued noun phrases
(noun phrases having the same referent), whereas sentences such as
John likes him and He likes John should not get covalued noun phrases.
These sentences are the basic data of binding theory; they are subject
to the binding principles A, B, and C respectively. These core data
are very robust and can be multiplied, making the traditional bind-
ing theory a descriptive hypothesis whose generality the more recent
accounts should preserve.
However, as emphasised by the examples above, we get sameness
of reference and disjoint reference precisely where we don’t expect
them according to the traditional binding theoretic view. For in-
stance, in (70b) the pronoun he refers to Ringo whilst the reflexive
himself refers to the wax statue of Ringo. In other words, we get dis-
joint reference where Principle A of binding theory leads us to expect
sameness of reference. A further counterexample to binding theory
is given in (71a). Contrary to Principle B, him refers to Oscar, so we
get sameness of reference where we should get disjoint reference—on
the binding theoretic view, the pronoun him should not be bound by
Oscar and thus should be free. Similar problems occur with Princi-
ple C, which is supposed to disallow sameness of reference between
proper names and other c-commanding phrases. Nevertheless, we do
get sameness of reference in (72a) where the two occurrences of Oscar
clearly refer to Oscar.
It should be noted that these are not the only challenges faced by
binding theory. These challenges have been singled out because they
can, in my opinion, receive a unitary treatment. To meet these chal-
lenges, I make use of the denotational economy account, which I as-
similate to a long linguistic tradition that attempts to explain binding
phenomena in a semantic/pragmatic setting.2 I shall build a more
general principle of economy based on the denotational economy ac-
count. I start with some minor modifications which increase the em-
pirical adequacy of this account.
4.2.2 Semantic economy: main assumptions
Traditional binding theory sought to account for coreference patterns
among noun phrases by keeping the (admittedly minimal) notion of
reference fixed, and fiddling with syntactic conditions on the binding
domain and indexation. It also imposed a strict distinction between
2 Reinhart (1983b) is acknowledged to be one of the first exponents of the pragmatic
tradition. Although we could say that denotational economy account is part of the
‘pragmatic’ tradition that started with Reinhart (1983a), the denotatinal economy
account will push its principles further to the semantic/pragmatic interface.
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syntactic and discourse binding. Instead, I am trying to account for
coreference patterns by keeping syntactic conditions as simple as pos-
sible, and by making appeal to a richer notion of reference. This also
involves relaxing the divide between semantic and discourse binding.
I shall draw on the framework proposed by Schlenker (2005) (see
Andy Kehler 1993 for a similar account). The resulting economy ac-
count rests on three general assumptions.3
73. Fregean guises. I generalise the notion of guise from individual
guises (or concepts) 〈s, e〉 to guises of other types. The economy
principle will be defined on such guises.
74. Antecedence. I appeal to a broader notion of antecedence, which
goes beyond the boundary of the sentence. By antecedence, I
shall understand sentential as well as non-sentential (or covert)
antecedence.
75. Semantic economy principle. A unique principle of economy, Non-
Redundancy, regulates the referential dependencies between noun
phrases.
The ideas underlying Schlenker’s account can be subsumed to a
traditional view according to which binding theory is to be reduced
to two principles: one geared towards identity of reference and the
other geared towards disjoint reference (see Kuno 1987, ch 1 for a re-
view of the traditional view). However, I prefer Schlenker’s account
because is more elegant and his applications of denotational econ-
omy are better developed (and up to date) than the original accounts.
Schlenker argues that binding theory can be reduced to a principle
he calls Non-Redundancy, under several additional plausible assump-
tions.
Notably, it is primarily Non-Redundancy that makes our semantic
(or denotational) account an economy-based account. The semantic
account that will be provided is, strictly speaking, a hybrid account,
since it makes use of two other crucial assumptions (concerning an-
tecedence and guises) which do not involve economy but are neces-
sary to get the denotational economy account off the ground.
The denotational account posits that the referents (guises) that are
the semantic values of expressions capable of entering a binding re-
lation as well as the referents salient in the background (the speaker
and hearer) are arranged in a linear sequence. Constraints on referen-
tial dependencies are then constraints on the form the linear sequence
can take, and on the ways it can be updated. The sequence is, broadly
3 The third assumption, Non-Redundancy, is, to my knowledge, original to
Schlenker’s account. I’m not sure whether Schlenker endorses the second assump-
tion (Antecedence), although it seems to me that he should (see also fn. 15). In
any case, the first two assumptions—Fregean guises and Antecedence—are more
common in literature.
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speaking, a semantic object, and thus can be constrained by seman-
tic and pragmatic principles. On the denotational account, the main
constraint on the sequence of evaluation is Non-Redundancy:
76. Non-Redundancy No object may occur twice in the same se-
quence of evaluation. (Schlenker 2005, p. 6)
Schlenker (ibid.) introduces a new indexing notation that works
better with the sequence-based account of binding. The basic idea
of the indexing notation is that potential bindees (anaphors, broadly
speaking) bear indices which indicate the place of their (binder) ref-
erent in the sequence of evaluation. For instance, he−1 depends ref-
erentially on the referent in the first slot, counting from right to left,
he−2 depends on the second referent, and so on. The binding is effec-
tively produced by pulling these (binder) referents from their initial
position into the last slot of the sequence (which is a position newly
created). Thus, in the sentence “John told Bill that he−1/−2 should
leave,” if the pronoun’s index is −1, it will be anaphoric on Bill, and
if it bears index −2, it will be anaphoric on John. The initial state of
the sequence can be represented as 〈j,b〉, and after binding is effected
the sequence becomes, e.g. 〈#,b, j〉. This latter sequence represents
the construction in which the pronoun (bearing index −2) is bound
by John, and thus the referent j (standing for John) is pulled into the
last position in the sequence. From now on, in analysing linguistic
constructions, I shall leave this notation implicit, but it is important
to note that this is the mechanism underlying binding on the denota-
tional economy view.
Non-Redundancy has an unmistakable economy flavour, since it is
aimed at prohibiting semantic redundancy. But, in my view, part of
the economy character of Non-Redundancy derives from its making
use of a ranking between linguistic forms, and, in particular, noun
phrases. The ranking of linguistic forms from more specific (less
dependent) to less specific (more dependent) should ultimately rely
on the presuppositional and assertoric content (or feature-content) of
NPs. To complete the denotational economy picture of binding, we
must ultimately say how the semantic contents of noun phrases can
be ordered. Non-Redundancy will be sensitive to the ranking of noun
phrases. For instance, proper names will be ranked higher than pro-
nouns in terms of specificity (or referential independence), and pro-
nouns, in turn, will be ranked higher than reflexives.4 I won’t try to
4 It is worth stressing that I deviate in important respects from Schlenker (2005).
I shall have the occasion to make clear the main points of divergence. To begin
with, Schlenker does not explicitly mention any ranking between noun phrases, but
I think that this is implicit in the way he conceives of pronouns, reflexives and
full noun phrases in his account. By way of his assumptions about indexing on
pronouns, the semantic role of reflexives (as arity reducers) and proper names (as
always introducing their referent at the end of the sequence), Schlenker arguably
imposes a ranking on noun phrases. This suggests that the original denotational
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spell out what’s involved in this ranking, and leave it at an intuitive
level.
To illustrate an application of Non-Redundancy, consider the (70a)
example When the Yankees accept the trophy, Jeter will represent them and
(72d) The Yankees believe that Derek Jeter will be the difference in the se-
ries. Contrary to the naive predictions of BT, there is an overlap in
reference between the proper name Jeter and the plurality to which
the noun phrases them and the Yankees refer. This is because, let us as-
sume, Jeter is part of the Yankees’ team, and thus by referring to the
latter, we automatically refer to Jeter. The referential overlap between
Jeter and his team is problematic on the grounds that coreference is
explicitly disallowed by binding theory (in the configurations specific
to the above examples). We can deal with this problem in a way com-
patible with denotational economy. Since the noun phrases refer to
pluralities whilst the proper names refer to non-plural entities, the
referents in the sequence of evaluation contributed by proper names
and the plural noun phrases will be different. This is sufficient to en-
sure that Non-Redundancy is not violated.5 The remaining examples
pose more serious problems, and have more general consequences for
an account of binding. I turn now to these examples, dealing with the
principle A, B and C cases respectively. In the subsequent discussion,
I shall utilise the binding economy data as a tool for introducing the
crucial assumptions of the denotational account, and once these are
in place, I shall go back to the two case studies introduced in chapter
3. My main task is to show how we can deal with these and other
problems within the denotational economy framework.
4.3 extensions of economy
I put forward my version of the denotational economy account. For
terminological variation, I shall call this account denotational economy
or semantic economy. In developing the denotational economy account
under the strictures of binding economy data, I will need to make
some minor, but necessary, revisions to the assumptions of the orig-
inal account (e.g. the assumption that reflexives are arity-reducers).
economy account is not far from other proposals that are revisionary with respect to
binding theory. So, for instance, Levinson (2000) advances a pragmatic account that
posits a similar ranking between noun phrases, and Safir (2004) finds that the source
of such a ranking is in the syntax. It would be interesting to bring these strands of
thinking together, and trey to unify them. It is essential for such a project to say
what specific properties of noun phrases are at the basis of such a dependency or
specificity ranking. I hope to be able to do this in future work.
5 To be sure, a similar strategy can be adopted within the traditional binding the-
ory. No matter which framework one adopts, note that there still remains to be
explained how to obtain the intuitive overlap of reference between pluralities and
individual referents. Since I am mainly interested in the basics of binding, I leave
this explanatory task on accounts of plurality, but see Schlenker (2005).
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This will ultimately lead us to an elegant typology of the denotations
involved in the binding data considered here including the data in
§4.2.1 and those in the two study-cases (see the conclusion). The mod-
ifications of the original denotational economy account are in great
majority based on assumptions or theoretical hypotheses that can be
found elsewhere in the literature. I pull these assumptions and hy-
potheses together, since they allow for the most elegant treatment of
the data under consideration, a treatment which is importantly in
accord with our desiderata (viz. generality and pragmatic support).
4.3.1 Extended Non-Redundancy
It would be convenient to start with the examples that are subject to
the binding condition B. In particular, there are two general linguistic
patterns that I want to draw your attention to. To begin with, the
binding economy data include examples where some object passes as
a proxy for an agent, and is referred to as if it were that agent herself.
These are the so called wax museum (or Madame Toussaud’s) cases.
My first point is that the wax museum examples are relevant for the
use of pronouns, and not only for reflexives. It is clear that in a
wax museum setting, a reflexive cannot be replaced by a pronoun,
preserving the sameness of reference (marked here by coindexation).
77. *[Ringo saw his likeness in the wax museum.] Ringoi admired
himi.
The behaviour of pronouns in wax museum cases requires an ex-
planation compatible with the explanation offered for the original
wax museum example (70b), Ringo saw his likeness in the wax museum.
He considered himself very impressive. To anticipate, on the account I
will be arguing for, the example (77) is unacceptable because in the
wax museum scenario, the two binding expressions (i.e., the expres-
sions potentially entering the binding relation, Ringo and him) have
the same guise as denotation. This violates the original condition B,
or the semantic restatement of this condition in terms of the deno-
tational economy principle, Non-Redundancy—the pronoun him in-
troduces the same guise in the sequence of evaluation, which yields
redundancy (and thus ungrammaticality).
Secondly, I make a generalisation of the denotational economy ac-
count in order to incorporate the Principle B obviation in (71e). The
example runs as follows: You know what Mary, Sue and John have in
common? Mary admires John, Sue admires him, and John admires him too.
Note that this sort of example is not readily accounted for with the
machinery assumed by the denotational economy account, and in par-
ticular by appeal to individual concepts or guises. If we take the ex-
ample at face value, no appropriate guise can serve as semantic value
for him. For we need a guise that differs from the guise of John (the
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mental file for John kept in the long term memory), and the context
does not seem to provide us with the required guise. The Principle
B obviation can nevertheless be explained by Non-Redundancy. To
see how, we need to generalise Non-Redundancy so as to cover not
only the sequences of semantic values of referential (or plural) noun
phrases but also sequences of semantic values of more complex gram-
matical categories. A natural extension of denotational economy is
to apply it at the level of structured properties and propositions, that
is, to expressions that can take structured meanings as semantic val-
ues. The effect of the generalised Non-Redundancy will then be to
disallow two identically structured meanings in the same sequence.6
However, in some contexts where there are pragmatic reasons to
draw a contrast, it is possible to obviate (generalised) Non-Redundancy.
This is the case with (71e). (The same strategy is needed for Principle
C obviations of the type Oscar likes Oscar—see §4.4.2 for discussion.)
Outside such contexts, there is no question about structured mean-
ings, and Non-Redundancy will rule them out. On the hypothesis
that Non-Redundancy applies in non-contrasting cases as well, we
predict that it should rule out sentences whose logical form is p∧ p,
p → p etc., assuming p expresses the same structured proposition in
these contexts. This semantic/pragmatic generalisation seems on the
right track, since utterances with those logical form in natural lan-
guage do seem infelicitous, due to manifesting redundancy. Only in
economy-configurations, which involve differently structured propo-
sitions or properties, are repetitions allowed; see e.g. (78g)-(78h).
Other sentences that violate (the revised version of) Non-Redundancy
are the following.
78. Non-Redundancy Violations (cf. Maxim of Manner, Grice 1967/1989)
a) ??I believe that Kent is smart and that Kent is smart.
b) ??John has two firms in Bucharest and one firm in Bucharest.
c) ??If John dances, he dances.
d) ??After John turned the key, John turned the key.
e) ??Are you leaving or not staying?
f) ??A blond and fair haired woman.
6 I’m building here on a suggestion by Heim (1998, 212ff). For Heim, guises are indi-
vidual concepts, i.e., functions from worlds to individuals. Moreover, Heim appeals
to what she terms structured propositions rather than guises. It is clear from her paper
that Heim does not suggest that we should adopt two distinct metaphysical posi-
tions regarding the semantic values of noun phrases and more complex expressions,
respectively. So my proposal is a terminological variation on Heim’s. A uniform
notion of guise which further ramifies into individual and complex guises is termi-
nologically and conceptually natural. I thus adopt a unique notion of guise, and
extend it from semantic values of type 〈s, e〉 to more complex types. Various other
extensions will be needed for other purposes. For instance, see Schlenker (2005,
pp. 48-9) for an extension in a different direction of the notion of individual guise
that is required to deal with problems related to quantifier binding.
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g) OKJohn kissed Mary, and Mary kissed John.
h) OKIf John loves him [=John], John loves himself.
The cases (78a)–(78f) are problematic because they involve redun-
dancy. For instance, (78b) offers no communicative advantage over
a non-redundant utterance to the effect that John has three firms in
Bucharest. Similarly for (78d): a simpler way to express the same
thought would be to say John turned the key twice. To be sure, prag-
matic reasons for uttering some of these sentences can be given. It
seems that we can draw a clear distinction between the (78a)–(78f)
cases and the (78g)–(78h) cases, in the sense that the latter present
us more clearly with differently structured semantic values that are
likely to have pragmatic import. In (78g), for example, the two kiss-
ing events are differently structured. (In case Mary forcibly kissed
John, we would not say that John kissed Mary.) In virtue of the dif-
ferently structured meanings, it is felicitous to report an essentially
unique kissing event using (78d). 7 8
Such cases can be explained by appealing to a broadly Gricean
view, by utilising something along the lines of the Maxim of Manner.
This principle prevents the speaker from making his message more
difficult than it has to be. In other words, this pragmatic maxim
requires that, if the semantic/pragmatic content is kept fixed, the
form of expression communicating that content should be simpler
rather than more complicated. However the point here cannot be that
these constructions’ behaviour is due to a pure principle of semantic
competence. Rather, we can see Non-Redundancy as being partly a
semantic rule and partly a pragmatic one. Thus, Non-Redundancy
seems to be, at least in the core binding cases, the Maxim of Manner
(or a similar pragmatic principle) grammaticalised.
How does the Non-Redundancy economy principle effectively come
to deal with the more complex guises? In short, the economy prin-
ciple works as follows: when an apparent violation of binding the-
ory (and, specifically, of Non-Redundancy) occurs, the interface first
checks whether there are guises of binding expressions, e.g. guise-
valued pronouns, that could ‘save’ the LFs, and if there are none,
7 Schlenker (2005, 19,20 fn. 21) posits, for different reasons, that propositions should
appear in the sequence of evaluation.
8 As Paul Elbourne (p.c.) suggested, an immediate problem for the view that Non-
Redundancy governs more complex meanings (properties and propositions) is that
VP-ellipsis seems to introduce a redundant semantic value in the sequence of evalu-
ation. However, it is not clear that we need to say that the elided phrase introduces
a new semantic value in the sequence. In fact, we have independent reasons to think
that it does not. A well-known account of VP-ellipsis has it that VP-ellipsis is a
form of anaphora, and takes elided phrases to depend anaphorically on previously
introduced verb phrases Hardt 1999; Andrew Kehler 2002. From the perspective of
the present account, this view is very appealing, since it entails that elided phrases
inherit the semantic values of previously introduced phrases, thus avoiding redun-
dancy (as desired).
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more complex guises are looked for, i.e., guises for properties ex-
pressed with the constituent pronouns. These complex guises can be
deployed only if there is an explicit communicational point (e.g. a
certain contrast to be drawn or a similarity to be highlighted), in ac-
cord with our second, pragmatic desideratum (and in contrast with
past uses of the interface economy principles).9 So, the linguistic re-
striction on the (78) cases receive a clear pragmatic motivation.
4.3.2 Against arity-reducers
In order to accommodate the principle A effects, Schlenker (2005)
assumes that reflexives will be treated as reducing the arity (i.e. the
number of arguments) of the verb. In this way, Schlenker succeeds
to account for reflexives without assigning them individual semantic
values which fall under the incidence of Non-Redundancy. In effect
he rules out principle A (and reflexive pronouns) from the domain of
Non-Redundancy.
In what follows, I shall focus on some of the challenges for the arity-
reducer (or ‘reflexiviser’) account of reflexives, and provide a more
orthodox solution that, in addition, preserves the main assumptions
of the denotational economy account.
Against the arity-reducer analysis of reflexives
The denotational view is formulated in terms of an arity-reducer view
of reflexives. This simplifies, in some sense, the account of the prin-
ciple A effects. Instead of considering that a transitive verb with a
reflexive object takes two arguments (with two semantic values that
should be non-redundant for economy reasons), this account has it
that the reflexive in question reduces the arity of the verb and hence
the verb ends up taking only a single (semantic) argument. For
instance, the verb love in Sally loves herself will become self-love af-
ter combining with the reflexive. The arity-reduced verb—self-love—
takes only one argument, namely Sally (or the corresponding guise-
valued meaning).10
9 We can check the plausibility of complex guises by embedding sentences in inten-
sional contexts. Thus, someone may well believe that John loves him [deictically
picking out John], without believing that John loves himself. The two properties
instantiated by John are different in those belief-worlds.
10 Some theorists—e.g. Bu¨ring (2005, p. 22) and C. Collins and Postal (2012, p. 19)—
have pointed out that there are reflexives that do not correspond to logical argu-
ments. Consequently, in sentences involving such reflexives, no relation between
individuals is being expressed, but rather a unique property that the subject satis-
fies. It is important to note that these cases are special, and involve only verbs like
behave. (These can be analysed either as involving a form of inherent reflexivity or as
requiring arity-reducing reflexives.) We can grant that some verbs require an arity-
reducer analysis of reflexives, as long as this is not generally the case. In fact, these
verbs are the best case one can make for the arity-reducer approach. However, we
see no reason to assume that all the verbs are of this type.
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A problem with the current account is that the assumed view of
reflexives cannot make sense of Madame Tussaud (‘wax museum’)
constructions, that is, examples like Ringo saw his likeness in the wax
museum. He considered himself very impressive, or Ringo fell over and
crushed himself. (These examples were first brought to light in connec-
tion to binding theory by Jackendoff 1992.) A context-aware account
of the wax museum cases should be consistent with the fact that the
utterance is made about two distinct individuals, since, after all, there
are two individuals in the envisaged scene. But on the arity-reducer
view, the unary predicate self-consider impressive can only be predi-
cated, by definition, of a unique individual, rather than two. Conse-
quently, it is hard to see how this view is supposed to handle such
cases in a way that does justice to the pragmatics of the wax-museum
scenario.
However, by adopting the previous theoretical assumptions, it is
possible to provide an elegant alternative. The wax museum exam-
ples would need an account in terms of guises, which proved to be
effective in handling pronouns and full noun phrases (viz. definites
and proper names) in Condition B and C configurations—several
such configurations will be further discussed in §4.4. In order to vin-
dicate principle A under the denotational economy account, we must
be able to say that the referent of Ringo and the entity referred to by
himself (the wax statue) are represented, in a sense, by the same entity,
a guise under which actually different referents are given. They are
both represented as, say, a Ringo-like guise. The Ringo-like guise is
both a guise of Ringo himself and of his wax statue. 11
We could implement this idea by considering that guises are func-
tions that pick out individuals that meet some (contextually variable)
standard of similarity. Then, Ringo and his statue will be assumed
to meet the relevant standard of similarity. Adopting some basic
ideas from situation semantics, we could say that the context of ut-
terance of the wax museum constructions make available two situa-
tions, formed from two individuals (Ringo and the statue) and their
properties (including the relational property of similarity), and the
similarity-based guise yields at each such situation the individual of
that situation in virtue of the similarity relational property that that
individual possesses.12 If this is on the right track, we should give
up the arity-reducer account of reflexives and say that the condition
11 Assuming that our guises are similar to what Frege meant by senses, we need to give
up the Fregean contention that sense determines reference, because on the present
view it is possible to have expressions with the same sense (guise) but different
referents.
12 This application of situation semantics differs from the standard applications in
Elbourne (2013) and Kratzer (2014) in allowing relational properties (rather than
simply non-relational properties) to be constitutive parts of situations. However, it
seems to me that such a relational property, however vague or abstract it might be, is
needed to deal with the wax museum cases, and also has some intuitive pragmatic
appeal in such cases.
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A is validated by the existence of the same similarity-based guise for
distinct individuals. This solution is attractive since it gives up a theo-
retical posit (about arity-reducers), and extends the use of previously
assumed machinery.
Reflexives will function differently according to a semantic econ-
omy account that does not assume the arity-reducer view. Reflex-
ives will pull the ‘referent’ with the requisite person and number
features out of its position in the sequence of evaluation.13 This refer-
ent should take the form of a similarity-based guise. We thus should
first get in the sequence the guise as the semantic value of Ringo, and
then move it to the end of the sequence when the semantic value of
the reflexive needs to be introduced. For now, I assume this guise
is given contextually, and gloss over details about how this guise is
effectively produced.
Apart from the wax museum cases, there is further motivation for
giving up the ‘reflexiviser’ (arity reducer) analysis. Another prob-
lem with this view is that, sometimes, reflexives and self-expressions
have different properties. Consider the following contrast, noted in
Williams (2003, p. 100):
79. Stories about the destruction of oneself can be amusing.
80. Self-destruction stories can be amusing.
The sentence (79) (also) admits the reading in which the agent of
destruction (the destructor) and the object (the theme or patient) of
destruction are different individuals, but this is not so for (80). In
other words, the interpretation of (79) is compatible with the exis-
tence of two individuals satisfying the role of agent and object of
destruction, respectively. In contrast, the only interpretation of (80) is
that in which the destructor and the person who is destructed are the
very same person. If the arity-reducer view is intended as a general
view of reflexives, this contrast needs explaining. That is, if the claim
is that, in general, reflexives reduce the arity of expressions they com-
bine with, why don’t they reduce the arity of verbs in nominalised
form?
Relatedly, Safir (2005, p. 123) points out an important difference
between constructions like he dressed and he dressed himself. In the for-
mer construction presumably the verb dressed should be interpreted
as self-dressed. Yet, only the latter construction—the one containing
a reflexive rather than a self-verb—can be felicitously used in a wax
museum scenario to refer to distinct individuals. Meanwhile, on the
arity-reducer view, there is no specific difference between the two
types of verbs; on a natural extension of the view, they will both be
13 I assume, to a first approximation, that the positions in the sequence are c-
commanding positions, i.e., for every pair of referents in the sequence, the left refer-
ent c-commands the right one.
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self-verbs. So, whilst under the present semantic assumptions the
relevant distinction falls out naturally from the orthodox account of
reflexives, the arity-reducer theorists should deploy further theoreti-
cal resources in order to draw the needed distinction between verbs
compatible with distinct individual contents (under the same guise)
and verbs that are not.
The arity-reducer theorist can postulate her way out of some of
these predicaments by saying that there is an ambiguity between re-
flexive pronouns and logophoric pronouns, and that logophoric pro-
nouns are not interpreted as reflexivisers. Leaving aside the potential
theoretical cost of ambiguities, it is clear that the wax museum cases
do not involve logophoric pronouns, as they don’t crucially depend
on the attitude holder’s point of view.
The advocate of the arity reducer analysis of reflexives might protest
that the criticism from the Madame Toussaud’s constructions is mis-
guided, because although reflexives are indeed claimed to reduce
the arity of the verb, there is still an appropriate slot (variable) in
the logical form corresponding to a distinct individual (given under
some guise). That is, by applying the denotation of the reflexive him-
self to that of the verb admire, we get a semantic value of the form
λx.x admires x, where the two occurrences of x will be assigned the
same guise standing for distinct individuals (say, at two situations of
the context).
However, the denotational economy account, as it stands, is not
equipped to handle the Madame Toussaud’s cases along the lines
suggested above. This is because, on this account, there is only
a unique referent in the sequence. This referent remains in place
and is not moved to the end of the sequence when the reflexive
which is anaphoric on it is being evaluated. On the reflexiviser (arity-
reducer) analysis, this reflexive enters in the computation of the truth-
conditions directly by being combined with a self-property (which is
predicated of that referent). No matter what denotation we attribute
to this referent, it cannot do the job of the two separate denotations
in the standard (non-arity-reducer) analysis of reflexives. The stan-
dard analysis of reflexive produces an asymmetry by allowing two
separate denotations for Ringo and himself (Ringo himself and the
statue, respectively). What is asserted is that Ringo in fact admires
his statue, but his statue is not said to admire Ringo. On the reflex-
iviser analysis, the same (self-)property is attributed to a guise. The
guise may in effect yield two distinct (but similar in their general fea-
tures) individuals on the occasion of utterance. The assertion accord-
ing to the reflexiviser analysis can thus be paraphrased as follows:
the individual with such and such [Ringo-like] features is engaged in
self-admiration. But this is not what is asserted by the wax museum
sentences. To assert what the wax museum sentences assert we need
to be able to separately manipulate the ‘self’ expression inside the
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reflexivised verb, since this is the locus where the said asymmetry is
introduced. (I have already suggested how to obtain the right read-
ing on the denotational account coupled with the standard analysis
of reflexives. We get the asymmetry simply as a result of the direction
of movement of the relevant guise, from Ringo to himself, rather than
vice-versa.)
Although a more intricate account might obtain the right read-
ing, another problem for the reflexiviser analysis is, as hinted above,
that it assumes a divide between logophoric and non-logophoric pro-
nouns. As we shall see below, the standard account of reflexives will
make the denotational economy account treat uniformly logophoric
and non-logophoric pronouns.
In light of these considerations, I preliminary conclude that the ar-
ity reducer account of pronouns cannot be maintained. Consequently,
Non-Redundancy will need to somehow regulate Condition A cases
as well. It remains to be seen what other constraints are needed in
order to have a semantic condition that fully covers Condition A phe-
nomena. From the perspective of a semantic, economy-based frame-
work, it is important that we can deal with the problematic condition
A cases reviewed here.
4.3.3 Antecedence
In order to add a crucial assumption to our account of the Condition
A effects, it is instructive to look at phrases such as he himself, and as
for myself. Kuno (1987, 118ff.) discusses Ross on the [pronoun reflexive]
construction, in which, pace Ross, one element can be deleted. They
call these constructions emphatic reflexives.
81. a) Tomi believed that the paper had been written by Ann and
himi himselfi.
b) Tomi believed that the paper had been written by Ann and
himi himselfi.
The question arises as to how these reflexives are bound. For these
cases at least, the standard notion of antecedence breaks down, since
the reflexives do not seem to be bound by a c-commanding position
in the relevant binding domain (for an explication of c-command, see
fn. 3). But if we assume a broader notion of antecedence, we could ex-
plain such cases, and, at the same time, we get a better grasp of some
of our Conditions A and B obviations. Considering first the Condi-
tion A configuration (70c) This paper was written by Ann and myself
and (70d) Physicists like myself/*himself are a godsend, it looks like the
speaker serves as contextual antecedent for the otherwise problematic
reflexive (myself ). There may be further criteria that the antecedent
should satisfy (see Kuno (ibid., p. 121)). The case (70d) shows that
the covert antecedent is constrained as to its person features, and, in
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particular, it cannot be 3rd person: *physicists like himself. In other
words, the covert antecedent can be only 1st or 2nd person, that is, its
referent can be only the author or the addressee. (Such a restriction
does not exist on overt antecedents: John said to Mary that physicists
like himself were a godsend. (Kuno (1987, p. 123)).)
There are further interesting apparent condition A violations that
suggest that a broader notion of antecedence is at least sometimes
needed. Take for instance expressions like as for myself as they appear
fronted in sentences like (82).
82. Kuno (ibid., p. 129)
a) As for myself, I won’t be invited.
b) ??As for yourself, you won’t be invited.
c) *As for herself, she won’t be invited.
Kuno posits that the pattern in (82) involves logophoric clauses,
that is, clauses that distinctively express the author’s attitude. Con-
sequently, the pronouns in these clauses can have the same value as
the author of the speech act, and, to my ear, they can refer to the
addressee.14 Hence, we gathered some initial motivation for intro-
ducing one of the key notions of the semantic account of binding,
the notion of antecedence. Although these examples do not require
an economy principle, they do require the notion of antecedence to
which the semantic economy principle, Non-Redundancy, seems to
be sensitive in some other cases. As the examples above suggest, the
covert non-sentential antecedent should be the author of the utter-
ance, and, perhaps, the addressee (but surely not a third party). As
I shall explain below, the assumption about antecedence is indepen-
dently needed.
The thrust of our discussion of Condition A cases is that we are
forced to consider reflexives as contributing their own individual
guises to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they appear,
and that the notion of antecedence needed to account for some of the
reflexives is broader than the standard one.
As Schlenker (2005) and many others observed, the latter assump-
tion, which introduces a broader notion of antecedence, improves
the data-base of the binding theory. It thereby improves the deno-
tational economy account of binding as well.15 One of the nice fea-
14 These examples also pose problems for the arity-reducer analysis, since, as I have
pointed out, that analysis needs a separate account of logophoric reflexives, whereas
the standard analysis of reflexives will cover both logophoric and non-logophoric
pronouns in a uniform fashion.
15 It should be noted that Schlenker (2005) continues to talk in terms of c-command.
That is, for him, the objects in the sequence are related by c-command. However, he
must have in mind an extended notion of c-command, one that applies to elements
that are covertly introduced in the syntactic structure, which should then be in a
position that c-commands the noun phrases overtly present in the surface structure—
see below for further examples that suggest just that.
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tures of the denotational economy view—with its attendant notion of
antecedence—is that it can explain why mentioning in an utterance
the name of the speaker or hearer, or a definite description known
to be referring to the speaker or hearer, produces infelicity. For in-
stance, suppose that Mary, the philosopher of language, tells John,
the semanticist, one of the following.
83. Infelicitous uses of names and definite descriptions for the speaker or
hearer (adapted from Schlenker 2005, p. 14)
a) #Mary has taught three classes today.
b) #The philosopher of language taught three classes.
c) #The semanticist should meet me in the pub this evening.
In uttering these sentences, Mary is referring to herself by (83a)-
(83b), and to John by (83c). Most of the time, such utterances sound
out of place. The rationale is, in broad outlines, quite obvious. Mary
could have used a pronoun instead of the name or definite descrip-
tion in order to convey the same propositions. Non-Redundancy can
straightforwardly explain the resulting infelicity. Instead of pulling
referents from the sequence out by using pronouns, such cases use
full noun phrases (viz. definite descriptions and names), and the full
noun phrases redundantly introduce the same referent once again,
contrary to what Non-Redundancy requires.
However, the trouble is that at some other times such forms of ex-
pression are totally acceptable. Following C. Collins and Postal (2012),
we may call the noun phrases in question imposters. To illustrate, a
doctor could felicitously ask his patient How are we doing today? and
the patient could equally felicitously reply We are doing better today. It
is clear that we here refers to the patient, although it does not have
precisely the most appropriate number features. A similar dialogue
can be imagined along the lines of the example (83a) above. Thus,
someone may ask Mary What has Mary been doing today?, to which
Mary could well reply: Mary has taught three classes today. Here too,
the pronoun you may be more appropriate than the proper name,
since the use of names usually indicates that the speaker and hearer
talk about a person who is not present in the context of the utterance,
or is far off in some sense. Both we and Mary act differently than
expected, and that’s why they were called imposters.
It is very tempting to see such phenomena as purely pragmatic.
On this view, imposters are deployed in a playful way in order to
make some communicative point, thus implicating something non-
stereotypical related to the form of expression.16 However, such cases
16 It is natural further to incorporate these cases to the principle M of the pragmatic
account (roughly, the Gricean maxim of manner), on the basis that such forms of
expression are marked, and thus encourage picking out different propositions than
the ones intended.
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should be handled with care, since, as C. Collins and Postal (2012)
argue, they seem to be syntactically constrained. For instance, they
produce economy effects, but generally abide by the binding theory,
except for their idiosyncratic agreement features. In any event, such
imposter phenomena require explanation, be it syntactic or pragmatic.
If the syntactic explanation offered by Collins and Postal is better
than a pragmatic one, than we should examine how the syntactic
explanation can be cast in terms of the denotational economy account.
Imposters do seem to have a pragmatic motivation. How to spell
out their pragmatics is not clear. However, they may be used as a com-
munication facilitator (think of a fathers’ use of the imposter daddy
when addressing their kids, e.g. Daddy is going to get you an ice cream)
or to obtain some special stylistic effect, e.g. irony (cf. e.g. The seman-
ticist forgot his syntax 1.01?).17 I leave a proper account of imposters
under denotational economy assumptions for future work.
4.4 case studies revisited
I have made a prima facie case for a cluster of assumptions (having
at its core the economy principle, Non-Redundancy) on the basis
of some of the binding phenomena in §4.2.1. (I discuss the rest of
the data introduced there in §4.4.2.) From now on, when speaking
of the binding theory (and its principles), I shall speak of whatever
cluster of principles and assumptions will do the work of the tradi-
tional binding theory in the denotational account (Non-Redundancy,
antecedence, guises etc.).
In this section, I turn to the examples whose interface economy
treatment I found objectionable in the previous chapter. Recall that
in the previous chapter I discussed two study cases, and concluded
that the economy based accounts dealt with these cases in an unsat-
isfactory manner. I have argued that the interface economy accounts
are unduly complicated because of the ways they conceive of the econ-
17 Indeed, Schlenker (2004) motivates something akin to what I have here identified
as imposters by appeal to pragmatic effects. (He presents them as an obviation
of a principle he calls Minimise Restrictors—roughly, a principle which requires
that relatively specific noun phrases should introduce denotations distinct from the
denotations previously introduced by other noun phrases, if any.) He considers
expressive-restrictors, and he argues that the reason why these expressive-restrictors
are allowed (despite being overly specific) is that they convey an extra-message. For
instance, Johni is so careless that [the idiot]i will get killed in an accident one of these days
(ibid., p. 3), sounds fine with the definite description in the second clause referring to
John himself on the pragmatic grounds that the use of the expressive idiot is relevant
for the communicational purposes of the speaker. As such the expressive definite
seems to violate the binding Condition C (viz. full noun phrases must be free/not
bound) or, on the semantic account, Minimise Restrictors. But note that there is more
to imposters than their occasional expressive content. Imposters like Mary or daddy
above do no contain any expression standardly assumed to be expressive, so a more
general account is needed.
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omy principles (as interface phenomena). In the following sections, I
continue this argument by targeting the empirical basis of those uses
of interface economy. I argue that the denotational economy is better
equipped to deal with the economy data in the two study cases, both
in terms of its smooth interface with pragmatics and in terms of its
generality.
Before going any further, a cautionary note is in order. I shall sub-
stantially shift the theoretical aims of the original extensions of the
linguistic economy principles used in the two study cases. The ex-
planatory ambitions behind these cases where different—they tried
to capture the best accounts of de se pronouns and specificational sen-
tences. These are not my aims. My main focus is to better integrate
the economy principles in a more general account of binding, and,
besides, I do not agree with some of the assumptions of the theories
the economy principles were meant to serve.18
4.4.1 De se cases
In the coming discussion, I continue to abstract away from many de-
tails of the compositional semantics of de se attitudes and reports,
and focus on how the standard semantic values of pronouns with de
se readings fare with the semantic economy mechanism. I implicitly
assume a semantics along the lines of the standard approaches to de
se, although I wish to remain neutral with respect to several details
regarding the syntactic realisation of the de se readings.19
De se and de re
Let us go back to the analysis of the previous de se cases, repeated
here for convenience.
84. I dreamt I kissed me.
a) I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed me logx. non-local binding
b) I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed me logy. local binding
The two possible structures of (84) realise non-local binding (a) and
local binding (b), according to whether OP or the lower constituent
I binds the pronoun me. OP is a logophoric operator whose role is
to introduce the author of the thought (or the centre) in the content
of the attitude verb (dream), and is responsible for the de se readings
of the pronouns that it binds.20As we have seen in the first study
18 As I shall make clear, I do not think that there is a (semantic) de re blocking effect,
and I find suspect the purported contrast between specificational and predicational
sentences with respect to the connectivity effects.
19 For more details, see Ninan (2010) and Schlenker (2011) and especially Anand (2006).
20 To get a clearer picture of the compositional semantics of the two binding structures
in (84), let’s focus on the clause embedded under the verb dream. As suggested in
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case, the pattern in the data is explained by the principle of binding
economy along with its insensitivity to the truth-conditional distinc-
tion between first-personal and de re readings. Anand (2007, pp. 11-2)
argues that this seemingly ad hoc assumption is not completely un-
warranted, since Condition A is equally insensitive to the distinction
between de re and de se interpretations. He thus interprets the follow-
ing example from Heim
85. Lakoff dreamt he was Jesus and forgave himself all his sins.
as showing that Condition A—precisely like the aforementioned
Binding Economy principle—does not ‘see’ the contrast between the
de se and de re interpretations.21 I offer here an alternative proposal
which agrees with Anand’s latter observation but not with his use of
interface economy.
I contend that the behaviour of pronouns in dream reports can be
explained in terms of guises, the semantic economy principle, and
some intuitive pragmatic reasoning. Recall that on our view the ex-
amples discussed above involve two distinct sorts of cases: (i) cases
where complex guises matter; and (ii) cases where individual guises
matter. The typology further ramifies. The individual guises are ei-
ther trivial or non-trivial, and the non-trivial ones are either special
(or mixture) guises or simple individual guises.
The ensuing multiplicity of guises reflects, in my view, a more com-
plex pragmatics due, in part, to the identity asserted in the standard
dream report cases. In principle, the binding patterns of a dream re-
port case (with identity) can be affected by multiple way of interpret-
ing the embedded pronouns. Thus, these pronouns may take, what I
call, mixture guises as denotation, or can produce complex guises at a
higher node (viz. structured properties). These denotations can thus
(84), in principle, there are two binding possibilities. Here are the two derivations,
following the compositional rules in Heim and Kratzer (1998, pp. 112-114).
• Non-local binding: JI kissed meiK = OPλx.[[ I kissed mei]g[i→x]] (by Predicate
Abstraction) = OPλx.[ I kissed g[i → x](i)](x)] = OPλx.[ I kissed x] (by Traces
and Pronouns Rule) ≈ I kissed the author of the thought (viz. the centre).
• Local binding: JIi kissed meiK = OP[I λx.x kissed mei]g[i→x]] (by Predicate Ab-
straction) = OP[I λx.x kissed g[i→ x](i)] = OP[I λx.x kissed x] (by Traces and
Pronouns Rule) ≈ I kissed myself.
According to Anand’s (2006, pp. 49-52) analysis, OP is an abstractor that is domi-
nated by a node whose semantic value is the centre (the person doing the thinking
in that context). Thus OP just serves the centre in order to combine with the de-
notation of OP’s sister. On this assumption, when local binding takes place the
abstraction determined by OP is vacuous.
21 The reflexive in (85) is problematic because it appears to be outside the c-command
domain of its potential antecedent he. However, if we take the conjunction to co-
ordinate VPs or V ′ rather than clauses, he ends up c-commanding himself. Here, I
assume that he doesn’t c-command himself, and that the binding effect (covaluation)
is obtained via a principle of economy. In fact, binding without c-command will do
all the same.
130
4.4 case studies revisited
interact with binding theory in the expected way. My claim is that it
is indeterminate which of these strategies of pronoun-interpretation
should be applied to a dream report sentence with identity when we
consult the sentence out of the blue. Outside cases with assumed
identity, I shall maintain that there is theoretical motivation for a min-
imal involvement for guises. But first things first. I start with the
observation that the pragmatics of the de se cases is more complicated
than formerly assumed, especially when the de se pronouns are inter-
preted under identity assumptions.
Now, here is, to a first approximation, what can be said by adopting
two of the options above: complex guises and individual guises. (84)
may be allowed (thus obviating condition B) because it expresses a
different complex guise from the one that would have been expressed
using a reflexive pronoun, instead of the non-reflexive pronoun.22
Thus (84) requires complex guises. One complex guise is a structured
property akin to kissing someone (expressed by using the pronoun
me) and the other guise is the property of self-kissing (expressed by
using a reflexive).23 It is in virtue of expressing the former property
that covaluation is possible. To deal with (85), I proceed in a similar
fashion as in the Madame Tussaud’s examples. That is, I assume
that there is a unique individual guise available, which serves as the
semantic value of both he and himself. Consequently, Condition A is
satisfied.
I suggest that mixture guises can potentially explain the dream
report cases with identity. As for simple (individual) guises, they are
not available in the de se cases. I conceive the simple guises producing
de se-readings as being ‘author’ guises, that is, individual concepts
that yield the author of the attitude (the attitude holder) at every
possible world. I shall argue that these guises are not available, and
that only trivial guises (roughly, referents) are available to the binding
mechanism.
As I suggested, the option invoking individual guises can appeal to
a special notion of guise that is made possible by placing the pronoun
in the context of an identity statement (Lakoff is Jesus). Intuitively, in
the dream reports whose content consists in part of an identity state-
ment, the ensuing guises are like mixtures of two substances, related
by a (perhaps symmetric) relation akin to the relation of putting to-
gether or forming a compact group. Another way to see this rela-
tion is as a process of identification—Lakoff is identified with Jesus,
forming the Lakoff-Jesus mixture. It seems that such mixture-based
semantic values can be referenced in natural language.
22 Note though that the reflexive construction I kissed myself can—but it need not—
express a different meaning. As I shall propose, we may fix on mixture guises, and
accommodate both reflexives and pronouns.
23 In lambda notation, the two properties are λx ∈ D〈se〉.λy ∈ D〈se〉.x kisses y and
λx ∈ D〈se〉.x kisses x, respectively.
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86. If Lakoff is Jesus, then Lakoff-Jesus forgave us all our sins.
Such a mixture can bind a reflexive pronoun that will thus end
up referring to a similar mixture (formed from the same substances).
Since only such a mixture-guise is present in (85), Condition A is
satisfied. It should be intuitively clear that no such mixture-guise
is involved in (84) (since no process akin to becoming/identification
has to be assumed in that case), and thus the Principle B is there
obviated by some other means, e.g., by complex guises, as earlier
suggested. However, focusing on the full original example, I dreamt I
was BB and I kissed me, there is a mixture based solution to the problem
of explaining the acceptability of the sentence. If a Lakoff-Brigitte
Bardot (L-BB) mixture guise enters the sequence of evaluation as the
referent of the second occurrence of the indexical I, we can see that
there is an intuitive reference overlap between this mixture and the
referent of the pronoun me (L). I speculate that in this particular case,
both the marginal felicity and infelicity of using the pronoun is due
to the partial overlap between L-BB and L. It is felicitous to the extent
the referents are partly different, but it is infelicitous to the extent that
there is some reference overlap.
Another possibility left open by the original dream report is that
the second occurrence of I denotes Jesus (or the corresponding trivial
guise that yields Jesus at every possible world) and me denotes Lakoff.
That effectively means that I shifts its meaning from Lakoff to Jesus.
No violation of the binding theory follows.
It seems to me that it is characteristic of the interpretation of dream-
report cases under identity assumptions that we are left wondering
who’s who, thus having trouble establishing the identity of the indi-
viduals to which the noun phrases refer. In other words, these dream
report cases are indeterminate, and pragmatic reasoning is required
in order to establish the semantic values of the relevant noun phrases.
So far, I presented two takes (based on complex guises and individ-
ual guises) on the pair of (84) and (85), but note that there is noth-
ing precluding both these possibilities being realised by the grammar.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysing the dream-report cases,
I shall set aside complex guises, since an individual guise approach,
together with a richer pragmatics, are exactly what we need to un-
derstand these cases. I see the involvement of pragmatic factors in
the interpretation of pronouns in dream reports as far more substan-
tial than previously admitted in the literature. My claim is based
on the following observations. In order to establish the expressions
on which pronouns are anaphoric, it is often crucial to use our back-
ground knowledge. Consider the following example due to Levinson
(2000).
87. The interpretation of pronouns depends on world knowledge (ibid.)
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a) Policei arrested the protesters because theyi feared vio-
lence.
b) Police arrested [the protesters]i because theyi advocated
violence.
The pronoun they will be taken to refer to the police in (87a), and
to the protesters in (87b), despite their being embedded in identical
syntactic environments. Anand’s data seem to manifest a similar kind
of context-sensitivity. Compare for instance the contrast between the
following two sentences, which are parallel to Levinson’s sentences
above. I put the likely interpretations of the pronouns in parentheses,
where BB = Brigitte Bardot and L = Lakoff.24
88. Sentences uttered by Lakoff with the parenthetical referential inten-
tions
a) I dreamt I was BB and I (BB) kissed me (L).
b) I dreamt I was BB and I (L) asked for an autograph of me
(BB).
It seems that the interpretation of the first person pronouns I and
me depends on the stereotypes associated with the interpretation of
the scenario. It is thus more likely that the dream reported in (88a) is
about Brigitte Bardot kissing Lakoff, whereas the dream reported in
(88b) is stereotypically interpreted as being about Lakoff asking for
Brigitte Bardot’s autograph. The possibility of swapping the interpre-
tations of the pronouns shows that dream report cases under identity
manifest more flexibility than the theorists discussing them allow for.
25 However, as the above examples make it plausible, the unattested
reading is a by-product of the contextual setting. Presumably, it is
in some sense more interesting for Brigitte to kiss Lakoff than the
other way around. But in a different contextual setting, the bias in
the interpretation of pronouns is clearly shifted.
The latter two remarks suggest that it is binding theory which
drives—or imposes strong constraints on—the interpretation of ref-
erential expressions, especially in the atypical cases of dream reports.
That is to say, when a pronoun is used, the interpretation as to its
referent will be chosen such that its referent is different from the
referent of the previous pronoun, in compliance with principle B of
binding theory (or with the semantic reinterpretation of this princi-
ple). Thus, we get the 〈BB,L〉 and the 〈L,BB〉 sequences, which are
both acceptable according to Non-Redundancy. When a reflexive is
used instead of the pronoun in (88), we look for a ‘minimal update’
24 For the moment, I leave out the special, ‘mixture’ guise interpretations, and focus
on the equally plausible, non-special guise interpretations.
25 Anand (2007, p. 1) for instance, considers that a reading entirely analogous to (88b))
(his example (2b)) is unattested.
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of the assignment of semantic values to the previous noun phrase in
order to accommodate the requirement of binding theory (or, on the
semantic view, of Non-Redundancy). Thus, the two noun phrases (I,
myself ) end up having the same referent, say BB-L. This fits better the
dream-world identity BB=L.
However, there is a problem with the assumption that binding the-
ory is equally well accommodated no matter what pronoun we are
using. Note the asymmetry between himself and him in (89).
89. a) Lakoff dreamt he was Jesus and forgave himself all his sins.
b) ??/?Lakoff dreamt he was Jesus and forgave him all his
sins.
The infelicity of (89b) suggests that the interpretation according
to which Lakoff=the forgiver and Jesus=the person forgiven is not
right. (This interpretation works for (89a).) If that would be the right
interpretation, the sentence (89b) should be perfectly acceptable, even
more so than (89a). In principle, if the above speculation to the effect
that binding theory drives the computation were right, we should
not be able to see the contrast between pronouns and reflexives in
this case. Binding theory should be able to impose an interpretation
which is compatible with the requirements of the binding principles.
The fact that pronouns do not seem to trigger disjoint (rather than
dependent) interpretations in (89b) suggests that our speculation was
wrong. However, we may trace the infelicity of (89b) back to the am-
biguity of him, coupled with the pragmatic oddity of the salient way
of resolving the ambiguity. The salient, but odd, way of resolving
the ambiguity would be one on which Lakoff forgave Jesus all his
sins. Note that the similar construction Lakoff dreamt he met Jesus and
confessed him all his sins is much better than (89b). The moral is that
we don’t need a truth-conditional economy principle in order to deal
with the interpretation of dream reports. The semantic reinterpreta-
tion of binding theory coupled with pragmatic factors can account
for the referential dependency relations.
My hypothesis is in stark contrast with the judgements expressed
by several theorists (e.g. Anand 2007; Percus and Sauerland 2003)
who claim that there is an asymmetry between sentences like (88a)
and (88b). This is because they think that there is a blocking effect
present in dream reports to the effect that de re pronouns cannot c-
command (and thus bind) de se pronouns. For these authors, only
the former reading, (88a), is acceptable.26 On my view, the contrast
in judgements is a matter of pragmatic salience. Once we endorse
26 Perhaps not incidentally, I do not share Anand’s judgements about the dream-
reports data—which are cited in favour of his hypothesis put forward in order to
explain the above, purported asymmetry. Anand (2007, pp. 3-4) admits that a non-
negligible part of his informants do not see any asymmetry between dream reports
and other attitude reports with respect to the blocking effect he hypothesises.
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that the pragmatics of dream reports under identity assumptions is
more complex, there is no need for positing a divide between attitude
verbs which manifest this asymmetry and those which don’t. Back-
ground information, rather than the type of verb, is at the origin of
the perceived asymmetry.
Therefore, I think the de re blocking effect—that prevents de re noun
phrases from c-commanding de se pronouns—is not the right gener-
alisation. To see this more clearly, here is an anti-de re blocking sce-
nario. In my dream, I happen inadvertently to send to myself on a
messenger app a line that contains only the following emoticon: “:-
)*”. Suppose I receive this line without realising who is the sender.
Knowing that, in chat slang, the :-)* emoticon means blowing a kiss,
I can felicitously report the event by saying I dreamt I kissed me. Like-
wise, someone may report my dream by saying Andrei dreamt that he
kissed him. Now notice that although I was the conscious receiver of
the cyber-kiss, I was not aware of sending the emoticon, and thus I
was not aware of being the cyber-kisser. So, I can be aware that I’m
being kissed, without being aware that I’m the kisser. This means
that me (or him) is interpreted de se, but the indexical I (or he) has a
purely de re interpretation. We don’t need the de se and de re individ-
ual guises to explain the purported obviation of binding theory. If
this is in effect an obviation, the acceptability of coreferential noun
phrases can be considered an obviation of Non-Redundancy due to
the pragmatic payoff associated with expressing a different complex
guise (the property kissing someone, rather than self-kissing).
The de re blocking effect, albeit a stable phenomenon, is a prag-
matic regularity following from the fact that, usually, when a person
is aware of being the agent of an action (or activity) whose object (or
patient) is that very agent, that person is also aware of being the ob-
ject of the action. So, usually, when the agent and object of an action
are the same, awareness of the identity of the agent correlates with
awareness of the identity of the object. This fact about attitudes is
also reflected in the ascriptions of attitudes. However, this fact is not
a semantic fact, but rather pertains to the pragmatics of attitudes and
attitude ascriptions. 27
Sensitivity to simple guises
To highlight an important aspect of the denotational economy ac-
count and the main difference between this account and the compet-
ing accounts, let us look at another de se case. Sharvit (2011) argues
that binding theory needs to be sensitive to two notions of covaluation
(type 1 and type 2 covaluation) in order to account for constructions
such as the following:
27 Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Jaszczolt (2013) put forward similar pragmatic
views.
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90. McCain convinced Palin to vote for herself/*her.
91. [ Palin [ 6 [ McCain convincedde re-w0 t6 [ 3 5 [LD PRO5 vote
for-w3 herself/*her6 ]]]]]
(91) gives the logical form of (90). Glossing over some details, the
key idea behind Sharvit’s reinterpretation of binding theory is the
following. On Sharvit’s account, PRO5 and herself/her6 are type 2 cov-
alued since the former denotes the self of the attitude holder via bind-
ing by convince and control by t6, and the latter denotes the attitude
holder herself, namely Palin, via type 1 covaluation (i.e. standard
binding).28 So, on this view, there are two guises, which are syn-
tactically (and referentially) linked to each other by a non-standard
syntactic/lexical mechanism.
This proposal raises an important issue. The issue is whether we
want to get de se (‘author’) guises into the extended binding theory
(including the economy principles). Should our theory of binding
constructions with de se pronouns be sensitive to simple (i.e., individ-
ual as opposed to complex) guises? There are several options. One is
to say that binding principles (including economy principles) are not
sensitive to distinctions between certain guises (Anand 2007). The
other is to say that binding principles are sensitive to such distinc-
tions, and thus need reformulation in terms of guises (Sharvit 2011).
I endorse both the sensitivity and insensitivity strategies for different
cases. However, insofar as the de se/de re readings are concerned, I
argue that it is better to view the denotational economy mechanism,
and thus binding theory, as totally insensitive to them. Consequently,
my contention is that no matter which of the options we take, we
don’t need to posit insensitivity of economy to the truth-conditions
of the two LFs proposed by Anand.
To see this, we have to refer to the denotational analysis of the data.
Does our economy-based account deal with the object control con-
struction in a way that shuns a partially ‘anaemic’ truth-conditional
economy principle, but can still compete with Sharvit’s account? As
we have seen, the basic semantic resources of the denotational ac-
count consist of individual and complex guises. Let us check the
solution in terms of complex guises. If Sharvit (ibid.) is right that the
binding theory principles should be stated in terms of two notions of
covaluation, we can try to model the two covaluation constructions
as economy competitors. Recall that the hallmark of an economy
principle is that it allows logical forms with novel truth-conditional
semantic values that could not have been obtained by purely gram-
matical means. On this option, complex guises—rather than individ-
ual guises—determine the relevant semantic values (those semantic
values that could not have been obtained otherwise). The problem
with this proposal is that it does not seem to have any pragmatic
28 Anand (2007) and Percus and Sauerland (2003) discuss similar data.
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motivation. One could respond, by arguing that sometimes grammat-
ical rules do not provide us with intuitive pragmatic motivations, but
this would conflict with our pragmatic desideratum. Other things
being equal, we need to employ principles that make sense from a
pragmatic perspective. It turns out that this is possible.
The other option is to appeal to simple guises, along with further
restrictions on their availability. We have PRO5 denote the attitude
holder (Palin) and herself/her6 denote a guise of the attitude holder.
But this means that the semantic values of the two binding expres-
sions are distinct, which would make the wrong predictions. To get
the same semantic value, we need to say that the two expressions
denote the same guise/referent. I shall opt for this more minimal as-
sumption to the effect that the de se/de re cases above do not involve
different guises, but rather a single constant guise (or the correspond-
ing individual referent). Binding theory is sensitive to purely de re ref-
erents of reflexives. Thus I take it that PRO and the reflexive/pronoun
are coindexed in the object control sentence (90), repeated here (with
annotation added) for convenience:
92. McCain convinced Palin PROi to vote for herselfi/*heri.
The coindexation between PRO and the reflexive/pronoun would
explain the patterns of judgement—the satisfaction of Condition A
and the violation of Condition B—without presupposing Sharvit’s
baroque logical forms. As far as I can tell, there is no syntactic diffi-
culty with such a hypothesis.29 It remains to be seen how to get the
de se readings pragmatically, and, more pressingly, why, while many
other extravagant meanings enter the semantics, de se readings are
not allowed in. The mechanism of guises provides a suggestion re-
garding the ‘how’ question. Since we can formulate the denotation of
a de se pronoun as a guise akin to the denotation of the description
the author/experiencer of the attitude, once the attitude holder sees her-
self through such a guise, she cannot fail to be self-conscious (that is,
she cannot fail to believe the centred proposition where she is agent
at every possible world). Then, in order to obtain a contextual de se
reading of a pronoun, the pronoun will receive an ‘author’ guise as
value.
Some may regard this strategy with suspicion, since just a moment
ago I adopted the ‘special guise’ solution that involves a richer prag-
matics. Is the previous solution in tension with the minimal solution
adopted for de se and de re cases? No, it isn’t. As intimated, both
the sensitivity and insensitivity assumptions are legitimate in differ-
ent types of cases. In particular, the case of identity under attitude
reports tends to produce sensitivity, while attitude reports outside
identity-contexts produce insensitivity. Note that the object control
29 For instance, Haegeman (1994, pp. 261-2) adopts basically the same pattern of coin-
dexation between PRO and the reflexives it c-commands.
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construction is not a case of identity, whilst the previous cases in-
volved identity in an essential way. As we have seen, identity cases
are special in being able to give birth to a richer pragmatics, and,
more specifically, to a more substantial involvement of guises in the
binding theory. I have argued that special ‘mixture’ guises are made
possible by the identification (of, say, Lakoff and Jesus) in the clause
of the dream-attitude verb. I have also shown that complex guises
can assume part of the explanatory burden, as they implicitly did in
Reinhart’s original account of binding obviations.
Why does identity trigger sensitivity? This presumably happens
because the identification gives rise to several pragmatic possibilities
that couldn’t be exploited otherwise. An argument that this is the
case proceeds from embedding the object control sentences under
dream reports with identity, and comparing the resulting construc-
tions with the object control sentences without assumed identity.
93. a) Mrs McCain dreamt she was Palin and that she convinced
her PROi to vote for herselfi/?heri.
b) Mrs McCain dreamt she was Palin and was convinced PROi
to vote for herselfi/?heri.
94. a) If Mrs McCain were Palin, she would know how to con-
vince her PROi to vote for herselfi/?heri.
b) If Mrs McCain were Palin, she would be convinced PROi
to vote for herselfi/?heri.
By changing the gender of the (McCain) agent in the object control
sentence (92) to avoid unnecessary complexities and by embedding
the resulting construction in a context in which the identity is as-
serted, as in (93) and (94), the initial contrast in acceptability of the
coindexed pronoun vs the coindexed reflexive in the original object
control sentence (92) fades perceptibly. Admittedly, this judgement
is a bit hazy. Nonetheless, if a slight improvement in the degree ac-
ceptability of the coindexed pronoun is indeed discernible, this can
be so because the identity assumption induces a richer pragmatics,
and Non-Redundancy can be satisfied by non-standard means such
as special guises. For instance, on the special guise reading, PRO
denotes the McCain-Palin mixture, herself denotes the same mixture,
and her denotes either Palin or Mrs McCain. The coindexation be-
tween PRO and her is possible because, in an intuitive sense, there
is an overlap of reference between the mixture and the purported
denotation of the pronoun (Palin or Mrs McCain). (Still further inter-
pretations of the pronouns may be available in the identity case.) But
in the absence of identity, only trivial guises are available, and the
condition A and B effects are present thus making the coindexation
impossible.
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I must confess that I’m not entirely convinced by my own judge-
ments regarding (93) and (94). For some reason, the identity context
does not yield an acceptability of the pronoun her as it did in (89b)
(for the pronoun him). If so, my contention that identity contexts
generally have an impact on binding theory should be revised, by
inspecting why the object control sentences preclude sensitivity of
binding theory to a richer pragmatics (and, in particular, to special
guises). Be that as it may, the claim that object control sentences (e.g.
(92)) can be accounted for by defining the binding principles over
referents (or trivial guises) still stands unabated.
In sum, my position regarding the de se and de re cases is the fol-
lowing. I agree with Anand that the economy mechanism does not
discriminate between de re and de se readings. (This commits me
to interpret, unlike Sharvit, the object control constructions without
building de se readings in the binding theory.30) However, I think
that the dubious economy mechanism posited by Anand is not nec-
essary. Some economy mechanism is in play in the interpretation of
such cases, but those interpretations (i) do not involve distinguish-
ing between de se and de re, and (ii) are only some among the many
other interpretations that are pragmatically available for those con-
structions.
In identity cases, the pragmatics is richer, but even there, the de
se/de re readings do not seem to have an impact on binding theory.
Crucially, nor does the de re blocking effect (preventing de se pronouns
from being c-commanded by de re noun phrases) seem to be present
in identity cases. I think that excluding the de se/de re distinction
completely from the domain of binding theory and, thus, from the
domain of Non-Redundancy (the insensitivity approach applied to
de se/de re) is conceptually advantageous relative to positing an econ-
omy principle that is insensitive to that distinction, but nevertheless
building the distinction in the semantics. It is conceptually advan-
tageous because it yields a stronger and more general principle of
economy, and a more elegant binding theory.
More generally, when it comes to the right treatment of de se pro-
nouns, there are two general, and quite distinct, methodological ideas
that can guide the approach. One is to build as much as possible in
the compositional semantics (and ultimately in the syntax), and then
adapt the binding theory to the richer semantic apparatus. This is by
far the dominant strategy in formal semantics.31 Another option is to
30 However, this difference should not be inflated. My assumption and Sharvit’s are
not all that different after all, because she claims that in (92) the binding theory (in
particular, principles A and B) should be sensitive to the different guises of the same
individual, namely Palin and her ‘self’ (the ‘author’ guise), and I state binding theory
over the same trivial guise, the Palin-guise. (And, on my assumptions, trivial guises
are akin to individuals).
31 Percus and Sauerland (2003) and Sharvit (2011) are representative theorists.
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be as minimal as possible about syntax and semantics.32 Under the
latter analysis, the de se/de re distinction does not make it in the truth-
conditional content at all. This distinction is obtained pragmatically
or by some other means (e.g. by deriving it from purely structural,
non-truth-conditional properties of the logical forms).
It is not clear to me how to argue conclusively for one of these
two options. Given the desiderata laid down before, I would choose
the second, more semantically minimalist strategy. This allows me to
keep to a ‘maximal’ structural parallelism between the main princi-
ples known to be governing the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of
binding. In particular, it allows me to use Non-Redundancy as the
main semantic principle that regulates binding. This might seem like
expressing a cavalier attitude towards the semantics, since I leave the
de se outside the semantics of binding, and simply don’t account for
it at all. However, the difference between my account and the more
mainstream ones should not be overstated. I agree that the correct
analysis of de se pronouns is along standard lines. My contention is
that the standard semantic values of de se pronouns are not relevant
for the purposes of binding theory. Moreover, I do not see any theo-
retical virtue in building richer structures into semantics in order to
capture a negligible part of what is, in fact, a much richer pragmatic
phenomenon. In contrast, the minimal account I favour allows for
a better interface between semantics and a certain region of pragma-
tics, and preserves the insights of denotational economy (which in
turn preserves the insights of the traditional binding theory).
4.4.2 Copular sentences and pure identity cases
I have dealt with contexts in which identity is assumed, and stud-
ied their implications for the interpretation of noun phrases relevant
for binding theory. But what happens to ‘pure’ identity cases, i.e.
cases where the interpretation of the noun phrases inside the identity
clause itself (rather than outside it, as before) is at issue? I turn now
to pure identity cases and next to the (related) copular sentences that
were the subject matter of the second case study in the previous chap-
ter. The pure identity statements are a species of copular sentences,
which fall (in part) under the incidence of the binding Principle C. I
thus have the chance to tie two loose ends that pertain to Principle C
effects in copular sentences.
Identity cases such as John is John have been mentioned as chal-
lenges for Principle C (Reinhart 2006; Safir 2004). These are prima
facie problematic for Principle C given that according to that princi-
ple the two occurrences of the DP John should not be coindexed. It
appears that identity statements are subject to Principle C since the
32 Higginbotham (2010) is the only representative of this approach to de se. J. Collins
(2007) and Neale (2007) have similar positions on domains other than de se pronouns.
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two noun phrases (proper names) are in a c-command relation. Prima
facie, we have no reason to stipulate that identity statements fall out-
side the incidence of Principle C. Consequently, the semantics should
interpret the two as referring to different individuals. However, this
is manifestly not so. A way out of this predicament is to say that the
semantics does not treat the two occurrences of John as bound either,
and hence does not use the λ-term λx(x is x) (the identity relation) in
order to interpret the sentence. Rather it is accidental coreference, not
binding, which is the result of semantic interpretation.
Some version of the maxim of quantity (preventing one to convey
unnecessary, e.g. trivial, information) can in principle regulate the
(broadly speaking) referential semantic values introduced by an ut-
terance. The usage of the same referential semantic value very much
weakens the meaning expressed by the identity statement, and the
usage of a different referential value determines a strengthening of
the meaning of the identity sentence.
Now, Non-Redundancy can be seen as a grammatical extension
of the maxim of quantity (or the Q-principle advanced by Levinson
2000), and can do that maxim’s job with respect to identity cases. In-
tuitively, statements such as John is John are not usually interpreted
by default as logically necessary, and thus (under plausible assump-
tions) as informationally trivial statements.33 Nor are the similar iden-
tity statements of the sort mentioned in (72c), and even (72b) meant
as necessary statements; rather, they are intended to provide some
useful information. If so, one doesn’t convey—and is not taken by
the audience to convey—a trivial statement by uttering identity state-
ments such as the above. That would amount to a violation of Non-
Redundancy. In more pragmatic terms, there is pressure to make the
identity statement strong enough for communicative purposes. This
is why one should be non-redundant in uttering/interpreting iden-
tity statements. The prediction is clearly borne out.
Being a bit more specific about our semantic assumptions will ben-
efit the understanding of the current account of identity statements. I
take proper names to be very closely related to definite descriptions.
I also assume that proper names have some descriptive content and
express guises (individual concepts).34 Consequently, we can get the
33 Identity statements, if true, express necessary truths. While I do not want to contest
the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic necessity, some iden-
tity statements that are metaphysically necessary will be recognisably epistemically
necessary as well—and this is the case for some of the identity statements that call
into question the principle C of binding theory. Necessary truths have seldom any
value in communication, especially when such communication involves statements
of the form John is John. It is the epistemic status of identity statements that is rele-
vant to the semantics/pragmatics of binding. In other words, binding theory does
not look at the metaphysical entities standing for noun phrases, but at the informa-
tion encoded by these noun phrases.
34 These guises may be trivial (or actualised), in which case we can accommodate the
standard intuitions of rigidity.
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infelicity specific to Condition C effects through the Non-Redundancy
principle, since their presuppositional and assertoric content are com-
parable to the content of other noun phrases. If the proper names
are more specific than pronouns, as seems plausible, they will tend
to introduce new referents. Thus, John said that John saw the movie,
and The man said the man saw the movie are both bad under a covalua-
tion reading, since they will each introduce redundant objects in their
respective sequences of evaluation. (Pronouns will be in a better posi-
tion to express the desired covaluation, by pulling out their semantic
values from positions more to the left of the sequence.)
While we are at principle C, let us discuss the rest of the binding
economy data in order to illustrate how the denotational economy
account handles them. Note that in (72b) Cicero turned out to be Tully
and (72c) He is Ralph the relevant noun phrases will introduce differ-
ent guises in the sequence of evaluation, e.g. the man called Cicero, the
man called Tully, the salient male etc.. Recall also the example where the
identity of an individual is under discussion, e.g. (71d). Suppose that,
precisely as in the (71d) example, in uttering She praises Zelda to the
sky, the speaker refers to Zelda herself. This is a standard obviation of
principle C, because the pronoun has a guise as semantic value (given
under a contextually appropriate description), whilst the name Zelda
has a different (constant) guise as semantic value. Therefore, the two
noun phrases introduce different referents in the sequence, and hence
the construction abides by Non-Redundancy. These are all different
individual guises.
A different type of case involves Evans-style obviation of princi-
ple C, which involve uses of proper names such as If everyone hates
Oscar, Oscar hates Oscar (example (72a) above). We are already fa-
miliar with such examples: Non-Redundancy is satisfied at the level
of complex guises (or structured meanings). The predicate hate Os-
car expresses a differently structured semantic value than hate himself,
although they are truth-conditionally equivalent in that context. If
we couldn’t satisfy Non-Redundancy at the level of a higher node
(expressing a property), this would have been a clear violation of
Condition C (or Non-Redundancy). 35
Coming back to the copular cases discussed in the preceding chap-
ter, let us see how we can account for them. Recall the identity state-
ments for which truth-conditional economy principles were postu-
lated by Sharvit (1999).
95. What John is shaving is a pet which belongs to him.
predicational, specificational
35 It should be stressed that we are not pretending to offer a wholesale vindication of
Condition C, but just to give an account of the reasonable predictions made by this
principle. We can use two names to express identity, and when we do, we violate
Condition C. A more nuanced binding principle is needed to cover these cases.
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96. What he is shaving is a pet which belongs to John.
predicational, */(?)specificational
I do not share Sharvit’s (*) unacceptability judgement for the speci-
ficational coreferential reading for he and John. This reading seems to
me much less deviant, and more like an acceptable, though slightly
odd reading—whence the (?).36 In fact, we can imagine a felicitous
utterance of (96) under the specificational interpretation in the fol-
lowing sort of scenario. Suppose that we are in a situation where the
identity of a contextually salient person is under discussion, and I ut-
ter (96) under the specificational interpretation as evidence that that
salient person (the referent of he) is John. Giving up the unaccept-
ability judgement and thus the necessity of explaining the purported
contrast between (95) and (96), we can give a uniform economy-based
explanation for both of these cases. To explain what is going on
in these examples we don’t need to form reference sets and com-
pare derivations, as on Sharvit’s interface economy proposal. As I
have pointed out in the previous chapter, both operations involve
great costs, and seem to be ad hoc. According to our denotational
economy account, the bound reading of (96) will be ruled out by
Non-Redundancy. Proper names are more restricted than pronouns,
and therefore when they appear in a sequence after a pronoun they
should introduce their own, distinct referent. If they do not, we end
up with two identical objects in the sequence, and one of them is
redundant.
As I remarked, Non-Redundancy has a broader pragmatic signifi-
cance (cf. Levinson 2000). Note that analogous referential patterns
hold good at the discourse level. For instance, He entered the room;
John then sat down does not have a reading on which he and John have
the same semantic value. This is readily explained by the semantic
economy principle alongside the assumption that proper names are
less dependent than other noun phrases. We thus have a unified ex-
planation of the copular constructions in terms of semantic economy.
36 But even if you do find this judgement to be available, there is a plausible assump-
tion that added to the DE-account can account for the judgement. A predicational
copular sentence such as What he is is an eccentric man and a total nuisance to John
can be treated in the sequence-based approach similarly to constructions like It is
hisi father that Johni hates and Hisi father called Johni, where John’s father is the salient
individual entering the sequence of evaluation rather than John when noun phrase
his father is processed. Likewise, John does not get in the sequence on the second
occurrence of the name John, but that salient, topicalised complex property an eccen-
tric man and a total nuisance to John. Thus John is introduced in the same sequence of
evaluation—which we may call the topic-sequence—at most once. In contrast, in spec-
ificational sentences, the second occurrence of John introduces an individual-topic
(rather than a property), and this is redundant because the first occurrence of the
name has previously introduced the same individual. For this account to work at
all, we need two sequences of evaluation (topical and non-topical) instead of one (cf.
Bittner 2001).
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If this approach is on the right track, two noun phrases can have
one of the following categories of pairs of semantic values (on our
semantic assumptions, guises) and contents (qua worldly individuals
that are the values of the guises at the relevant world and intuitively
correspond to the noun phrases).
97. The typology of noun phrases’ semantic contents (broadly speaking)
a) same guise, different individuals (wax museum cases (70b));
b) different guises, same individual (the identity under dis-
cussion cases (71d), identity statements (72d));
c) same guise, same individuals (ordinary, non-identity, uses
of proper names (72a));
d) different guises, different individuals (other ordinary uses
of noun phrases).
According to the above typology, the guiding principle of the se-
mantic/pragmatic restatement of the binding theory, Non-Redundan-
cy, will be formulated sometimes over individual guises (of the two
varieties: constant and informative) and at other times over complex
guises. Admittedly, this proposal barely scratches the surface of bind-
ing phenomena. My intent has been to provide a useful description
of a cluster of data, rather than to explain a phenomenon in detail.
I have glossed over a number of syntactic intricacies of binding and
omitted a detailed semantic analysis of the phenomena. But I have
not set out to do that. Instead, my purpose was to show how a more
fine grained semantics for noun phrases alongside a central princi-
ple of economy can alleviate traditional problems for binding theory,
and to point to the main ingredients of a successful account of bind-
ing. Another, more concrete, purpose was to demonstrate the relative
advantage of the semantic economy account of binding as opposed to
the standard interface truth-conditional economy account. The major
advantages of the current account over the truth-conditional economy
accounts is that the former is always compatible with the pragmatic
considerations involved in the evaluation of a broad range of linguis-
tic data, and its basic assumptions are much more elegant than those
of its main competitor.
The advantages of the present account, as well as its difficulties,
follow from the assumption that the denotational economy account
needs several types of guises and some (default or pragmatic) restric-
tions on the occurrence of such guises. Also, it should be clear that
the problems for this account do not pertain to its not being parsimo-
nious. Individual guises do the job of both individual referents and
the standard (informative) Fregean guises. The latter are indepen-
dently needed for understanding communication and the so called
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Frege puzzles involving propositional attitudes.37 We can interpret
the individual referents as trivial guises (or actualised descriptions):
constant functions, which deliver, at each world or situation, the same
individual. Thus, the treatment is simple enough; it has as a funda-
mental notion, the notion of guise, which can in turn be of several
types: individual (trivial, special, and simple) and complex.38 In what
follows, I point out two important challenges facing the denotational
economy project.
The first problem is how to distinguish between binding and coref-
erence on the denotational economy view. Binding is straightforward
in this system: it consists of moving individual guises in the sequence
to a newly created slot, at the end of the sequence. The expression
corresponding to the initial position of the guise is said to bind the
expression corresponding to the newly created slot. The individual
guise that is pulled out is the semantic value of both the binder and
bindee expression. In contrast, something akin to the notion of coref-
erence is justified only in cases where distinct guises (either simple or
complex) are introduced in the sequence of evaluation. More specifi-
cally, coreference appears just in case there are distinct guises of the
same individuals, that is, guises that yield the same individual at the
actual world, but yield different individuals at other possible worlds.
Guises have played an important role in this discussion, and in par-
ticular, in accommodating the obviations of Principles A, B, and C.
But, unfortunately, it is well known that unconstrained guises grossly
overgenerate. As Schlenker (2005, p. 18) remarks, one should find
ways to limit the involvement of guises in binding theory, since other-
wise all the binding theoretic violations could be cancelled by letting
binding expressions take guise-values contextually. Heim (1998), in
discussing the same problem, suggests that the right restriction is
to disallow contexts with distinct guises that are presupposed to be
coreferential. In her terms, contexts never assign distinct but presup-
posedly coreferential guises.39
37 What’s usually contested—but nonetheless assumed here—is that these Fregean
guises are part of the semantics. Some theorists will have them as part of pragmatics.
I won’t enter the debate about the proper division between semantics and pragmatics
here. For me, this division is instrumental. What’s important for my purposes is to
argue for a semantic account of binding which is consistent with what was already
conceived (with some degree of success) as the syntax of binding. To be sure, the
present remarks about the semantics of binding can be reconstructed as remarks
about the pragmatics of binding.
38 Schlenker (2005) discusses some of the basic test cases for Non-Redundancy, the
Dahl puzzle and quantifier binding. The semantic economy solution to the Dahl
puzzle needs some stipulation, but it should be remarked that so does Fox’s truth-
conditional solution. See discussion in the previous chapter.
39 See Heim (1998, 216 fn.11, 2011, pp. 204-7) for outlines of the proposal. Schlenker
(2005, 18 fns. 18-9) suggests a potentially different approach. He appeals to the no-
tion of conceptual cover from Aloni (2005). Aloni conceives of a conceptual cover as
a set of guises that are in one-to-one correspondence with the domain of individuals
at each world. (As Aloni shows, conceptual covers can be deployed to solve several
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There are two possible ways to develop these ideas. One is to say
that guises of individuals always stay ‘packaged’ in the sense that
if there are multiple descriptions for the same individuals, these de-
scriptions will form a conjunctive guise, rather than several separate
guises of the same individual. Under pragmatic pressure—e.g. when
a perceptual guise is given contextually—there may exist two guises
for the same individual. These are the cases where binding theory
obviations occur. However, in the next step the guises merge if they
are ‘recognised’ by the competent speaker as being different guises
of the same individual.
In contrast, the second potential implementation grants that multi-
ple guises for a unique individual may indeed be available to cogni-
tion in general. What we need to assume, though, is that, in general,
only unique guises for each individual are available to the grammat-
ical economy mechanism dealing with binding. Grammar ‘packages’
unique guises for each individual. (Perhaps memory limitations can
be invoked to render this hypothesis more plausible.) Nonetheless, in
special contexts, where there is the necessary pragmatic motivation,
the mechanism will allow two distinct guises for an individual. This
solution has the advantage of eliminating the need to artificially limit
the number of guises. However, it does this at the price of assuming
the modularity of the denotational economy principle.
By modularity here I mean a restriction on the guises rather than
a restriction on the domain of syntactic/semantic data to which the
economy principle applies. So the restriction is one that belongs to
the interface between semantics and pragmatics and has the effect of
creating a bottleneck in the ‘flow’ of guises towards binding theory. In
other words, I do not mean modularity in the sense that the economy
principle is trumped by multiple other grammatical principles and
contextual factors. This latter type of modularity is precisely what
I found objectionable in chapters 1 and 3. So the range of construc-
tions under the incidence of the semantic economy principle is wider
than it used to be in the case of interface economy principles. Non-
Redundancy is central to the denotational economy account, sanction-
ing virtually all the binding constructions surveyed here, whilst the
interface economy principles were, as we have seen, rather marginal
within an account of binding.
I have argued for the denotational economy approach to binding
theory obviations, and I have also made a case that denotational econ-
omy promises to offer a general account of binding. The force of this
account lies in the intuitive appeal that the central principle, Non-
Redundancy, enjoys, and, more specifically, its pragmatic motivation.
puzzles pertaining to attitude ascriptions.) Schlenker then suggests that working
with a unique conceptual cover for binding expressions in the unmarked cases seems
to be the needed solution. In other words, conceptual covers are a natural constraint
on the availability of guises.
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I have also showed how to handle de se constructions and copular
sentences in the denotational economy framework. An important
challenge—one that I leave for future work—comes from the addi-
tional assumption that guises are in play in the denotational account
of binding. The challenge is how to manipulate the introduction of
guises in order to predict the coreference and disjoint reference pat-
terns specific to BT. A further development concerns the broader no-
tion of antecedence. I have shown that this notion can accommodate
cases that were previously unavailable to binding theory. However, I
have not discussed the differences between the notion of antecedence
and the standard definition in terms of c-command, let alone cases
of pronouns bound to their antecedent from non-c-commanding po-
sitions. Indeed, I assumed that antecedence incorporates an extended
c-command relation that can be established not only within the sen-
tence, but also between the author and audience of the context and
the referent introduced in the sentence.
In this chapter I sketched an account of binding economy phenom-
ena, showing how the account deals with the de se pronoun cases
and copular constructions, which proved to be problematic for the
standard accounts of linguistic economy. In presenting the semantic
economy account, I also argued for its superiority relative to the inter-
face economy accounts, according to two desiderata (the generality of
the economy principle, and their transparent pragmatic motivation).
This completes the second part of the thesis, dealing with binding
phenomena. What I have achieved in this second part is, in crucial
respects, similar to the outcomes of the first part of the thesis, which
dealt with scope. There, as well as here, I have made a prima facie
case for moving away from the ‘interface’ characteristics of the stan-
dard economy principles (and, specifically, from their very restrictive
domain of application) towards a semantic/pragmatic account that
gives a more central role to linguistic economy considerations. I turn
next to investigating the consequences of economy for the semantics
of noun phrases and for the idea of logicality in natural language.
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Part III
FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF L INGU IST ICECONOMY
5 LOG IC IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
I have always respected those
who defend grammar and
logic. We realise, fifty years
later, that they averted serious
dangers.
Proust, Le Temps Retrouve´, 106
5.1 introduction
In the previous chapters I argued against a series of assumptions built
into the standard economy accounts of scopal and binding phenom-
ena, and I proposed a cluster of assumptions that should be part of
the economy-based accounts of scope and binding. These chapters
contributed to a descriptive work on scope and binding. In the fol-
lowing two chapters, I set out to show that economy principles are far
from being abstract linguistic mechanisms, instead having important
consequences for issues in the philosophy of language. If some of the
essential assumptions on which the economy-based accounts of scope
and binding are correct, we can draw conclusions about some struc-
tural properties of language, viz. logical properties, as well as about
the nature of noun phrases, e.g. demonstratives. To show that the
economy-based accounts have these important consequences, I need
to backtrack and assume a baseline economy account of binding and
scope. I choose as baseline accounts the standard economy-based ac-
counts. They are well-known, and have some important empirical
coverage.
The assumptions of the standard economy-based accounts on which
I rely, as well as the assumptions of the arguments in the next two
chapters, do not contradict my claim (in the previous chapters) that
the standard economy-based accounts are unsatisfactory. First, the
relevant properties are presumed by my account as well. In partic-
ular, the inferential properties of certain linguistic constructions are
essential in establishing the grammaticality of the logical forms that
disambiguate the linguistic construction in question (this is also the
case for my accounts of scope and binding). Second, my overall argu-
ments in the next chapters (especially the first) do not depend on the
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economy-principles being entirely true. In particular, the arguments
of the next chapters go through even if the mechanisms posited are
semantic/pragmatic rather than pertaining to the interface between
syntax and semantics (where the computation is supposed to take
place according to the standard principles of economy).
In this chapter I spell out a consequence of having economy-based
constraints on natural language, namely, a thesis concerning the re-
lationship between logic and language. The logicality of natural lan-
guage, albeit a classical theme in philosophy, is controversial, mainly
because there is still no consensus about what exactly is meant by the
thesis that natural languages have or lack logical structure.1 This is,
to be sure, partly due to difficulties inherent to the notion of logical-
ity, but is equally a consequence of the lack of awareness regarding
linguistic phenomena that can support the idea that fragments of nat-
ural language exhibit logical properties. Here, I shall make a case
for the thesis that language is logical—the logic in natural language
thesis, LNL, for short—based on linguistic phenomena that have not
been seriously considered in relation to LNL. I am primarily look-
ing at the LNL thesis from a linguistic perspective, and thus I need
to make some standard assumptions about logical notions, without
arguing for them. My aim will then be to show that these logical
properties, arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, are also gram-
matical properties, broadly speaking.2
LNL says that language has bona fide logical properties. The thesis
goes beyond mere regimentation of natural language in a logical sys-
tem. The claim is not only that some items of logical vocabulary can
be used to translate natural language sentences. LNL is rather a thesis
about certain linguistic properties of natural languages or fragments
thereof. These linguistic properties are deemed logical. In principle,
these logico-linguistic properties can be located anywhere that is the-
oretically fruitful: at the level of syntax, semantics, pragmatics, or at
some interface level between these ‘modules’. LNL can receive sup-
port from a strong analogy between these purported logico-linguistic
properties—as they arguably appear in linguistic hypotheses—and
1 The logicality of natural language has been denied (in different ways) by both
ideal and ordinary language philosophical traditions but was put forth and de-
fended (in different forms) by the works of Montague (1974), Grice (1967/1989) and
many others. Talk of logicality is familiar from linguistics textbooks (Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet 2000, Gamut 1991, Heim and Kratzer 1998, Kamp and Reyle 1993.)
Notions of logicality and formality are also much discussed in philosophical logic
(e.g. Etchemendy 1990/1999, Sher 1996).
2 The argumentative strategy will be similar, in broad outlines, to the one adopted by
Grice. Grice (1967/1989) argued that apparent counterexamples to the hypothesis
that logico-linguistic expressions (especially, conditionals and conjunctions) function
as their truth-functional counterparts in standard logic can be mitigated by factoring
in pragmatic effects. It is in this spirit that our argument proceeds, although I would
like primarily to consider potential syntactic and semantic constraints, rather than
Grice’s pragmatic constraints on the logical behaviour of some natural language
expressions.
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the logical properties of formal languages. The latter type of prop-
erty are far better understood, and among them we have all sorts of
logical consequence relations, validity and other properties based on
semantic invariance. It is some such properties that LNL postulates
about natural language.
The LNL thesis can be spelled out in several ways, according to
what we take logic to be, and which aspect of natural language is our
focus (syntax, semantics, lexical semantics, pragmatics etc.). I shall
assume, for purely heuristic reasons, a standard, classical view of
logic, along the lines of first order logic, or an extension thereof. It
will also be important to distinguish between two versions of the LNL
thesis, according to the epistemic role that logic plays in linguistic
inquiry:
98. logicality figures in the formulation of novel empirical hypothe-
ses, principles etc. in linguistics. (Empirical role)
99. logicality is a ‘big fact’ about language, or a general constraint.
It is methodologically and conceptually desirable that hypothe-
ses reflect or are compatible with such general constraints. (Nor-
mative role)
Although the two notions are related (since there is a sense in
which both have empirical consequences) their epistemic roles are
different. To distinguish between the two, consider the principle of
compositionality, which qualifies as a ‘big fact’ about language. Note
that linguistic hypotheses need not make explicit reference to compo-
sitionality in order to be considered empirically adequate. However,
their compatibility with (some form of) compositionality remains an
adequacy criterion for such accounts. Ceteris paribus, a linguistic hy-
pothesis compatible with the big facts is better than one which is
not. So both the strictly empirical and the conceptual (or normative)
understandings of LNL are relevant here. However, some skeptical
arguments against LNL are implicitly based on the idea that if logi-
cality in the first sense is not an option, the LNL thesis is not worth
holding. This conclusion is not warranted, because both versions
are important. In fact, my argument will defend LNL in both these
senses.
The plan of the chapter is the following. I start by discussing a lin-
guistic hypothesis about binding phenomena that, arguably, involves
logicality (§5.2.1). I show how the logicality of binding phenomena
can be implemented in a first order language (§2.2). I then turn to
the arguments that LNL detractors have advanced against logicality
in natural language (§§5.3.1–5.3.4). I show that these arguments fail
(to different extents) to make a strong case against LNL. The key
points made here are (i) that there are linguistic phenomena that, as
it were, wear logicality on their sleeves and, moreover, (ii) that there
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are several ways of defining the relevant logicality features (e.g. logi-
cal consequence relations, validity) that the sceptics have overlooked.
In closing, I discuss the conceptual advantages of the LNL thesis.
5.2 linguistic evidence
In this section I take as a case study a linguistic phenomenon that
suggests that logical relations play an important role in grammar. The
principle of binding economy underlying the linguistic phenomena
that will be discussed below is well-supported by linguistic evidence,
albeit not unanimously accepted. I shall assume that this principle
is plausible. My point does not depend on the absolute correctness
of the Binding Economy hypothesis. I am primarily interested in the
potential explanatory role that logical properties have in linguistics.
Accordingly, I shall also gloss over several syntactic and semantic
details pertaining to the binding domains and the noun phrases that
enter binding relations. The LNL thesis is independent of such details.
(A clearer picture of what an account of binding would look like is
proposed in chapter 4.)
5.2.1 A linguistic hypothesis: Binding Economy
Binding theory (BT) (Chomsky 1981) deals with referential depen-
dence between binders (antecedents) and bindees (anaphors, broadly
speaking). Let us call the two kinds of expressions potentially enter-
ing in a binding relation binding expressions. Principle (or Condition)
C of BT says that full noun phrases (e.g. proper names) should be
always free (not bound). Principle C covers a broad range of data,
among which the following.
100. a) *She1 told Claudine1 to sit down.
b) *He1 greeted Oscar1.
The natural unacceptability judgements elicited by (100a)–(100b)
(under the readings expressed by coindexing) are readily accounted
for by Principle C. The referential dependency (represented by nu-
meric indices) is not allowed because proper names cannot be bound,
according to the binding principle C. However, it has been noted
(firstly in Evans 1980) that binding expressions in configurations like
(100) can on occasion refer to the same entity. For instance,
101. a) She1 is Claudine1.
b) Only he1 still thinks that Oscar1 is smart.
are both acceptable under the interpretation that the pronouns re-
fer to the very same person referred to by the name that follows. In
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(101a) this seems even to be required. In contrast, (101b) is most natu-
rally uttered on an accasion in which many people think Oscar is not
smart, but Oscar himself still does. So these are apparent violations
of Principle C of BT.
A natural solution that attempts to preserve Principle C is that the
(101) cases are not in fact cases of binding (referential dependency)
but cases of (accidental) coreference. Hence, according to this intu-
ition, there are two kinds of, what we might call, covaluation: bind-
ing and coreference. Although this intuition is on the right track, it
is incomplete because we want to know how (and why) the gram-
mar distinguishes between the two types of covaluation, binding and
coreference. (Otherwise, it would look like an ad hoc strategy to do
away with recalcitrant data.) A principled reason for distinguishing
between the two types of covaluation is given by a principle of econ-
omy, along the lines of Rule I of Reinhart (2006). I shall call this
principle Binding Economy (BE) and state it informally as follows.
Binding Economy (BE): The binding and coreference read-
ings of a given sentence must be compared as to their se-
mantic content and the coreference reading ‘wins’ if and
only if it has a different semantic content than the binding
reading.
The principle of economy compares the competing linguistic forms
underlying the binding readings and coreference readings. These lin-
guistic forms are the elements of a set, or comparison class. The
competing linguistic forms entering the comparison class are ranked
according to two criteria: lexical identity (roughly, same words) and
meaning identity (roughly, same truth-conditions). The former crite-
rion is obligatory (i.e. no linguistic form enters the competition un-
less it contains the same set of lexical items as its competitors), whilst
the latter is, as we shall see, rather optional. Thus, Binding Econ-
omy selects among lexically identical linguistic forms (i.e., linguis-
tic forms built out from the same lexical items) that linguistic form
which is the ‘best’. Being the best may mean two things: (i) coref-
erence linguistic forms are selected (as ‘winners’) only if they satisfy
lexical identity but not also semantic identity (i.e. if they are lexically
identical to the competing binding linguistic forms, but semantically
distinct from them); otherwise, (ii) the binding linguistic form, i.e.,
the linguistic form realising binding (rather than coreference), will be
the best. The existence of these two options is what makes meaning
identity optional—it may be trumped if the economy condition (i) is
satisfied.
What are the two, semantically different, binding and coreference
readings of the sentences in (101)? Let us consider them in turn, and
give an intuitive paraphrase for each of these readings.
102. She1 is Claudine1.
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a) She λx (x is x ) & she = Claudine. binding reading
b) She λx (x is Claudine ) & she = Claudine. coreference
reading
The two readings differ crucially in the portions highlighted by the
grey areas. The readings can be paraphrased as follows. She (Clau-
dine) has the property of being identical to herself (binding reading).
In contrast, the alternative interpretation says that she (Claudine) has
the property of being identical to Claudine. These are distinct proper-
ties: self-identity, and being identical to Claudine, respectively. The
former is trivial, the latter gives us interesting information. As sug-
gested, the principle of economy allows coreference configurations iff
they bring interesting information (namely, novel truth-conditional
meanings).
Alternatively, the relevant difference in truth-conditions may be for-
mulated at the level of the individual semantic values. Thus, we may
use guises—the semantic values of definite descriptions—as seman-
tic values for the relevant binding expressions. Thus, she may refer
to a perceptual guise that yields Claudine at the actual world, or to
Claudine herself (or to a trivial guise that yields Claudine in every
world). It surely makes a difference to the truth-conditions of (101a)
whether she takes as semantic value one guise or the other. Binding
economy is sensitive to such a truth-conditional difference. Out of the
two ways of spelling out the truth-conditional difference, the second
is better, because it makes more pragmatic sense: it is easier to con-
struct a context in which the pronoun she takes a guise as denotation.
In contrast, the first representation requires that the utterer intend a
specific contrast between the two properties (self-loving and loving
Claudine). Were there no such intention, the account would overgen-
erate, since virtually any utterance can produce different structured
denotations, and this would imply that the economy principle always
trumps the Condition C effects (which, of course, is not what we ob-
serve).
However, the second example is better handled along the lines sug-
gested in the first representation of the differing truth-conditional
effects.
103. Only he1 still thinks that Oscar1 is smart.
a) Only he λx (x still thinks x is smart & he = Oscar). binding
reading
b) Only he λx (x still thinks Oscar is smart & he = Oscar).
coreference reading
In a similar vein, the binding reading attributes a second place
property (relation) that people bear to themselves, whilst the coref-
erence reading attributes them a relation that people bear to Oscar.
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These are again different relations. Although neither of these deter-
mines a trivial reading (as in the previous example), the two readings
have different truth-conditions. The binding interpretation says that
Oscar is the sole person who thinks of himself that he is smart, and
the other people (salient in the context) don’t think the same of them-
selves, but may think that of Oscar. The coreference interpretation, in
contrast, says that Oscar does, and the other people do not, have the
following thought: Oscar is smart. The readings thus differ in that
the former is compatible, whilst the latter is not compatible, with the
proposition that Oscar is smart. So, according to BE, coreference must
be allowed because it yields a distinct (novel) truth-condition which
also fits the context of utterance. If, contrary to fact, there were no
difference in truth-conditions, BE would disallow coreference.3 Note
also that the different structural relations between who is the thinker
and who is smart according to the thinker are more salient in (103)
than the corresponding relations in (102). So the pragmatic desidera-
tum previously alluded to is intuitively satisfied.
5.2.2 A sketch of a logic for Binding Economy
BE compares the truth-conditions of the binding and coreference read-
ings in order to establish which of the two readings is allowed.4 One
natural way to do this is to see if one of the two linguistic forms
can be true and the other false under the same interpretation (i.e. by
giving each of the symbols in the two competing linguistic forms uni-
form interpretations). If the two can take different truth-values, they
are not equivalent. Thus, the BE mechanism checks logical relations
and, more specifically, mutual entailments between the two possible
readings.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall use first order logic with identity
to represent the BE mechanism and its computation. I take the two
place predicate B to be the ‘locus’ of binding; roughly, it will repre-
sent binding. More precisely, B will be interpreted in two mutually
exclusive ways: (i) if the two places of the predicate take two iden-
tical individual variables or constant terms (e.g. Bxx, Baa), then B
means that the two terms are bound, but (ii) when the terms occur-
ring in the two places of the predicate are different (e.g. Bxy, Bab)
the predicate is interpreted as “the two terms are not bound” (this
representation is akin to vacuous binding). Otherwise put, the predi-
3 See Reinhart 2006, pp.186ff. for more examples, and p. 185 for a full statement of
her economy principle, Rule I.
4 The principles of economy are common in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995).
Their role is to establish which linguistic form is a grammatical logical form, and
thus interpretable by the semantics. In our case, one of the two readings will be a
proper logical form (LF). To establish which linguistic form will be grammatically
licensed, the principle of economy checks their semantic contribution.
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cate B will simulate the binding capabilities of the λ operator.5 I shall
use the identity sign as usual. Thus, the result is that the present
formalism will represent binding (or lack thereof) by B and coref-
erence by the identity sign, =. The BE mechanism will compare the
coreference readings (on the right-hand side of the biconditional) and
binding readings (on left-hand side of the biconditional) of the sen-
tence “She is Claudine,” with c being the constant term standing for
Claudine and s being the constant term standing for she. (The latter
notation convention is not meant to say that pronouns are constants
rather than variables, but is a simple notational implementation of de-
ictic pronouns. More generally, I assume that I fixed the individuals
corresponding to the constants s and c appropriately, with different
individuals for different constants, unless otherwise indicated.)
104. (Bsc∧ s = c)↔ Bcc coreference = binding⇒ * coreference
105. (Bsc∧ s , c)↔ Bcc coreference , binding⇒ ok coreference
From the point of view of the semantics for first order logic, the
computation of (104) should intuitively yield the truth-value true, and
the computation of (105) should intuitively yield the truth-value false.
From a linguistic point of view, the former reflects the fact that the
coreference and binding properties have the same truth-conditions,
and thus coreference is disallowed by BE. The latter represents the
fact that the coreference and binding readings have different truth-
conditions, and thus coreference is allowed by BE. It is this latter case
that represents the acceptability judgements of our two sentences in
(101).
Note that the BE will hold for any sentence with a Principle C con-
figuration, i.e., with a proper noun anteceded by a (c-commanding)
pronoun. Binding Economy is a general hypothesis about the be-
haviour of linguistic constructions, under relevant syntactic and se-
mantic constraints. Binding Economy is not only general, but, on
reflection, also has the modal force of a logical statement, viz. it is
necessary. Using the first order logic notation, we can safely formu-
late the two possible economy-based computations envisaged above
in terms of derivability (`) over the relevant domain of semantic val-
ues
106. ` ∀xy((Bxy∧ x = y)↔ Bxx) coreference = binding⇒ *
coreference
107. 0 ∀xy((Bxy∧ x , y)↔ Bxx) coreference , binding⇒ ok
coreference
5 The predicate B can be taken as a logical constant (akin to the λ operator) or a pred-
icate. Nothing hinges on this choice as long as we keep its interpretation constant.
The above sentences will have the same logical properties, no matter what the status
of B is.
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or, equivalently, as
108. ∀xy(Bxy∧ x = y) a` ∀xBxx coreference = binding⇒ *
coreference
109. ∀xy(Bxy∧ x , y) 0a ∀xBxx coreference , binding⇒ ok
coreference
These statements are intuitively correct, and can be proved in any
of the proof systems of first order with identity (using universal quan-
tifier elimination, substitution of equivalents, and the rules for con-
nectors). Either of the two pairs of statements express the general
conditions under which the BE functions. Otherwise put, they ex-
press the two possible outcomes of the computation in a general fash-
ion. Moreover, given that first order logic is sound, we can formulate
the corresponding meta-theoretical statements in terms of semantic
validity (replacing ` with ), and, equivalently, in terms of a seman-
tic logical equivalence (replacing a` with ≡). Hence, it seems that
logical statements characterise the behaviour of the linguistic mecha-
nism presupposed by Binding Economy. Let us discuss some of the
main features of representing logicality using the first order notation.
My implementation represents the relevant logicality features of
the BE mechanism, and abstracts away from most of the lexical ma-
terial not needed to discriminate between binding and coreference.
As I remarked, the lexical material in the sentence is not relevant for
the computation, since the two readings will be built out of the same
lexical material. (See lexical identity criterion, introduced above.)
The domain of quantification of my first order formalisation (104–
109) contains possible individuals or guises (functions from worlds
to individuals). This is needed because the BE computation has an
evident modal flavour, as can be seen in the discussion of (103) above.
It is not my purpose here to give a full blown semantics for bind-
ing expressions. Very roughly, we could assume that the binding
expressions (and, more specifically, pronouns) can take, in contexts,
semantic values akin to either proper names or definite descriptions
(where the former are rigid, whilst the latter are non-rigid). Thus, it
is a necessary identity that Sally is Sally, but only a contingent identity
that she (Sally) is the person talking on BBC1 almost weekly in 2013.6
6 I have not spelled out the logic needed to make the required distinction in truth-
conditions between the readings above, although the distinctions are, I think, intu-
itive enough. What we need in fact is a first order modal logic capable to express
both necessary and contingent identity. (See Priest (2008, 367ff.) for an exposition
of the syntax and semantics of such a logic, as well as for the proof of soundness
that we need for such a logic, if we assume a semantic notion of logicality.) The
two types of identity are expressed over guises, or functions from possible worlds to
individuals. Two guises are necessarily identical if they pick out the same individual
at all worlds, and are contingently identical if they pick out the same individual at
some world.
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Finally, in order for the LNL thesis to hold under a semantic (rather
than a syntactic) definition of logical properties, the logical system un-
derlying BE needs only to be sound, rather than complete as well.7
This ensures that it distinguishes between valid and invalid infer-
ences, or, alternatively, between satisfiable and unsatisfiable sentences.
But it only needs to distinguish between such properties for state-
ments of a very specific syntactic and semantic kind, that is, state-
ments having Principle C configurations. So, the logic for Binding
Economy need not cover all the valid inferences. This makes the chal-
lenges to LNL easier to meet.
If this implementation of the BE mechanism is accurate, then it
seems that the binding phenomena, and more precisely the role of
the distinction between binding and coreference readings in formulat-
ing BE, point to important logical features of linguistic constructions.
Note that even if the BE hypothesis is not ultimately correct, it still re-
inforces the LNL thesis in the (98) sense above, because it is obvious
that an important linguistic hypothesis refers to, or depends upon,
logical features of linguistic forms. The BE mechanism computes mu-
tual entailments of sentences having a Principle C configuration. Ac-
cording to the economy-based linguistic hypothesis, logical forms are
licensed (i.e. are grammatical) only if they enter in the appropriate
logical relation with their competitors. It is worth noting that I have
discussed only one economy-based mechanism concerning binding,
but the family of economy-based hypotheses is much wider. Similar
economy-principles involving binding, quantifier scopes, and scalar
implicatures have been put forward in the linguistics literature. Ar-
guably, they too involve logicality, but our study-case should be suffi-
cient to make this point.8
7 I use first-order logic, rather than a higher order logic, for pragmatic reasons. How-
ever, first-order logic is sufficient to make our point. Using first order logic made
my task of showing the potential logicality underlying Biding Economy easier, since
soundness is a notorious property of first order logic. However, the same argument
would cary over to lambda calculus. The legitimacy of inferring validity from deriv-
ability (i.e. the soundness property) is not limited to first order systems. Indeed, the
so called simply typed lambda calculus assumed in linguistic semantics is also sound,
so a formulation in lambda calculus of the BE will preserve my tentative conclusion
to the effect that logical statements characterise the BE mechanism. (See Carpenter
1997, p. 54ff for the soundness proof of the simply typed lambda calculus.)
8 For instance, Fox (2000) advances his own version of Binding Economy and
Schlenker (2005) proposes a local alternative to the same principle. See Heim (1998)
for a restatement of a version of Reinhart’s principle of economy, as well as Bu¨ring
(2005) for discussion of the economy-principles involving binding. Fox (2000) and
Reinhart (2006) put forward similar principles of economy governing the scopal be-
haviour of quantifiers. Reinhart (ibid.) generalises the economy principle to scalar
implicatures. Moreover, Gajewski (2002, 2009) argues based on data about gener-
alised quantifiers and exceptive phrases that grammar is sensitive to what he calls
l-analyticity, which is arguably a logicality property. See Chierchia (2013) for a book-
length development and defence of the thesis that grammar is sensitive to logical
properties. Moreover, Fa˘la˘us¸ (2014) argues on a cross-linguistic basis that free choice
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Moreover, my preferred versions of economy principles defended
in chapters 3 and 5 could also be used to make the very same point
in favour of LNL. The binding economy principle, Non-Redundancy,
is sensitive to identity between guises, and the controversy-based ac-
count relies crucially on contradictions and strength-based inferences
(scalar implicatures). So both these accounts invoke logical proper-
ties. However, I focus here on Reinhart’s binding economy account,
since it is one of the standard economy-based accounts, and is very
well known in the linguistic literature. It also makes clear that posit-
ing a grammar sensitive to logical properties is important in linguistic
explanatory practice.
Before turning to problems for the idea of logicality of language,
it is crucial to understand the role of first order logic in the argu-
mentation so far. The choice to frame the problem in terms of first
order logic is motivated by the simplicity and familiarity of this logic.
My key claim here is that the class of consequence relations captured
by first order logic (under a suitable interpretation of its logical con-
stants) overlaps with the class of consequence relations captured by
more expressive and descriptively adequate logics, and that a signifi-
cant point of overlap is the computation underlying binding economy.
Otherwise put, the inferences captured by first order logic cover the
same properties/relations of natural language constructions (to do
with binding and coreference) as the inferences expressible in a richer
logic. For the purposes of this discussion, we can abstract away from
the properties of these richer logics, because the point about the em-
pirical relevance of logicality can be made by appeal to a simpler
apparatus (see also footnote 7).
5.3 main objections to the lnl thesis
If my assessment of the above binding data is correct, it should spell
trouble for the LNL sceptics. But before claiming that the challenge to
LNL has been met, we have to check our characterisation of BE, and
other claims favourable to the idea of logicality in natural language,
against the specific claims and arguments of the LNL sceptics.
As a prelude to a detailed discussion of the main objections, it is
helpful to see how the LNL sceptics view logicality and its relation
with natural language. Michael Glanzberg summarises his argument
against LNL thesis as follows.
First, the logic in natural language thesis is false: we
do not find logical consequence relations in our natural
languages. [...]
phenomena are also sensitive to contradictions. The present chapter can be seen as
proposing an additional case study favourable to this logicality thesis.
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I sketched a three-fold process that allows us to get
from a natural language to a logical consequence rela-
tion. The process involves identifying logical constants,
abstracting away from other features of meaning, and ide-
alizing away from quirks in the structure of human lan-
guages. The relation between logic and natural language
is thus less close than advocates of the logic in natural lan-
guage thesis would have it, while the three-fold process
allows that there is some connection. Glanzberg (forth-
coming[b], p. 49)
It is important to note here that the LNL thesis is seen as a gen-
eral thesis about natural language, rather than as a thesis about its
semantics. Glanzberg’s discussion focuses on semantics, and in part
we shall do the same. But the moral we want to draw is about natu-
ral language, or about grammar, broadly speaking, including syntax,
semantics, pragmatics, and the interfaces between them. A second
important feature of LNL that we can distil from the above passage
is that a key criterion for logicality is the existence of logical proper-
ties, and especially the existence of consequence relations in natural
language. Accordingly, in defending the LNL, I shall have to give
evidence for the existence in language of such logical properties. Fi-
nally, this passage also suggests that we get to logical processes only
by abstraction and idealisation. An important task of section §5.3.4
will be to assess the impact the abstraction and idealisation have on
the LNL thesis.
Zoltan Szabo voices a related worry against what he calls the doc-
trine of logical form. He states his position as follows.
The logical form of a sentence would be a characteristi-
cally logical arrangement of its parts; what gets arranged
would be the sentences’ extra-logical matter. The central
thesis of this paper is that such a separation is impossible
unless it is made actual by fiat. That is, except for artifi-
cial languages designed so as to have formulae factorable
into logically significant form and logically insignificant
matter, the separation cannot be made. [. . .]
What my view is really incompatible with is the broadly
Davidsonean idea that we can squeeze genuine logical
forms out of a compositional semantics for natural lan-
guage. That, I think, is a hopeless project. (Szabo´ 2012,
pp. 108-9)
The passages from Szabo suggest that the identification of genuine
logical form, as pure properties of language, is not possible. Accord-
ing to this claim, we cannot extract pure logical forms from linguistic
data. In what follows, I shall attempt linguistically to motivate such
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pure logical forms. I now turn to examining in more detail the anti-
LNL positions just outlined.
5.3.1 Discussion of the arguments from (in)competence and lexical-ity
The arguments from logical competence and from lexical semantics
are stated as follows.
110. Argument from logical (in)competence: Logic is an educated
ability, rather than part of linguistic competence (as suggested
by the usual logical deviance in human reasoning).
(cf. Williamson 2007)
111. The argument from lexical semantics: The lexical entailments
cannot be systematised as formal properties of natural language,
so they fail to give us a proper consequence relation.
(Glanzberg (forthcoming[b]))
There are several ways to spell out the argument from (in)competence.
I shall dispense quickly with a radical version argument under the
assumption that the linguistic competence idea is on the right track.
I won’t provide any novel way to defend the linguistic competence
idea, but I think it is a reasonable assumption. If we accept that there
is an aspect of our cognition (i.e., linguistic competence) realising the
linguistic principles that theorists formulate (correctly, at least some-
times), then we could also entertain that the alleged logical abilities
built into linguistic competence are informationally encapsulated or
inferentially isolated from the educated abilities the lack of which
leads to logical deviance. In other words, logical deviance is compat-
ible with logico-linguistic competence. To be sure, the sceptics may
not be swayed by this claim of compatibility of logicality built in the
linguistic competence and, at the same time, logicality as an educated
ability. Their retort might be that logicality of the kind presupposed
above is too complex an ability for people to possess unreflectively,
at a sub-personal level. However, faced with the binding economy
phenomena (and other similar ones), we should favour the possibil-
ity that logicality explains actual linguistic data. In other words, I
prefer the potential explanatory adequacy of postulating logicality to
ruling out logicality on intuitive and shaky grounds of psychological
implausibility.
Therefore, the scepticism that I shall subsequently discuss does not
deny linguistic competence and logicality altogether, but only that
logicality is in any way part of this competence.
Let us then move forward to the argument from lexicality, (111). As
Glanzberg (ibid., p. 25) and many other theorists have pointed out,
lexical items in natural language have very idiosyncratic entailment
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patterns. An example is the different entailment patterns of the verbs
cut and tear: the former entails that the action (the cutting) is done
with an instrument, whilst the latter does not. The entailment gener-
ating behaviour of such lexical items is highly irregular, which makes
it very difficult to see how this behaviour might count as logical. I
agree with the argument from lexicality, but it has limited force, as
its proponents would surely acknowledge.
It is true that the lexicon is idiosyncratic, this being one of the
reasons why Chomsky isolated it as a separate module of grammar,
understood “in a rather traditional sense: [as] a list of “exceptions”,
whatever does not follow from general principles” (Chomsky 1995,
235, cf. 30). This is not to say, of course, that the lexicon cannot be
studied theoretically, but it does suggest that the lexical semantics is
not the most adequate place to look for support for the LNL thesis. It
is to be expected that logicality will be part of the general principles
of grammar, part of what linguistic minimalists call the Computational
System, rather than part of the lexicon. The binding data discussed
above do not concern the idiosyncratic features of the lexicon, but
rather the interface between the syntax and semantics of binding. In
fact, as I have pointed out, the BE principle specifies explicitly that in
the competition for licensing the linguistic forms, the lexical material
of the linguistic forms is kept fixed, and what is varied is only their
potential to take binding or coreference readings, which determine, in
turn, potential differences in truth-conditions. More generally, most
of linguistics (except for lexical semantics) abstracts away from lexi-
cal properties most of the time.9 In conclusion, the argument from
lexicality does not challenge the LNL thesis in its strongest form.
5.3.2 Discussion of the argument from absolute semantics
The argument from absolute semantics is the central objection against
LNL.
112. The argument from absolute semantics: Linguistic semantics
assumes a fixed, absolute model in spelling out the (shared)
meanings of natural language sentences and expressions, i.e.
their truth-conditional contributions. But then natural languages
lack a logical consequence relation, because this notion is de-
fined in terms of preservation of semantic value across models.
Therefore, natural languages lack an essential logical property.
(Glanzberg (forthcoming[b]), cf. Lepore 1983)
Before going into the argument from absolute semantics, an impor-
tant remark about the interpretation of linguistics works is in order.
Michael Glanzberg claims that even mainstream model-theoretic se-
mantics, as presented in e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998) is, or at least
9 Glanzberg himself makes a very similar point in Glanzberg forthcoming(a).
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can plausibly be reconstructed as, absolute semantics (see Glanzberg
(forthcoming[b], 21ff)). Let us grant that this is plausible with re-
spect to proper names and predicates. We should note that once
we move to functional items, absolute semantics becomes less ap-
pealing.10 However, I won’t begin by disputing the interpretation
of model-theoretic semantics as absolute semantics. I shall try to con-
ceive of absolute semantics in the best light. Indeed, I shall argue
that even if we assume the most appealing absolute semantic desider-
ata, it is still desirable to rule logical properties in rather than out of
language.
The other three objections are closely connected to the absolute
semantics objection, so it is helpful to sketch this connection before
getting into details. All the objections attack the (logical) formality of
the linguistic constructions. Formality, or what I have called logicality,
is perhaps most naturally conceived as invariance under permuta-
tions of the domain, or invariance under changes of model. That is,
the linguistic expression or construction deemed to be formal, should
preserve its semantic value, which may be a specific truth-functional
function, in the case of logical constants, or the truth-value true, in
the case of sentences. Now, the argument from formality (117) says
that language does not isolate for us logical constants (as opposed
to non-logical ones). The argument from absolute semantics (112)
says that we actually cannot even define logical constants, valid infer-
ences, and logical consequences, simply because the space of models
needed to do this is not among the tools of natural language seman-
tics. Finally, the argument from abstraction/idealisation (119) says
that in order to isolate the logicality we want, we have to postulate or
identify the logical constants (the basic invariants), and then abstract
away from the absolute model (on which natural language seman-
tics is based), thus getting a space of models, and then idealise so
as to remove the linguistic idiosyncrasies of the linguistic construc-
tions deemed logical, e.g. the distributional idiosyncrasies of natural
language quantifiers.11
10 For instance, von Fintel (1995), who is working within the model-theoretic tradition,
clearly has no absolute semantics presuppositions. In fact von Fintel takes functional
items to be in part logical items. These items are “invariant under permutations of
the universe of discourse”, which–for von Fintel as well as for an important logic
tradition—basically means that “logicality means being insensitive to specific facts
about the world” (pp. 178ff). Therefore, in assessing whether the semantics is as-
sumed to be absolute, it very much depends on what are the semantic phenomena
one is looking at. More generally, I agree with Yalcin (2013) that the notion of se-
mantic value in linguistic semantics is to be construed as different from content.
Absolute semantics, on the other hand, construes semantic values as contents.
11 In order to make the argument from formality independent from the argument from
absolute semantics, we can formulate it as targeting a pre-theoretical and intuitive
notion of logical constant. Indeed, both Glanzberg’s and Szabo’s arguments can be
reconstructed as saying that the pre-theoretical notion of formality is problematic. As
we shall argue below, the intuitive character of formality is precisely what makes the
argument against LNL weak. Once we find a theoretical criterion to define formality
163
5.3 main objections to the lnl thesis
5.3.2.1 On absolutism
In this chapter, I assume that absolute semantics is tightly related to
a model-theoretic semantics, in the sense that absolute semantics as-
sumes that only a unique model interprets the linguistic expressions—
this unique model is called absolute. I take it that the main motivation
for construing the semantics for natural language as being absolute is
to dispel relativism. There should be facts of the matter according to
which a phrase has the fixed meaning it has, and absolute semantics
is meant to represent these facts by assuming an absolute model.
A central point in the articulation of the present argument depends
on what one understands by a model, in the mathematical sense. At
the very least, a model is a structure comprising a vocabulary (sym-
bols), a domain (or universe of discourse) consisting of individuals,
and possibly other types of objects, and an interpretation that assigns
objects in the domain to vocabulary items. By taking a model and
modifying any of its three components (vocabulary, domain, inter-
pretation), we get a different model, which will be somehow related to
the model it is built from. It is this characteristic of model-theory that
allows us to define distinct but related models that makes it initially
unclear what an absolute model is.
A natural feature that might make a model an absolute model is that
it consists of a fixed domain of objects, interpreted naturally as objects
of the real world.12 This feature is needed for realist or objective
semantics, worthy of the name “absolute”. (The absolute semantic
values in the fixed domain can be either internal or external. Absolute
semanticists see them as external, but the argument against LNL is
independent of this assumption.)
But this does not yet pin down the notion of an absolute model.
We can still ask how big such a model is, what it consists of, how
to construct an absolute model, and in effect if there need be only
one such model. To begin with, we may think of the absolute model
generated from a fixed domain as giving us the basic elements out of
which we can build the denotations of complex expressions. Under
this interpretation, the absolute denotations of complex expressions
for a class of expressions, the issues arising from our pre-theoretical intuitions are
no longer problematic.
12 The absolute character of the semantics is related to the distinction between a fixed-
and variable-domain interpretations. This distinction is at the centre of a debate
in the history of logic regarding Tarski’s explication of the notion of logical conse-
quence. See Mancosu (2010) for a very useful discussion of the topic. As far as I can
see, only fixed-domain interpretations are compatible with absolute semantics.
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should not be part of the absolute model.13 This is not the way that
absolute semantics is standardly conceived of.
The advocates of absolute semantics have in mind a broader notion
of absolute model, one which encompasses the recursive principles
building complex semantic values from the syntactic arrangement of
more basic expressions and their meanings. This broader absolute
model can be viewed as a (recursive) extension of the initial model
containing only the semantic values that serve as interpretations for
the basic vocabulary. Therefore, on this broader view, absolute seman-
tics contains a space of absolute models. The smaller models interpret
particular linguistic constructions.14 I take this broader view to be de-
sirable, since it is capable of giving absolute semantic values to all the
expressions of a language, including especially complex expressions.
In sum, with observations about absolute semantics in place, a nat-
ural question arises: What does the absolute semantics view make of
our argument that the BE is characterised by logical statements?
5.3.2.2 Ways to define logical properties compatible with absolute se-mantics
The argument from absolute semantics attempts to deny us the right
to use the model-theoretic resources (the space of models) in defining
logicality or formality of the BE mechanism. So, according to the
argument against LNL, our seemingly logical statements are general,
but not also formal and necessary, as the usual logical statements
are. This is because the formality and necessity properties come via a
space of models: for a sentence to be necessary it should be true in all
models; for an expression to be a constant is for it to have the same
semantic value in all models. Some expressions are formal because
their values do not vary with the information supplied by models,
but they are solely determined by the meanings of logical constants
(cf. Glanzberg forthcoming(b), pp. 7-8). Lacking a space of models,
13 For instance, the denotation of “white dog”, a dog individual having the property
of being white, on this hypothesis, is not part of the absolute model. Only the
whiteness property and dog individuals are part of the absolute model, and we
get the denotation of the expression “white dog” by extending the model, i.e. by
adding a piece of vocabulary of the model (built out of two extant words according
to syntactic rules) and by further adding a new composite object in the domain of
the model, which will be linked to the piece of vocabulary just introduced by the
interpretation function of the model. The same goes for more complex expressions,
such as sentences.
14 To illustrate what models are used for, note that, very often, linguists’ data concern
structural ambiguities. For instance, an utterance of a doubly quantified sentence
(Every teacher likes a pupil) is sometimes ambiguous between two scopal interpreta-
tions. These interpretations are, of course, distinct. Using model-theoretic apparatus,
we represent the distinct scopal interpretations by interpreting the utterance as true
in two distinct models. So, in order to be able to represent structural ambiguities we
need two distinct models. If these models are extensions of a more minimal, initial
absolute model, we can see them as absolute models as well. They will be part of
the broad absolute model.
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we are unable to substantiate formality and necessity claims about
natural language expressions.
I shall argue that absolute semantics cannot deny us the legiti-
macy of utilising the resources to formulate logical statements with-
out making further assumptions. In appendix F, I document three
semantic solutions and a syntactic one. Here, I present the syntac-
tic solution and a unique semantic solution, which inherits the es-
sentials of the three semantic solutions. This semantic solution will
surely run counter to the assumption of the argument from abstrac-
tion/idealisation. However, that assumption is equally problematic,
as I shall show below.
The ways to define logical properties can be classified in two cate-
gories: semantic and syntactic. There are several options regarding
the semantic definitions of the logical properties invoked by LNL,
which follow from the definition of a model as a triple. The cru-
cial ingredient shared by all these semantic approaches is the follow-
ing. Insofar as we think that the space of models is doing important
theoretical work in defining (logical) properties of natural language,
we can use the model-theoretic apparatus to do so. However, there
is a twist. We single out a specific model as representing the ‘real
world’ denotations of the linguistic vocabulary. Everything beyond
that model will not represent denotations of linguistic vocabulary but
only structural properties that can be formulated using that vocabu-
lary. The process of getting the space of models can be thought of
as idealisation, but, as I shall argue, this does not prevent us from
accepting LNL.
Abstracting away from the details, I contrast proof-theoretic sys-
tems and model-theoretic ones.15 The former are syntactic, whilst the
latter are semantic. The syntactic systems are, for instance, natural
deduction systems, tree-based systems or axiomatic systems, which
are all based on symbol manipulation. The semantic systems are
based on the notion of interpretation in a domain of (various kinds
of) objects and satisfiablity of a formula in that domain. In a syntactic
system, to check validity of a formula we check that formula using
the established rules of deduction and further syntactic ‘indicators’
of validity (namely, the derivation of the formula from the axioms in
the axiomatic system, or the derivation of a contradiction from the
15 This is not the place to develop the distinction between ways of conceiving logic. See
MacFarlane (2000, pp. 50–79) for discussion of three basic, and historically important,
ways of defining formality or logicality. Roughly speaking, the first is one that sees
logic as normative, the second is the model-theoretic one (permutation-invariance),
and the third is the syntactic one. Insofar as these notions apply to logicality in
natural language, the three-way distinction shows that the argument from absolute
semantics has limited force, because, even granting that it succeeds to block the
model-theoretic logicality, there would still exist two other ways in which to conceive
logicality in natural language. Indeed, I just argued that a syntactic view of logicality
is adequate for certain empirical problems. I shall argue later that LNL in the second
sense (99), has something akin to the normative role of logic.
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negated formula in natural deduction and the tree-based systems).
In a semantic system, we check the validity of a formula by way of
interpreting that formula in a domain, and, in particular, by trying to
find a counter-model.
The ultimate aim of presenting the possible ways to define logical
properties is to show that we can characterise the basic statements rep-
resenting the logic of Binding Economy (i.e., the statements in (106)
and (107)) as expressing genuine logical consequence relations, rather
than other sorts of implication. These possibilities represent the ways
in which we can circumvent the restrictive criteria of absolute seman-
tics (at the same time preserving its non-relativist desideratum), and
still get bona fide logical properties.
The semantic solution is compatible with the crucial requirement
of absolute semantics, and fits well with our BE data above. The com-
patibility with absolute semantics is ensured by the fact that absolute
semantics requires the semantics to privilege an absolute model, that
is, a fixed domain and fixed interpretation function or valuation. But
a model-theoretic view allows for semantic flexibility.
This is to say, even if we abstract away from the meanings of some
expressions in a sentence, or even if we consider that these expres-
sions have other meanings than they actually have, sentences that
contain these expressions will still have some invariant properties. In
other words, there is a class of sentences that will have the same ex-
tension (truth-value), no matter how we (uniformly and consistently)
fix the extensions of certain words in contexts. This is, of course, a
well known idea about the distinction between logical and non-logical
properties, but the key point is that that distinction is compatible with
absolute semantics. What absolute semantics requires is to privilege
some model, which will be called absolute if it satisfies such and such
intuitive criteria. A model-theoretic view is flexible enough to accom-
modate such a restriction. This flexibility is not an odd or quirky
property of the model-theoretic view, but it is a natural property of a
formal tool that can be adapted to our theoretical needs. Thus, abso-
lute semantics, in many of its forms, is compatible with the semantic
flexibility of a model-theoretic view.
But what if we define absolute semantics more strictly? It would be
possible to reject the aforementioned semantic flexibility, and thereby
contend that the semantics of natural language is not only absolute,
but also exclusive. On the exclusive view, the semantic values (ref-
erents, extensions, properties etc.) of each expression that can be
formulated in the vocabulary of the model can be interpreted in only
one, fixed, way. This view is not appealing, since it seems to lack
important theoretical resources, and its other theoretical or practical
advantages are not clear. This may seem quick and question begging
against the LNL sceptic. But it really is not, if we take the explana-
tion based on binding economy at face value, as I think we should.
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In order to distinguish between binding and coreference in a gen-
eral manner, we need a logical system that would verify the equiv-
alence between any binding and coreference forms, no matter what
semantic values the binding expressions (viz. the potential binders
and bindees) happen to get in the context. This logical system effec-
tively abstracts away not only from the lexical material not relevant
for binding theory, but also from the semantic values of pronouns
and full noun phrases (e.g. proper names). The generality of the
system rests on the fact that it computes equivalence regardless of
the semantic values of the binding expressions, and irrespective of
how we conceive of the nature of these semantic values, be they ab-
solute or relative. That is, the generality of the system consists of its
computing (or checking) logical equivalence.
However, if the advocate of absolute semantics thinks that no se-
mantic resources are available to formulate such a logical system, ab-
solute semantics, in the absolute semanticist’s view, is not compatible
with the binding economy account. To be more precise, if no rele-
vant semantic resources are forthcoming on the absolute semantics
thesis, it follows that absolute semantics is not compatible with the
binding economy account (and with LNL) under a semantic under-
standing of these views, i.e., presuming that the logicality invoked
by these views is semantic in nature. (As we shall see shortly, it
is nevertheless possible to formulate binding economy and LNL in
non-semantic terms.) But in fact absolute semantics cannot cut off
the semantic resources needed for defining linguistic logicality, as it
may appear at first glance. To see this, consider the following toy
absolute/exclusivist semantics.
Consider, in particular, a language with two individual constants
a and b standing for Ann and Bill, the only people in the domain
D, and two predicates S and R standing, respectively, for individu-
als who swim and individuals who read in the domain. We also
know that Bill both swims and reads, while Ann swims. In short,
our absolute/exclusive semantics has it that I(a) =Ann, I(b) =Bill,
I(S) = {a,b} and I(R) = {b} (where I is the assignment function).
Now, consider the following sentences.
113. Everyone who swims and reads reads. ∀x((Sx∧ Rx)→ Rx)
114. Someone both swims and reads. ∃x(Sx∧ Rx)
Both sentences come out true, or are satisfied, in the absolute model
M, 〈D = {a,b},S,R, I〉. But, importantly, there is still an important
difference between how the two sentences behave in this model. In
particular, (113) is true in every sub-model of the absolute model,
whilst (114) is not. That is, (113) is true in 〈D ′ = {a},S,R, I〉, 〈D ′′ =
{b},S,R, I〉, and 〈D = {a,b},S,R, I〉, whilst (114) is false in 〈D ′ =
{a},S,R, I〉, because Ann does not read in the interpretation provided
by the absolute model (an interpretation preserved in the sub-model).
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In other words, only (113) is valid in the space of sub-models of the
absolute model.
We should note that the sub-models are defined by taking sub-
domains of the absolute domain, preserving the behaviour of the
interpretation function I on this sub-domain in the sense that I will
continue to map a to Ann, and Ann will still be in the extension of
the predicate S on this interpretation. It is true that the extensions of
predicates will be different on the different sub-models, but it is im-
portant that the sub-models get the relevant facts right, so to speak.
In particular, no individual will be assigned the wrong properties:
Ann continues to be a swimmer, and Bill continues to be a swimmer
and a reader in every sub-model in which such individuals exist. Oth-
erwise put, the sub-models are faithful to the absolute model, and in
virtue of this fact they may be called ‘absolute’ as well.
To see what is the significance of validity in the space of sub-models
generated by M, consider alternative models to M. There are two im-
portant types of alternative models: ones that are isomorphic to M,
and ones that are not isomorphic. An isomorphic model is one in
which we swap the values of I for the arguments a and b, so that a
will denote Bill and b Ann (leaving everything else the same). A non-
isomorphic model is, for instance, one in which we add another object
in the domain of the absolute model, say, Chris, extending the inter-
pretation function appropriately such that I(c) = Chris. Arguably, in
any type of alternative model, (113) remains valid and (114) remains
invalid—precisely as they are in the absolute model M. This suggests
that we only need a restricted space of models to define the validity
of sentences such as (114), and, crucially, that the absolute model
can provide us with the necessary resources to produce the required
space of models. Therefore, the space of sub-models of the absolute
model M is representative for a larger space of models, and certain
logical properties in the former will carry over to the latter. In order
to define logical properties for certain natural language statements
we need not look any further than the absolute model, since the ab-
solute model implicitly contains all the semantic resources needed in
order to assign validity to these sentences.16 Hence, the moral of this
toy example is that absolute, and even exclusive, semantics is suffi-
cient for offering a notion of logicality in natural language, and that
no extra-resources (viz. no non-absolute models or models that are
unfaithful to the absolute model) are needed in order to be able to
attribute validity to certain statements in natural language.
16 Of course, this is not to say that absolute sub-models will preserve all the properties
definable in the absolute model, or in any other model. For instance, the sentence
Only Ann swims will be true in the sub-model 〈D ′ = {a},S,R, I〉, but false in M. So
the satisfaction of this sentence will not be preserved in the space of sub-models,
but, then, we wouldn’t consider this sentence logical in the first place. In general,
such sentences are contingent, and their satisfaction conditions will not be matters
of logic.
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There is yet another crucial point in favour of LNL. Note that
although exclusive semantics would block our semantic approach
to defining logical properties, it is inoffensive regarding the proof-
theoretic (syntactic) solution. But the proof-theoretic solution is a per-
fectly adequate candidate for logicality in natural language. The rea-
son why Glanzberg (forthcoming[b]) has not considered this way to
meet the challenge to LNL is perhaps the following. The mainstream
formal semantics is model-theoretic, and, according to this reasoning,
semanticists could not propose non-model-theoretic solutions. A fur-
ther assumption that could seem to reinforce this point is that the
main task of semantics is to state truth-conditions. But this reasoning
is not entirely accurate. Firstly, for certain empirical problems, spe-
cial formal tools may be needed. So we are not stuck with model
theory, and much more flexibility in using formal tools is shown
by formal semantics and linguistic theory in practice. Secondly, al-
though Glanzberg is surely right that the main task of (at least main-
stream) formal semantics is to state truth-conditions, this doesn’t
mean that auxiliary hypotheses not involving truth-conditions (but
otherwise compatible with the main task of looking for the right
truth-conditions) cannot be formulated. In fact, for linguists working
at the interface between syntax and semantics, non-model-theoretic,
logic-based, hypotheses would do the same job as the model theoretic
ones. Binding Economy is a case in point.17
There are two methodological desiderata following from our de-
cision to stay close to the empirical investigation of language. The
first is that the question of logicality is a local one, tied to the par-
ticular fragment of language under investigation. The second is that
there are multiple formal tools that are used in studying fragments of
language (specific linguistic phenomena). To these linguistic method-
ological desiderata I add a philosophical-logical one. There is no need
to reject pluralism about the ways to conceive logical consequence
(syntactic, semantic) out of hand. There are many ways to capture
an intuitive notion of implication, and the syntactic one is certainly
among the formally most sophisticated and clear. Moreover, there is
a pretty straightforward (local) relation between the deductive notion
of consequence and the inferential relation between sentences in nat-
ural language (Shapiro 2002, 236ff.). As we hinted, only if we also
17 Interestingly, one of the proponents of economy principles, Fox (2000, p. 68) sug-
gests a deductive system by whose proof theoretic computations, certain syntactic
operations and structures are ruled out as ungrammatical in case the deductive sys-
tem proves that the specific structures are not logically equivalent. According to Fox,
the structures are part of a very constrained, modular deductive system, i.e. a sys-
tem that does not take in consideration any sort of logically-looking constructions
whatsoever, but only constructions of a very specific form. The deductive system is
then sensitive to a ‘logical-syntax’ which consists of quantifiers, modal/intensional
operators and variable binding operators. (See Reinhart 2006 for a similar proposal.)
Moreover, on the philosophical side, MacFarlane (2000, pp. 195–6) reports that Evans
(1985) made a similar suggestion (based on different data).
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want to take into consideration the semantic notion of consequence,
the soundness and completeness theses become interesting insofar as
support for LNL is concerned.
I conclude that Binding Economy combined with the proof-theoretical
solution make a serious case for LNL. The argument from absolute se-
mantics fails to challenge LNL, if we define logicality proof-theoretically.
LNL is supported by the empirical hypothesis that binding economy
phenomena are sensitive to logical properties under a syntactic un-
derstanding of logicality.
What about the semantic version of LNL? My contention is that
the argument from absolute semantics also fails to challenge the se-
mantic solution above. It cannot do so without further assumptions,
which would turn absolute semantics into exclusive semantics. The
exclusivist assumptions that might be brought up to support the ar-
gument from absolute semantics against LNL are the assumptions of
the argument from formality (logical constants), and of the argument
from abstraction and idealisation. I turn next to these arguments.
Since they both support exclusivism, I will call the opposing view,
which is the one I favour, liberalism.
So, to take a broader perspective on the semantic positions re-
garding logicality in natural language, the two opposing views that
emerge are the following.
115. Exclusivism, against LNL. Logicality (constants, consequences,
validity) is defined in terms of invariance of semantic value
under permutation of models. But natural language has only
one model – an absolute and exclusive one. Therefore, natu-
ral language lacks all the core logical properties. We could get
logicality only by abstraction from the absolute and exclusive
semantics, and further idealisation, but the result of abstraction
and idealisation does not reflect properties of language.
116. Liberalism, pro LNL. Logicality may indeed be an invariance prop-
erty. Moreover, natural language is flexible enough to ‘see’ a
space of models, although only one such model is privileged or
absolute. Therefore, at least some linguistic constructions can
be partitioned into logical (valid) and non-logical (contingent),
and doing so is sometimes useful for empirical purposes.
I shall refine the two positions in light of the features of LNL scep-
ticism that will be shortly discussed.
5.3.3 Discussion of the argument from formality
The argument from formality can be stated as follows.
117. The argument from formality: Natural language does not iso-
late for us pure logical forms (and logical constants), i.e., forms
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that would permit us to study the logical properties of language,
e.g., validity of natural language inferences, as opposed to the
non-logical properties of language. (cf. Glanzberg forthcom-
ing(b), Szabo´ 2012)
I don’t find the argument from formality convincing. It is true that
natural language does not isolate a stock of logical constants for us.
Some tentative identification or choice of constants is needed. This,
I claim, is not a problem for the linguistic theorising that relies on
logical properties. The identification of logical constants should be
regarded, broadly speaking, as an empirical problem. (The situation
is hardly different from what happens in other sciences, which must
choose their own ontologies.) We have (overt or covert) expressions
and lexical items that seem prima facie to have logical behaviour: con-
junction, disjunction, quantifiers, λ-operators etc. (For instance, our
BE implementation employs at least two logical constants, = and ∧.
These are the logical constants that linguistics should postulate, in
our case.) It is these expressions which support the idea of a formal
aspect of natural language sentences, and ultimately LNL.18 Indeed,
on a semantic account of LNL, we have to check, using linguistic tests,
whether they have the required invariance properties. And more im-
portantly from an empirical perspective is what sort of invariance
properties they have. Once we identified some invariance properties
(e.g. truth-preservation), we thereby showed that the corresponding
linguistic constructions do have logical behaviour. Hence, the stipu-
lation (or identification) of logical constants per se is not problematic,
as long as there really are properties that justify the classification of
certain expressions as, in some sense, constant or invariant. In the
practice of linguistics, there is no insurmountable problem with iden-
tifying formal properties. In effect, several proposals of what these
formal properties are have been put forward. See Keenan (2001) and
van Benthem (1989) for formal arguments that many expressions of
natural language are logical constants.19
18 Nothing in the present argument relies on all the logical constants being part of
the syntactic, object language, although some will definitely be part of syntax (e.g.
conjunction). (For instance, λ operators may not be assumed to be part of natural
language syntax.) But logicality is a global property of a linguistic system, and as
such it can be uncovered even by using logical constants in the semantic, metalan-
guage. Otherwise put, the language should be logical in order to be able to employ
logical constants in the metalanguage the way we employ them. Thus, our discus-
sion pertains, for the most part, to the semantic properties of language and does
not make contentious assumptions about the syntax. (Note, in particular, that our
implementation of BE is not meant to be faithful to the linguistic syntax of some nat-
ural language sentences, but rather it is meant to be faithful to the logical properties
needed to get the BE principle off the ground.)
19 There is a further apparently problematic issue about formality and logic here. We
might have some very specific logical behaviour in mind when looking for logical
constants in natural language. For instance we may take as prototype of logicality
first order logic. But I see no reason to stick with any pre-conceived notion of logic.
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The logical constants in natural language are supplied by the so
called functional items, e.g. determiners (all, some, the), conjunctions
(and, or), tense inflections (third person singular -s, future marker will)
etc.. Functional items are a closed class, in the sense that competent
speakers cannot invent and then adopt new functional items. While
there are many noun phrase neologisms that get into circulation every
year, this is not so for functional items. As many theorists remarked,
it is in effect very difficult to get in circulation a simple conjunction
for something like the NAND operator. (This operator, also known
as the Sheffer stroke (↑) is a conjunction that makes a sentence p ↑ q
true iff at least one of the conjuncts p, q is false.)
A worry about functional items is that there is no clear and gen-
eral criterion that distinguishes them from other lexical items. But
the lack of such a criterion should not deter us from giving a plau-
sible semantics for a language consisting of a subset of such items
(cf. Chierchia 2013, p. 52). In particular, the lack of a criterion for
functionality should not deter us from taking the semantics of some
functional items to give us a class of logical consequences. Therefore,
I see no reason for scepticism towards picking out logical constants.
Szabo´ (2012) puts forward a triviality objection against distinguish-
ing between formality and truth-regarding facts. Although he does
not assume absolute semantics, his argument denies the formality
property of natural language inferences. It is thus an argument against
LNL, in a more general form (which needs not tie logicality to model-
theoretic assumptions). The argument purports to show that we can-
not really separate between truths in virtue of form and truths in
virtue of facts. Indeed, Szabo´ (ibid., 135ff.) claims that the following
example shows that formal truths depend on factual truths:
118. a) Context. The speaker felicitously asserts the valid argu-
ment “Alex is a father; therefore, Alex is a father or a
mother” and then goes on as follows.
b) ??Never mind whether every father in fact is a father or a
mother. My assertion of “Alex is a father; therefore, Alex
is a father or a mother” is true in virtue of its form.
The infelicity of (118b) suggests, pace Szabo, that formal truths and
factual truths cannot be independent, and thus, plausibly, the formal
validity of sentences such as “Alex is a father; therefore, Alex is a fa-
ther or a mother” depends on facts. However, it is clear what we may
say to explain away the infelicity from the perspective of a model-
theoretic approach to logicality. The first sentence in (118b) (the one
starting with never mind . . .) presupposes that “Alex is a father; there-
fore, Alex is a father or a mother” is falsified in some model (i.e. has
Logic may legitimately be conceived as an empirical discipline. I shall return to this
issue in the concluding remarks.
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true premises and false conclusion in that model), whilst the asser-
tion of the inference itself rules out a falsifying model. Szabo antici-
pates such an answer and retorts that even if such a presupposition
account of the infelicity is right, we can factor out the presupposition
and the assertion above would still sound odd. But if we somehow
cancel out the presupposition, the sentence ends up sounding fine
(although pragmatically odd). The sentence would say something to
the effect that some facts are thus and so, but that there is an indepen-
dent formal truth (that does not depend on the facts). Setting aside
the cancelling out of the presupposition, cases like (118b) are more
likely to show that sometimes we can felicitously infer from factual
truths to the invalidity of some alleged truths in virtue of form. These
inferences are exactly what we would expect if LNL were true.
As Szabo himself points out, it is safer to assess the logicality of
natural language relying less on informal notions (e.g. factuality, for-
mality) and more on better understood theoretical notions. He calls
the ensuing thesis (p. 120) the linguistic version of logical form, and he
argues against it by putting forward, inter alia, an argument from ide-
alisation (see below). I myself argue here for a linguistic version of
LNL from binding data. However, it is worth stressing that LNL is
not identical to the linguistic version of logical form, in the version
originally conceived by Szabo. The logicality I argued for is not com-
positional, in the sense that the BE mechanism is a restricted mecha-
nism functioning in parallel with (or independently of) the composi-
tional mechanism. So the BE hypothesis involves a much more lim-
ited form of logicality than the kind of logicality Szabo targets, and
thus remains untouched even if Szabo’s arguments succeed. The lin-
guistic version of logical form (against which Szabo argues) asserts
that logicality follows from compositional semantics. I think that this
thesis too is preferable to the one denying that natural language has
logical properties. However, to defend this more general thesis is to
defend LNL in its second sense (99), that is, as a thesis that is desir-
able for its economy in using theoretical resources, as well as being
more compatible with some ‘big facts’ about linguistic competence
(e.g. systematicity).
So, if our logical implementation of the Binding Economy principle
is on the right track, we have an argument for a linguistic version of
LNL, one that has no formality-problem. Its formality follows from
the logical structures that most plausibly account for the linguistic
phenomenon. Thus, formality is an empirical consequence of the best
account of the linguistic phenomena in hand (in our case, binding
economy phenomena).
5.3.4 Discussion of the argument from abstraction and idealisation
The argument from abstraction and/or idealisation is the following.
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119. The argument from abstraction and idealisation: Natural lan-
guage semantics has as its main job to state the truth-conditions
of natural language sentences. Another possible job is to ab-
stract and idealise away from its primary empirical domain,
and talk about some abstract properties of the system devel-
oped when doing empirical work. But logical properties seen
from the meta-level are relative to our mathematical or logical
point of view, and the idiosyncrasies of the meta-language. In
any case, what we do not get is the real logical properties of
natural language. (cf. Glanzberg forthcoming(b), Szabo´ 2012)
To begin with, I propose a working definition that distinguishes
between abstraction and idealisation. Abstraction is the process of
removing some details from the description of a phenomenon (these
details correspond to some real properties of the object described that
are deemed nevertheless irrelevant). Idealisation does not consist in
removing details, but sometimes it actually implies adding details in
the description, such that the description says false things about the
object. It says false things, but it also says some true things that are
really important.
We can look at the issue about abstraction and idealisation in lin-
guistic semantics from the following perspective. The bone of con-
tention between exclusivism and liberalism is to choose among the
following three pictures:
120. The absolute model Ma consisting of the pair of absolute do-
main and absolute valuation 〈Da, Ia〉 is primitive. We get other
models by generalising or abstracting away from the valuation
Ia thus obtaining the space of valuations F, which in turn de-
termine a space of possible models. We then can go on and
check/define our logical properties, but these will not be lin-
guistic properties (Exclusivism)
121. We start with a space of models as primitive, and get the abso-
lute model—by some sort of idealisation—by choosing one of
them as privileged. (Extreme Liberalism)
122. It is fine to assume, with the exclusivist, that there is an absolute
model Ma, and that the model is primitive. But the derived
models are equally important for linguistics in general, and for
linguistic semantics in particular. Therefore the derived space
of models is empirically relevant. (Liberalism)
We may recognise these positions as extensions of the liberal and
exclusive theses defined in (115)–(116). What has changed is that we
distinguish between two versions of liberalism, weak and strong (or
extreme). It is the weak version of liberalism (henceforth, simply liber-
alism) that I endorse, on the assumption that model-theoretic seman-
tics is on the right track. (I think that Extreme Liberalism is not far
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from the truth, but assuming it here in order to argue for LNL would
amount to begging the question against the absolute semanticist.)
It might seem that no empirical data are able to discriminate straight-
forwardly between the exclusivist and extreme liberalist proposals
and so conceptual criteria should be brought in to decide between
the two views. In a sense, both exclusivism and liberalism idealise
the linguists’ practice and speakers’ linguistic behaviour. In prac-
tice, linguists do not specify a unique absolute model but rather sub-
models (or perhaps restricted extensions) of an absolute model. Nor
do speakers talk about the whole universe of discourse, or about the
same universe of discourse at every time. So, absolute semantics is
itself an idealisation/abstraction from linguists’ and linguistic prac-
tices. On the other hand, a space of valuations cannot be read off of
the linguistic practice either. Given that both exclusivism and liber-
alism misrepresent language in some sense, it might seem better to
choose a simpler view, along the lines of absolute semantics (because
it involves only one model). But there are both empirical and con-
ceptual reasons for preferring the middle position, the liberal version,
which allows a version of LNL to go through. This is in part because it
accounts more straightforwardly for empirical data presented above,
and also because it has conceptual advantages.
Supporters of exclusive semantics (and model-theoretic definitions
of logicality) do not seem to acknowledge that the case against LNL
rests on the kinds of assumptions presented above in (120). Arguably,
they claim that LNL is false, on the basis of distinctions that implicitly
take one of the exclusivist assumptions for granted.
Michael Glanzberg’s appeal to the distinction between local and
global quantifiers is a case in point. He writes:
Attending to the local versus global distinction, we can
reconcile two facts that might have seemed in tension.
First, familiar determiners in natural language have more
or less the semantics that logical theory says they should.
[...] But the reason is simply that semantics of natural lan-
guage uses local properties of quantifiers in spelling out
the semantics of determiners. These are already available
to absolute semantics.
Now, this does not mean we can never look at the global
notion of quantifier in thinking about natural language.
The basic idea for giving absolute truth-conditions is the
local one, and in fact, sometimes we can get interesting
further results out of local definitions. But on occasion, we
learn something by abstracting away from absolute truth
conditions, by looking at global generalized quantifiers [:]
[...] natural language determiners express restricted quan-
tification.
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In looking at this sort of global property, we are not sim-
ply spelling out the semantics of a language. Rather, we
are abstracting away from the semantics proper – a speci-
fication of contributions to truth-conditions – to look at a
more abstract property of an expression. It turns out, in
this case, abstracting away from the universe of discourse
is the right thing to do. Particularly when asking about
logical or more generally mathematical properties of ex-
pressions, this sort of abstraction can be of great interest
[...] even if it goes beyond the semantics of any language
per se.
This sort of possibility shows how we might take the
step from semantics proper to logic [...] Glanzberg (forth-
coming[b], pp. 32-33)
The basic idea of the passage is the following. There is a distinction
between local and global quantifiers, which solves a certain tension.
Otherwise put, the locality and globality are properties of the very
same expressions, viz. the quantifiers (as Glanzberg suggests in the
third paragraph). The whole argument rests on the assumption that
when we are doing linguistic semantics, we focus exclusively on lo-
cal properties (secured by absolute semantics), and thus that global
properties are quasi-irrelevant for semantics.
I think that this assumption—to the effect that grammar is not sen-
sitive to global properties—cannot be true as it stands. A relevant
piece of data is the following. Downward monotonicity is clearly
a global property: it requires that in every model subset-inferences
hold (cf. appendix A on monotonicity). For instance, assuming that
the conditional If you are student at UEA, you get a library card is true, a
similar conditional will be true of a subset of the students at UEA, say,
the doctoral students at UEA: If you are doctoral student at UEA, you
get a library card. It is a well known fact that negative polarity items
are sensitive to downward entailing environments (see e.g. Chierchia
2013). For instance, the negative polarity item any does not appear
in upward entailing environments but only in downward entailing
ones. That is why If any UEA student exists, she will have a library card
is acceptable, whilst *Any UEA student exists is not. Note that the
acceptability of negative polarity items only in downward entailing
environments is robust: the scope of negation gives rise to precisely
the same type of subset-inference as the antecedents of conditionals
(exemplified above) do. Thus, the negative polarity item any is accept-
able in I don’t have any money on me, whilst it does not sit well with
assertions: *I have any money on me.
The critical point is that downward monotonicity is not a content-
related properties. It does not depend on the specific semantics of
words (or lexical items) such as student, UEA etc.. Downward mono-
tonicity is a property that depends on the semantic relation between
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phrases such as student and student at UEA, rather than on semantic
values of these phrases themselves. For instance, student and UEA
can be replaced by other arbitrary words, say pupil and Eaton, pre-
serving the semantic relation between the resulting phrases. If down-
ward monotonicity were tied up with the semantics of such words as
student and UEA, it would stop being a general property. Then, the
patterns of acceptability that we observe in constructions involving
negative polarity items would not be general. But downward mono-
tonicity and the patterns of acceptability of negative polarity items
are general. I have shown that the resources of absolute (and even
exclusive) semantics are sufficient to define logical properties such as
the validity of certain simple quantified sentences, and the same re-
mark carries over to downward monotonicity, since this property too
is an invariance property that can be defined on a space of absolute
sub-models.20
Unless the exclusivist semanticist finds a way to define downward
monotonicity (or a notion that does the same job) even more locally,
we have reason to think that (at least some types of) global proper-
ties are empirically relevant for linguistic inquiry. There are further
empirical reasons to think that grammar is sensitive to global prop-
erties, but, for now, let us get clear about the entire dialectic of the
argument from abstraction and idealisation, and the role that the dis-
tinction between local and global properties of quantifiers plays in
this argument.
Glanzberg identifies a tension, which he characterises as following
from the striking resemblance between some features of the quan-
tifiers in logic and in natural language respectively. On this view,
which I assume here as well, this similarity is due to the fact that
both types of quantifiers have the same local properties. However, the
real tension, it seems to me, appears when we ask about the global
properties of quantifiers in logic and in natural language. Are these
global properties the same or not? The answer provided is nuanced.
On the one hand, the semantics is absolute (read ‘exclusivist’), which,
according to the argument from absolute semantics, makes talk of
global properties (viz. invariance properties defined over a space of
models) impossible at the level of semantics. Thus, quantifiers do not
have global (logical) properties at the semantic level. On the other hand,
Glanzberg says that even if only the local properties of quantifiers
are available to absolute semantics, “this does not mean we can never
20 To do so, the crucial step is to interpret the predicates S and R in our toy absolute
semantics as sets of students and sets of students at UEA, thus ensuring that R ⊂ S,
and add a further predicate C, denoting the set of individuals in the domain owing
a library card. Then, we can check that ∀x(Sx→ Cx)  ∀x(Rx→ Cx) holds in all the
sub-models of our toy semantics. If this comes out as valid, we can capture it within
an absolute semantics. To repeat, this is empirically desirable, since, otherwise we
would be in the position of not being able to explain the patterns of acceptability of
e.g. NPIs.
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look at the global notion of quantifier in thinking about natural lan-
guage.” He adds that we “can get interesting further results out of
local definitions” by abstracting away from absolute semantics (and
its corresponding universe of discourse), in particular, results about
“abstract propert[ies] of expression[s]”, or “about logical or more gen-
erally mathematical properties of expressions.” Thus, quantifiers do
get global (abstract, logical) properties at a level that “goes beyond
the semantics of any language per se.” So, pace Glanzberg, quantifi-
cational expressions in natural language lack logical properties at the
semantic level but have those logical properties at some post-semantic
level.
I think that the real tension comes from talk about properties of
expressions at two levels, levels whose very characterisation rests ex-
clusively on one’s view of semantics: liberal or exclusive. Indeed,
Glanzberg’s appeal to absolute semantics is an implicit endorsement
of exclusivism. Recall that liberal semantics does not deny, and in
fact agrees with, the core motivation of absolute semantics, that is,
the adequacy constraint on linguistic theorising to the effect that ex-
pressions have their objective, worldly content, but also claims that
this adequacy constraint does not exhaust the resources of linguistic
semantics. Thus, the exclusive semantics is a somewhat dogmatic and
stipulative position about the bounds of linguistic semantics. (From
this point of view, its apparent defect is that it lacks independent mo-
tivation.) It is worth registering that LNL is a thesis about natural lan-
guage in general. If one wants to have an exclusive view of semantics,
one can still maintain that linguistic expressions have logical proper-
ties at other levels. What is important for the LNL supporter is that
logical properties are realised by natural language, and this counts in
favour of LNL irrespective of how we draw the boundaries between
the semantic and non-semantic levels (interface and post-semantics).
Liberalism, by definition, is not tied up with the restrictive view about
semantics, and allows for the model-theoretic apparatus to be used
to represent ‘modules’ of the grammar other than semantics (in the
exclusivist view).
But if the exclusivism underlying the argument from absolute se-
mantics takes pride of place in arguing against LNL in semantics (but
not, as we have seen, in grammar, more broadly speaking), what is
the force of the argument from abstraction and idealisation against
the model-theoretic version of LNL as a general thesis about lan-
guage? In the last paragraph of the passage above, Glanzberg sug-
gests that by abstracting away from absolute semantics, we “take the
step from semantics proper to logic.” A lot depends on how “logic” is
understood. Does the logic, as invoked in this argument, have some
empirical content? Does it represent properties of language? If the
logic has empirical content, this establishes LNL in the ‘compromise’
version presented above (granting exclusivism about semantics, but
179
5.3 main objections to the lnl thesis
placing logicality at some post-semantic level). This would be a weak
version of the argument from abstraction and idealisation. But if the
claim is that in moving to logic, we lose the empirical content about
language altogether, the argument from abstraction/idealisation in-
voked by the LNL sceptics, I shall argue, does not adequately justify
this claim. This argument, which I oppose, would be a strong version
of the argument from abstraction/idealisation. So my pro-LNL posi-
tion will be this. The argument from idealisation and/or abstraction,
in either its strong or weak version, cannot achieve anything beyond
what was already achieved by exclusivism. Moreover, I think that
the LNL sceptics overstate the case against LNL made by this argu-
ment, if the argument is intended in its strong sense. The first claim
follows from our discussion of exclusivism underlying the use of the
distinction between local and global properties of quantifiers. In the
remainder of this section, I shall argue for the second claim.
Glanzberg may not maintain the strong version of the argument
from abstraction and idealisation.21 However, it is plausible that he
should maintain it, as long as he takes his position to undercut the
LNL thesis in all its versions, in particular the interface version, sup-
ported by Binding Economy under a semantic definition of logicality.
Provided that he needs the strong version to effectively argue against
LNL, I assume that he does endorse it. The following passage from
Glanzberg may serve to settle the issue of the strength of the strong
version of the argument from abstraction and idealisation.
Idealization, as it figures here, is a familiar kind of ideal-
ization in scientific theorizing, that builds idealized mod-
els. One way to build idealized models is to remove ir-
relevant features of some phenomenon, and replace them
with uniform or simplified features. A model of a plane-
tary system is such an idealized model: it ignores thermo-
dynamic properties, ignores the presence of comets and
asteroids, and treats planets as ideal spheres (cf. Frigg
and Hartmann, 2009). When we build a logic from a nat-
ural language, I suggest, we do just this. We ignore irrele-
vant features of grammar, and replace them with uniform
and simplified logical categories. We do so for particular
purposes. [...]
Thus, we need to add a process of idealization to those
of abstraction and identification. We need all three to get
from natural language to logic. We only get to logic –
21 The fact that he talks about “logical or more generally mathematical properties of
expressions” (see the passage quoted above pp. 32-3) suggests that he does not
endorse the strong version, since the logical properties in question presumably are
properties of linguistic expressions; but the fact that he presents logic as the study
of valid reasoning (see quotation below), without mention of linguistic competence,
suggests that for him logic does not have empirical content as far as linguistics is
concerned.
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something that serves our purposes in analyzing valid
reasoning, and is recognizably like what logicians work
with – when we include idealization. Glanzberg (forth-
coming[b], p. 48)
So Glanzberg presents us an interesting analogy between the model-
theoretic account (or the logic) of certain linguistic expressions, e.g.
quantified expressions, and scientific models, as treated in the gen-
eral philosophy of science. Assuming that the analogy is on the right
track (which is not clear, as we’ll see below), we reach the previous
decision point. If the underlying argument is a weak version of the ar-
gument from abstraction and/or idealisation, it is just a restatement
of exclusivism, as argued above. But what if it is intended as a strong
version?
If indeed we are dealing with the argument in its strong sense,
it has an implicit assumption about idealisation, which is problem-
atic.22 The implicit assumption is that models, by idealisation and/or
abstraction completely lose their grip on reality. But such an assump-
tion is very contentious, since it is a mainstream (realist) position
that idealised models, even after abstracting away from some features
of reality, still can track core features of reality (i.e. of phenomena
or of data), and thus can be (at least approximately) true about the
world. Otherwise put, it is a standard assumption that models rep-
resent their target systems, or that in using models we learn about
target systems (see Frigg and Hartmann 2012). After all, borrowing
Glanzberg’s analogy, it is not at all obvious that a model of a plane-
tary system that ignores such and such properties of planets is com-
pletely misleading in representing the world, and, more specifically,
the physical properties of the planets. It can still get some relevant
facts right. For instance, it can still represent correctly the movement
of planets, their trajectory and speed, in the (possibly counterfactual)
case in which no asteroids interfere with the planetary system. The
same holds, mutatis mutandis, in the linguistic case. No reason is given
for thinking that in moving away from absolute semantics the logical
properties of expressions that we thus get are not properties with
which grammar endows such expressions. On the contrary, it seems
that in appealing to the abstract tools of model-theory we discover
important properties of linguistic expressions.
22 It is worth pointing out that this brings us in a difficult area pertaining to idealisation
in science. We cannot do justice to the discussion of idealisation in philosophy
of science. Moreover, the analogy between the discussions of idealisation in the
philosophy of science and in the philosophy of linguistics is very difficult to draw
precisely. This is because we don’t yet have a clear and independent understanding
of what to take as the target system of linguistics, that is, what sort of features of
reality realise linguistic properties. (We do get an independent target system with
the model of planetary motion, since the planets are independently observable.)
With this caveat in place, let us go back to the strong version of the argument from
idealisation.
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There are further problems with the above analogy between the
role of model theory and the role of the idealised model of planetary
motion. I find that this strategy of the argument from abstraction
and/or idealisation doesn’t fit too well with the way the notions are
conceptualised in philosophy of science.23 There are two reasons for
this.
Firstly, both abstraction and idealisation are conceived as kinds
of distortion by either simplifying a model—qua scientific model—
in order for the target system to become computationally tractable
(Gallilean idealisation) or by ignoring everything except for the core
causal factors responsible for a phenomenon (abstraction). Both kinds
of idealisation involve a simplification of the model-theoretic appara-
tus used, rather than the introduction of new theoretical material. But
Glanzberg’s use of idealisation and/or abstraction in linguistics as-
sumes that the two actually add theoretical material, so they amount
to complications of the scientific model. This is because we basically
add a space of models—qua mathematical structures, rather than sci-
entific models—to the absolute one, and this cannot be seen as a
simplification of the model—qua scientific model. So, if idealisation
and abstraction involve simplification, model-theoretic semantics can-
not be obtained by idealisation or abstraction. Secondly, Glanzberg’s
argument from abstraction and/or idealisation (from absolute truth-
conditions) also suggests a change in subject matter rather than a sim-
plification. We move from local (content-related) properties to global
(logical, content-independent) relations. But then the analogy with
idealised models in science does not fit the linguistic case, because in
the scientific models’ case we do not change the target system. Rather
we make simplifying assumptions about it. Thus, an important draw-
back to conceiving of idealisation and abstraction in this way is that,
on this conception, the bridge between local (content-related) and
global (content-independent) properties of language remains prob-
lematic. How could we legitimately state that the global properties
of quantifiers are properties of the very same things that have such
and such local properties in natural language, if the idealisation story
fails? It becomes appealing not to suppose that there is a gap be-
tween local and global properties in the first place. Moreover, the
problematic character of idealisation in linguistics also indicates that
the general point against LNL crucially rests on exclusivism.
But perhaps there is a way out of the idealisation predicament for
the LNL sceptic. A third possibility is that the simplification spe-
cific to idealisation takes place at the level of syntax, or perhaps at
some other non-semantic level. Indeed, this seems to be suggested by
23 See Frigg and Hartmann (2012) which is the same source that Glanzberg cites (up-
dated with material that does not affect the present discussion) and also Weisberg
(2007), for two articles on notions of idealisation in science.
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Glanzberg (forthcoming[b], p. 46), which gives the following exam-
ples to illustrate his point:
123. Distributional differences between every and a
a) Max is a friend of mine.
b) *Max is every friend of mine.
c) There is a book on the table.
d) *There is every book on the table.
124. Scopal differences between every and a
a) John did not read every book. non-ambiguous
b) John did not read a book. ambiguous
The key idea is that in saying that the quantificational determiner
every expresses the universal quantifier ∀, and that the indefinite de-
terminer a(n) expresses the existential quantifier ∃, we are abstracting
away from the syntactic differences (or differences of other nature) be-
tween how these expressions function in natural language, and how
they function in, say, first order logic.
However, the existence of syntactic quirks of logical words in natu-
ral language is perfectly compatible with their having logical proper-
ties similar to the logical properties of the corresponding constants in
logic. What such examples show is that the class of consequences in
natural language will differ from the class of consequences in some
system of logic. But this is to be expected. What the argument from
abstraction and/or idealisation is supposed to show is that there is
no overlap between the class of logical properties in natural language
and the class of logical properties in some standard logical system.
For instance, a supporter of LNL will be happy to accept the distribu-
tional differences presented in (123), but still maintain that the argu-
ment Every book is on the table; therefore, a book is on the table is valid in
both natural language and first-order language under some assump-
tions (e.g. non-empty domain). Consequently, abstracting away from
syntactic features should not lead to the abandonment of the LNL
thesis.24
24 This also raises the question as to what is the precise view of logic one assumes
in order to compare logic and language. Glanzberg points out that we can take a
more permissive view of logic as the basis for logicality, but this would make the
LNL much weaker and uninteresting. However, there is a problem with the dialec-
tical use of the permissive view of logic. The permissive view of logic was defined
as accepting non-classical views of consequence (logicality), but it ends up being
a liberal view about the syntactic and semantic mismatches between logic and lan-
guage, mismatches that do not directly concern logical consequence (cf. Glanzberg
forthcoming(b), pp. 9-10, 47). In any case, it doesn’t seem to me to be an uninter-
esting conclusion that which establishes that the logicality in natural language is
non-classical. However, the view that there are syntactic mismatches between first
order logic and natural language is well known, thus not surprising – see e.g. Bar-
wise and Cooper (1981).
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There is yet another gap in the argument from abstraction and
idealisation based on the examples in (123). Interestingly, it is ar-
guable that Glanzberg’s examples (124), under a certain linguistic
analysis, militate in favour of the logicality of natural language, rather
than posing a problem for it. In connection with the contrast shown
in (124), the key question is why the indefinite quantifier phrase a
book can take scope over the negation, whilst the universal quantifier
phrase every book cannot do so? One plausible answer is that there is a
syntactic constraint (or a set of syntactic constraints) that makes such
scopal behaviour possible (cf. Beghelli and Stowell 1997). Another
plausible answer is that a semantic principle is responsible for that
distributional contrast. That is, two operators cannot enter in scopal
interactions if the interpretation resulting from their interaction (i.e.
from the inverse scope reading) is logically stronger than the interpre-
tation resulting from lack of interaction (i.e. from their surface scope
reading). This latter hypothesis explains the data in (124b): when
the universal crosses the negation, the resulting, inverse scope, read-
ing entails the surface scope reading, but when the existential crosses
the negation, the resulting inverse scope reading is not stronger than
the surface scope reading. Indeed, this principle is yet another econ-
omy principle, similar to Binding Economy.25 What is important for
present purposes is that explaining some scope phenomena makes
appeal to logical properties (entailment or semantic strength), and
thus that LNL is an empirical thesis that might help explain puzzling
linguistic facts.
Moreover, Barwise and Cooper (1981, 182ff.) explain the contrasts
in (123c)-(123d) by appeal to logical (global) properties, rather than to
syntactic constraints. Thus, the ungrammaticality of Glanzberg’s data
(123c)-(123d) can also be traced back to logical properties. Here is
how this is done. We define strong determiners as those determiners
D for which every restrictor A in the domain E is such that A ∈ D(A)
in every model 〈E, JK〉 (where E is the domain of individuals and JK
the interpretation function). That is, a determiner is strong if the
generalised quantifiers (viz. sets of sets) that it determines contain
the restrictor in every model. Those determiners which do not have
this property are weak.
We observe that only strong determiners are allowed in there is/are
constructions. For example, every is a strong determiner, whilst some,
a, and no are not. (Cf. *There is every book on the shelf, There is a
book on the shelf ; see also (123c)-(123d).) Roughly speaking, strong
determiners give rise to generalised quantifiers (sets of sets) which
contain among their members the whole domain of discourse E of
the model. But only every is such a determiner, since, say, every book
is bound to contain the entire domain of books (in every model). In
25 For a development of this account, see Mayr and Spector (2010), as well as my
discussion in chapter 2.
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contrast, some book or no book do not contain the entire domain of
books in every model. It follows that a global property of determiners,
viz. their strength, is responsible for the contrast in (123c)-(123d). 26
Therefore, two of the mismatches invoked by Glanzberg between
first-order logic and natural logic can be explained by appeal to (what
is standardly conceived as) global properties of natural language.
Even assuming that the use of model theory (and the correspond-
ing space of models) amounts to idealising from the absolute model
(and the truth-conditions) for natural language expressions, there is
no reason to believe that the idealisation does not capture essential
linguistic properties. In fact, what we learn from the above examples,
as well as from the binding economy study case discussed earlier, is
that natural language is sensitive to global properties.
Zoltan Szabo brings into play new considerations against LNL. His
argument from abstraction proceeds as follows.
When it comes to explanation by abstraction, the more
abstract the better. The fact that (3) is an instance of (3’)
goes some distance towards explaining its validity, the fact
that it is an instance of (3”) goes further, and the fact that
it is an instance of (3”’) is as good as it gets. This is as it
should be – eliminating more and more clutter we get a
clearer and clearer view of how the truth of the premises
guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
(3) Alex is a father; therefore Alex is a father or Alex is
a mother
(3’) a is a father; therefore a is a father or is a mother.
(3”) a is F; therefore a is F or a is M.
(3”’) p; therefore p or q.
Explanation by abstraction is just a step away from no
explanation at all. It is roughly akin to saying “The valid-
ity of this inference is self-explanatory – you will see it for
yourself as soon as I remove the irrelevant details that ob-
scure your insight.” It is an attractive view that the limits
of logic are set by the scope of adequate explanation by
abstraction. Logical validity is epistemically fundamental
– to explain it all we can do is remove the dust and hope
that validity will shine through. Other validities are not
self-evident – to explain them we have to appeal to neces-
sary truths. (Szabo´ 2012)
26 In fact, the full explanation of the contrast goes even further in making the tauto-
loguousness of there is/are-sentences with strong quantifiers as the source of the un-
acceptability of (123d)—see Barwise and Cooper (1981, p. 183) and Gajewski (2002,
pp. 6-7) for details.
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So, the challenge is to point to the features of (3) which make it
a valid argument, an argument with such and such a logical form.27
The logical form, (3”’), of (3) is obtained by abstraction. But does
abstraction provide explanation? Szabo’s argument thus amounts to
asking the supporter of LNL to present grounds for the explanatory
usefulness of the LNL thesis. So what is the explanatory force of log-
ical form? My answer to the challenge is that the abstraction towards
a logical form is explanatory, not merely in virtue of being a process
abstraction, but in virtue of its end result: it succeeds in making sense
of some otherwise puzzling facts about natural language. Recall that
the ‘binding economy’ study case was prompted by questions regard-
ing the behaviour of binding constructions. For instance, why does
a proper name appear to be bound, despite its being in a condition
C configuration? The answer was that the proper name appears to
be bound only because it is coreferential with another noun phrase
(in particular, a pronoun), and that coreference is allowed only if a
particular logical relation holds between the coreference reading and
the binding reading. Therefore, a particular logical relation explains
why proper names appear to be bound, which would be otherwise
puzzling from the viewpoint of traditional binding theory.
I conclude that no vicious or explanatorily trivial abstraction or
idealisation is involved in getting to the logical properties of natural
language expressions. What we do in defining or discovering logi-
cal properties is just setting aside facts irrelevant for the matter at
hand. Leaving some facts aside does not falsify the ensuing account
in the sense of adding properties (logical properties) that are not in
the target system. An effective sceptical argument from abstraction
or idealisation should show that the processes of abstraction or ideal-
isation involve distortions that ‘produce’ logical properties that were
not instantiated by the target system (in our case, by the grammar).
No such positive reason was provided by the LNL sceptics. Given
that abstraction and idealisation are common in other sciences, with-
out a much clearer account of abstraction and idealisation in linguis-
tics, and their purported shortcomings, the argument from abstrac-
tion/idealisation offers us no reason, beyond exclusivist assumptions,
to doubt LNL. 28 Idealisation, as Chomsky (1995, p. 7) rightly pointed
out, “is a misleading term for the only reasonable way to approach
27 The present argument is simpler, and more general than the previous ones. Firstly,
Szabo does not argue against LNL from absolute semantics. Secondly, Szabo’s ar-
gument is not premised on the acceptance of model-theoretic semantics. Thirdly,
Szabo’s argument does not target the claim that certain inferences in natural lan-
guage have logical forms either. Rather, his argument targets the explanatory value
of LNL. As such, the argument from abstraction advanced by Szabo is sceptical with-
out making strong stipulations (e.g. exclusivism) about the boundaries of semantics.
28 In other words, there is equivocation on what precisely is the target of the abstrac-
tion/idealisation argument. It is not clear which is the ‘true-part’ and which the
‘false-part’ of these processes. Cf. Glanzberg (forthcoming[b], pp. 44, 48), Szabo´
(2012, 124ff.).
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a grasp of reality.” This just suggests how difficult it is to make the
argument from abstraction/idealisation palatable.
5.4 concluding remarks
Competent speakers can separate logically true sentences, e.g. All
students are students from sentences that are not logically true. This
is a big fact about our linguistic competence, and any framework
that is equipped to characterise the logical properties of these sen-
tences should do so. The fact that the logical sentences are not the im-
mediate concern for the practicing linguistic theorists should not be
interpreted as suggesting that logical properties are not empirically
relevant. As far as I can see, it just suggests that logical properties of
natural language are taken for granted, and that the theorists apply
themselves to more difficult questions about natural language. There-
fore, as long as model theory (or some other framework) provides us
with the resources to define logical properties, suppressing these re-
sources out of allegiance to some high-level desideratum (as the one
behind exclusivism) amounts to signing up at the very outset for loss
of empirical coverage.
An important dialectical problem for LNL scepticism is that it por-
trays the abstraction/idealisation process as aimed at getting a logic
out of natural language. But this is not the proper aim of LNL: we
want to know how much overlap there is between the class of logi-
cal consequences (and valid inferences) characterised by some logic
and that realised by natural language, rather than show that the two
classes coincide. Otherwise put, we want the ‘generative’ power of
logicality: the classes of models are theoretical tools that can define
(‘generate’) properties that seem to be properties of language. It
seems that an indefinite number of linguistic constructions have these
logical properties. In this sense, logicality is akin to other formal prop-
erties such as recursiveness and some form of compositionality since
it generates structures that are empirically relevant. If this is true, the
problem of getting a pure logic (or a pure logical form) of natural
language misconstrues the aims of of the logic in natural language
thesis.29 The LNL thesis is an essentially empirical hypothesis about
language, and our task as theorists is to establish the limits of such
a thesis, rather than to obtain a ‘pure’ logic out of it. In other words,
to get support for LNL we don’t need to show that natural language
distinguishes between, e.g., logical validity and lexical/linguistic va-
lidity, but rather that it distinguishes logical properties (viz. forms
29 Nonetheless, this is the conception that LNL sceptics have in mind; see Glanzberg
(forthcoming[b], 41ff.), Szabo´ (2012, 124ff.).
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of validity and logical consequence) from non-logical properties (viz.
forms of invalidity and contingency).30
In sum, LNL is a broad thesis and objections that do not target
particular versions of this thesis are doomed to be inconclusive. For
instance, on the face of it, notions of logicality are referred to in the
syntactic linguistic literature, both in the proof-theoretical tradition
(Chomsky 1957) and in the model-theoretic one (P. Blackburn and
Meyer-Viol 1997, Potts 2002). The role of derivability and (preserva-
tion of) satisfiability are employed in such studies in order to define
grammaticality. Moreover, logicality will be clearly found in natural
language at a pragmatic level, if at all. These are all areas where LNL
scepticism is not prima facie justified.
Consistency claim
Before concluding, we have to ask how would LNL look from the
perspective of the controversy-based account. My claim is that the
controversy-based account, the view for which I argued in chapter
2, preserves a crucial characteristic of the standard scope economy
accounts, namely, its reliance on logical properties.
Recall that the implicature set consists of the scopal logical forms
whose lexical items are completely ignored: that is, only functional
items (e.g. quantifiers) are kept for the purposes of the computation.
The scopal logical forms are obtained by some purely formal opera-
tion (e.g. quantifier raising) that acts on the functional items. Effec-
tively, it swaps the quantifiers and reverses their precedence relation.
Moreover, the functional items trigger (at least sometimes) scalar im-
plicatures. Scalar implicatures are dependent on the semantic rela-
tions between these functional items. For instance, the implicature
from some to not all is based on the semantic relation between the
quantifying determiners some and all, which determines at the level
of logical form an entailment relation (to the effect that sentences
containing all entail sentences where we substitute some for all). Once
more, there is nothing content-related (in the sense of absolute seman-
tic sense) in the structural relations that determine scalar implicatures.
The scopal logical forms and their implicatures form the implicatures
30 One worry the LNL sceptics might have is that the thesis over-generates: there
are many natural language inferences that are not even grammatical, although their
corresponding logical counterparts are well-formed. The problem of judging the
adequacy of the thesis that natural language realises logical consequences may be
conveniently compared with the problem of judging whether merge is an operation
of syntactic structure building (cf. J. Collins 2011). One could say: merge surely
overgenerates—e.g. the words book and blue cannot be freely combined, cf. blue book,
*book blue—so in order to get merge out of natural language one have to abstract
away from cases where merge does not give the right predictions. But this would
be surely incorrect, since merge is not supposed to be the only structural constraint
on language. Then this reasoning is also incorrect, mutatis mutandis, in the case of
worries about overgeneration regarding the logical consequence relation in natural
language semantics.
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set, which is then used in order to determine the scopal admissibility
of the logical forms. The property relevant for the computation of
scopal admissibility is inconsistency. Needless to say, this is another
formal property, since the precise real-world content corresponding
to two logical forms is completely irrelevant for determining whether
the logical forms are (in)consistent .
Therefore, it is clear that, irrespective of one’s foundational view
on logicality, the principles regulating scope on the controversy-based
account are logical. One may opt for a syntactic or semantic view of
logicality, but these views just spell out what is already made man-
ifest by the way the mechanism posited operates, namely its formal
inferential capacities. If this is so, no matter which linguistic economy
account turns out to be true, we can keep holding on to LNL.
To conclude, in this chapter I have argued for three key ideas. (i)
Logicality is referenced in explanatory hypotheses in linguistics, the
Binding Economy principle being a case in point. (ii) The argument
from absolute semantics is compatible with LNL; in particular, there
are two broad ways of defining validity and logical consequence that
cannot be ruled out by absolute semantics, a model-theoretic (or se-
mantic) one and a proof-theoretic (or syntactic) one. (iii) Denying
LNL on the grounds that it lacks formality or that it is obtained
by abstraction and idealisation is problematic; both arguments fail
to acknowledge that LNL shares with scientific inquiry more gener-
ally the need (and right) to delimit its subject matter (to fragments
of natural language), make some postulations (e.g. about logical
constants/functional items), and to abstract and idealise. These hy-
potheses (supporting logicality in natural language) should be judged
on their overall plausibility and economy, rather than by comparing
them to an ideal of logicality (requiring, for instance, that natural lan-
guage should present us with pure logical forms, or that linguistic
constructions have the same syntactic and distributional properties
as their first order logic counterparts).
So the moral of the foregoing is that logicality (in the sense of logi-
cal properties such as realising a logical consequence relation) is both
empirically and conceptually desirable as a property of grammar. A
divide between content-properties (truth-conditions) and meta-logical
properties, although it makes perfect sense when we think about for-
mal languages, cannot serve as a divide in empirical relevance: it can-
not be a divide between what is and is not empirically pertinent for
natural language theorising. It is misleading to claim that stating
truth- and satisfaction-conditions for linguistic expressions amounts
to doing natural language semantics, while maintaining at same time
that stating logical properties of linguistic expressions is just doing
logic. Both ‘content’ properties and logical properties can equally
well reflect features of the linguistic competence.
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Within the overall argument of the thesis, this chapter serves to
present another significant aspect of linguistic economy. In particu-
lar, it demonstrates that economy-based accounts lend support to a
linguistic version of the LNL thesis, and thereby corroborates many
other positive arguments to the effect that grammar is sensitive to log-
ical properties. More generally, this chapter, taken together with the
following, also purports to show that the linguistic economy princi-
ples have significant consequences on the architecture of the grammar,
consequences that are unexpected and may sometimes run counter to
one’s philosophical intuitions.
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ECONOMY-BASED ARGUMENTSFOR A NON-REFERENT IA LACCOUNT OF COMPLEXDEMONSTRAT IVES
the, the ‘definite article’, is
that with a weakening of the
demonstrative force.
Jespersen (1933, p.261)
The last two chapters of the thesis investigate the import of assum-
ing that grammar is governed by economy principles. Linguistic econ-
omy, I argue, has significant consequences on debates in the philoso-
phy of language and linguistics. In this chapter, I show that economy-
based accounts argue for a special conception of noun phrases. I take
as a study case complex demonstratives, but the implications of econ-
omy are broader, and likely apply to other noun phrases such as
definite descriptions, pronouns, simple demonstratives, and proper
names. The same methodological strategy as in the previous chap-
ter applies: in order to study the consequences of economy, I need a
baseline account, and I have chosen the standard principles of econ-
omy for this purpose. Once more, whilst my preferred statements
of the economy-principles (namely, the ones for which I argued in
chapters 3 and 5) would serve just as well, the standard principles
are well-known and basically correct over the range of data impor-
tant for the argument in this chapter. Therefore, since my favourite
economy-principles account for the same phenomena in the seman-
tics/pragmatics (rather than at the syntax/semantics interface, as the
standard principles do), their prediction about the scope and binding
patterns of complex demonstrative will arguably be the same. It is
these predictions that will play the most significant role in this chap-
ter, rather than the precise mechanism that accounts for them.
6.1 introduction: an outline of the argu-ment
In the recent linguistic and philosophical literature, the paths of little
words such as the and that (also known as definite determiners), have
been very different. This despite their similarity in many distribu-
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tional respects, As a result, the more complex expressions in which
these determiners can be embedded (e.g. the man, that man) have
been seen as dissimilar too. So a mainstream view is that demonstra-
tive and descriptive definites need to receive different treatments.1
This chapter argues that such a division is not warranted with re-
spect to definite descriptions and complex demonstratives (e.g. the
man in the corner). I defend a non-referentialist position about com-
plex demonstratives and, by extension, about definite descriptions.
More precisely, I take referentialism to be direct referentialism. A
directly referential expression is one whose content (rather than lin-
guistic meaning or character) is invariant over possible worlds and
is given directly, rather than via a descriptive condition. (This entails
that directly referential expressions do not shift their denotations in
the scope of propositional attitude verbs and other intensional oper-
ators.) My non-referentialist position is related to, but more neutral
than, that of King (2001) and Elbourne (2008). I share with these au-
thors a non-referentialist view, but I am less committed to a precise
semantic treatment of complex demonstratives. Rather, I argue that
an important class of cases suggests a general constraint on the syn-
tax and semantics of complex demonstratives. I reach this position
by a number of different and generally unexplored routes. In par-
ticular, in arguing that complex demonstratives are not referential, I
shall mainly employ several well-supported principles of linguistic
economy.
I put forward two anti-referentialist theses, which involve further
assumptions about the syntax and semantics of complex demonstra-
tives:
i. Scope Economy implies that complex demonstratives and defi-
nite descriptions have identical scopal properties.
ii. Binding Economy implies that complex demonstratives have
the semantics of non-(directly)-referential expressions.
To support the two theses and use them to target the referentialist
account of complex demonstratives, I need to make several assump-
tions about the principles of economy, which are needed to get my
argument off the ground. Accordingly, I shall assume that the princi-
ples of economy are correct. Of course, like any empirical hypotheses,
such principles may prove to be incorrect (or, as I argued in the pre-
vious chapters, not entirely correct). However, I contend that there
are good reasons to adopt them. They can be taken as descriptive
generalisations over a restricted (but relevant) set of data, and this
is sufficient for the purpose of the present argument. A key step in
1 Neale (1990), developing a Russellian line, treats definite descriptions as (restricted)
quantifiers, while Kaplan (1989) argues that pure demonstratives (that is, a species
of demonstratives) are directly referential. This further motivates a division between
definite descriptions and demonstratives (including complex ones) more generally.
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the argument will be to show that a smooth interface between syntax
and semantics requires complex demonstratives (and other definites)
to take non-referential semantic values. (If the arguments in the pre-
vious chapters are correct, the present argument can be restated in
terms of principles governing the semantics/pragmatics interface. I
return to this point in the conclusions.)
Focusing on linguistic economy has a significant impact on the
strength of certain semantic assumptions that I am adopting, as well
as on the shape of the dialectic of my argument. Crudely put, I shall
be deflationary with respect to the former, and very flexible with
respect to the latter. In particular, even if I shall make some pro-
visional assumptions about the nature of definite descriptions and
complex demonstratives, I’m ultimately neutral with respect to the
precise semantics that these expressions have to receive. I am primar-
ily interested in the specific implications of economy principles on the
semantics of complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, and
these implications will impose constraints on, rather than fully deter-
mine, the semantics of the definites. The constraint that will emerge
is that these definites are non-referential. Moreover, the dialect will
be flexible in the sense that I shall try to weaken referentialism about
complex demonstratives from two distinct perspectives. One perspec-
tive, adopted in the first part of the paper, is to argue from quantifica-
tional (basically Russellian) assumptions about definite descriptions.
The other perspective, adopted in the second part of the paper, is to
argue from non-directly referential (basically Fregean) assumptions
about definites. In other words, I argue for thesis (i.) by adopting
Russellian (quantificational) assumptions about definite descriptions,
trying to subvert the conviction that complex demonstratives lack the
purported Russellian characteristics of definite descriptions. As for
thesis (ii.), I defend its general plausibility by demonstrating the theo-
retical advantages ensuing from the assumption that complex demon-
stratives have a Fregean (non-directly referential) semantics. I leave
open which precise non-referential analysis will ultimately account
for the wide range of linguistic data considered here. I think that in
order to argue for a precise semantics of definites one has to go far
beyond economy considerations.2
6.2 scope and economy
In this section, I am concerned with the significance of scope for es-
tablishing the nature of complex demonstratives. I argue from a po-
sition of epistemic incertitude about the scope data, since they seem
2 Paul Elbourne makes a good case for analysing definites, pronouns, and proper
names as denoting individual concepts; see Elbourne (2005, 2008, 2013). See also
Hawthorne and Manley (2012) for an equally promising alternative.
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to me to be difficult. This will require fine-tuning the data in order
to make them more clear cut, and sometimes taking two different
perspectives on the same piece of data. My aim is to show that no
matter what construction we consider (be it a construction involving
a definite description or a construction involving a complex demon-
strative), and no matter what perspective we adopt with respect to
that construction, it is always possible to show that definite descrip-
tions and complex demonstratives behave similarly when embedded
in that type of construction. I other words, my argumentation strat-
egy is always comparative: no matter where the data seem to lead us,
they would lead us in the same direction for both complex demon-
stratives and definite descriptions. The significance of this purported
similarity between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions
will become apparent shortly.
6.2.1 The argument from scope
Arguments against quantificational theories of complex demonstra-
tives are sometimes based on purported differences between their
scopal interactions (with other operators) and the standard scopal
interactions of quantificational phrases. The scope of a functional ex-
pression or operator (e.g. quantifier, negation etc.) is a theoretical
notion that is meant to explicate why we have distinct judgements
about the truth-conditions of a class of structurally ambiguous sen-
tences. It is hypothesised that the structural ambiguity is a reflex of
the scope-property of the functional expressions in question, or of
the different relative positions (scopes) those functional expressions
can take relative to each other. Here is an illustration of the scope
possibilities of a linguistic construction, and their effect on the truth-
conditional content of that linguistic construction. For instance, the
sentence
3. All men are not cowards. (∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
may express the proposition that each man has the property of
being non-coward (surface scope reading), or, alternatively, it may
convey the proposition that not all men are cowards (inverse scope
reading).3
3 As far as the notational conventions are concerned, I represent the surface scope
reading by (∀ > ¬) and the inverse scope reading by (¬ > ∀), on the right hand
side of the natural language sentence (as above). If one such reading is judged to
be sounding odd, degraded, or completely unacceptable, I shall prefix it with ?, ??,
and * respectively. Throughout the chapter, I shall describe the scopal feature of a
sentence in several equivalent ways. I shall say, for instance, that such a sentence
has two readings or interpretations, or that it is structurally ambiguous, or that it
manifests scopal flexibility. In case that sentence lacks these attributes, I shall say
that it has one reading, is unambiguous, or is scopally rigid.
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From a logical perspective, it is plausible to think that the scope-
property of a natural language sentence is a syntactic feature that
sometimes has, and some other times doesn’t have, semantic—truth-
conditional—consequences. This assumption seems natural in lin-
guistics too, where the logical form (LF) is standardly taken to be a
level that encodes the scope ambiguities. Example (3) clearly shows
that the different interpretations of the scope-property have an effect
on the truth conditions of the construction. In the case of (3), the two
readings become available as a result of the fact that the universal op-
erator (∀) can have two positions (or scopes) relative to the negation
operator (¬).
But at some other times, the semantic effects of scope are not visible,
as we shall see shortly.
The argument from scope is simply the following: since complex
demonstratives have scopal properties that are different from the
scopal properties of other standard quantifier phrases, the complex
demonstratives cannot be quantifiers. In other words, the argument
from scope is an inference from scopal differences to differences in
syntactic/semantic category. This argument poses problems for quan-
tificational accounts of complex demonstratives, and indirectly sup-
ports referentialist accounts. Non-referentialists are hard pressed to
tackle the argument from scope. It is the purpose of the first part
of this chapter to take the side of the non-referentialist, and thus ar-
gue against the pertinence of the argument from scope. But first it is
worth making clear what the initial background motivation for the
argument from scope was.
A familiar way of dividing up the varieties of noun phrases (or
determiner phrases) is to distinguish between quantificational and
non-quantificational phrases. Interestingly, the non-quantificational
phrases are seen as (directly) referential. According to the so called
Dilemma Hypothesis a term is either referential or quantificational (but
not both). A referential term is syntactically simple. It refers directly
to an entity, which is its (Kaplanian) content, and this content doesn’t
vary with possible worlds. In other words, the referential terms are
object-dependent. In contrast, a quantificational term is syntactically
complex, since it has the form [determiner + restrictor]. A quantifica-
tional phrase does not refer directly but via the descriptive material
in its restrictor, and thus its content varies with possible worlds.4
So, assuming this dichotomy, the argument from scope has it that if
complex demonstratives are not (scopally) like definite descriptions,
and definite descriptions are quantificational, it follows that complex
demonstratives are not quantificational, and thus they should be di-
rectly referential. In the current chapter, I set up the theoretical op-
tions differently. I shall assume and defend a version of the Dilemma
4 See Dever (2001) and Neale (1993) for the presentation and further motivation of
the dichotomy. I follow here Dever’s presentation.
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Hypothesis. It is a version since I shall formulate it as a dilemma
between (direct) referentialist accounts and non-referentialist (rather
than quantificational) accounts. I give up on the original version of
the dilemma since, as we shall see, the category of quantifiers, and
the corresponding notion of scope, are not heuristically very useful
(see the interim conclusion). It seems to me that the division between
referential and non-referential (uses of) expressions is more promis-
ing, although not completely clear cut itself. In any case, even if two
version of the dilemma were on equal footing, the second one serves
our dialectical needs better, since it is consistent with the conclusions
drawn in the second part of the chapter.
Much of the force of the argument from scope depends on the lin-
guistic evidence that it invokes. In this section, I shall focus on the
linguistic evidence for, and counter-evidence to, the argument from
scope.
The argument from scope, as presented in Dever (2001, pp. 278ff.),
purports to establish that we need to distinguish complex demonstra-
tives (CDs) from quantificational phrases (QPs) on the basis of their
scopal features.5 This argument is presented in terms of the Russel-
lian view of definite descriptions, and, for the sake of the argument,
I shall assume this view in this part of the chapter. (However, our
conclusions won’t depend on this assumption.6) On the Russelian
view, the definite descriptions are taken to be QPs, along the lines of
standard quantifier phrases, e.g. ‘every man’, ‘three women’, ‘some
kids’ etc.. One of the important features of QPs is that they typically
engage in scope interactions. Dever claims (on behalf of the referen-
tialist) that definite descriptions engage in scope interactions, whilst
complex demonstratives don’t. Thus, to exemplify, the famous sen-
tence
4. The King of France is not bald.
a) [ιx : King of France x]¬ bald x surface scope
b) ¬[ιx : King of France x] bald x inverse scope
is assumed to admit two readings, one in which the negation ap-
plies only to the predicate bald (surface scope), and the other in which
the negation is moved so as to take scope over the whole clause (in-
verse scope). Some may find the inverse scope reading implausible,
5 Dever presents the argument from scope and offers his own solutions to the per-
ceived problems ensuing from this argument, problems pertaining to the peculiar
scopal properties of complex demonstratives. In this chapter I shall suggest an alter-
native approach to these problems.
6 The proponents of the arguments from scope follow Neale (1990) in making the as-
sumption that definite descriptions are quantificational and therefore scopally flex-
ible. Those who are neutral regarding the nature of definite descriptions, can take
the evidence invoked by the argument from scope at face value, as pure linguistic
evidence to the effect that definite descriptions behave truth-conditionally differently
from complex demonstratives.
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precisely because the negation presumed to take wide scope seems to
be metalinguistic rather than sentential. (As I shall observe later on,
this reading is in fact available for complex demonstratives as well.)
The existence of the wide scope structure at LF for sentences such as
the above has been already contested (see e.g. Glanzberg 2008). In
this section, I will add a further argument from Parallelism and Scope
Economy to show that complex demonstratives, definite descriptions
and certain quantifiers pattern alike. They pattern alike, inter alia,
by blocking wide scope for negation. Then a similar argument will
be offered for the scopes of intensional operators relative to those of
complex demonstratives, definite descriptions and standard quanti-
fier phrases. My primary aim is to show that the scope-property of
complex demonstratives is the same as that of definite descriptions,
thereby undercutting the argument from scope.
The plan for the first part of the chapter is to argue against the ar-
gument from scope by considering the scope of negation in §6.2.3 and
the scope of intensional operators in §6.2.4. I shall put together my
sceptical conclusions about the referentialist uses of scope in §6.2.5.
Then, in §6.3, I put forward a positive argument in favour of a non-
referentialist condition on the semantics of complex demonstratives,
based on binding-theoretic considerations.
6.2.2 Scope Economy and Parallelism
It might be thought that certain sentences are ambiguous as to their
scope-properties (i.e., the scopes exhibited by the operators internal
to these sentences) even if the different scopes do not determine dif-
ferent truth-conditions.7 This is of course a coherent possibility. How-
ever, if the Scope Economy principle is correct, this possibility is not
exploited by the grammar of natural language. Briefly put, thanks to
economy in the grammar, there are no scopal interactions that yield
truth-conditionally redundant outputs. In order to spell out this idea,
consider the following constructions (adapted from Fox 2000, p. 30),
and the scopal contrasts that they exhibit.
5. a) A boy admires every teacher. Mary does, too.
(∃ > ∀), *(∀ > ∃)
b) A boy admires every teacher. A girl does, too.
(∃ > ∀), (∀ > ∃)
The question raised by these linguistic data is why the first (itali-
cised) sentence in the construction (5a) is scopally ambiguous, whilst
7 For instance, Dever (2001, p. 279) suggests that “we are free to hold that [certain sen-
tences] involve a quantified complex demonstrative [that] merely [give] rise to two
readings which are truth-conditionally equivalent.” A similar position is suggested
by Braun (2008b, 250ff.) for modal contexts. As we shall see, this is precisely what
Scope Economy does not allow us to say.
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the first (italicised) sentence in the construction (5b) is not scopally
ambiguous. The only difference between the two resides in the sen-
tences with which they are combined. I shall call these (second) sen-
tences in each of the two examples ellipsis sentences, since they are
obtained by eliding (deleting) part of their verbal phrase.
Let me first make clear what the relevant difference is. Embedded
in (5a), A boy admires every teacher may be interpreted as saying that
there is a unique boy who admires every teacher, or, alternatively, that
there may be multiple boys that admire different teachers, and, taken
together, admire every teacher. But, surprisingly, when we interpret
this sentence in the context of (5a), where the sentence is followed by
an additional (elided) sentence, namely Mary does, too, the ambiguity
vanishes. That is, a boy in the first sentence refers to a unique boy
who admires every teacher, and not to some boy or other. Hence, the
first sentence no longer exhibits an ambiguity, as it does in isolation.
In contrast, the first sentence in (5b) is not disambiguated when em-
bedded. What is the cause of these contrasts in the scope patterns of
basically the same linguistic constructions? Otherwise put, why does
the very same sentence behave differently in the different embedding
environments?
The strategy I shall be pursuing is essentially the one put forward
by Fox (2000). Fox argues that scopal constructions that do not yield
truth-conditional payoffs are disallowed at LF. The principle under-
lying this particular property of scopal constructions is called Scope
Economy (SE). We can state the principle, informally, as follows. (In
chapter 3, I reformulated the idea of scopal economy in terms of the
Admissible Scope principle.)
scope economy Truth-conditionally inert LF scopal structures are
not grammatical.
The argument for (SE) makes use of an additional plausible princi-
ple, Parallelism, which, to a first approximation, requires that a truth-
conditionally similar structure is realised in the antecedent and the
elided sentence. Here is the argument. First, the ellipsis sentence
(the second sentence in each example) is sanctioned by (SE). Second,
by Parallelism (PAR), the second sentence imposes a parallel scopal
configuration on the antecedent sentence (the first sentence in each
pair). I shall call the mechanism formed from the two principles
PARSE. Due to PARSE, we get the judgements represented in paren-
theses, whereby only the scopal configuration of the first sentence
that corresponds to the scopally informative configuration of the sec-
ond sentence is allowed.
PARSE is presumed to be responsible for the puzzle exhibited by
the sentences in (5). The key piece of data is that the ellipsis sentence
in (5a), viz. Mary does [admire every teacher], too, is scopally rigid (or
unambiguous), since, intuitively, there is only one way to go about
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interpreting it. Scope Economy prevents syntactic or formal opera-
tions from applying if these operations do not produce a different
interpretation. Since no syntactic operations apply, there will be no
inverse scope for the ellipsis sentence in (5a), and the unique syntactic
configuration of the ellipsis sentence will be propagated in the first
sentence of (5a) via Parallelism. Hence, A boy admires every teacher will
have only one interpretation in the context provided for it in (5a), al-
though, taken in isolation, it has two readings. This explains why the
reading *(∀ > ∃) is not permissible for the first sentence. In contrast,
no rigid scopes occur in (5b). The ellipsis sentence A girl does [admire
every teacher], too is ambiguous, and, by Scope Economy, receives two
syntactic scopal structures. Analogous structures will be imposed via
Parallelism on the first sentence, A boy admires every teacher, which
will be ambiguous as well. We thus obtain the reading two readings
for the first sentence, including the reading that was missing in the
previous case (∀ > ∃).
Note that Scope Economy has a limited application: it does not
sanction scopal interactions between any operators whatsoever. There
are logically-possible scopal interactions which are not available to
natural language. Whilst it is true that some truth-conditional content
does matter for the purposes of licensing logical forms (and thus the
scope possibilities of the operators), we can find cases in which other
truth-conditional effects that are ‘in principle’ possible do not seem
to matter in the least at the interface between syntax and semantics.8
As we shall see, this insensitivity of Scope Economy to certain truth-
conditional contents will not interfere with our argument.
Assuming that the claims regarding PARSE are on the right track,
I shall argue that complex demonstratives and definite descriptions
pattern in the same way because our two principles cannot discrimi-
nate between the scope possibilities afforded by constructions contain-
ing complex demonstratives and definite descriptions. Additionally, I
shall highlight the scopal similarities of complex demonstratives and
definite descriptions, and other scope-taking operators. It will also be-
come apparent that my argument regarding the scope of intensional
8 Presumably, further syntactic constraints (such as island constraints and clause-
boundedness of quantifier raising) block such possibilities. One example is that
sentential negation of the form it is not the case that or it is not true that does not sco-
pally interact with quantifier phrases. Another example is that definite descriptions
do not interact with negation. Thus, even if in principle the scopal interaction is
possible (indeed Russell and his followers thought that not only it is possible, but
that negation does interact scopally with definite descriptions), such a possibility
does not seem to be realised by the grammar. As we shall see, Scope Economy is
part of the reason that such an interaction is not grammatically licensed. But the
cause for the lack of interaction may run deeper than Scope Economy. One possible
explanation—an explanation that we do not endorse—may be that definite descrip-
tions are simply not quantifiers, so they cannot move to take scope. In such a case,
Scope Economy will merely register the effect of this (merely hypothetical) syntactic
constraint on movement. Another cause may be general constraints on movement.
(This seems to be the case for the lack of scope flexibility of it is not the case that.)
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operators (in section §6.2.4) actually holds independently of the two
principles, and thus that the two principles further corroborate my
conclusion.
In what follows, I apply the PARSE method to cases involving
negation (not) and intensional operators (possibility, belief etc.). This
method detects scope. The method is essentially the one underlying
our previous examples (see e.g. (5)). We take one sentence whose
scopal ambiguity we want to test (target sentence) and combine it
with an additional sentence which is unproblematically ambiguous
(test sentence). Then we study the effect of the target sentence on the
(ambiguous) test sentence. The ambiguous test sentence reflects the
properties of the target sentence. There are two possible outcomes. (i)
If the effect on the test sentence is that the test sentence is restricted
to a single scope configuration, this means that the target sentence is
not ambiguous, and admits only one scope configuration; in particu-
lar it will exhibit the corresponding scopal structure.9 (ii) But if the
effect on the test sentence is that the test sentence continues to exhibit
ambiguity, then the target sentence is ambiguous as well.
I shall sometimes refer to the two, antecedent and ellipsis, sen-
tences as a composite. The composite will thus always take the form
antecedent sentence + ellipsis sentence. This will be the form that most
of our subsequent examples will take. A composite has a symmetri-
cal structure in each of its two parts. It is in virtue of this fact that we
shall be able to test scopal properties.10
9 But what exactly does the notion of corresponding structure amount to? Let me first
illustrate. The scopal configuration of the test sentence (here, the first sentence) in
Every teacher admires a pupil. Mary does too is, by PARSE, the configuration where the
existential (a pupil) takes scope over the universal (every teacher). This corresponds
to the scopal reading of to the second (target) sentence (Mary does too). The unique
scopal reading of this (target) sentence entails that there is a unique pupil, and
the first sentence’s only scopal configuration that produces the same entailment is
the one where the existential takes scope over the universal. (Only in this scopal
configuration does the first sentence entail that there is a unique pupil.) Thus, a
fixed scopal structure A of a sentence s corresponds to a fixed scopal structure B
of a sentence t if A preserves the same entailment that B does. If one of the two
sentences, say t, is unambiguous, and thus, by Scope Economy, has only one fixed
scopal structure, then, by Parallelism, the composite s + t will disambiguate s to
whatever scopal structure preserves the same entailment as t. As illustrated above,
the scopal structure of s—as disambiguated through the PARSE mechanism—may
not correspond to the surface scope of t. This means, in general, that the patterns
of entailment rather than the syntactic scopal structure constrain the reading of the
target sentence under Parallelism.
10 One may ask why is it necessary to use ellipsis at all. Ellipsis is a safety condi-
tion that ensures that Parallelism works properly, i.e. that it projects ‘parallel’ or
structurally similar scopal configurations (see the remarks about the notion of corre-
spondent scopal structure and Fox 2000, pp. 29ff. for discussion). Parallelism seems
to be a more general linguistic principle, and may share important features of visual
cognition (see Kuno 1987, pp. 7ff.).
200
6.2 scope and economy
6.2.3 The relative scope of negation
A relevant test involves composites consisting of sentences that are
uncontroversially structurally ambiguous. If these ambiguous sen-
tences cannot disambiguate the sentences containing definite descrip-
tions and complex demonstratives, we get further evidence that the
latter are not in fact scopally ambiguous. Accordingly, one good way
to test scope is to consider two composites with antecedent sentences
consisting of descriptions and demonstratives respectively, as illus-
trated in (6).11
6. a) The King of France is not bald. And a duke of England is
not either. (the > ¬), *(¬ > the)
b) That King of France is not bald. And a duke of England is
not either. (that > ¬), *(¬ > that)
The result is that inverse scope readings are blocked in both cases.
So descriptions and demonstratives are similar in their impact on the
clearly ambiguous sentence that occupies the second position in the
composite.12 Hence, since not even the otherwise ambiguous sen-
tences (containing quantifiers and negation) can trigger inverse scope
readings of complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, we are
entitled to claim, by PARSE, that complex demonstratives as well as
definite descriptions cause scope rigidity, and therefore are scopally
rigid. One might object that the PARSE configurations are not the
right environment for scope to show up. Although I agree with the
spirit of this observation, and we surely need to consider other types
of environments to test the scope of demonstratives, note that, as far
as the PARSE test is concerned, complex demonstratives and definite
descriptions fall into one class, whilst standard quantifiers fall into
another. PARSE does not show any contrast between the two types
of definites (complex demonstratives and definite description), but it
does show one between quantifiers and definites.
There is a further class of non-intensional examples that straightfor-
wardly points to the same similarity in scopal flexibility between com-
plex demonstratives, definite descriptions, and proper names. That
is, take a standard ambiguous test sentence (e.g. A student likes every
professor) and combine it with target sentences containing complex
demonstratives (e.g. That teaching assistant likes every professor), elid-
ing appropriately one of the sentences. It is a simple exercise to show
11 Since Parallelism is symmetrical, swapping the sentences in the composite (and
eliding one of them appropriately) will create the same effect. That is, there will
be no inverse scope reading in this case. Both sentences in the composites take a
uniform, narrow-scope negation.
12 We could consider a third composite containing proper names in each of the cases in
order to emphasise the similarity in scope possibilities between descriptions, demon-
stratives and proper names (e.g. Three men in black are not bald. And John is not either).
It’s easy to see that proper names have the same scopal possibilities as descriptions
and demonstratives. We return to the significance of this remark later on.
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that complex demonstratives pattern with definite descriptions (and
proper names, as shown in fn. 12). So, the non-negative contexts
(contexts without negation) prove the same point.
To sum up, it is plausible to think that the source of scopal rigidity
has to do with definite descriptions and complex demonstratives. It
can be easily seen that existential quantifiers do not freeze the scope
associated with the ambiguous test sentences as CDs and DDs do.
A common referentialist retort to the observation that some tokens
of complex demonstratives and definite descriptions behave similarly
is that complex demonstratives, sometimes, go proxy for definite de-
scriptions, or, alternatively, are charitably interpreted as definite de-
scriptions on the circumstances of utterance. Thus, the referentialist
has reason to treat such cases as special cases, and set them aside.
This claim looks dubious because it presupposes the existence of a
mechanism that re-interprets one semantic structure as an entirely dif-
ferent one. In contrast, on our account, this identification of complex
demonstratives and definite descriptions will not seem ad hoc since
I shall claim that complex demonstratives are like definite descrip-
tions in important syntactic and semantic respects.13 This, along with
the non-ambiguity account of complex demonstratives that I shall en-
dorse later on, gives a more general and less ad hoc account of the
syntax and semantics of complex demonstratives than the referential-
ist one.
6.2.4 The relative scope of intensional operators
In this section, I examine the scopal interactions between intensional
operators and complex demonstratives.
Dever (2001) points out that there are cases in which scopal in-
teractions cannot be distinguished and that their indistinguishability
is due to their truth-conditional equivalence under each of the two
scope readings. (Cases in point are those where a definite descrip-
tion or complex demonstrative combines with a universal quantifier.)
However, the distinction between surface and inverse scopes becomes
visible when we use intensional operators. If there are no ambiguities,
then, the argument goes, complex demonstratives are not quantifiers.
And indeed, Dever does not find scope ambiguities in any of the fol-
lowing intensional sentences, borrowed from Dever (ibid., p. 271).
7. That man in the corner could have stayed home tonight.
13 This is not to claim that complex demonstratives are exactly like definite description.
Admittedly, the demonstratives have a clear demonstrative character, which definite
descriptions lack. For instance, on can use that by pointing to an object in uttering
that is big, but the same cannot be said about the definite the in *the is big. However,
note that a similar difference can be replicated with expressions that are often taken
as quantifying determiners, for instance all and a: all are big vs. *a is big. Thus, some
differences in distribution should not detract us from saying that two expressions
have basically the same syntactic features.
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8. That governor of California used to be a Democrat.
9. Albert believes that that upright citizen is a spy.
Dever’s assessment of the above sentences seems plausible: scope
ambiguities are doubtful here if we interpret the sentences out of the
blue. However, in light of the coming discussion, I claim that there
is another plausible explanation of the scopal pattern exhibited by
the examples above. Moreover, if we correctly control the linguis-
tic constructions and their contexts of utterance, the apparent scopal
differences between the two types of definites simply vanish. It is
worth reminding the reader that the argument is comparative, and
purports to show that whatever reading one might get with complex
demonstratives, that reading is claimed to be available for definite
descriptions as well (and vice versa). So the force of the argument re-
sides in showing that the judgements, even if sometimes hazy, are the
same for sentences with demonstratives and descriptions. In this way,
we can compensate for the uncertainty associated with each example
taken individually.
Kripke (1980) and others have argued that there is a contrast be-
tween definite descriptions and proper names in that proper names
designate rigidly, whilst definite descriptions are (most of the time)
non-rigid designators. In possible world semantics this amounts to
saying that only definite descriptions, but not also proper names, are
capable of having various, possible world dependent contents (viz.
referents that vary with the possible world of evaluation). However,
this doesn’t mean that definite descriptions always have semantic val-
ues that are sensitive to possible worlds. This fact points to a similar-
ity between definite descriptions and complex demonstratives. Sub-
stituting definite descriptions for the complex demonstratives deter-
mines equally non-ambiguous constructions:
10. The man in the corner could have stayed home tonight.
11. The governor of California used to be a Democrat.
12. Albert believes that the upright citizen wearing a tie is a spy.
(Note that I assume with the proponents of the argument from
scope—and for the sake of this argument—that the different modal
profiles of the operators in question are in part due to their scopal
properties.) Consider the first sentence with the definite description
the man in the corner taking surface scope over the modal operator.
As with the corresponding case involving complex demonstratives, I
find it equally difficult to get an inverse scope reading. Under such a
reading, the man in the corner should vary with the possible worlds
that we are considering, and thus should find himself, roughly speak-
ing, in a situation in which he is both in the corner and at home at
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the same time (see below for discussion). However, the unavailability
of the wide scope modal in this case may be due to our privileg-
ing a referential reading of definite descriptions.14 Suppose that the
wide scope modal reading were available, but non-salient, after all.
Even if this were so, and one did get the wide scope reading of the
modal could, I see no reason why it shouldn’t be available for complex
demonstratives as well. Consider the sentence above, repeated here
for convenience
13. That man in the corner could have stayed home tonight.
a) [that x : man in the corner x]^(stayed home tonight x)
b) ??^[that x : man in the corner x](stayed home tonight x)
The second interpretation reads as follows: for every possible world
w, whoever is the unique distal person satisfying the description in-
side the complex demonstrative (i.e. satisfying man in the corner) is
also a person who stayed at home at a particular time t (i.e. at night
time) at w. In a context in which the sentence is uttered about a
man who is, say, in the corner of a pub, and further assuming that
the pub is not his home, the inverse scope interpretation will be false
at all possible worlds w and so necessarily false. (For now, nothing
hinges on the ‘necessarily false’ judgement, since we can characterise
it simply as very implausible or unlikely.) This is because, in that
particular context, two contradictory predicates—being in the corner of
the pub at t and being home at t—are predicated of each possible indi-
vidual satisfying the complex demonstrative. Thus, the inverse scope
reading is roughly this: It might have been the case that whoever sits
in the corner of the pub is at the same time at home. Once again,
14 Rothschild (2007a) proposes a distinction between role-type and particularised uses
of definite descriptions, whereby only the former pragmatically presupposes the ex-
istence of a unique satisfier at the world of evaluation. In other words, only the
role-type definite descriptions should be used when it is common ground that there
is a unique individual that can satisfy the description. The particularised definite
descriptions need accommodation in order to get an interpretation on which there
is a unique satisfier at the world of evaluation. A typical example of a role-type def-
inite description is the president of U.S.; a typical example of a particularised definite
description is the man in the corner. Rothschild argues that only role-type uses of
descriptions can produce (a reading equivalent to) the narrow scope reading under
modal operators, basically because they already guarantee the existence of a unique
relevant individual at each possible world (rather than no such individual, or more
than one). In contrast, particularised uses of definite descriptions do not guarantee
that such the unique relevant individual exists at each world, and thus they will
be typically interpreted as taking scope outside the modal (unless some contextual
information can be produced in order to revert this default interpretation).
We study here mainly particularised uses of definite descriptions. The extent to
which particularised definite descriptions can receive narrow scope readings de-
pends on the particular context in which they are evaluated. How easy (or difficult)
it is to get the narrow scope readings under modals will hinge on our capacity of
imagining such contexts when particularised definite descriptions are evaluated out
of the blue.
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this reading does not seem to be available, and neither does the cor-
responding reading for the sentence containing a define description
instead of a complex demonstrative.15 But if you do find the nec-
essarily false reading available, this will be counter-evidence to my
argument (viz. the argument against the argument from scope) only
if definite descriptions do not allow for this reading.
A similar remark can be made about (12): Albert believes that the
upright citizen wearing a tie is a spy). Many will find, contrary to the
assumptions of the argument from scope, that this construction am-
biguous between the two scopal readings, since the narrow scope
reading of the description is very difficult to get (see fn. 14 for a po-
tential explanation). I find that this construction does allow for the
narrow scope reading for the definite description, but I also find the
corresponding narrow scopal reading for the complex demonstrative
possible. A context that makes these readings more salient is one in
which it is assumed that in the relevant possible worlds there always
exists a unique individual who wears a tie. Then, the narrow scope
reading for the two definites goes easily through. In the absence of
such a context, both definites tend to receive a wide scope reading,
outside the intensional operators.
We can examine the scopal possibilities more systematically by
making use of the method based on our two principles, Scope Econ-
omy and Parallelism. To examine the scopal interactions with modals,
consider the following sentences (inspired by Dever’s examples) in
the usual composite configuration, first sentence + ellipsis sentence. As
we have seen, Scope Economy and Parallelism can detect all the sco-
pal possibilities of ambiguous composites in non-intensional contexts.
Do they do the same in intensional ones? To answer this question, we
consider composites consisting of standard quantifiers paired with a
modal. The minimal context of utterance for the following construc-
tions is one in which we are talking about men in some pub and we
ask whether it’s possible for them to be at home.
14. a) Every man in the corner could have stayed home. And all
men in the middle could have too. (∀ > ^), ??(^ > ∀)
b) Every man in the corner could have stayed home. And all
the men in black could have too. (∀ > ^), ??(^ > ∀)
It is very hard to hear the narrow scope interpretations for the
modals. The narrow scope interpretation for the modal in (14a) would
involve a contradiction (under plausible pragmatic assumptions), but
it’s very difficult to hear such a contradiction. The same is true for def-
inite descriptions and complex demonstratives (as well as for proper
15 For instance, Hawthorne and Manley (2012, p. 211) find that the similar construction
That guy who is actually president might not have existed does not exhibit an obviously
false narrow scope reading for the demonstrative. This seems to be the case with
our (13b).
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names, omitted here.) In effect, the definite descriptions and complex
demonstratives in the ellipses sentences in (15a) and (15b) respec-
tively, cannot take narrow scope, and, consequently, cannot trigger
wide scope readings for the modals.
15. a) Every man in the corner could have stayed home. And the
man in the middle could have too. (the > ^), ??(^ > that)
b) Every man in the corner could have stayed home. And that
man in black could have too. (that > ^), ??(^ > that)
There are two important points to note about these cases. (i) Both
the antecedent and the elided constructions resist the wide scope
reading of the modal ‘could,’ and thus we get the ??(^ > . . .) judge-
ments. In order to work out what the wide scope reading might have
been, consider the ‘in principle’ possible contrast between (14a) and
(14b) cases, where the descriptive contents of the quantifiers ‘some’
and ‘every’ are men in the middle and man in black respectively. The
contrast is that the former could in principle involve a contradiction,
whilst the latter could not. The former would say that some men
in the middle of the pub are home at the same time, whilst the lat-
ter would say that every man is both a man who wears black and
stays at home, which is surely non-contradictory under the minimal
contextual information assumed here. But in fact this ‘in principle’
contrast is not exhibited by the interpretation of the above sentences.
This comes to saying that the readings in which the modals have wide
scope are impossible in all the sentences above. Consequently, (ii) our
test using the two principles, Scope Economy and Parallelism, fails to
show any interesting outcome. (As in the case of Fox’s data, we need
a scopally ambiguous antecedent sentence in order to test the effect
of Scope Economy on the ellipsis sentence by Parallelism.)
A plausible reason why Dever’s modal example does not manifest
scope flexibility is that the modal is in the perfect form which intro-
duces something akin to a presupposition of counter-factuality. E.g.
you could have done it implies that you didn’t do it. Similarly, in saying
that the man could have stayed home, one suggests that the man did not
actually stay home, and this, in turn, has an effect similar to pulling
the quantifiers, the definite descriptions, or the complex demonstra-
tives out of their place in the scope of the modal. The presupposition
of counter-factuality interferes with our judgements of scope. We can
remove the effect of the alleged presupposition by rephrasing our ex-
amples using simpler modal forms (can, could) or other intensional
operators (as the ones suggested by Dever and cited above in (8)-(9)).
I shall call such modals soft intensional operators.
The following constructions are similar to the ones above, except
for their using soft intensional operators.16
16 I use ^ to represent all the intensional operators indiscriminately.
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16. a) The man in the corner can/could/might stay home.
(the > ^), ?(^ > the)
b) That man in the corner could stay home.
(that > ^), ?(^ > that)
c) Every man in the corner might stay home.
(∀ > ^), ?(^ > ∀)
These constructions seem to me to make available both scopal read-
ings. We could interpret them as saying something either about the
modal profiles of actual men in the corner, or about the men that
happen to satisfy the condition in various possible situations. The
second interpretation is still marginal, but I find it possible neverthe-
less. (Some may doubt that it is available.) However, there is yet
another way to modify these examples in order to make wide scope
modals salient. Indeed, when using the suitable predicate, the wide
scope reading of the modal becomes manifest.
17. a) I thought that that man in the corner was not in the corner.
(the > ^), (^ > the)
b) I thought that every man in the corner was not in the corner.
(∀ > ^), (^ > ∀)
c) That man in the corner could not be in the corner.
(that > ^), (^ > that)
d) It is possible that some men in the corner are not in the
corner.
(∃ > ^), (^ > ∃)
It is fairly easy to hear a contradiction when reading the above sen-
tences. For instance, upon hearing (17c), one may disapprovingly re-
ply “No, that man in the corner cannot fail to be in the corner, because
he just is a man in the corner.” That is, the complex demonstratives
(as well as the descriptions and the standard quantifiers) can take nar-
row scope under a modal. Under the interpretation exploited by the
above disapproving answer, all the above sentences imply that there
are possible worlds in which a man satisfies contradictory predicates.
Of course, this is not to say that this reading is salient in the sense
that it is the interpretation on which the parties in a conversation will
zero in. The other possible reading is much more salient, presumably
because it is favoured by something like Grice’s Maxim of Quality,
viz. don’t say what you believe to be false; see Grice (1967/1989).
The key idea is that if this reading is indeed available, we find, once
again, that definite descriptions and complex demonstratives behave
in the same way with respect to their scopal possibilities.
Taking inspiration from the yacht example of Russell (1905), we
find further constructions that have the same contradictory flavour
specific to the wide scope modals above. We expect that they too
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will show that complex demonstratives and definite descriptions (and
other quantification phrases) behave on a par.
18. a) I believed that the man in the corner was taller than he
(actually) was. (the > ^), (^ > the)
b) I believed that that man in the corner was taller than he
(actually) was. (that > ^), (^ > that)
c) I thought that every man in the corner was taller than he
(actually) was. (∀ > ^), (^ > ∀)
These examples will receive different analyses according to the the-
ory of comparatives one endorses.17 Under our basically Russellian
analysis of the comparative constructions, the structural ambiguity is
a matter of scope. (This assumption is not uncontentious, but what
matters in the end for our argument is the structural ambiguity, and
the way it can discriminate between definite descriptions and demon-
stratives.) The two readings are brought out as follows. The ‘taller
than’ relation expressed by the verb phrase in the subordinate clause
yields the two alternative results—the contradiction and the more nat-
ural reading—because we can vary independently the degree of tall-
ness of the two arguments of the relation. And the independent vari-
ation with possible worlds is obtained by the choice of scope of the
intentional operator, namely by choosing narrow scope intensional
operators. When intentional operators have narrow scope under the
other operators (e.g. the, that, every), the degrees of tallness of the ar-
guments of the tall-relation may differ, and saying that the referent of
one argument is taller than the referent of the other argument makes
sense. In contrast, when the intensional operator takes wide scope,
the degrees of tallness will not vary independently and, in fact, they
will be the same in every possible world. In such a case, it is con-
tradictory to say that a degree of tallness is (strictly) greater than an
equal degree of tallness. As the contradiction becomes apparent, we
access the narrow scope reading of the modal. Therefore, it is plau-
sible that the complex demonstratives are not scopally rigid as some
authors have suggested.
One may not be convinced by examples involving contradictions
precisely because they exploit a (perverse?) tendency to look for
contradictions. It may be claimed that such tendencies create only
illusions of scope. (I made much of this sort of tendency in the third
17 Some theorists have presented strong evidence against a Russellian analysis of com-
parative constructions in terms of scope. Heim (2000, p. 51)—drawing on von Ste-
chow (1984)—points out that the sensible (non-contradictory) reading of compara-
tives in yacht-type sentences cannot be a matter scope, since this reading will need to
cross island boundaries when the comparative construction is embedded in the an-
tecedent of a conditional, and, even worse, it will misrepresent the truth-conditions
of such conditional statements. Thus, von Stechow (ibid., 12ff.) argues that Russel-
lian accounts make wrong predictions about a conditional statement such as If Mary
smoked less (than she did), she would be healthier (than she is).
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chapter’s ‘controversy-based’ account of scope, and I argued that it of-
fers an interesting and plausible perspective on the scopal properties
of a number of linguistic constructions.) In any event, there are fur-
ther examples which do not exploit potential contradictions. Aided
by the background information, we can construct further examples
manifesting similar scopal flexibility across a wide domain of expres-
sions. The context for the utterances below is as follows. A waitress
tells her colleague about the men at the “cheaters’ table,” i.e., that
table in a restaurant which is conveniently hidden or isolated from
outside views so as to allow cheaters secretly to meet their lovers.
The waitress thus tells her friend the following.18
19. a) The men at the cheaters’ table could be despicable.
(the > ^), (^ > the)
b) Those men at the cheaters’ table could be despicable.
(those > ^), (^ > those)
c) All men at the cheaters’ table could be despicable.
(∀ > ^), (^ > ∀)
d) A man at the cheaters’ table can hide under the table.
(∃1 > ^), (^ > ∃1)
e) That man at the cheaters’ table can hide under the table.
(that > ^), (^ > that)
I find that these examples allow for both scopal readings. The wait-
ress may mean that some particular (actual world) men/man at the
cheaters’ table could be despicable. But she may equally mean that
men at the cheaters’ table, quite generally, can be despicable. Other-
wise put, she may equally mean that men that sit at the cheaters’ table
at some possible world, different from the actual one, are despicable.
(There is a contrast between the availability of narrow scope demon-
stratives, as the plural ones seem to take narrow scope more easily.
This does not affect our argument, as long as the contrast holds for
definite descriptions as well, which seems to me to be the case.)
Since we have a stock of sentences which are ambiguous, we expect
that the mechanism created by the interaction of Scope Economy and
Parallelism should classify them as ambiguous as well (in the parallel,
symmetrical fashion specific to this mechanism). Arguably, this is
precisely what happens. I leave this as an exercise for the reader. If
my discussion so far is correct, the PARSE method will just confirm
the above judgements of ambiguity.
It is important to consider how the present argument fares with
other takes on the scope of complex demonstratives in the literature.
18 Alternatively, we can prefix “possibly” to the above sentences and drop “could”.
It may help to take the modals to be epistemic. In this interpretation, the waitress
says that as far as she knows, it is possible that those men at the cheater’s table are
despicable. The same readings may be obtained with other intensional operators,
such as “I thought.”
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Jeffrey King (a quantificational non-referentialist) and David Braun (a
referentialist) have a series of exchanges19 that touch on the scope of
complex demonstratives relative to intensional operators. The bone
of contention is the availability of narrow scope readings of complex
demonstratives. Complex demonstratives should exhibit such read-
ings on a quantificational view. Braun points out that the examples
provided by King are all controversial. But none of the constructions
previously analysed here is mentioned in that context. I think that the
previous examples—especially (18) and (19)—can serve to answer the
referentialist challenge; they show that narrow scope complex demon-
stratives are indeed available. This is precisely what we would expect
if complex demonstratives were quantificational, or, more generally,
non-referential.
Braun (2008b, 247ff.) also mentions certain negative contexts that
seem to pose problems for a quantificational account, namely sen-
tences like That man in black does not exist. The objection is essentially
a restatement of the argument from scope: the same sentence with
a definite article substituted for the demonstrative—e.g. The man in
black identical with b does not exist20—exhibits scope ambiguity, but,
the argument goes, the demonstrative one is unambiguous. Braun as-
sumes as unproblematic that definite descriptions give rise to scopal
ambiguities. As indicated, I do not have the same judgements about
the interactions between definite descriptions and negation. More
importantly, I have just argued from scope economy considerations
that in fact such demonstratives and descriptions are identical in their
scope-taking behaviour.
Braun acknowledges that his arguments rely heavily on pragma-
tics. This is significant, since it is then easy to show that the argu-
ments from scope do not offer any advantage to the referentialist. I
contend that, sticking with the examples of the type suggested by
Braun, both complex demonstratives and definite descriptions will
again come out as scopally alike. Suppose John says, in speaking
about Homer, “That man wrote the Iliad and the Odyssey” and Mary
retorts “That man does NOT exist” or, a bit more naturally, she utters
“That man did NOT write the Iliad and the Odyssey.” I can easily
hear the wide scope reading—or a truth-conditionally similar met-
alinguistic reading—of the negation. Mary does not mean to deny
that some author or other wrote the Iliad and the Odyssey, but only
that there is a unique (and in some sense) distal person who authored
19 See especially King (2008), Braun (2008b) and references therein.
20 The reason why the definite description the man in black identical with b includes the
‘identical with b’ condition is that, on a non-referential view, this sort of condition
is what separates a referential use of a definite from a non-referential use. Then, the
version of the argument from scope discussed here attempts to show that the type
of definite description that non-referentialists claim is equivalent to a referential use
of a complex demonstrative has, in fact, different scopal properties than the complex
demonstrative itself.
210
6.2 scope and economy
the works usually attributed to Homer. Plausibly, these are cases of
metalinguistic negation (see Horn 2001). Of course, metalinguistic
negation may not have anything to do with scope. However, recall
that this particular argument is given under the assumption that the
pragmatic aspect does show something about the scope-properties of
linguistic constructions. My point is that assuming that scope is in
part a pragmatic phenomenon gives us stronger reasons to put defi-
nite descriptions and complex demonstratives into the same category.
If so, this doesn’t help the referentialist in isolating complex demon-
stratives from definite descriptions. The pragmatic mechanism affect-
ing the scope of definite descriptions is bound to affect the scope of
complex demonstratives as well.
The main moral of this section is that the interpretations of complex
demonstratives and definite descriptions show a common pattern.
The economy-based data are generally indicative of the common pat-
tern. I also made an independent case that complex demonstratives
and definite descriptions have the same behaviour in intensional con-
texts. The PARSE mechanism is not crucial in this case, and, in effect,
was not posited to account for the putative scope of modals, which
may be affected by other principles than those that affect DPs.21 Nev-
ertheless, PARSE further corroborates our point about the scopal sim-
ilarities between definite descriptions and complex demonstratives.
6.2.5 Interim conclusions about scope
Some theorists may object to the assumption that the data invoked
previously are a matter of scope. It is true that I talked in terms of
scope, but what really matters for my purpose are the predictions
in terms of judgements about truth-conditions. Firstly, in making
remarks about the scopal similarities between proper names, definite
descriptions and complex demonstratives (see e.g. fn. 12), I do not
mean to say that the rigidity of proper names is a matter of their
scope taking property.22
Secondly, some of the patterns of the data I presented, and espe-
cially those involving negation, may pertain to their focal possibilities,
rather than to their scopal possibilities. If this is the case, the econ-
omy principle will be sensitive to the truth-conditions associated with
the focal possibilities or alternatives of a given linguistic construction.
(See fn. 23.) Thirdly, when it comes to the interaction between defi-
21 The original domain of the economy-principle—in Fox (2000)—is the scopal interac-
tion between DPs. See Mayr and Spector (2010) for a more general application of a
similar principle of scope economy to modals, and chapter 1 for discussion.
22 It may well be the case that the account of rigidity in terms of scope is correct,
but I neither make or need, this stronger assumption here. My observations are
compatible with a semantic mechanism that manipulates the world of evaluation of
the relevant expressions, in the sense that it lets the denotation of that expression to
vary across possible worlds or just fixes the denotation at the actual world.
211
6.2 scope and economy
nites and intensional operators, we can in principle get distinctions in
truth-conditions via scope or, alternatively, via directly manipulating
the possible world denotation of the expressions in question. This
is prima facie compatible with the PARSE mechanism. We are free
to stipulate that PARSE detects truth-conditional distinctions that are
not due to scope but to some other device. Finally, it is important to
note that I basically followed the referentialists’ train of thought, and
drew consequences from their assumptions. Even if it turns out that
what I took to be scope is not a coherent and unitary phenomenon
after all, this will equally undermine the argument from scope. Al-
though this would not be an ideal theoretical situation, it will do for
my purposes.
I have argued that complex demonstratives and definite descrip-
tions are similar in their scope taking properties. One important, but
perhaps not decisive, idea is that the current argument is enhanced
by the hypothesis that definite descriptions are quantifiers. The hy-
pothesis that definite descriptions are quantifiers is one of the most
prominent in the literature, and might support the claim that com-
plex demonstratives are quantifiers too. This will work if one makes
an important assumption, one that also underlies the argument from
scope, namely that scope is a reliable enough diagnostic for the syn-
tactic and semantic categories of DPs. However, we need not rely on
this kind of argument from the scopal similarity between complex
demonstratives and definite descriptions to their semantic category.
This is not because of doubts regarding the quantificational character
of definite descriptions, but rather because we have reasons not to
rely on scope as a quick guide to syntactic and semantic category in
the first place.23
Scopal possibilities do not discriminate between referential and
non-referential expressions. Thus, the data I presented show that
scope, in negative and non-negative contexts, is a much more lim-
ited phenomenon than is usually acknowledged. This seems to be a
data-point for the referentialist about complex demonstratives. But
our discussion also shows that, in intensional contexts, scope is a
more maximal property than the participants in the debate over the
scope of definites have admitted. Indeed, in intensional contexts com-
plex demonstratives pattern with definite descriptions, but not with
proper names. This seems encouraging for the quantificationalist and,
more generally, for the non-referentialist. We are in the position to
draw two safe conclusions.
23 For a similar position about scope, but one that is primarily intended to cast doubt
on the quantificational accounts of (at least some tokens of) definite descriptions, see
Glanzberg (2007). The direction of my argument is exactly the opposite: I would like
to cast doubt on the success of referentialist accounts of complex demonstratives. See
also the argument in Rothschild (2007a) against the view that scope considerations
are strong enough to show proper names are semantically distinct from definite
descriptions.
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20. First, if our discussion is on the right track, it very much weak-
ens the argument from scope, which claims that definite descrip-
tions display scopal properties not shared by complex demon-
stratives and thus cannot be quantifier phrases. Hence, Scope
Economy provides a reason why the argument from scope is
inconclusive. It is due to the semantically ‘fruitful’ interaction
of determiner phrases that scope is allowed (and, possibly, fur-
ther syntactic constraints24) rather than to their syntactic and se-
mantic category (be it quantificational or non-quantificational),
strictly speaking. By semantically ‘fruitful’ interactions I mean,
in line with the economy-theoretic reasoning, interactions be-
tween quantifiers that can provide novel truth-conditional con-
tents. According to Scope Economy, quantificational phrases
like every student, definite determiner phrases like the student
and that student, and proper names like John have the same sco-
pal (in)flexibility when combined with, say, a universal quanti-
fier.
21. Secondly, on closer inspection, when the context is carefully set
up, complex demonstratives always match the scopal proper-
ties of definite descriptions. Therefore, even if complex demon-
stratives are not quantificational, it is still plausible that they
are non-referential, i.e., not directly referential. The interactions
with intensional operators surveyed here seem to indicate that
the content of complex demonstratives and definite descriptions
is not invariant under evaluation at various possible worlds.
There is another general argument that corroborates the same con-
clusions. One can make a syntactic argument in favour of the view
that complex demonstratives and definite descriptions are similar,
and thus that complex demonstratives are non-referential.25 A promis-
ing argument for the claim that complex demonstratives and definite
24 Scope Economy does not fully explain why certain scope constructions are not pos-
sible: additional syntactic constraints are needed to explain this. What the two
principles show is that we cannot detect scope for some unknown reason (including
reasons pertaining to economy), even if in principle scopal flexibility might exist.
PARSE tells us that this doesn’t happen for some reason (see fn. 8). On the other
hand, it should be kept in mind that the predictions of Scope Economy are robust
(Fox 2000). In other words, until we find what causes the Scope Economy not to
detect the ‘in principle’ possible, truth-conditional novel, scope configuration, it is
reasonable to suppose that Scope Economy does, in fact, apply at the interface syn-
tax/semantics and that it thus detects the lack of scope flexibility. So until we find
a deeper explanation for the scope of complex demonstratives, the hypothesis that
the two principles do constrain the interface syntax/semantics provides us with a
reliable tool for detecting scopal properties. As I show at the end of the chapter,
the controversy-based account of scope (see chapter 2) can recover the predictions of
Scope Economy, but it remains to be seen if it can deal with the problem just alluded
to in a less stipulative manner.
25 King (2001) made a similar type of argument relying on antecedent contained dele-
tion and weak crossover data, but that argument is very problematic, as shown by
Altshuler (2007).
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descriptions have the same syntax is one that depends on the fea-
ture composition of articles and demonstratives in English-type lan-
guages, rather than on their scopal properties, as the argument from
scope would have it. Indeed, it was argued that a principle of feature-
economy governs the transformation of demonstratives (originally
specifiers of DPs) into articles (heads of DPs).26 This is an argument
that definite descriptions and complex demonstratives (and perhaps
the standard quantifier phrases) have the same syntactic category. If
we corroborate this syntactic conclusion with the discussion of scope
in this section, we have reasons to think that complex demonstratives
and definite descriptions are more than just similar. This seems en-
couraging for the non-referentialist. However, I won’t insist on this
type of argument here, for the following reason. Some referential the-
orists are ready to grant that the syntax of both types of definites is
the same, and even that the two have the syntax of quantificational
phrases, but she still thinks that some complex demonstratives are
semantically referential (see fn. 39). Now, I’m not at all enthusiastic
about this argumentative move (which indeed seems to me to be ad
hoc), but nor do I have a strong argument against it. A strong ar-
gument would be one that shows that the syntax of complex demon-
stratives implies a non-referentialist semantics of complex demonstra-
tives. Since I don’t know a completely convincing argument of the
latter type, I don’t think that the referentialist will be swayed by the
syntactic argument. Therefore, even if this syntactic considerations
are important, their dialectical force is, in the present context, quite
limited.
6.3 binding and economy
In the coming discussion, I shall provide an argument that, I claim,
will tip the scale more decisively in favour of non-referentialism about
complex demonstratives. So far, I have argued that the scopes of
complex demonstratives and certain alleged quantificational phrases,
such as definite descriptions, look very much alike, and that this sug-
gests that the argument from scope that complex demonstratives are
not quantificational (but rather referential) fails. I have not yet es-
tablished that complex demonstratives are non-referential, although I
rendered the hypothesis more palatable by casting doubt on the argu-
ment from scope. In this section, I argue from binding considerations
that complex demonstratives are in effect best seen as non-referential
phrases. The key point is that the syntactic and semantic constitution
of a complex demonstrative should allow it to take different values in
different situations (or possible worlds). This is possible only if the
26 See van Gelderen (2007) for the feature-economy based argument. See also Abney
(1987, 177ff) for a view that takes the and that to be determiners.
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descriptive material expressed by a complex demonstrative is seman-
tically (i.e., truth-conditionally) relevant.
I shall be using a principle of economy governing binding patterns
(Binding Economy). One of the key theoretical roles of such a princi-
ple is to preserve the insights of binding theory in the face of appar-
ent counter-evidence. Hence, in using this principle, I shall thereby
assume that the traditional binding theoretic considerations are both
empirically and conceptually fruitful generalisations that a semantic
account should preserve and accommodate.
6.3.1 Binding conditions, coreference, and economy
Binding theory regulates the referential dependencies between pro-
noun, reflexives and the so called ‘full’ noun phrases (e.g. definites,
proper names). In particular, it consists of three principles/conditions
(A, B, and C) that deal, in turn, with reflexives, pronouns and full
noun phrases. Of particular interest for the coming discussion are
principles B and C. I shall introduce these principles later on (but see
also chapter 3 for more context on binding theory).
It has been argued that in order to vindicate the principles of bind-
ing theory we need a distinction between binding and coreference,
and some principle of economy to handle the binding and coreferen-
tial structures (see fn. 28 for references on this argument). If we use
these tools, we can account for some apparent violations of binding
principles. I take coreference, as well as the more fundamental notion
of reference, as a broader notion which encompasses not only expres-
sions standardly assumed to be referential, e.g. proper names, but
also expressions with non-individual denotations (i.e., values which
are not entities, semantic objects of type 〈e〉). These expressions will
be considered referential in the broader sense, and thus the notion of
coreference applies to them as well. (So this assumption is consistent
with our non-referentialist allegiance.)
If coreference is, in a sense, a broad notion, it is, in a theory-internal
sense, a restrictive one. Coreference is a restrictive notion in the fol-
lowing sense. Two expressions can be coreferential, in the strict sense
assumed here, only if neither of these expressions is referentially de-
pendent on the other. That is, we are in a (‘coreference’) situation
in which two expressions e1 and e2 refer independently to the same
thing, rather than in a situation in which e2 inherits its referential
properties from e1, or vice-versa. Intuitively, binding involves link-
ing two expressions that thereby come to have the same denotation,
whilst coreference means that two expressions have the same denota-
tion without being linked. Two expressions are coreferential only if
they are not bound. In other terms, the two expressions are corefer-
ent just in case they are not coindexed at the syntactic level (the level
of logical form, LF) and thus their semantic values are not synchro-
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nised via the mechanism consisting of the λ-abstraction rule plus the
assignment function at the semantic level.27
The aim of the following argument is to show that in order to gener-
alise the principles governing binding, we need to make the assump-
tion that the meanings of complex demonstratives are non-referential.
For this purpose, I shall extend the discussion of the so called obvia-
tions of binding theory—which in turn are motivated by the principle
of economy and some pragmatic reasoning—to complex demonstra-
tives, following suggestions by Heim (1998). As Heim suggests, it
is clear upon examination of the relevant cases that the principle of
economy applies also to full noun phrases, not just to pronouns, as
initially proposed by Reinhart.28 Building on this idea, we get a gen-
eral argument that economy-principles involve non-referential com-
plex demonstratives.29
Binding Economy—or what Reinhart and Heim call the Coreference
Rule—is a principle that depends on the notion of (in)distinguishable
interpretation. Its main effect is to introduce more flexibility in the
binding rules, that is, to allow for obviations of binding theory. To a
first approximation, obviations are benign exceptions to the general
principles of binding. Here is the intuitive statement of the principle:
binding economy Accept obviations of binding principles only if
such obviations are not semantically vacuous, i.e. produce some
distinct interpretations from a given sentence.
The economy principle will become clearer once we consider its
concrete applications. For now, we know that the principle preempts
indistinguishable interpretations, but allows distinct (or distinguish-
able) interpretations. In order to see what sort of interpretation is
referenced by Binding Economy, we have to see what these interpre-
tations are made of. Heim (ibid., 213ff.) argues that in order to make
27 See e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998, 269ff.) for the semantic details pertaining to the
distinction between binding and coreference.
28 Several versions of Binding Economy approach give an account of pronouns and/or
proper names similar to the one I propose for complex demonstratives (Bu¨ring 2005;
Elbourne 2005; Heim 1998; Reinhart 2006; Schlenker 2005). My extension of the
economy-considerations to complex demonstratives is very natural (cf. Heim 1998,
222 ff.) and even required if the economy principle is to give a general account
of binding phenomena under further plausible syntactic and semantic constraints.
Moreover, the ensuing account of complex demonstratives as non-referential is in
line with arguments to the effect that complex demonstratives share important fea-
tures with definite descriptions. See also the arguments in Elbourne (2008) who is
partly motivated, as I am, by economy phenomena.
29 Note that Heim’s analysis targets principle B of binding theory, and she explicitly
refrains for extending it to principle C. I show that principle C also lends itself to
an economy-based treatment, which involves treating complex demonstratives as
semantically (if not also syntactically) complex. It is likely that principle C should
be revised. Since in chapter 4 I proposed a different, ‘denotational economy’ frame-
work for binding anyway, I won’t worry too much about the problems that principle
C faces. The discussion that follows should be taken as the first step towards inte-
grating the principle C phenomena in the denotational economy account.
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the economy principle descriptively adequate we need inter alia to
define interpretations in terms of individual concepts, rather than in
terms of directly referential expressions. An individual concept (or
guise) is a function from worlds to individuals satisfying conditions
which may, but need not, be given contextually.
A standard example will clarify the main notions. Consider then,
Chris and Lora, who are looking at a candidate for some office, and
inquire into the identity of that candidate. All they know about the
identity of the candidate, at this point, is that the candidate is speak-
ing on a soapbox. This is also the definite description they would
use to pick out the candidate, since it is perceptually salient that that
person is speaking on the soapbox. In this context, Chris says speak-
ing about the candidate in question: She [the speaker on the soapbox]
must be Zelda, since she’s praising her to the sky. In doing so, the utterer
uses a context-sensitive guise: the pronoun she, used on an occasion
in which an individual speaking on a soapbox is salient, takes as
semantic value a guise, or, in more Fregean terms, a mode of pre-
sentation of that salient individual. On Heim’s account, the pronoun
she in the given context, denotes a guise, which is a function from
worlds to unique female individuals on a soapbox at each world, that
is, roughly, the unique female individual that at the world in question
satisfies the condition of speaking on a soapbox. It should be stressed
that the guise is not the female individual, but the function that yields
this individual.
But what guise would a complex demonstrative denote in sen-
tences such as That man is funny? Extending the previous definition of
guises, we can say that the guise which is the semantic value of this
complex demonstrative is the function from worlds to unique men
that are distal (or far off in some straightforward or figurative sense),
and may satisfy some further contextually given condition. The guise
in the minimal form presented in the present example is not supplied
by the context, but, naturally, further contextual descriptive material
can be added to the condition unique distal man. For instance, the
guise may be something akin to the meaning of the definite descrip-
tion the unique distal man speaking on BBC4, and the referent of the
complex demonstrative is the individual who satisfies that descrip-
tion, if there is such a salient individual in the context of utterance.30
So the descriptive material that the guise consists of is not limited to
30 Indeed, guises are nothing else than Fregean Senses (see Frege 1997). According
to Frege, the Sense is the way in which an object (content) is given. Heck (2002)
argues that we need Sense in order to account for the possibility of communication
and understanding, even if, according to him, the direct referentialist is right that
demonstratives have singular contents. Our argument shows that Sense is indeed
required, in order to make sense of the apparent violations of the binding principles,
and in order to establish more precisely and correctly the domain of applicability
of the binding theory. This is done by positing economy principles. To be sure, an
important aspect of positing guises is to meet pragmatic constraints in a way which
is consistent with the generalisation of a theory of binding (see chapters 3 and 4).
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the descriptive material in the surface form of a complex demonstra-
tive, but some additional descriptive material can be contextually fur-
nished. If no specific context is provided, as is the case with the above
use of the complex demonstrative, competent speakers can neverthe-
less imagine a neutral context for it. Then, the demonstrative will
denote a more abstract guise, like the guise of that individual that I’m
demonstrating now irrespective of who that is.
Providing a full semantics in terms of guises is beyond the pur-
poses of this chapter, but two remarks related to such a semantics
are important. First, guises are independently needed in accounts
of belief attributions. One has to explain why, for instance, a = b
holds, but a person can believe that a is F, without believing that b
is F. Guises help explain this puzzling fact, which is usually called
Frege’s puzzle. That person believes the same proposition under dif-
ferent guises, and is acquainted with the proposition (or with the
corresponding fact) only under a guise. (The distinct propositional
guise is determined by the distinct individual guise contributed by
the expressions a and b.) We shall therefore account for the obvi-
ations of binding theory by extending the application of the notion
of guise usually invoked to solve Frege’s puzzle. Second, a further
constraint on guises is needed in order to handle the behaviour of
intuitively directly referential expressions. That is, we should be able
to pick out the referent at the actual world as the referent of such
an expression across possible worlds more generally. What we need
is a configuration similar to actualised definite descriptions. I shall
briefly return to this later (cf. fn. 41).
Adopting this view of guises commits us to a specific non-referential
view of complex demonstratives, a view according to which they are
semantic objects of type 〈s, e〉, functions from worlds to unique in-
dividuals. However, since I are neutral with respect to the specific
semantics of definites, it may well be that the desired effect can be
obtained by semantic values of other types, for instance, by a version
of the quantificational view of DPs. 31 In principle, any semantic
type that admits of a descriptive condition—indeed anything not di-
rectly referential—will support a similar, non-referential view. I shall
provisionally take the denotations of complex demonstratives to be
individual concepts. Guises offer us a good way of defining the no-
tion of indistinguishable interpretation that Binding Economy makes
use of. We still owe an explanation of how linguistic economy works
31 See Rothschild (2007b) and especially Hawthorne and Manley (2012) for analyses
and developments of the ‘restrictor’ analysis of definites. These accounts use the
semantic resources of quantifier domain restrictors (and presuppositional contents
restricting the value of these restrictors) in order to cover the specificity effects of
definites. As Hawthorne and Manely suggest, this restrictor analysis is compatible in
its essentials with other theories since the condition that can be built in the restrictor
can equally well be built in other parts of the semantics of definites.
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and why it allows for obviations of binding principles. This will make
more plausible the non-referential view.
6.3.2 Condition B cases
Condition (or principle) B of binding theory requires that pronouns
should not be bound locally, in their domain. Further complications
about how to define the local domain of binding aside, the core pre-
dictions of this principle are clear. Take, for instance, the proper
names and pronouns in the following sentences.
22. a) John likes him.
b) Sadie told her to wait for a week.
Uttered out of the blue, these sentences rule out interpretations to
the effect that him refers to John and that her refers to Sadie. This re-
striction is standardly conceived as being syntactic, because we don’t
need to know anything about the reference or denotation of expres-
sions in order to judge coreferential readings as inadequate. Intu-
itively, the condition applies prior to the semantic interpretation of
the noun phrases in question, although of course it constrains their se-
mantic interpretation. Since Condition B is robust and quite general,
we need an account of the interface between syntax and semantics
that is compatible with this condition.
In this section I develop an economy-based account of complex
demonstratives in the Condition B configurations taking my inspi-
ration from Heim (1998). The main binding economy examples in-
volving complex demonstratives are given below. (I represent the
covaluation of two expressions by italicising them. By covaluation
I understand sameness of reference, leaving it open if it is due to
binding or coreference.)
23. Obviations of Condition B32
a) (In response to someone looking for John.) That man put
on John’s coat, so that man must be him.
b) – Is that woman Zelda?
– That woman’s praising her to the sky. It must be Zelda.
c) If everyone hates a man, then that man (himself) hates him.
(ex. (19), ibid., p. 222)
d) Everyone here – Mary, Sue, that guy – has something in
common. Mary hates that guy, Sue hates that guy, and that
guy hates him too.
32 An example similar to (23a) was first discussed by Higginbotham 1985, p. 570 and
credited to Nancy Browman.
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These examples originally targeted pairs of pronouns, or pairs con-
sisting of a proper name and pronoun. I modified them in order to tar-
get pairs of complex demonstratives and pronouns. The result is that
we are still in a Condition B configuration (pronouns should be free
in their domain), but this time we have complex demonstratives ap-
pearing in such a configuration, as potential antecedents. One ought
to explain why although these pronouns are in a Condition B config-
urations, they still seem locally bound. This constitutes an apparent
violation of the Condition B.33 The key idea is that these are not vio-
lations of binding principles, since, in fact, they are not in a binding
configuration. They involve coreference, which looks like binding
but is nevertheless different. The difference is that whilst binding
amounts to coindexation (or a more minimal mechanism that does
the same job), coreference relies on coreferential but non-coindexed
lexical items. We are now in a position to draw the relevant conse-
quences for the syntax/semantics of complex demonstratives.
As I have suggested, Binding Economy appeals to the notion of
(in)distinguishable interpretation. There are two relevant notions of
(in)distinguishable interpretation, corresponding to the following two
types of cases: (i) cases that directly require guises (23a)–(23b), and
(ii) cases that require structured meanings (23c)–(23d).34 Let us start
with the type (i) cases.
Examples (23a)–(23b) involve different guises of, as it happens, the
same individual, and thus obviate Condition B by conveying new
truth-conditional contents, even if, at the level of reference or con-
tent, the propositions expressed could be the same. So, in (23b), the
33 The data we are considering are not best conceived as binding theory violations,
but rather obviations (see also Bu¨ring 2005). They are obviations because we get
covaluation of binding expressions where binding theory predicts that we should
not have covaluation. They are not pure violations because we may assume, as we
did, that there are two complementary types of covaluation, binding and corefer-
ence, and that the binding principles concern only the former. Thus, we may get
covaluation via the latter route, that is, via coreference. The existence of the corefer-
ence option makes clear why our pre-theoretical intuitions suggest violations of the
binding principles (although, once again, in fact the violations are only apparent):
we take covaluation to be determined via binding, when in fact the covaluation is
determined via coreference.
34 What we have called “structured meanings” are structures that are more fine
grained than truth-conditional contents. These can be seen as Russellian proposi-
tions. It may seem striking that Binding Economy needs to be formulated both in
terms of Fregean senses and Russellian propositions. One may think that advocates
of Russellian propositions could mine Binding Economy for evidence that grammar,
broadly speaking, is sensitive to such structured propositions and properties. (See
King (2013) for an argument that non-trivial syntactic structure transfers to struc-
tured meanings and J. Collins (2013) for an argument to the contrary.) However, this
would not be conclusive, since arguably the solution to the binding puzzles does not
depend on the presumed metaphysical nature of the structures involved. Thus, we
may well consider that the structured meanings are Fregean senses or modes of pre-
sentation. In chapter 4, I have assumed such a general notion of Fregean sense (com-
prising what I have called individual and complex guises), but for pragmatic rather
than metaphysical purposes.
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demonstrative that woman will take as semantic value the guise F(w),
whereas the pronoun her will be anaphoric on Zelda and thus will be
valued G(w), the memory entry for Zelda. For present purposes it is
immaterial whether the descriptive material is represented at LF by
filling a variable or whether the descriptive material is added at the in-
terface.35 What is important is that the semantics will treat complex
demonstratives as having more fine grained (intensional) semantic
values. Consequently, if the query in (23b) was made about a woman
speaking on a soapbox, the salient guise will be something like the
distal woman on the soapbox in wa. Supposing that indeed Zelda is the
person demonstrated, the content of the demonstrative at the actual
world (wa) will be Zelda. But the content is given via a guise. And
it is the guise that is relevant for the binding relation. Provided that
this guise will differ from the memory entry for Zelda, the seman-
tic values of the demonstrative and pronoun will be different, thus
meeting the refined condition B.
Similarly, in (23a) the binding obviation in the last sentence is prag-
matically licensed because of the two different guises that are deno-
tations of the complex demonstrative that man and the pronoun him.
The guise of the former is a perceptual guise, and that of the latter is
a description associated with John.
The analysis of the cases (i) is straightforward in broad outlines.
The example (23c) is a familiar case in the literature on anaphora. It
features a donkey anaphor, the demonstrative that man himself, which
will referentially depend on the indefinite a man. (The demonstrative
will be interpreted as that man that everybody hates.) The pronoun that
obviates Condition B is used in order to highlight that we are dealing
with a universal instantiation of a property (roughly, hating a partic-
ular man), rather than the ascription of another property (self-hating).
Even if the universal instantiated property and the self-ascription end
up having the same content, their communicative impact differs, due
to their having different structured meanings. And it is their struc-
tured meanings that Binding Economy is sensitive to. This is another
Principle B obviation that looks (but just looks) like a violation of that
principle. Even if the complex demonstrative that man and the pro-
noun him end up coreferring, their informational uptake is different,
and therefore permissible for reasons of linguistic economy.
We can see that not all these examples are based on comparing
potential logical forms involving different guises, but it is important
that some of them do. For instance, (23d) will be licensed by compar-
ing differently structured propositions (or properties), whilst (23b)
requires guises (see below). It is theoretically appealing to say that
35 The interface solution is faithful to the account of Reinhart (2006), but an alternative
in which Binding Economy governs the interplay between two syntactic mechanisms
was advanced by Heim (1998). I shall be neutral on the specific implementation of
Binding Economy. Either implementation has essentially the same non-referentialist
consequence for the semantics of complex demonstratives.
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guises are always involved in enforcing the binding theoretic require-
ments. Accordingly, we’ll have a binding theory uniformly formu-
lated in terms of guises. In the next section I shall argue that guises
are also required by Principle C cases (and in chapter 3 I make the
same claim about Principle A cases). Crucially, this argument com-
mits us to taking a stance on the semantics of complex demonstratives
as well.
The main motivation for positing that guises are semantic values
for binding expressions came from Condition B configurations, that is,
from configurations that involve pronouns that appear to be bound in
their local domain (but in fact aren’t). Therefore, these considerations
involve primarily pronouns. Note that we need to extend the conclu-
sions about the semantic value of pronouns to the other expressions
entering binding relations specific to Condition B. In particular, the
antecedents of the pronouns in the Condition B configuration need
to have semantic values that are comparable to the semantic values
of pronouns. By comparable semantic values I mean semantic values
which are evaluable as to their identity. In order to be compared the
binding expressions have to have denotations of the same semantic
type. When the semantic values are compared the following ques-
tion has to be answered. Does the pronoun have the same semantic
value as its antecedent? If it does, the binding condition is violated
or obviated. If it doesn’t, the binding condition is neither violated
nor obviated. Of course, whether we are in a case of obviation or
violation of the binding condition depends on what the context of
utterance looks like, and, in particular, on whether the purported ob-
viation serves any purpose in communication. The key idea is that
complex demonstratives can play the role of antecedents that bind
pronouns, and thus the semantic values of pronouns should be of the
same type as that of complex demonstratives. In light of these con-
siderations, complex demonstratives take guises as semantic values.
This argument for positing guises will carry over, mutatis mutandis, to
the Condition C cases.
6.3.3 Condition C cases
I turn next to cases where complex demonstratives do not play the
role of potential antecedents (or binders), but that of potential bindees.
It is worth reminding ourselves that the binding Condition C gov-
erns constructions such as (24).
24. a) He likes John.
b) She told Sadie to wait for a week.
In these constructions, there is a clear prohibition against identi-
cal reference. The pronouns and the proper name in each of these
sentences are interpreted by default as having distinct referents. As
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was the case with Condition B, Condition C seems quite general and
robust.
In light of these observation, the following examples need explain-
ing.36 I take complex demonstratives to be R-expressions or full noun
phrases (referential expressions, broadly speaking), thereby subject to
Condition C. As before, the binding expressions that have the same
denotation, and thus seem referentially dependent, are italicised.
25. Obviations of Condition C
a) (She must be talking about herself.) She’s praising that
woman too much.
b) He put on that man’s coat. So he must be him.
c) Only he thinks that guy is smart.
d) I know what Ann and that guy have in common: she
thinks that guy is terrific, and he thinks that guy is terrific
too.
The reasoning should be familiar from our previous discussion of
binding obviations. What is interesting about these cases is that they
seem to violate Condition C of binding theory. But almost the same
constructions (e.g. He thinks that guy is smart) are subject to Condition
C, so something special must occur in our (25) cases. The apparent
anomaly is that the complex demonstratives and pronominals in each
of the sentences seem to have the same referent, but, contrary to Con-
dition C, the sentences are acceptable. The solution to this puzzle is
to conceive of these constructions as involving obviations of a bind-
ing condition. As pointed out earlier, there are two—necessary and
mutually consistent—ways to go about binding obviations. These
two approaches to obviation directly correspond to the two cases of
Condintion B obviation above. Cases of type (i) need an account in
terms of guises (25a)–(25b), whilst cases of type (ii) are those that
require structured meanings (25c)–(25d).
As before, cases of type (i) are solved if we assume that binding
expressions refer to individuals under guises. Indeed, if we posit
that the denotations of the potential binding expressions (e.g. the
pronouns, complex demonstratives, and names) are guises, we can
explain the obviation of Condition C. On this view, Condition C op-
erates on guises, requiring the pronouns and the complex demon-
stratives in the domains of these pronouns to denote different guises.
Moreover, the appearance of a Condition C violation in the (25a)–
(25b) examples is due to the pronouns and complex demonstratives’
ending up referring to the same individual, under two different guises.
For instance, (25a) can be uttered naturally on an occasion where
the identity of a person is at issue. The audience of the context doesn’t
36 Examples of the kind given in (25c)–(25d) were first discussed in Evans (1980).
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know whether a particular person, referred to using the demonstra-
tive that woman, is Zelda or not. The utterer reasons that that person
must be who the audience thinks she might be. Suppose that on that
occasion the person in question (the referent of the demonstrative that
woman) is speaking on a soapbox. The guise which is the semantic
value of that woman will then be something akin to that woman speak-
ing on the soapbox, a guise that is distinct from the guise stored in
long-term memory for that person. (We assume that both the speaker
and the hearer know her, say, know that she is called Zelda, and may
have further information about her.)
A similar account can be given for (25b). However, we need a
special context to make sense of this binding obviation. Suppose the
speaker (Mary) is, in that context, only slightly acquainted with a
man and among the few things she knows about him is that he has
a nice coat. Seeing a person putting on that nice coat, Mary utters
(25b) and thereby wonders whether that person is the man she is
acquainted with. Even admitting that that man is identical to the
person putting on the coat, Mary’s binding expressions refer to him
by different routes or under different guises. Binding Condition B is
sensitive to guises, which are different for the two expressions, rather
than to the referent, which is the same for the two expressions.
In contrast, when different guises are not provided contextually, the
coreference readings express different structured propositions than
the binding interpretations. These are cases of type (ii). To illustrate
how structured meanings produce distinct interpretations consider
the following example. Suppose a person thinks that Ann is smart,
and that person is Ann herself. Now, this unique situation can be cor-
rectly described in two distinct ways. There is an obvious difference
between the proposition that Ann thinks of herself as being smart, and
Ann’s thinking of Ann as being smart. The propositions thought by
Ann are differently structured: one concerns Ann’s being smart, whilst
the other concerns the thinking agent’s being smart. But the propositions
have the same truth-conditions because Ann is the thinking agent.37
Likewise, our examples (25c)–(25d) give birth to two distinct read-
ings under the binding and coreference structures. The coreference
structures end up being preferred thanks to their conveying distinctly
structured propositions, as a consequence of Binding Economy. So
both examples can be clearly accounted for by appeal to distinctions
between expressions with the same content but different structured
meanings.
37 It might help to think of the distinction between the two structured meanings in
this context as the distinction between purely de re interpretations and de se (first-
personal) interpretations. Thus, Ann might think she has a property, without know-
ing that she herself has the property. However, note that the distinction between
structured meanings is independent of, and more general than, the first-personal vs
non-first personal distinction. For discussion of the interaction between structured
meanings, first-personal interpretation and binding, see chapters 2 and 3.
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Example (25c) needs a proper context in order to be considered al-
together felicitous. The context may be, for instance, this. A group of
individuals doubt that a particular one of them, say X, (referred to by
that guy) is smart, but there is an individual who nevertheless thinks
that X is smart, namely X himself. Now, (25c) obviates Condition
C because it conveys a message which is distinct from the message
that would be conveyed by binding, viz. the message obtained if that
guy would be replaced by the reflexive himself. That distinct mes-
sage relies on coreference between he and that guy, and consists of
the structured meaning to the effect that someone satisfies the prop-
erty of thinking that X is smart, which is different from the property
of thinking of oneself as being smart. It so happens that a unique indi-
vidual, X, realises both of these properties, but the properties have
different structures.
In the example (25d), the obviation happens due to the novelty of
the structured meaning of the clause he thinks that guy is terrific. This
clause conveys the message that the property of thinking that a person,
say X, is terrific is shared by several individuals. Once more, this prop-
erty is different from the property of thinking of oneself as being terrific,
although the situation described by predicating those properties of
X is, by assumption, the same situation. In other words, the prop-
erty is differently structured. According to our hypothesis, Binding
Economy sees such interpretive differences and licences obviations of
Condition C.
In summary, my discussion of the Binding Economy principle shows
that in order to make sense of the apparent violations of Condi-
tions B and C, we need to posit that complex demonstratives take
guises as semantic values, and thus that they refer indirectly via a
Fregean sense. If we are further assuming one of the two versions
of the Dilemma Hypothesis (see discussion above), the complexity
of the semantic values of complex demonstratives implies that they
are either quantificational, or, less restrictively (but more generally)
non-referential. Since my task is to choose between referential and
non-referential expressions, I take the above observations to support
the more general (and neutral) non-referentiality thesis. I have thus
provided further support for a non-referential account of complex
demonstratives.
It is worth stressing that the implications of Binding Economy are
more general, and have application beyond complex demonstratives.
In particular, the same non-referentialist conclusion holds for proper
names and definite descriptions too. Focusing on the latter, it is sug-
gestive that guises look like the denotations of implicit descriptions.
My claim is that definite descriptions can be felicitously substituted
for complex demonstratives in both Condition B and Condition C
configurations. It is easy to see that definite descriptions give rise
to the same obviations of binding theory as complex demonstratives
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do. Therefore, they too should take guises as semantic values on the
occasion of those utterances. This is not to deny that there may be rel-
evant differences between definite descriptions and complex demon-
stratives. Nevertheless, the behaviour of definite descriptions and
complex demonstratives seems to be identical in the binding patterns
presented here, and, as I suggested, these examples provide moti-
vation for an elegant generalisation to the effect that definites have
guises as semantic values. The conclusion that both types of defi-
nites have similar semantic values also fits nicely with the argument
presented in the first part of the chapter, which shows the scopal sim-
ilarity between definite descriptions and complex demonstratives.
6.3.4 Interim conclusions about binding
I have argued that the content of complex demonstratives varies with
possible worlds, since their intensional semantic values are poten-
tially non-constant functions from possible worlds to other types of
semantic values. Thus, the referentialist cannot maintain her direct
reference thesis. Binding Economy entails that the obviations of bind-
ing theory occur precisely when the direct reference of the binding
expressions (pronouns, complex demonstratives etc.) fails. This is be-
cause the descriptive material introduced by guises makes the truth-
conditional content of complex demonstratives and pronouns vary
with the world of evaluation.38 This is also corroborated by our dis-
cussion of the scope interactions between complex demonstratives
and intensional operators.
I do not deny that in certain contexts complex demonstratives can
indeed be used in a seemingly directly referential way to express sin-
gular contents. But, from my theoretical perspective, such uses are
only special cases of complex demonstratives whose contextual se-
mantic value is a function which is constant across possible worlds.
What I deny is that such referential uses have a significant impact
on the linguistic meaning of complex demonstratives, and, in partic-
ular, that they show that complex demonstratives denote individuals
or, equivalently, have semantic values of type 〈e〉. According to the
constraints imposed by the principles of economy, complex demon-
stratives need to have some other type of semantic value, for instance
individual concepts 〈s, e〉 (as on my provisional assumption), predi-
cates 〈e, t〉, or quantifier phrases 〈et, t〉 (or an intensional version of
predicates or quantifiers).
38 The denotational account of binding proposed in chapter 5 will have the same
consequence, since the notion of guise plays a crucial role there too.
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6.3.5 Referentialist ways out
The friends of referentialism might pursue three main strategies in
order to evade the conclusion drawn from binding economy phe-
nomena. Firstly, one might try to reformulate Binding Economy in
terms of purely (directly) referential notions, thus equating complex
demonstratives to terms, such as (type 〈e〉) individual constants or in-
dividual variables, rather than guises. Secondly, one might claim that
the direct referential uses of complex demonstratives are not those
that Binding Economy targets, but rather an independent category.
Thirdly, one might try to argue that Binding Economy is mistaken. I
shall address all these strategies in turn, providing some good, but
admittedly not definitive, objections against them.
First strategy
One strategy the referentialist may adopt is the following. Binding
Economy phenomena are a mixed bag. We seem to have examples
where guises are at the forefront. But we also seem to have examples
where other kinds of structured meanings are important, that is, the
examples where the economy principle is sensitive to the universal
instantiation of a property. The latter cases are neutral with respect
to the semantic values of the expressions involved in binding rela-
tions. The referential account is perfectly compatible with Binding
Economy as used in these latter cases. The question then becomes
whether we can reduce the former cases to the latter cases, that is,
whether we can make the economy principle sensitive exclusively to
structured meanings rather than to guise-valued complex demonstra-
tives. The solution would work along the following lines. When, in
the process of determining the referential dependency, we encounter
what looks like a binding theory violation (at the level of individual
referents!), we process up to a higher node in the tree, take the denota-
tion corresponding to that node, intensionalise (by sticking in a world
argument), and look for pragmatic cues that the resulting denotation
is useful for communicative purposes. If some pragmatic rationale is
found, a binding theory obviation is allowed precisely as in the cases
where structured meanings matter. If this can be done, then we’ll
get a simpler account in terms of structured meanings, rather than
in terms of structured meanings and individual concepts. More im-
portantly, according to this account complex demonstratives can be
conceived of as (directly) referential.
However, there are good reasons to think that the two cases are
essentially different, and cannot be accommodated by a principle of
economy that is sensitive to a single kind of semantic value, namely,
structured meanings. It is easy to see that the communicative points
of uttering sentences of type (i) and (ii) are clearly distinct. In one
case the identity of a person is at issue: the point is to make an infor-
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mative statement to the effect that two possibly distinct individuals
are in fact the same. And reference to possible individuals can only
be made through the lexical items that have individual contents. In
the other case the point is to convey universal instantiation of a prop-
erty (e.g. hating a man), which is different from attributing a reflexive
property (e.g. self-hating). In this case, the denotation of more com-
plex expressions is referenced by the economy principle.
As I argue in chapter 3, it is both theoretically and empirically ap-
pealing to see the two types of semantic value needed in stating the
principle of binding economy as special cases of Fregean guises. In
any event, however we choose to conceive of these semantic values,
the key point is that both types of semantic values are needed. In par-
ticular, individual guises are needed. Positing individual guises as se-
mantic values preserves a localist insight already present in binding
theory and central to linguistic theory more generally. Some linguis-
tic hypotheses are necessarily stated in terms of syntactic or seman-
tic properties of lexical items (broadly speaking, including functional
items), rather than only in terms of properties of more complex ex-
pressions or linguistic structures. This is not a matter of convenience,
but rather an essential property of certain linguistic phenomena. In-
deed, in binding theory, binding relations are grammatical or ungram-
matical partly in virtue of the intrinsic features of noun phrases. To
be sure, further structural requirements—e.g. c-command—may also
be partly restricting the binding possibilities, but the key idea of bind-
ing theory is that structural properties are not the only determining
factor. The binding properties of lexical items depend in part on their
intrinsic features. Thus, we can remain conservative with respect
to binding theory for cases of type (i), cases involving guises under
which the referents of binding expressions are given. On the other
hand, we have to put up with type (ii) cases, which involve structured
meanings (or complex guises), since these cases are not reducible to
local properties of lexical items. Therefore, contrary to the suggestion
made earlier, we still need Binding Economy to be sensitive to both
types of semantic value.
Second strategy
As mentioned above, the second escape route is to circumvent Bind-
ing Economy phenomena altogether. That is, the referentialist might
claim that the implications of Binding Economy are orthogonal to her
claims about complex demonstratives.
There are two possible claims about complex demonstratives that
may be pertinent for the referentialist position in this connection: (i)
a claim about the relation between character and content, and (ii) a
claim about the relation between syntax and semantics, which can be
spelled out in two ways, according to whether we see the object of
semantics as being (iia) meaning qua character or (iib) meaning qua
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content. (I understand content in the standard way, as a function
of character.) To elaborate, linguistic meaning—the object of study of
linguistic semantics—may refer to several kinds of lexical information.
I am interested here only in the type of semantic value encoded in the
linguistic meaning of complex demonstratives or, alternatively, in the
character of complex demonstratives.
The connection between syntax and linguistic meaning, (iia), is not
something that the referentialist position is concerned with. A refer-
entialist is concerned with content. I think that in the end how one
conceives the interface between syntax and semantics, (iia), does have
an effect on one’s view of content. I shall return to this point.
The referentialist is then interested in the claims (i) and (iib). The
claim (i) is that the structure of character (linguistic meaning) lacks a
certain sort of implication for the structure of content. The claim (iib)
is that syntactic structure lacks the same sort of implication for the
structure of content. The sort of implication that these structures lack
is, naturally (from a referentialist perspective), the implication that
the contents are non-singular. Character—whatever its structure—
may be just a way the singular content of a complex demonstrative
is given. The syntax of complex demonstratives may take different
forms (even the form of standard quantifier phrases), but, the referen-
tialist argument runs, the claim that contents are singular still holds
true all the while.39
I shall not dispute these referentialist claims directly. I agree with
the referentialist that various mismatches between the structure of
syntax and linguistic meaning, on the one hand, and the structure
of content, on the other, may well exist, and thus that content can
be singular and simple even if syntax and linguistic meaning, are,
in some sense, complex. Of course, if the singularity of content is
all there is at issue, the position defended here (non-referentialism)
and referentialism will turn out to be compatible after all. However,
there is a feature of our account that may escape notice. Returning
to the way we conceived the relation between the syntax of complex
demonstratives and their semantics (linguistic meaning), an impor-
tant feature was that the logical form of complex demonstratives is
interpreted as a guise rather than as an individual. And this means
that the alleged singular contents of complex demonstratives are not
direct (and thus rigidly determined) contents. In other words, our ap-
peal to guises as denotations of complex demonstratives, for the pur-
poses of vindicating binding theory, prevents direct contents. Hence,
what we think about the interface between syntax and semantics (iia)
has unavoidable repercussions on the type of contents that complex
demonstratives are assumed to have.
39 Such a position, to the effect that complex demonstratives have the same syntactic
form as quantificational phrases but the semantic structure of referential expressions,
is indeed endorsed by Braun (2008a, p. 65).
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The referentialist might try to argue for a strong claim to the ef-
fect that guises are irrelevant to the nature of the content of com-
plex demonstratives. But the strong claim cannot be true. The direct
referentiality thesis does not hold for nominal phrases, inasmuch as
the nominal phrases enter binding theory, and binding theory is for-
mulated over guises. In response, the referentialist might endorse
a weaker thesis, according to which complex demonstratives refer
rigidly, although not directly but rather via guises (akin to the way
descriptions like the sum of 5 and 7 refer). But even if this claim holds
for complex demonstratives in the Condition B and C configurations,
it cannot be generally true, in light of the intensional cases discussed
in §6.2.4. To accommodate the intensional examples, the referentialist
thesis may be advanced for a subclass of complex demonstratives, try-
ing to construe the implications of Binding Economy in such a way
as to allow for complex demonstratives whose denotations are indi-
viduals rather than guises, and which will thus refer directly (and
rigidly).
Accordingly, there is a more modest way of circumventing Bind-
ing Economy. I mentioned previously that provided that in some
cases we need our economy principle to be sensitive to guises, bind-
ing theory should be uniformly formulated in terms of guises (func-
tions from worlds to unique individuals), rather than individuals.
But, the referentialist might contend, we need not do that in order
to account for the previous phenomena. Instead, we may preserve
binding theory sensitive to the identity of individuals (i.e. semantic
values of type 〈e〉), and switch to other semantic values (in partic-
ular, to guises) when the context requires it. A type-shifting opera-
tion may be invoked in order to switch from one semantic value to
another. Thus, features of the context trigger the Binding Economy
mechanism, which, in turn, triggers a type-shifting operation. It is
only then, it might be claimed, that guises become available to the se-
mantics. Given that such type-shifting operations are independently
required (at least in some theories), this alternative seems prima facie
plausible. The referentialist could try to exploit this alternative view,
which is perfectly compatible with the data discussed here. It would
then seem to follow that the binding economy phenomena are simply
not cases of direct referential uses, and thus are not effective against
the referentialist.
I can see why someone would like to hold on to this position, but
I find it unsatisfactory, as it stands. The ambiguity account implied
by the referentialist view of complex demonstratives (irrespective of
whether it is implemented by type-shifting or other means) is, from a
linguistic perspective, more problematic than a uniform account. The
ambiguity view of complex demonstratives has several methodologi-
cal shortcomings.
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Firstly, the ambiguity postulated about complex demonstratives
doesn’t look like the normal lexical ambiguity (e.g. the ambiguity
of bank). Concerning demonstratives, consider the expression that,
which is ambiguous between a complementiser C, a relative pronoun,
and a determiner D. Focusing on the that-complementiser and the
that-determiner, note that only the latter takes number features in En-
glish, and person features cross-linguistically, e.g. in Romance. Com-
pare such an ambiguity to the presumed ambiguity of demonstratives.
Is there any linguistic (or cross-linguistic) motivation for postulating
a difference between e.g. bound and referential demonstratives, or,
more generally, between directly referential and non-directly referen-
tial demonstratives? I doubt that there is such a motivation pertaining
to syntax or linguistic meaning (cf. Elbourne 2005; King 2001).
Secondly, the syntax and semantics/pragmatics of complex demon-
stratives are more constrained than the pragmatic meaning qua con-
tent, which depends crucially on the communicative intentions. If the
ambiguity of complex demonstratives is pragmatic in nature, it may
very well be indeterminate whether complex demonstratives express
singular contents or relations (cf. Schiffer 2005).40
However, from the standpoint of the interface between syntax and
semantics/pragmatics, it is much clearer what sort of structure com-
plex demonstratives are required to have in order to abide by linguis-
tic economy. Hence the syntax and semantics of complex demonstra-
tives are safer criteria for non-arbitrarily classifying complex demon-
stratives. Firstly, our account is not threatened by indeterminacy:
there may be indeterminacy about which proposition is being prag-
matically expressed, but still the non-referential semantic value of the
complex demonstratives may be playing its role in obviating binding
theory. And this is its main explanatory task.
Secondly, the ensuing elegance of the syntax and semantics of com-
plex demonstratives (and related expressions), and the promise of
more unified view ofDPs are further motivations for a non-referential
account of complex demonstratives. We have no independent reason
to isolate complex demonstratives from other binding expressions
(e.g. definite descriptions) which behave, in all relevant binding re-
spects, in the same way.41 In fact, economy considerations aside, we
40 I find that there is no reliable source of evidence for or against the simple ver-
sus complex constituency of content. In principle, everything that would require
a richer content can be mirrored by features of the character (linguistic meaning).
So the whole argument for or against singularity of content seems to me to rely on
intuitions. That intuitions about referents are not reliable is easy to see. After all,
quantificational phrases like at most one woman and at least one woman or only one man
will intuitively pick out a unique individual, but we don’t want to conclude from
this that such expressions are referential.
41 The main reason why one would prefer an ambiguity account is that sometimes
complex demonstratives appear to be rigid and some other times they appear to be
non-rigid. On my view, the rigidity and non-rigidity of complex demonstratives is a
pragmatic feature built on a uniform semantic property of complex demonstratives.
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have reasons to believe that the meanings of complex demonstratives
are a particular sort of guises, namely individual concepts (Elbourne
2008), which further supports my claim that they are non-referential.
In addition, there are conceptual advantages to having only one sort
of semantic values for complex demonstratives instead of many, since
we can then formulate the semantics of binding in terms of a unique
type of semantic value. It is also a conceptual advantage to see the
similarities between complex demonstratives and other types of noun
phrases such as pronouns, definite descriptions and proper names.
There is an emerging consensus that the semantics of such expres-
sions is not best seen as directly referential.42 Being able to preserve
the similarities, we may at least remain open (if we don’t get closer)
to a unified semantic theory of noun phrases.
I think that the non-ambiguity account has methodological advan-
tages. However, I admit that some theorists may remain unconvinced
by the non-ambiguity desideratum. If one is swayed by intuitions
about the singular contents and rigidity of complex demonstratives
rather than by methodological considerations, one is free to endorse
an ambiguity account. In this case, my argument would amount to
showing that there is an important class of complex demonstratives
that is non-rigid, and its semantic value is a guise. Note that my
account of the relevant class of complex demonstratives remains non-
directly referential, and the similarities between definite descriptions
and complex demonstratives pointed out earlier are still in place. The
ambiguity account is what results after factoring in the empirical con-
sequences of the economy principles, and leaving out the method-
ological considerations of unity, generality, and simplicity. It is worth
stressing that though this account is indeed maintainable (because
coherent), once the argument from scope is proven to fall short, it
is devoid of any empirical motivation. Until further motivation is
provided, the referentialists would simply appear to be dogmatically
clinging to their intuition of direct reference.
(We may account for intuitions of rigidity, pragmatically, by letting the descriptive
material of the complex demonstrative contain a description roughly along the lines
of that individual identical to the individual demonstrated.) Hence, we do not need to
assume that there are two kinds of linguistic meaning of complex demonstratives,
one rigid, and another non-rigid. Relatedly, a non-ambiguity account is better in
terms of data coverage.
42 There are many recent analyses of noun phrases that lean towards non-referential
view. I have in mind accounts of pronouns (Elbourne 2005), definite descriptions (El-
bourne 2013; Fara 2001; Neale 1990; Rothschild 2007a, proper names (Elbourne 2013;
Fara 2013; Matushansky 2008), and, of course, demonstratives (Elbourne 2008; King
2001). See also the different general accounts that propose to unify these broadly
referential noun phrases in Elbourne (2013) and Hawthorne and Manley (2012). Al-
though these analyses are incompatible in various ways, they are all non-referential.
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Third strategy
Finally, there is a perhaps more radical strategy of indirectly de-
fending the referentialist by objecting to principles of linguistic econ-
omy. This radical strategy might prove encouraging for the referen-
tialist, insofar as it threatens the economy considerations adduced
here. Such positions are readily available. Indeed, Heim (2009) and
Roelofsen (2008) have expressed scepticism regarding Fox’s principle
of parallelism (Fox 2000), and Reinhart’s division of labour between
syntax and the interface (Reinhart 2006). However, there are several
reasons why this scepticism should not deter us from siding with the
non-referentialists. Firstly, even if some may find parallelism wanting
in binding configurations with ellipsis (pertaining to the strict and
sloppy readings), note that the kind of parallelism I relied on con-
cerned scope, rather than binding. And parallelism may very well
be a feature of scope even if it doesn’t deal adequately with binding.
It is true that Fox’s predictions using Parallelism and Scope Econ-
omy have some independent problems (see D. E. Johnson and Lappin
1999), but the problems are not insurmountable. More importantly, I
know of no direct comparative study of Fox’s account of scope and
other accounts of the same data. Thus, there are no actual promising
alternatives. Until such an account is made prima facie plausible, it
doesn’t seem misguided to rely on Scope Economy. Parallelism is
assumed in other areas of linguistic theorising (especially in theories
of ellipsis), and a more general constraint on cognition (see fn. 10).
Secondly, I agree that the division of labour between syntax and
semantics that is assumed by the standard economy accounts is prob-
lematic. I haven’t surveyed all the possible interface economy ac-
counts,43 but, in chapter 3, I also express scepticism about the princi-
ples of economy introduced here. Nevertheless there is no guarantee
that by giving up the interface economy principles, one will be enti-
tled to a referential view of complex demonstratives. For even if these
principles of economy are proven to be wrong in the long run, some
of the regularities that they uncover may still be problematic for the
referentialist. In fact, it is relatively easy to show that other accounts
of the same data have the same non-referentialist consequences (see
the ‘consistency claim’ in the conclusions).
6.4 summary and concluding remarks
My purpose has been to establish necessary constraints on a semantic
analysis of complex demonstratives, remaining neutral with respect
to the final form that the semantics of such expressions should take.
43 For instance, interface principles of economy, and the division of labour they secure
between syntax and the semantics/pragmatics, are one of the tenets of the Minimal-
ist Program, even in the more recent incarnations (see e.g. Reuland 2011).
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The key constraint has been the requirement, due to Binding Econ-
omy, that the linguistic meaning of complex demonstratives contain
a descriptive material, and that they at least sometimes have a pos-
sible world variant content. We can then claim, on methodological
grounds of simplicity and unity, that generaly complex demonstra-
tives denote guises. Another constraint on the semantics of complex
demonstratives is based on Scope Economy and Parallelism. I have
argued that the syntax and semantics of complex demonstratives and
definite descriptions should be similar in the sense that they both
interact with intensional operators, but they don’t interact with nega-
tion. Moreover, we saw that if Scope Economy is correct, even quan-
tifiers are sometimes preempted from taking scope. However, it’s
worth stressing that, with respect to scope, complex demonstratives
pattern sometimes with quantificational phrases and sometimes with
proper names. For these reasons, I have concluded that scope is an
unreliable mechanism for determining the syntactic and semantic cat-
egory of complex demonstratives.
Consistency claim
Before concluding, I need to tie up an important loose end. At the
beginning of the chapter, I claimed that Scope Economy is not essen-
tial to my argument and that basically the same assumptions on the
basis of which I was arguing were also guaranteed by the account I
defended in chapter 4—the denotational economy account.
Indeed, I contend that the denotational economy account inherits
from the standard binding economy account some of its conceptual
‘raw material’. One basic difference between the denotational and
standard accounts is that the former relies on semantic/pragmatic
principles, whilst the latter relies on syntactic/semantic principles.
This difference pertains to the type of interface that the two accounts
are serving. However, the difference uncovers a commonality, be-
cause on both accounts the grammar needs access to semantic infor-
mation; after all, both accounts interface with semantics. Since guises
are semantic values, what remains to be argued is that guises are
essential to the denotational economy account.
Given the discussion in chapter 4, it is obvious that guises are es-
sential to the denotational economy principle. Consider again the
standard Reinhart-Heim case where identity is in question. Say that
Mary, one of Zelda’s acquaintances, watches television and upon see-
ing someone that looks familiar utters the following: Is the speaker
Zelda? She must be Zelda; she praises her to the sky. The story is cer-
tainly familiar by now. The underlined expressions constitute an ap-
parent violation of the binding principle B, which requires pronouns
(e.g. her) to be free in such configurations. As I remarked, since the
sentence is entirely acceptable, we have to explain its acceptability in
a way compatible with the otherwise fruitful and quite general prin-
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ciple B. The denotational economy account, explains the acceptability
of the construction by letting she and her take as denotations different
guises. For example, if in the context of utterance Mary happens to
be gesturing at a person talking on the television, she takes as denota-
tion the perceptual guise akin to the guise expressed by the definite
the person speaking on the television, and her might inherit the guises
that Mary associates with Zelda (perhaps a trivial guise that returns
Zelda at every world). The denotational economy principle, Non-
Redundancy, is thus observed, since there will be no redundancy in
the sequence. On the denotational economy account—as on the stan-
dard economy accounts—the coreference of the two pronouns does
not conflict with the binding principle, because the binding principle
is formulated in terms of guises, rather than referents.
At the beginning of the chapter, in the sections dealing with scope,
I argued on the assumptions that the regularities uncovered by Fox
(2000) are correct. Fox uses the principle of Parallelism in order to
argue—from pairs of potentially scope-taking sentences, where one
of these sentences is elided—that the Scope Economy principle is a
plausible restriction on scope. But I also suggested that Scope Econ-
omy and Scope Admissibility are coextensive, in the sense that when-
ever a sentence has distinct scopal readings, its implicature set (i.e.,
the set consisting of the disambiguated scopal interpretations and
their scalar implicatures) is inconsistent. Since I can state Scope Econ-
omy in terms of Scope Admissibility, and there are independent rea-
sons to think that Parallelism is plausible, I can run basically the
same arguments that Fox did, and show that complex demonstra-
tives and definite descriptions behave similarly with respect to scope.
In particular, the argument shows that complex demonstratives and
definite descriptions have the same effect on the scopal interpretation
of elided sentences, a fact which encourages the conclusion that they
both abide by Scope Economy (or, in our terms, Scope Admissibility)
in the same way.
Therefore, even if I replace the standard principles of economy as-
sumed in this chapter by the principles of economy for which I have
argued previously (in chapters 2 and 4), the relevant non-referential
conclusions remain in place. We have reason to believe that complex
demonstratives have denotations that are more fine grained than in-
dividuals.
Going back to the main train of thought, I conclude that the thrust
of the argument has been that we need a more flexible semantics for
complex demonstratives, rather than a rigid, directly-referential one.
My desiderata for a semantics for complex demonstratives are com-
patible with theories that treat complex demonstratives as quantifiers,
individual concepts, or some sort of predicate. The present discussion
is also compatible with a certain referentialist account, but one that
lacks direct referentialist commitments. However, if what one wants
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is a direct referentialist account, one needs to embrace an ambiguity
account of complex demonstratives, which, I have argued, is prima
facie methodologically inferior to a unified account.
From our perspective, direct singular contents have no particular
explanatory virtue. The best strategy of argumentation is to start with
some urgent empirical constraint (e.g. the apparent failure of binding
theory), and then ask how best to conceive of the linguistic meaning
of complex demonstratives. This may not do justice to the intuitions
that the referentialist cherishes the most, but nevertheless it has some
theoretical virtues that the referentialist constraints on semantic theo-
rising cannot achieve. On the view endorsed here, the main challenge
is not to come up with adequate semantic analyses for particular uses
of complex demonstratives, but rather to build an account that does
justice to the similarities and dissimilarities between the relevant ex-
pressions. The main role of an account of complex demonstratives
is not to isolate particular uses, but rather to capture the behaviour
and the syntactic and semantic nature of complex demonstratives in
a way that also allows us to see the continuities and discontinuities
between complex demonstratives and other expressions, such as def-
inite descriptions, proper names, and quantificational phrases.44
This ends the study of the impact of economy on themes in the
philosophy of language. As we have seen, the economy principles
are explanatorily useful, and impose constraints on what we should
take as structural properties of language (e.g. logicality) and as the
proper semantic analysis of noun phrases (e.g. complex demonstra-
tives). Previously in the thesis, I proposed two accounts of some
aspect of scope and binding, which have an ‘economy’ flavour in the
sense of endowing logical forms with grammatical properties relative
to their alternatives and an independent ranking of these alternatives.
Since my own proposals are essentially semantic/pragmatic restate-
ments of the standard economy that crucially preserve the reliance
on logical inference and guise-valued noun phrases, the results of the
last two chapters should be safely obtained within the frameworks
that I proposed.
44 There are further interesting interactions between complex demonstratives and sev-
eral other linguistic constructions. These interactions deserve attention in develop-
ing an empirically well supported account of demonstratives. For instance, how do
complex demonstratives behave in copular (identity) clauses? What are the syntac-
tic and semantic differences and similarities between complex demonstratives and
the standard quantifier phrases (e.g. some woman, every article)? How do complex
demonstratives and the standard quantificational phrases interact scopally with ep-
ithets? Moreover, which non-referentialist account is best? Are there even grounds
for thinking that a unified account is possible?
It would be also interesting to study what are the criteria of individuating expres-
sions such as complex demonstratives. Why do philosophers tend to give pride of
place to several semantic considerations, rather than thinking of the syntactic proper-
ties as being constitutive to what an expression is? Is it even possible to individuate
expressions in a systematic and non-arbitrary way?
236
7 CONCLUS IONS
In this thesis I discuss a host of specific linguistic phenomena, and for-
mulate several hypotheses that, albeit theoretically promising accord-
ing to the desiderata I proposed, are yet to be probed empirically. An
important advantage of these accounts is that they are comparatively
more promising than their competitors. Let me briefly summarise the
arguments of each chapter.
In chapter 1, I discuss the strong economy principle according to
which strong inverse scopes—inverse scopes that asymmetrically en-
tail the surface scopes—are disallowed and therefore syntactically ill-
formed. I point out that strong economy theorists have assumed,
problematically, that upward entailing determiners such as every trig-
ger existence presuppositions, whilst downward entailing determin-
ers such as few do not. I then go on and present a number of coun-
terexamples to strong economy, based, among other things, on phe-
nomena such as antecedent contained deletion and comparatives (see
below for a further illustration of the problems). These problems
show strong economy to be, if not downright false, at least a very
restricted phenomenon, trumped by many other principles and con-
ditions on scope. This principle’s narrow domain of applicability
suggests that there should be better alternatives. Perhaps another
explanatory strategy is possible, according to which the counterex-
amples to strong economy are simply possibilities allowed by a more
general principle of economy. I propose such a principle in chapter 2.
There I argue that Scope Admissibility (and further auxiliary assump-
tions) regulate the salience of scopal readings. This account allows
for the many possibilities that strong economy wrongly predicted to
be disallowed. It also recovers the good predictions of the original
Scope Economy principles. Moreover, the account seems promising
in terms of its implications for the role of contradictions in grammar.
In particular, I suggest that there are data showing that inconsistent
scopes are, in a sense, more salient than consistent ones.
In chapter 3, I turn to the topic of binding and show that extensions
of the standard binding economy principles to new domains—the
purported economy effects in constructions consisting of de se pro-
nouns, and in specificational copular sentences—have two shortcom-
ings. One shortcoming is that they fail to provide some pragmatic
motivation for positing economy principles. The truth-conditions of
the competing logical forms should have an effect on the result of the
selection of the winner. Otherwise, we have no hard evidence that
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the competition exists in the first place. A more general shortcoming
is that the type of reasoning behind the binding economy principles
would overgenerate if it were applied to other constructions. More
specifically, I found fault with the counterfactual implicit in the bind-
ing economy principle, namely, the assumption that a logical form
which determines a truth-conditionally novel content should be al-
lowed only if other grammatical means couldn’t be used to obtain
that result. I point out that there are other grammatical operations
that satisfy this type of counterfactual, and still we wouldn’t want
to posit an economy computation for each. To vindicate the binding
economy principles, we need to invoke their modularity or their role
as ‘repair strategies’. This, I argued, produces the reverse problem of
having a too restricted or narrow principle. I conclude that the stan-
dard economy principles, though initially supported by some very
sophisticated predictions, have become explanatorily marginal, and
that this suggests that they do not offer a good description of binding
patterns. A more general and better pragmatically motivated frame-
work is needed.
Drawing on an existing account, in chapter 4 I develop an improved
framework, namely, the semantic denotational economy account. This
account makes use of a principle of economy, Non-Redundancy, and
several auxiliary assumptions about the notion of antecedence and
the semantic values of noun phrases (which are taken to be guises).
I show how these assumptions can be used to account for a host
of economy effects by going through examples that manifest ‘obvia-
tions’ of the three binding conditions (A, B, and C). I then return to
the cases that were found problematic in the previous chapter—de se
pronouns and copular sentences—and argue that a deflationary solu-
tion (which makes the most of the denotational economy principle)
is to be preferred. I conclude that the denotational economy account
is more promising because it gives a more central role to economy
principles and is better motivated pragmatically. This is in accord
with the two original motivations for economy principles (generality
and pragmatism) which are also our desiderata for a good linguistic
economy account.
In chapter 5, I argue that the standard economy principles imply
that grammar is sensitive to logical properties, and thus support the
logic in natural language thesis (LNL). Basically, economy principles
are stated under the assumption that mutual entailments between the
competing logical forms have to be computed in order to license one
of them. I argue that the logicality involved in binding economy (and
in other linguistic hypotheses) can be conceived of proof-theoretically
or model-theoretically. Some standard objections to the LNL thesis—
e.g., the argument from absolute semantics and a version of the argu-
ment from idealisation—cannot even get off the ground if we under-
stand logicality in a proof-theoretic way. I then go through several im-
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portant objections in order to defend the model-theoretic (or seman-
tic) view of logicality in natural language. In particular, I argue that
the central objection to the LNL thesis, the argument from absolute
semantics, sacrifices empirical content by making highly restrictive
assumptions about the resources available to semantics—resources
that do not allow us to define logical properties. I also show that the
arguments from lexical semantics, logical constants, and abstraction
and idealisation remain inconclusive in the absence of stronger as-
sumptions about language (such as ‘absolute semantics’). I conclude
that the standard economy principles, but also the proposed restate-
ments of the economy principles, lend support to LNL, and that it
is both empirically and conceptually desirable to keep certain logical
properties in the grammar, rather than to push them in non-linguistic
realms.
In chapter 6, I exploit one of the essential auxiliary assumptions
of the binding economy accounts, namely the assumption that the
binding principles should be stated in terms of guises. This entails
that, from an economy perspective, complex demonstratives (but also
other noun phrases) are not directly referential. This is basically the
argument in the second part of the chapter. In the first part of the
chapter, I grant the referentialist (the theorist that advocates the direct
referentiality of complex demonstratives) that definite descriptions
are quantificational. The referentialist’s argument, viz. the argument
from scope, purports to show that there are important dissimilarities
between the scopal behaviour of complex demonstratives and defi-
nite descriptions—where the latter are, crucially, deemed to be quan-
tificational. According to the argument from scope, these dissimilar-
ities show that complex demonstratives cannot be quantificational. I
demonstrate that the argument form scope does not go through by ex-
amining a number of (what I assume to be) scopal constructions, and
find that the differences between complex demonstratives and defi-
nite descriptions are minimal. A seizable part of these constructions
involves configurations that test scope possibilities under the assump-
tion that the standard Scope Economy principle and the Parallelism
principle (governing VP-ellipsis) are correct, and thus can be used
to detect scope. This counter-argument coupled with the argument
in the second part of the chapter and with some methodological as-
sumptions (about generality and simplicity of the semantics of noun
phrases) made me take the non-referentialists’ side with respect to
the semantics of complex demonstratives. (I suggested that the moral
is generalisable to other definites and proper names.)
In light of the hypotheses defended in the thesis, I would like now
to take a broader perspective and elaborate on the general outlook
of my proposals, pointing at the parts of the thesis supporting the
general views laid out here. In essence, I am asking: What would
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binding and scope phenomena be like, were my proposals true, at
least to some reasonable extent?
To begin with, on the view advertised in the thesis, the binding the-
ory would be sensitive to a richer semantic ontology consisting of all
sorts of intensional objects (roughly, possible, rather than merely ac-
tual, objects). These objects will primarily (but not exclusively) serve
as the meanings of noun phrases, (such as pronouns: she; definites:
the man in black, that man in black and proper names: George). One
condition on the use of these objects is that they have some intuitive,
pragmatic motivation (rather than some abstract and theoretical un-
economical one). I called these intensional objects guises. (I defend
the significance of guises in chapters 4 and especially 6.) The seman-
tics will be populated by individual guises, the semantic values of
noun phrases. Individual guises are semantic objects that take the
form of functions from worlds (or situations) to individual objects,
provided that the individual objects satisfy certain descriptive con-
ditions. For instance, in case Mary utters the sentence She is smart,
having in mind a person with whom Mary talks on the phone, the
meaning of the pronoun she will be the contextually given guise akin
to the denotation of the definite description the person Mary is talking
on the phone with, assuming that the only potential individuals that
can satisfy the description are women. If Mary were to utter, in the
same context, She is Mary, two distinct guises would be identified.
Likewise, if Mary uttered She likes her, whatever the guise for her de-
notes, it will be assumed to be a different guise than the guise which
gives the meaning of she, in conformity to the traditional binding the-
ory. The guise-valued semantics of noun phrases matches very closely
the requirements of the syntactic theories, in particular, the principles
of traditional binding theory. Even better, it can be adapted to cases
that were problematic for traditional binding theory.
To illustrate the capabilities of this enriched ontology by appeal
to a new type of guise, consider again Mary uttering, in the context
of a logic lesson, If everyone adulates Kirstin, shei totally adulates heri.
As several theorists remarked, we can get away with this sort of ap-
parent violation of the traditional binding theory because there is a
nuance in the meaning conveyed by this utterance. A more correct ut-
terance, according to the binding theory, would be she totally adulates
herself, but because Mary can convey a significantly different message
by saying she adulates her, the binding theory can be overridden. The
new type of guise that can represent the significant distinction be-
tween adulating someone (as expressed in Mary’s actual utterance)
and self-adulating (as the traditional binding theory would have it) is
called a complex guise. Mary gets away with the utterance in question
because it expresses a different guise than the one that would have
been expressed using the reflexive herself. The complex guise akin
to the meaning of love someone allows Mary to say (or assume) that
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many other people, indeed everyone, is given under the same guise.
This would not be possible by expressing the guise for loving oneself
(or self-loving), because Mary does not want to say (or assume) that
everybody loves themselves.
As I argued in chapter 4, the semantics/pragmatics of guise-valued
noun phrases is quite rich. Thus, there are further applications of
guises: e.g. special guises and individual similarity-based guises. Let
us start with the former. Special individual guises are mixtures of
two individuals, and result from an asserted identity statement. Sup-
pose Mary utters that she dreamt that she was Brigitte Bardot. It is
perfectly possible to form, in the context of such an identification, a
guise that combines some essential traits of Mary and Brigitte. If after
making the identification between Mary and Brigitte, Mary goes on
and says I was hiding from me, we should be able to interpret the first
person pronoun I as expressing the special guise akin to the denota-
tion of the ‘compound’ description the Mary-Brigitte, and the pronoun
me as referring to a different guise, say the guise for Mary or Brigitte
(depending on the context). This is in accord with the reasoning in
the previous paragraph: binding theory would require a reflexive in
order to refer to the same individual, but given that on this occasion
me does not exactly refer to the same person, we can get away with
an utterance I was hiding from me, because the meaning conveyed is
significantly distinct.
As for similarity-based guises, they are useful in situations in which
Mary is talking about a different object as if that object was Mary her-
self. These situations are easy to construct by thinking of copies or
artistic representations of a person. Thus, if Mary is looking at a pic-
ture of herself, or perhaps a statue representing her, we could report
the scene by saying Mary is looking at herself, although what she is ac-
tually looking at is a representation of herself (in some medium, e.g.
paper or wax). The physical situation is pretty straightforward, at
least in common sensical (if not semantic) terms. But how should we
incorporate the utterance of Mary is looking at herself in binding theory,
which requires that the denotations of Mary and herself be the same?
The answer is that the common denotation of the two noun phrases
is a Mary-like guise, a function that yields in (two parts of) the con-
text of utterance two distinct individuals who share some physical
similarities.
The thesis that complex demonstratives denote guises (argued for
in chapter 5) falls out from this assumption about the semantic ontol-
ogy, and is supported by the overall plausibility of the thesis.
My aim in positing guises is ultimately to be able to state condi-
tions on their behaviour that are comparable with (if not better than)
the traditional binding theory. Accordingly, guises should behave
in a regular fashion, according to some general linguistic principles.
As we utter sentences consisting of noun phrases, we (as competent
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linguistic agents) order the denotations of noun phrases on a line, a
sequence of guises. Take any two noun phrases in an utterance. Their
denotations is either the same or different. The competent speakers
(and hearers) can interpret two noun phrases in a sentence as having
either the same referent or disjoint referents.
According to the denotational economy account (defended in chap-
ter 4), one basic principle is followed by competent speakers in decid-
ing the coreference or disjointness (i.e., the property of having distinct
referents) of noun phrases. An independently plausible assumption
about the ranking of noun phrases according to their dependency po-
tential, or specificity, is needed in order to complement the economy
principle. This ranking requires that certain noun phrases introduce
new referents, and that yet other noun phrases do not introduce new
referents but rather use the referents introduced by the former type
of noun phrases. The former type of noun phrases are less referen-
tially dependent (more specific or concrete), whilst the latter type are
more referentially dependent (less specific). For instance, intuitively,
proper names and definite descriptions are less dependent as to their
denotation on other referents (guises) in the sequence, but pronouns
are more dependent. Reflexives are the most dependent, and they
must use a previously introduced guise. The principle A of the tradi-
tional binding theory requires reflexives always to be bound. In terms
of sequences, we say that reflexives, while processed, must pull out
their semantic values (guises) in a position at the end of a sequence.
On the other hand, proper names and definite descriptions must in-
troduce their own semantic values. Consequently, if they introduce a
value that is already present in the sequence, the sentence ends up be-
ing ungrammatical. This is the case, e.g., with He saw John, assuming
that the pronoun and proper name receive the same interpretation.
Hence, the picture is that the denotational economy principle (Non-
Redundancy) regulates the use of guises in the sequences of eval-
uation constructed for sentences. The economy principles impose
constraints on when an expression can introduce a guise or recycle
an already existing one. The economy requirement on sequences of
guises leads to the emergence of the binding patterns realised by nat-
ural language constructions. Because on the current view guises are
semantic values, the account of binding is semantic. Further, because
these guises are sometimes given pragmatically, the account of bind-
ing is also pragmatic, in the sense that its raw materials, the guises,
are formed pragmatically. The principle of economy resembles prin-
ciples that are deemed to be pragmatic (communication-oriented).
Non-Redundancy requires the more (referentially) dependent noun
phrases to recycle guises and thus resembles the pragmatic principle
requiring economy of expression (keeping the truth-conditional con-
tent fixed). On the other hand, if the less (referentially) dependent
noun phrases are to realise their potential of referring by themselves,
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they should introduce their own guises, which, again, should be non-
redundant. Therefore, the principle of economy has a similar flavour
as the maxim of manner: (i) it pressures speakers into using the most
economical forms of expression (i.e., forms of expressions whose se-
mantic values can be parasitic on the semantic values of other expres-
sions), and (ii) prevents them from using special or overly-specific
forms unless they convey novel messages. The first aspect of the de-
notational economy principle covers uses of pronouns and reflexives
(viz. the domain of binding principles A and B), and the second
handles proper names, definites, and demonstratives (i.e., the noun
phrases in the domain of binding principle C). See Levinson (2000).
I consider this similarity between denotational economy and more
familiar pragmatic principles an advantage, because it guarantees, at
least at the outset, that we do not posit extraneous structure or com-
putation to deal with binding. (In fact, the basic criticism I levelled
against the standard interface principles of economy in chapter 4 was
that they appeared to introduce structure (and computations) that are
not needed. Even if they succeed to make correct predictions, from
a design perspective they do not make sense. If we were to design a
perfect grammatical system, whereby the different modules of gram-
mar cooperate well with each other, using interface principles of econ-
omy would be bad design, because they involve difficult solutions to
problems we need not have.) More generally, I have suggested that
pragmatic constraints can put a check on linguistic accounts, prevent-
ing them from positing computations which are burdensome, ineffec-
tive, and explanatorily marginal. Hence, the similarity between the
semantic economy principles and pragmatic principles reflects better
the purported elegance of grammar—one of the overarching motiva-
tions for positing economy principles. By endorsing the denotational
economy view, we have a semantic theory that mirrors the structural
features of pragmatics, because there is a clear analogy between the
economy principles of the denotational view and the pragmatic prin-
ciples, such as we know them.
It is worth pointing out that the principle of binding economy is
local, in the sense that it involves comparisons between sub-sentential
structure, rather than between entire logical forms. I have proposed
a rather different account of scope, one that relies on considering the
properties of a number of logical forms. However, as we shall see
shortly, the computation based on these logical forms is semantically
restricted. I now turn to presenting the scope-phenomena, according
to the controversy-based account.
Scope is a broad phenomenon, very difficult to capture by overar-
ching generalisations. However, as some theorists have suggested, a
potentially interesting hypothesis is that the semantic strength of a
scopal reading of a given sentence has an effect on the grammatical
availability of that scopal reading. I have shown this hypothesis to be
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problematic. On the face of it, Everyone admires someone has a stronger
inverse scope reading (saying that there is a person that everyone
admires). Many other counter-examples have been documented in
chapter 1. I concluded there that the idea that stronger scopes are
disallowed by grammar seems theoretically weak and unsustainable.
In chapter 2 I put forward a similar thesis which has it that any
sentence that can produce an inconsistency after disambiguation and
consideration of scalar implicatures (inferences from ’some’ to ’not
all’, and the like) is, in some sense, interesting, and its scopal read-
ings are clearer, more salient or easier to get. Two questions arise in
connection to the way the saliency of scopal readings has just been
presented. Why are disambiguation and implicatures so important,
and what does it mean for a sentence to have a clear or less clear
scopal reading?
First, why focus on disambiguation and scalar implicatures? Scalar
implicatures are strength-based inferences that do not depend on
much more than the expressions (in particular, the functional items)
in the sentence. Likewise, for a sentence to be endowed with struc-
tural ambiguity, we do not have to consider information outside the
sentence itself. (Of course, some scalar inferences can be cancelled if
we have additional contextual information, and, similarly, sentences
can be disambiguated given the pragmatically available information,
but both the scalar inferences and the disambiguation are triggered
by semantic/pragmatic properties inherent to the sentence.) So it is
plausible to think of an utterance as generating a logical space—viz.
a space of possibilities whose partitions or divisions mirror the rela-
tions between the disambiguated logical forms and their implicatures.
The logical space of a sentence is supplied by (what I have called in
chapter 4) the implicature set of the sentence consisting of the scopal
readings of the sentence and their implicatures. The implicature set
of a sentence is generated by a mechanism that is essentially based
on the semantics of the functional expressions that make up the sen-
tence.
The rationale for constructing a sentence’s logical space is the fol-
lowing. Imagine a controversy oriented conversationalist who is also
a competent speaker of a natural language. Let us call this person
a ‘controversationalist’. A controversationalist will be presumably in-
terested in sentences whose logical space is partitioned in such a way
that one cannot be in two of its partitions at the same time. In this
way, this mythical character ensures that by interpreting a sentence,
one will be put in a situation similar to that of choosing between
two sides in a debate—in effect, it is as if one would find herself in
the middle of a linguistic controversy. In other words, the contro-
versationalist wants a logical space with inconsistencies. Following
the logic of controversy, the more inconsistencies in the logical space
the better. The worse that can happen, from our character’s point of
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view, is that no inconsistency appears. Also, the clearer the inconsis-
tencies, the happier the controversationalist. In less mythical terms,
these inconsistencies determine, in turn, more (or less) salient scopal
readings.
I called the ensuing account of scope grounded in the notion of
inconsistency the controversy-based account. I think of this account
as being a linguistic economy account, because it involves forming
sets of propositions in order to license the grammatical property (e.g.
scope-salience) of a linguistic construction for which that set was con-
structed.
It turns out that we cannot obtain more than one inconsistency out
of the logical space formed from the disambiguated logical forms
of a given sentence and their scalar implicatures. What we can get,
though, is a more (or less) clear inconsistency in the logical space
generated by a sentence. This brings us to the second question: What
does it mean to say that a scopal reading is more salient than another?
I left the meaning of salience of an interpretation (or scopal read-
ing) at an intuitive level, meaning something akin to the clarity of the
interpretation or the easiness to grasp that interpretation. To make
the notion more precise, we need to distinguish between two related
meanings of salience. A scopal reading of a sentence s may be salient
relative to another scopal reading of the same sentence s. A scopal
reading of a sentence s may be salient relative to the corresponding
scopal reading of a different, but structurally similar, sentence q. Ac-
cordingly, there are two axes along which we can compare saliency.
One is across sentences (intra-sentential), and the other is within sen-
tences (extra-sentential).
Along the extra-sentential axis, a scopal reading is more clear or
salient than another just in case it belongs to a sentence which gen-
erates a logical space with a simpler partitioning that, moreover, al-
lows for a contradiction (or an empty intersection between partitions).
That is, provided that there is a contradiction, the less partitions there
are in the logical space of a sentence, the more salient the scopal read-
ings of that sentence will be. The extra-sentential salience is thus a
matter of the simplest (disjoint) partitioning. In other words, the in-
verse scope of a sentence is more salient than the inverse scope of
another in case the former sentence derives more ‘quickly’ a contra-
diction.
As far as intra-sentential comparisons of salience are concerned,
the scopal reading that is essential for producing the contradiction re-
ceives a special saliency status. Most of the time, it takes two readings
to get a contradiction, which makes these readings equally salient
from the perspective of the controversy-based mechanism. (Note that
there are further factors affecting scope-saliency, such as the left-to-
right parsing direction, and various other pragmatic factors.) But
there are special cases where we get a reading which is itself a contra-
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diction. There is at least one type of linguistic construction capable
of producing contradictory scopal readings. (We shall see some ex-
amples shortly.) In fact, these contradictory scopal readings will be
salient both intra-sententially and extra-sententially.
According to the controversy based account, the (extra-sentential)
saliency of scope shows a certain gradability. At one end of the spec-
trum, there are, as it were, ‘infinitely’ non-salient scopes, generated
by sentences that can produce no contradiction. At the other end,
there are sentences with very salient inverse scopes. (These are the
sentences which generate a contradictory scopal reading—see below.)
In between there is a vague terrain, where no saliency distinctions are
noticeable (see chapter 4 for examples).
This picture can be interpreted in a broadly Gricean fashion. Of
course, you may say, contradictions are interesting in the sense of
the controversy-based account only because the potential to generate
a contradiction is, logically speaking, the same thing as the poten-
tial of generating truth-conditionally distinct scopal readings. And
a sentence’s being ambiguous between two truth-conditionally dis-
tinct scopal readings has an important pragmatic function, since it
allows us to convey different messages relative to different contexts
of utterance using the very same sentence. So, if ambiguous sentences
have some pragmatic import, based on the different truth-conditional
contents that they can express, and truth-conditionally different dis-
ambiguated logical forms are all we need in order to generate an in-
consistent implicature set, then, the argument goes, the controversy-
based account follows from more basic facts about communication.
However, this reasoning disregards an important dissimilarity be-
tween the apparent motivations of the Gricean and controversy-based
accounts. The crucial point of dissimilarity follows from the fact that
contradictory scopes are more salient than contingent ones.
To see this, consider the sentences with an inconsistent scopal read-
ing announced earlier. Compare the sentence John wants to be taller
than himself with John wants to be taller than Sue. These sentences are
structurally ambiguous between two readings. On one reading (read-
ing 1), John wants to be taller than a person (namely, John himself
or Sally) is at the actual world; he wants his degree of tallness to be
higher than another person’s actual degree of tallness. On the other
reading (reading 2), John wants to be taller than a person whatever
his/her height is, or (equivalently) whatever height that person hap-
pens to measure at some possible world. Now, note that on reading 2,
the former sentence (which utilises a reflexive) is much more salient
than the other sentence (utilising a proper name). It seems to me that
this difference in saliency is clear in the phenomenology of interpret-
ing the two comparative sentences. This is because, I hypothesise,
contradictions are, in some sense, appealing. The sense in which they
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are appealing is, roughly speaking, the sense in which they serve the
controversationalist introduced earlier.
There are many other constructions involving comparatives that
have the property of generating a contradiction on one of their dis-
ambiguating logical forms. All of these contradictory logical forms
are, on reflection, more salient than other parallel logical forms that
are not contradictory. Crucially, this saliency-contrast cannot be fully
explained in Gricean terms, because the saliency of a contradiction
cannot, in general, be the expression of cooperative communication.
Quite to the contrary: the contradictions above do not seem to play a
role in communication. So one reason to think that this is a controversy-
geared phenomenon is the very existence of salient contradictions. Of
course, this does not exclude the possibility that this mechanism indi-
rectly serves a broadly Gricean picture of communication, but, taken
at face value, its primary motivation is quite different.
Inconsistency and its cognates (e.g. contradiction, incompatibility)
are basic notions used to define many other notions.1 Thus, we say,
for instance, that a conditional (or perhaps a causal) claim having the
form p→ q is true just in case it is not the case that p and q are incon-
sistent (i.e., it is not the case that p can be true and q false). Moreover,
judging from our cognitive lives, we do have very basic intuitions
about what is inconsistent/incompatible with what. We may have a
notion of inconsistency/incompatibility that is more general than, or
just different from, the logical one, as we find, for instance, in the re-
mark that raining is incompatible with the streets being dry. Further,
inconsistencies are defects in our arguments, so it makes sense to be
more sensitive to them rather than to other logical properties. Given
the broad cognitive significance of this notion (cf. Brandom 2008), it
is not implausible to think that the notion of inconsistency plays a
central role in the semantics and pragmatics of natural language.
How does the controversy-based account fare with other views cur-
rently on the market? One advantage of having a controversy-based
account of scope saliency is that we cover all the cases covered by the
original Scope Economy principle. But it becomes immediately clear
by examining the relevant data that further syntactic, semantic, and
pragmatic constraints on scope are needed in order to complement
the controversy-based account.
From the perspective of current research in linguistics, the controver-
sy-based account completes an emerging picture about the role of log-
icality in grammar. This emerging picture lends support to the thesis
that grammar is sensitive to logic. There are several ways to show
this, and one argument that I put forward in favour of the thesis (cor-
roborated by many other arguments) is from principles of economy.
1 To be more precise, what we need, strictly speaking, is the notion of inconsistency
that disallows two propositions to be true at the same time, but allows them to be
false at the same time.
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Before showing how the controversy-based account fits in this pic-
ture, let us pause to sketch the argument from economy (developed
in chapter 5).
My claim is that standard principles of economy involve logicality.
Recall that in order to allow an inverse scopal reading of a sentence,
Scope Economy has to check whether that reading is different from
(or non-equivalent to) the surface scope reading. Given that all lexical
material is put aside, and only the structural properties of the scopal
readings are relevant for the ‘economy’ computation, the process of
checking the non-equivalence of two logical forms is a process of
checking the logical non-equivalence of those logical forms.
A similar argument can be run from the Binding Economy prin-
ciple (see §5.2.2). A given expression within a sentence that seems
to violate a binding principle is allowed just in case that expression
makes a contribution to the logical form of the sentence, a contribu-
tion which is logically distinct from the contribution made by another
competing expression (that is in accord with the binding principle).
In other words, if the guises introduced by the expressions that seem
to disregard binding theory are different from the guises introduced
by the expressions that are in accord with it (and if the former guises
are pragmatically useful), they are allowed, and binding theory is
obviated. Since distinctions between guises are a matter of how the
guises behave across possible worlds, and that all the lexical items in
the sentence are removed for the purposes of the economy computa-
tion, the distinction between the resulting logical forms is a matter
of determining whether a given equivalence holds across possible
worlds (i.e., in a space of models that serve to interpret the equiva-
lence in question). So distinguishing between logical forms involves
checking whether a given equivalence is valid, or whether a certain
type of logical consequence relation is in place between two logical
forms.2
Now, the thesis that grammar is sensitive to logic has many other
advocates, whose arguments are based on a wide range of linguistic
evidence. One important strand of research seeks to explain ungram-
matical sentences by their contradictoriness (Chierchia 2013). But
not every kind of contradictoriness generates ungrammatical con-
structions, since, for instance, It’s raining and it’s not raining or He
is taller than himself are perfectly grammatical, albeit contradictory.
The needed contradictoriness must be insensitive to the identity of
lexical items, that is, the contradictoriness should occur even if the
lexical items were substituted non-uniformly. Gennaro Chierchia dis-
tinguishes this notion of contradiction, viz. G-contradiction, from
the standard notion of contradiction, viz. L-contradiction. Accord-
2 Validity or logical consequence can be defined not only in the suggested seman-
tic terms—as truth-preservation across possible worlds,—but also syntactically, as
derivability from a set of axiom by way of rules of inference.
248
conclusions
ing to the former, e.g., It is raining and it is not raining is not a (G-
)contradiction, since, if we substitute lexical items in a non-uniform
fashion in that sentence, we can get potentially true statements, e.g.
It is snowing and it is not raining. (According to the more standard L-
contradiction conception, the sentence It is raining and it is not raining
is surely contradictory.) But if the role of G-contradictions is to gen-
erate ungrammatical sentences, what is the role of L-contradictions?
L-contradictions may well have no role, since we know that as-
serting or assuming contradictions leads to ineffective communica-
tion. However, my claim, based on the controversy-based account,
is that the L-contradictions—or simply contradictions—have a pos-
itive role. The positive role of L-contradictions is to make logical
forms (more or less) salient, rather than to disallow logical forms
(the negative task of G-contradictions). On the controversy-based ac-
count, the linguistic constructions that have the potential of generat-
ing contradictions are more attractive than those that do not. So the
controversy-based account put together with the accounts based on
G-contradictions plead for a division of labour in the grammatical
role of contradictions: there are good contradictions and bad ones.
The G-contradictoriness accounts, the controversy-based account, as
well as the standard economy-based accounts, bring significant and
intriguing support for the general thesis that grammar is sensitive to
logic.
An important consequence of the present dissertation is to broaden
the notion of economy. Linguistic economy can be seen as an inter-
face feature of grammar, a mechanism that regulates the interface be-
tween syntax and semantics, or, as I proposed, a semantic/pragmatic
feature. In putting forward the denotational economy account and
the controversy-based account, I argued for a semantic/pragmatic
view of linguistic economy, on the grounds that these views are bet-
ter motivated pragmatically and more general. (In chapters 1 and 3,
I have shown that the pragmatic and generality desiderata are not
met by the standard, interface accounts.) But there is some feature
of the interface economy explanation that is preserved under seman-
tic/pragmatic accounts, namely that in order to establish whether
a given linguistic construction is grammatical, other constructions
should be considered. This feature is present in my accounts as well
as in many other accounts, especially in those making use of logical
properties in order to explain ungrammaticality.
These general observations suggest that thinking about the vari-
eties of linguistic economy has a rich and insightful impact on our
current understanding of language and grammar. Linguistic econ-
omy has consequences on how we conceive of the meaning of noun
phrases (pronouns, definites etc.), on the structural properties of lin-
guistic constructions (e.g. logicality), and on how we think of the
general principles governing scope and binding. As far as the key
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hypotheses presented here are concerned (the controversy-based ac-
count and denotational economy), I think that there are several theo-
retical guidelines and resources that might help advance our under-
standing of scope and binding. Regarding scope, we have to look
more into the cognitive significance of contradictions, attempting to
find other linguistic phenomena in which they may be involved. We
might try to exploit for the purposes of linguistic inquiry the appar-
ent tension between the phenomenological saliency of contradictions
and their lack of pragmatic/communicative appeal. With respect to
binding, a key area that promises to offer some illumination for the
present endeavours is the study of the properties of noun phrases
(their ‘features’, presuppositional and assertoric content) that are re-
sponsible for their varying appetites for referential dependency.
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Part IV
APPEND ICES
A MONOTON IC I TY
In presenting the strong principle of economy, we need to rely on
logical properties of linguistic operators, and in particular on down-
ward monotonicity. Here, I shall define the possible ‘monotonicites’
of natural language operators and then discuss each in turn.1 These
notions have been assumed in the preceding discussion.
monotonicities Let A,B,C be the sets corresponding to the seman-
tic values of linguistic predicates, and o a linguistic operator.
Provided that A ⊆ B, the relations Ro can have the following
properties:
(↖) left upward monotone 〈A , C〉 ∈ Ro ⇒ 〈B , C〉 ∈ Ro
(↙) left downward monotone 〈B , C〉 ∈ Ro ⇒ 〈A , C〉 ∈
Ro
(↗) right upward monotone 〈C , A〉 ∈ Ro ⇒ 〈C , B〉 ∈ Ro
(↘) right downward monotone 〈C , B〉 ∈ Ro ⇒ 〈C , A〉 ∈
Ro
For convenience, I shall speak of the semantic values of various
natural language predicates as being sets. The types of monotonicity
defined above correspond to inference patterns that depend on the
semantic relations between sets, the semantics of the relevant oper-
ators, and the syntactic distribution of the phrases expressing these
sets and operators.2
We are talking about operators in the broad sense, including the
negation operator and quantificational determiners such as few, some,
less than three, exactly four and so on. As mentioned, an operator’s
monotonicity determines the patterns of entailment of sentences of
a specified syntactic and semantic structure containing that operator.
1 In this appendix, I build on the discussion in Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 152).
2 One might wonder what the upward and downward, left and right notions have to do
with the corresponding definitions. The ‘vertical’ attributes of monotonicity, upward
and downward, correspond to the subset and superset relation between the sets A
and B. For instance, if we start in the right-hand side of a definition that makes use of
A in the antecedent, and we infer something about B in the consequent, we basically
go upward, since, by hypothesis, A is the subset of B. The ‘horizontal’ attributes of
monotonicity, left and right, refer to the position that A or B have relative to C in the
antecedent in (the right-hand side of) each definition. For instance, if the antecedent
in the right-hand side of a definition has B (or A) to the right of C, the monotonicity
defined is right monotonicity.
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Here are a few examples of entailment, where each time the first
sentence (b) is understood to entail the second (b), and the set A is
included in B.
26. The Rsome supplied by the determiner some is left upward entail-
ing (↖). (The same can be said about Rsome-not supplied by the
phrase some . . . not.)
a) Some [UEA students in room 01.07]A are [philosophers]C.
b) Some [UEA students]B are [philosophers]C.
27. The Rno supplied by the expression no (or none of ) is left down-
ward monotone (↙).
a) No [UEA student]B is a [philosopher]C.
b) No [UEA student in room 01.07]A is a [philosopher]C.
28. At least three and more than two (and the underlying R> 2) are
right upward monotone (↗)
a) At least three/more than two [philosophers]C are among
the [UEA students in room 01.07]A.
b) At least three/more than two [philosophers]C are among
the [UEA students]B.
29. Fewer than two and less than two (and the underlying R< 2) are
right downward monotone (↘).
a) Fewer than two [philosophers]C are among the [UEA stu-
dents]B.
b) Fewer than two [philosophers]C are among the [UEA stu-
dents in room 01.07]A.
The argument for strong economy relies on the downward mono-
tonicity property of linguistic operators. We should retain two im-
portant points from the present discussion of monotonicity. Firstly,
the monotonicity property of an operator depends on its position
relative to the noun phrases (with the sets A,B, and C as semantic
values), and, more importantly, on their position relative to other op-
erators. The dependence of the monotonicity property of operators
on their surrounding configuration falls out of our definitions. Sec-
ondly, note that there are linguistic operators that have none of the
monotonicity properties listed above. Cases in point are the quanti-
fier phrase exactly three students and more than three but less than five.
For instance, from the fact that exactly three UEA students in room
01.07 have failed, one cannot infer that exactly three UEA students
have failed. Nor does the inference in the opposite direction hold.
Thus, there are operators that have no monotonicity property. These
two observations are important because they suggest how to inves-
tigate the GSEC hypothesis under all its aspects, a task undertaken
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in §1.2.2. The monotonicity properties of an operator determine the
relative semantic strengths the operator in question will have under
different scopings.
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B FURTHER COUNTEREXAMPLES TOSTRONG ECONOMY
Some of the most notable counterexamples are the following. Uni-
versal quantifiers and negation swap places in some cases. These in-
teractions resemble the scopal interactions between indefinite GQPs
and negation: the subject GQPs must scope over negation on neutral
intonation, and the object GQPs are scopally flexible (type 2a + type
1a). (Beghelli and Stowell 1997, ex. 30a-b, p.28)
30. a) All the boys didn’t leave. (∀ > ¬), *(¬ > ∀)
b) John didn’t read all the books. (∀ > ¬), (¬ > ∀)
Similarly, Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 137) suggest a further ambi-
guity, which turns out to be another type 1a counterexample. I adapt
slightly their example. Suppose that the utterer is talking about what
the weather was like on a short break of 3 days.
31. It didn’t snow on more than two days of the (3 day) break.
a) max. two days of snowing and at least one non-snowing
day (¬ > more than two)
b) no snowing day and three non-snowing days. (more than
two > ¬)
So the difference between the two readings is like the difference
between asserting that there has been some snowing and asserting
that there hasn’t been any snowing. The latter assertion is surely
stronger, contra the principle of strong economy.
von Fintel and Iatridou (2007, p. 464) present the following scopal
construction involving negative polarity item (NPI) expressions (e.g.,
any, anything), as well as the judgements on the right-hand side:
32. Mary didn’t wear any earrings at every party. (∀ > ¬ > NPI),
(¬ > NPI > ∀)
Both relevant readings are allowed. The surface scope reading says
that there is no particular earring Mary wore at every party. In
contrast, the inverse scope reading says that Mary didn’t wear any
earrings at any party. The latter reading is stronger. Yet, contrary
to strong economy, it seems a perfectly acceptable interpretation–
another type 1a counterexample.
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33. Definite descriptions and existential quantifiers in predicative position
do not interact scopally with negation (Brogaard 2007, p. 123)
a) John is not the owner. *(the > ¬)
b) Lisa is not someone you can trust. *(∃ > ¬)
It is clear that these copular sentences are not saying that there
is a unique owner that John is not, and that there is someone you
can trust that is not Lisa, respectively. Both of these inverse scope
interpretations are weaker than the surface scope interpretations. It
is only the surface scope that is available for (33). Thus, the sentences
should be read as saying something akin to the following: there is
not unique owner who is John, and there is no person you can trust
such that that person is Lisa. (A similar behaviour is replicated by
indefinites in copular sentences, e.g. Jane is not a coward.)
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C CB DEF IN I T IONS AND PROOFS
Take p and q to stand for the surface and inverse scope readings of
a given natural language sentence. These readings are the in principle
possible logical forms of s, and should go through the implicature
mechanism in order to be endowed with salience. The two readings
of the sentence have an internal structure of the form O1O2 (surface
scope) and O2O1 (inverse scope), where O1 and O2 are natural lan-
guage operators (e.g. negation, quantifiers etc.). The propositional
variables p and q preserve the relevant semantic relations between
the scopal readings. In particular, there are several relevant types of
relation between the two scopal readings. Arguably, the relation be-
tween the scopal readings of the examples surveyed in the present
paper, fall into one of the categories below.
1. either p ⊂ q or q ⊂ p
2. p = q, where p and q are non-empty.1
3. p∩ q = ∅, because either p = ∅ or q = ∅
As far as the notation is concerned, read p ⊆ q as p entails q. A
proposition p entails a proposition q just in case for every possible
world w, q(w) = 1 if p(w) = 1. Similarly, p ⊂ q reads p strictly
entails q. A logical form p strictly (or asymmetrically) entails a form
q just in case for every possible world w, q(w) = 1 if p(w) = 1, but
the converse does not hold (it is not the case that if q(w) = 1, then
p(w) = 1). Further, p = ∅ means that p is self-contradictory, and
p∩ q = ∅ means that p and q are inconsistent.
The implicature set of a sentence consists of its scopal interpreta-
tions p and q and their scalar implicatures. For example, assuming
that p ⊂ q, the relevant scalar implicature of q, I(q), is p, the comple-
ment of p. Meanwhile, p does not have any relevant implicature, and,
consequently, I(p) does not belong to the implicature set. In case no
implicature I(p) arises, what gets in the implicature set, and is con-
sidered a relevant implicature, is the trivial implicature. That is, the
relevant implicature I(p) is taken to be >, the proposition that is true
everywhere and thus includes the entire domain of worlds. In this
way, we make sure that I(p) does not affect the inconsistency of the
implicature set.
1 p = q is shorthand for p ⊆ q and q ⊆ p.
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In general, then, the relevant implicature set of a sentence s will be
Is = {p,q, I(p), I(q)}. Admissible scope requires that if the implicature
set Is of sentence s is inconsistent, both of s’s scopes, p and q, should
be admissible, i.e., (CB-)salient. Salient (without further qualification)
means that the degree of salience of the sentence s is positive, but it
does not tell us anything about what degree that is or how it com-
pares to the degree of salience of other sentences.2
Definition 1 (Implicature set). The implicature set of sentence s is Is =
{p,q, I(p), I(q)}, where p, q, and I(p), I(q) are the scopal readings of s and
their relevant scalar implicatures, respectively.
Definition 2 (Admissible Scope). The scopal logical forms p and q of
sentence s are admissible (or salient) iff the relevant implicature set Is is
inconsistent.
Note that only p and q can give birth to relevant implicatures, and
thus the relevant scalar implicature can take the form p or q. In other
words, even if it is logically possible to find an r, distinct from p and
q, that strictly entails or is strictly entailed by p or q, r will not be
part of the computation.
Definition 3 (Relevant Implicatures and Sets). A scalar implicature I(p)
(or I(q)) of a sentence s is relevant if it has the form q (or p), where p and
q are the scopal logical forms of s. In case no implicature of this form exists,
the relevant implicature is >. A relevant implicature set Is consists only of
relevant implicatures (and the scopal readings).
For convenience, we can suppress the adjective relevant, since it is
clear from the context when an implicature and the resulting implica-
ture set are relevant.
On these assumptions, it is easy to prove that if a sentence has two
(scopal) logical forms and one of them strictly entails the other, the
sentence has two salient scopal readings. In other words, if s’s scopal
readings p and q are related in one of the two ways displayed in (1),
p and q should be salient interpretations of s.
Proposition 4 (Strict entailment). For any scopal readings p and q of a
sentence s, either p ⊂ q or q ⊂ p holds, then s’s implicature set Is is
inconsistent, and p and q are admissible for s.
Consider the first case in (1), where the relation between the scopal
readings of s is p ⊂ q. Then, the relevant implicature set of a sentence
2 By asserting q, given p ⊂ q, the message conveyed will not be simply the implica-
ture but rather the implicature subtracted from what q says, namely, C(q) = q− p,
where C stands for the truth-conditional content conveyed. I won’t need to use C,
since the purpose of the computation is not to spell out the content conveyed after
introducing the scalar implicature. (But note that the content conveyed is implicit in
the implicature set, since it is equivalent to the set of worlds that make true both p
and q, namely, p∩ q.)
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s will be Is = {p,q, I(q),>}. As I(q) = p, and thus I(q)∩ p = p∩ p =
∅, the implicature set Is is inconsistent. By Admissible Scope, both p
and q are salient.
For parity of reasoning, a symmetrical result will be obtained in
case q ⊂ p, where p and q are the surface and inverse scope readings
of the sentence s. To show this, it is enough to substitute p for q in
the reasoning above. The implicature set will be Is = {p,q, I(p),>},
an inconsistent set in virtue of the equivalence I(p) ∩ q = q ∩ q = ∅.
In virtue of Admissible Scope, both p and q are, once more, salient.
Hence, Strict Entailment is true.
Consider now what happens in case (2), where the scopal readings
of s are equivalent (but non-empty). In this case, it follows that there
is no relevant r, which strictly entails or is entailed by p or q, and
which can serve as a basis for a relevant implicature. Thus, the impli-
cature set associated with s will consist only of p and q, which are by
definition consistent.
Proposition 5 (Equivalent Scopes). If the two scopal readings of a sen-
tence s are logically equivalent, p = q, the resulting implicature set Is is
consistent, and the scopal readings are not admissible.
Moreover, case (3) generates admissible scopes, because one of the
scopal readings p and q is itself inconsistent, which makes the impli-
cature set inconsistent.
Proposition 6 (Self-Contradictory Scope). If one of the scopal readings
p and q is inconsistent (i.e., is the empty set ∅), Is is inconsistent, and p
and q are admissible.
Three further remarks are in order. Firstly, every example dis-
cussed in chapters 1 and 2 falls into one of the (1)-(3) categories, and
is thus covered by one of the three propositions above. But it is worth
pointing out that if there were cases where p and q were overlapping,
but neither of them strictly entailed the other (namely, cases where
p∩ q , ∅), then p and q would end up being inadmissible under the
current assumptions. Further assumptions would be needed in order
to account for them.
Secondly, the admissibility or (positive) saliency is attributed to
both p and q once we get an inconsistent implicature set. In order to
allow for comparisons, we need to distinguish between the saliency
of the scopal readings that are admissible. In order to do that, we
invoked the intuitive notion of quickness: a scopal reading is more
salient than another if it derives more quickly a contradiction in its
implicature set. The implicature set and the set theoretic relations
between its members establishes a logical space. We can translate the
notion of quickness in terms of partitions of the implicature set; the
less partitions are needed in order to obtain a contraction, the quicker
the derivation of a contradiction is. Case (3) is relevant in this respect.
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For the inconsistent reading, say q, represents a null partition, and
the other partition in the logical space established by the implicature
set is p. This is the simplest partitioning that might obtain, since
once we see the null set we can be sure that we have obtained a
disjoint partitioning, whereas for all the other cases the consideration
of further partitions are needed. So we expect that other sentences
with more complex partitions will generate less salient scopes. Intra-
sententially, the scopal reading that is essential for generating the
inconsistency is more salient (everything else being equal). So we
expect that a self-contradictory scope, as described in (3), should be,
ceteris paribus, more salient than the opposed scopal reading. Thus,
this suggests that the complexity of the partitioning in the logical
space defined by an implicature set is a measure of the gradability of
scopal salience.
Finally, in chapter 2 I made use of the notion of secondary impli-
catures. To introduce this notion, we assume p ⊂ q and add another
logical form r, stronger than p (i.e., r ⊂ p). Hence, if such a logi-
cal form r exists, the implicature set will have an additional member,
I(I(q)) = I(p) = r (namely, the secondary implicature of q). Then, all
it remains to be done is to define Scope Admissibility in terms of the
enlarged implicature sets.
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The following table summarises the data considered in chapter 2 and
the ones given below. Each row in the table contains the relevant
forms that enter the implicature set of the scopal reading to be tested
for admissibility. In the inverse scope implicatures (IS-implicatures)
and surface scope implicatures (SS-implicatures) columns, I use a bar
| to separate the primary and secondary implicatures (if any). As for
the other notational conventions, the negation, standard quantifiers,
and intensional operators are represented as usual; M and F mean
many and few respectively, ∃2 means exactly two. For the numerical
cases, <, > have the standard meaning: less than and greater than.
Further, I used m/3 to mean m objects out of 3, and, similarly, (0−
n)/7 will be used to say that between 0 and n objects out of 7 have
the relevant property. I emphasise in grey the forms that give rise to
contradictions.
Surface Scope (SS) SS-Implicatures Inverse Scope (SS) IS-Implicatures
∃∃ ¬∀∃, ∃¬∀ | ∃∃, ∃∀ ∃∃ −
∃∀ ¬∀∀ = ∃¬∀ | ∃∀ ∀∃ ∀∃¬
∀∃ ∀∃¬ | − ∃∀ ¬∀∀ | ∃∀
∀∀ − ∀∀ −
∀¬ = ¬∃ − ¬∀ = ∃¬ ∃
¬∀ = ∃¬ ∃ ∀¬ = ¬∃ −
F∀ M¬∀, ∃∃ ∀F ∀¬M, ¬F∀
M∃ M¬∀, ¬∀∃ ∃M ¬∀M | ∀F
M∀ ¬∀∀ ∀M ∀¬∀, ¬M∀
∃F − F∃ ¬∃F , ¬M∃
^(c < c)⇒ ⊥ − − −
(c < c)⇒ ⊥ − − −
¬ >2= (0− 2)/7 − − >2 ¬ = (0− 4)/7
¬∃2 (0− 2)/5 ∃2¬ 3/5
most > 3⇒ > 3 − 3 > most⇒ 3 −
∀∃3 ⇒ > 3 − ∃3∀ ⇒ 3 −Table 1.: The rows that give rise to contradictions between the items in grey
contain admissible inverse scopes. According to the controversy-
based account, all other things being equal, the quicker the contra-
diction occurs, the more salient the inverse scope is.
Recall that, where such contradictions appear, the relevant surface
and inverse scope are grammatically available (admissible or salient),
even if not pragmatically salient. Except for the ∃∃ and ∀∀ rows, all
the other rows contain scopes that are admissible by Scope Admis-
sibility. The surface and inverse scopes of these constructions are
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truth-conditionally identical, so no implicature will produce inconsis-
tencies (see previous appendix). Under our hypothesis, among the
admissible scopes, the surface ones are generally more salient in neu-
tral contexts, but there is also opposing pressure towards making the
inverse scopes more salient via Gradability.
I hinted (in fn. 6) that the cases below, in which, according to
Miyagawa (2011), negation seems to block reconstruction, support
the strong economy account. The judgements represented on the
right hand side are not mine. To anticipate, I shall predict that both
scopal readings are in fact possible for the two constructions. This
runs counter to Miyagawa’s judgement about (4).
4. a) Some student or other has answered many of the questions
on the exam.
(many > ∃)
• surface scope: some student answered many questions
∃ > many
• surface scope implicature: all students answered some
(/few) questions ∀ > ∃ or ∀ > F
• inverse scope: many questions were answered by some
student many > ∃
• inverse scope implicature: not all questions were an-
swered by some student ¬∀ > ∃
• contradiction from scope implicature and inverse scope
implicature ⊥
b) Some student or other has answered few (of the) questions
on the exam. (both)
• surface scope: some student answered few questions
∃ > F
• surface scope implicature: none of interest
• inverse scope: few questions were answered by some
student F > ∃
• inverse scope implicature: no single students answered
these few questions ¬∃ > F
• contradiction, since surface scope and inverse scope im-
plicatures are incompatible ⊥
5. I have not met some student. *(¬ > ∃)
6. Some student or other hasn’t answered many of the questions
on the exam. *(¬ > ∃)
The constructions (4a)-(4b) have inconsistent implicature sets. There-
fore, the constructions should be scopally flexible.
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The construction (5) is a special case due to the at least apparent
impossibility of surface scope. If this were the case, the problem
generated wouldn’t be unique to GSEC, but also to SE. In any event,
I tentatively handle (5) in the same manner.
7. I have not met some student.
• surface scope: I have not met any student (¬ > ∃)
• surface scope implicature: none
• inverse scope: there is a student I have not met (∃ > ¬)
• inverse scope implicature: there are some students I have
met
• contradiction: between surface scope and inverse scope im-
plicature
On our view, the contradiction leads to the moderate accessibility
of the inverse scope.
On several theorists’ judgement, the construction (6) has no inverse
scope interpretation. Let’s see if we can obtain this result by way of
the consistency test.
8. Some student or other hasn’t answered many of the questions
on the exam.
• surface scope: some student has not answered many ques-
tions (∃ > ¬)
• surface scope implicature: some student answered many
questions
• inverse scope: no student answered many questions (¬ >
∃)
• contradiction: between surface scope implicature and in-
verse scope.
Since a contradiction is generated, our prediction does not accord
with the judgements expressed in (6). On our broader view of scope,
both scopal readings are possible.
I noted (in fn. 6) that some of the data presented by Beghelli
and Stowell (1997), repeated here as (9)–(10), are also supporting the
strong economy principle. As before, I try to handle them using an
inference that connects implicatures with scope possibilities. I am as-
suming that we lack contextual information about the total number
of books.
9. Indefinites or bare numerals under negation.
a) The students didn’t read some books.
b) The students didn’t read two books.
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• surface scope: the students did not read 2 books¬ > ∃2
• surface scope implicature: at most one book was read
1∨ 0
• inverse scope: two books were not read ∃2 > ¬
• inverse scope implicature: ∃x unread book x
• no contradiction, since all the assumptions are compati-
ble
c) No student read some books.
d) No student read two books.
• no contradiction (for two books, the computation is the
same as the above)
10. QPs always take scope above negation in the absence of marked
intonation.
a) Some students didn’t read this book.
b) Two students didn’t read this book.
• surface scope: 2 students didn’t read this book ∃2 > ¬
• surface scope implicature: ∃x student who read this
book x
• inverse scope: it’s not the case that two students read
this book ¬ > ∃2
• inverse scope implicature: at most one student read
this book 1∨ 0
• no contradiction
c) Some students read no books.
d) Two students read no books.
• no contradiction (for two students, same as the computa-
tion above)
For the bare numeral quantifiers, I listed the computations above. It
should be remarked that although no contradiction ensues in contexts
with imperfect information (as the ones above), contradictions can
be generated when we get more specific information. Because such
contradictions are possible, but hard to obtain, I in fact predict that
the pragmatic scope of such constructions is indeterminate. I focus
next on the versions using the quantifying determiner some. Since
its inverse scope implicature is not consistent with the surface scope
reading, I again predict moderate availability.
Turning to the cases in (10), it is an easy exercise to show that we
obtain a contradiction, and thus, on my account, the construction has
an inverse scope reading which, moreover, is moderately salient.
Further examples involving numerals are given below:
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11. a) At least three/more than two [UEA students] are never/not
[prepared for the exam]. (↗)
b) Always, at least three [UEA students in room 01.07] are
[prepared for the exam]. (↖)
c) Never were there more than three [UEA students] [pre-
pared for the exam]. (↘)
Lacking any precise contextual information, no contradiction en-
sues, so we only expect a slight bias towards surface scope. Both sco-
pal readings are available. However, once we get more information,
we become, in principle, able to rule out one of the scopal readings.
Let us now look at another set of examples. As before, we give
the inferences testing the scope availability of some of these construc-
tions.
12. a) In most of John’s classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen.
(most > 3), (3 > most)
b) In all of his classes, John was angry at some/exactly three
Frenchmen. (∀ > ∃), (∃ > ∀)
• surface scope: in most of his classes, John was angry at
some Frenchmen or other
• surface scope implicature: no (particular group of) French-
men upset John in most of his classes
• inverse scope: some Frenchmen upset John in most of his
classes
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and inverse
scope
A contradiction is also obtained for the numerical case, (12a). I
represent the computation in the following figure.
SS: 3 > most⇒ n = 3
IS: most > 3 ISI: (n > 3)
⊥
Figure 6.: The surface scope reading and inverse scope implicature are in-
consistent
13. c) In every room in John’s house, every bottle is in the corner.
d) In every room in John’s house, you can hear a (some) tune.
[He’s got the Sonos multi-room system.] (∀ > ∃), (∃ > ∀)
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• surface scope: In every room in John’s home, you can
hear some tune or other.
• surface scope implicature: no tune can be heard in ev-
ery room
• inverse scope: there is some tune that you can hear in
every room
• contradiction between surface scope implicature and in-
verse scope
14. a) Whatever John does, most of the class falls asleep.
b) Whatever John does in the class, some people in that class
fall asleep. (∀ > ∃), (∃ > ∀)
These cases differ only syntactically from some of the examples pre-
viously discussed. This is because they involve surface scope univer-
sal (or most) quantifiers dominating some sort of existential quantifier.
As above, inverse scope is stronger, and thus Scope Admissibility al-
lows it, and given that the inconsistency is obtained relatively fast,
the inverse scope has some degree of saliency.
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I present the results of a linguistic survey run on-line, through the
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. The results mostly corroborate
the main thesis of chapter 2. In what follows, I describe how the
survey was introduced to the informants and then present the survey
itself. To keep this appendix short, I skip over some parts of the
survey. In particular, I omit the preliminary questions asking the
informants to attest that they are native speakers of English, some
additional examples given in the instructions, as well as the filler
questions in the survey.
about the experiment The linguistic experiment consists of a
questionnaire (survey), preceded by a list of instructions which ex-
plain how to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire contains
42 sentences that must be evaluated or ranked by native speakers of
English. Each informant is paid $3 for reading the instructions and
completing the questionnaire, which takes about 20 minutes overall.
What to do and how to do it?task Each of the tasks involves a little story and one or more corre-
sponding sentences. To do the tasks, make sure you:
1. understand the little story
2. understand the sentences coming after the story, including the
possible ways of interpreting these sentences
3. evaluate the sentences in the context of the story, that is, rank
each sentence on a scale from 1-7 according to its compatibility with
the story.
ranking of sentences The ranking of sentences is the essential
part of the experiment. The worst sentences are ranked 1 and the per-
fectly good ones are ranked 7. Of course, you may use any other num-
ber between 1-7 to rank the sentences, according to how bad/good
a sentence appears to be. The higher the number, the better the sen-
tence!
examples of stories and sentences To give you an idea about
how to rank sentences, here are several examples of very bad and
very good sentences in the context of specific little stories.
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Typographical conventions The story is written in normal font.
The sentences to be evaluated are written in monospaced font. To
draw your attention to a particular expression in a sentence we will
wrap the expression in stars, like so: *expression*. Our few comments
and guidelines are displayed in italic fonts.
Example 1 John likes fishing and in the last vacation he went fish-
ing in three different creeks (creek1, creek2, and creek3). He caught
three fish: one in creek1, another one in creek2, and yet another one
in creek3. So, are the following proper ways of describing the situation?
(1) John caught a fish in three creeks. [1] Matthewson (2004, p. 408)
(2) John caught a fish in each creek. [7]
Note: Evaluate a sentence only in its context, that is, as part of the little
story. Take sentence (1): “John caught a fish in three creeks”. If you
interpret sentence (1) outside its context, it will be good from a grammatical
point of view (albeit implausible, because it implies that John caught the very
same fish in each of the creeks). But in the context of the story, it is really
bad because the story tells us that John caught three fish (not just one, as
sentence (1) implies). So sentence (1) receives grade [1]. On the other hand,
sentence (2) is very good and fits perfectly well the context, and so gets the
highest grade, [7].
We should say that the evaluation of sentences is flexible: some people
will feel that they want to give a [2] to sentence (1) and a [6] to sentence (2).
That’s all right! What’s unacceptable for most native speakers of English is
to rank (1) above (2).
Also, note that (2) is considered perfectly good even if it’s not as explicit
as it could be: it says that John caught a fish in each creek, leaving it implicit
that it is about each of the *three* creeks mentioned in the story. So we are
not interested in how comprehensive the information conveyed by a sentence
is, but only in its degree of compatibility with the context, assuming it is not
altogether misleading. As long as the sentence is compatible with the context,
and the information it conveys is not misleading, it should be as good as a
more explicit or comprehensive sentence (compatible with the context).
Bottom-line Each sentence is preceded by a little story. Always
evaluate sentences in the context of the given story. The evaluation
is somewhat flexible. However, do not hesitate to give 7s and 1s if
the sentences do (or don’t) make sense to you in their context. Fi-
nally, it’s not important whether the sentences are fully informative.
What really matters is the compatibility of the sentences with the
story/context, provided that they are not misleading in that context.
key guidelines for evaluation
• we are not interested in whether these sentences would be graded
highly by a writing teacher, or whether they mesh with the rules
of grammar you learned in school.
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• nor do we care about the style or clarity of the sentences, or
about their being fully informative. We are interested only in
whether you think that these sentences are informative enough
and sound right to you in their contexts.
• we are interested in the evaluation of each sentence on its own,
rather than in whether there are better alternative ways of say-
ing the same thing. So if you have to evaluate a sentence S, we
want you to judge how good S is (in its context), rather than
how good S is compared to another sentence S’ (that might be
used in the same context).
• finally, this experiment is not designed to be a memory test or
any other way of measuring your abilities. So just tell us if you
find the sentences acceptable in regular conversation.
The questionnaire
Please evaluate the following sentences in the context of their stories.
Story 1 Some time ago, John had to meet my students, but he was
not able to do so because he was sick. The students didn’t get to meet
John. Do the following express well what happened in the story?
(3) John didn’t meet every student of mine.
(4) John didn’t meet all my students.
Story 2 Yesterday, John was able to come to meet my students, and
he did. However, several students were not able to make it, and they
didn’t show up to the meeting. How good are the following sentences?
(5) Every student of mine didn’t show up.
(6) All my students didn’t show up.
Story 3 Bill the doctor had to see the students after John met them.
But the students were too tired after the meeting with John, and
didn’t show up at the meeting with Bill. So Bill didn’t get to see
the students. Is this situation correctly depicted by the following sentence?
(7) One student didn’t show up to meet Bill.
Story 4 On each floor of the university building A, there are many
windows (say 23). On each day of the week, someone opens the
windows on one—and only one—floor. Is the following the right thing
to say?
(8) Many windows are always open in this building.
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Story 5 On each floor of the university building B, there are very
few windows (say 3). On each day of the week, someone opens the
windows on one—and only one—floor. Is the following sentence right
in this context?
(9) Few windows are always open in this building.
Story 6 Let’s imagine that the twelve apostles had a very small
number of things which were common property; that is, the apostles
shared a very low number of things (say three silver coins). Are the
following assertions right?
(10) Every apostle had few things.
(11) All apostles had few things.
Results and interpretation
I collected responses from thirty informants, all self-avowed native
speakers of English. As shown above, a task consists of reading a
little story and then assessing sentences in the context of the story,
using a scale from 1-7 (1 means very bad, and 7 means very good).
The aim of this set up is to verify if the inverse scope readings of
several sentences are available. And the stories are meant to make
salient the inverse scope readings of the sentences to be evaluated.
We expect sentences which exhibit scopal flexibility to be maxi-
mally compatible with contexts requiring the inverse scope reading.
As we can see, all the sentences but one can be made compatible with
the context, and this suggests that they admit inverse scope readings,
and thus are scopally flexible. (Note that these sentences are the con-
structions (37a), (37b), (40), (42a), (42b), and (47) of chapter 2, and are
also the equivalents of the constructions (8)-(10) of chapter 1.)
The results are summarised in the figure below. Red designates the
proportion of informants that found the inverse scope of the corre-
sponding sentence to be bad in context (and thus ranked the sentence
between 1-3). The exact percentages are given on the left-hand side.
Blue designates the proportion of informants that found the inverse
scope of the corresponding sentence to be good (ranked 5-7), and the
percentages are given on the right-hand side. We assume that if 30%
or more of the informants found a sentence good under its inverse
scope interpretation, then the inverse scope is indeed available.
What the graph shows is that an important percentage of our in-
formants find most sentences in our pull compatible with the con-
text. (The only exception is One student didn’t show up to meet Bill.)
Under our assumptions, this means that these informants grasp the
inverse scope readings of the relevant sentences. This offers provi-
sional support for the thesis that scopal flexibility is a less restricted
phenomenon than several theorists have thought.
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The acceptability of inverse scope readings in context
For convenience, I repeat the main sentences here, following the
increasing order of acceptability of their inverse scope, as they appear
in the graph.
(4) John didn’t meet all my students. cf. (3)
(9) Few windows are always open in this building. ≈ (42b), (10b)
(6) All my students didn’t show up. cf. (5)
(11) All apostles had few things. cf. (10)
(10) Every apostle had few things. ≈ (42b)
(5) Every student of mine didn’t show up. ≈ (37a), (8a)
(8) Many windows are always open in this building. ≈ (42a), (10a)
(3) John didn’t meet every student of mine. ≈ (37b), (8b)
(7) One student didn’t show up to meet Bill. ≈ (40), (9)
I do not claim that these results are definitive. Much more work
(both experimental and conceptual) should go into establishing the
scopal properties of doubly quantified sentences. For the moment,
we have to content ourselves with these suggestive results.
I would like to single out one methodological problem posed by
this survey. One important challenge is to establish that compatibil-
ity of a sentence with a context really tracks the inverse scope of that
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sentence. My interpretation of the data assumed that this is the case,
and a corresponding (definitional) assumption went into my notion
of scope. However, an alternative interpretation of our experimental
data may run as follows. When the story (linguistic context) and the
sentence are taken in conjunction, they constrain what is conversa-
tionally taken for granted without actually producing any constraint
on the logical form of the sentence, i.e., without requiring the instan-
tiation of an inverse scope logical form.
My provisional strategy of response to this challenge is to define
scope in terms of notions that are more transparent than that of log-
ical form. On my conception of scope, scopal properties are just log-
ical properies defined in terms of entailment and (in)compatibility
with context, rather than the special linear ordering of quantifiers. (In
chapter 2, I referred to this as a more pragmatic notion of scope. It
is also a more deflationary notion of scope.) This is more transparent
because the patterns of entailment (compatibility, and incompatibil-
ity) of sentences, are easier to test than their elusive logical form. I
am aware that this notion of scope is not everyone’s notion of scope.
However, an argument to the effect that the previously mentioned
methodological issue can be solved by assuming my deflationary no-
tion of scope should be left for another occasion.
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I contend that there are four ways of defining a notion of logical
consequence (and more generally logicality properties), which are
consistent with the absolute model constraint.
1. Pre-semantic Solution. Take a frame1 to be the fixed domain Da
of an absolute model Ma, with a specified vocabulary V . Thus,
the frame will leave open which of all the possible valuations
Ii in F (i.e., the set of possible functions taking us from sym-
bols in V to objects in Da, respecting semantic categories2) is
the absolute valuation Ia. We can now take in sentences and
test them under arbitrary possible valuations Ii before attribut-
ing them (or independently of attributing them) their absolute
values suplied by the absolute valuation Ia. (This generates a
set of validities which, together with the sentences generated by
the absolute semantics, give rise to further inferences.)
This strategy fits the (BE) hypothesis very well. This is because
e.g. we don’t have to know who Claudine is (i.e. who is its fixed
semantic value) in order to be able to evaluate the grammati-
cality of She is Claudine using the (BE) mechanism. Thus, the
logical computation of sentences in Principle C configurations
may precede at pre-semantic level before even considering the
absolute valuation and model. That is, we are free to use the
entire space of valuations to define whatever logical properties
we need, including the one underlying (BE).
2. Post-semantic Solution. Suppose that we don’t have the liberty of
doing the previous move. That is, we already have in place a
fixed, absolute valuation Ia, and the domain making up the ab-
solute modelMa. In this case, to get logicality we can generalise
from Ia to arbitrary possible Iis. We can see the generalisation
as follows. First we write the valuations functions Ii as binary
relations Ri in Da × V . Accordingly, if the absolute valuation
took us from symbol v1 in V to object d1 in D, then, in terms
1 See Patrick Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema (2001) on the definition of logical
consequences in modal logic at the level of frames (relational structures, without
a valuation). Here, as in the modal logic case, frame marks the fact that no refer-
ence to models is made in defining logical consequences; we abstract away from the
contingent information introduced by models.
2 The set F is thus the set {Ii : A → B|A ⊆ V&B ⊆ D} of possible functions from
subsets of V to subsets of D.
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of relations, we write Rv1d1. Let us suppose that some such
unique relation is realised by the grammar (broadly speaking).
Now, the generalisation is based on a systematicity assumption,
to the effect that whoever can form Rv1d1, can also form Rv1d2,
Rv2d1 etc. respecting semantic restrictions (e.g. individual con-
stants will be related only to individuals in Da). Provided that
it is not implausible to think that our cognition is systematic, we
thus can get a space of models at post-semantic level, starting
with the resources made available by the absolute semantics.
This is akin to saying that the competent speakers can entertain
the possibility of things being named differently than they actu-
ally are or of predicates having different extensions. As far as
the (BE) hypothesis is concerned, the way we call the individu-
als in the domain and the extensions of the lexical items are im-
material to the grammaticality verdict given by the (BE) mecha-
nism, which shows that this post-semantic solution is compati-
ble with the (BE) hypothesis.
Another plausible way to interpret the post-semantic view is to
divorce it from what cognitive systems can do. Firstly, what
is important for explanatory purposes is whether some judge-
ments of acceptability can be explained in terms of logicality
defined post-semantically. Secondly, the knowledge we have
about what a cognitive system can do is very partial, and is not
a direct concern of the semanticist. According to this interpreta-
tion, formulating a semantics at a more abstract level than the
cognitive one is entirely acceptable.
3. Semantic Solution. A third possibility of getting invariance prop-
erties doesn’t require tweaking the valuation functions at all,
as both the above solutions did. We can get a space of mod-
els out of an absolute model Ma, 〈Da, Ia〉, simply by splitting
the model in smaller, disjoint sub-models.3 These sub-models
will be absolute, by the absolute semantics lights – all truth-
conditions will be given with respect to parts of the real world.
We can then extend our absolute sub-models by adding to each
of them the logical sentences we want to test. Sentences true in
all sub-models will be valid. Thus, we may simulate a space of
models only based on decomposing the absolute model. This
proposal is perhaps most attractive as a model of how compe-
tent speakers carve out the universes of discourse (domains)
they are speaking about. In effect, speakers rarely talk about
the whole universe of discourse, about all the objects in the do-
main. The domain is most of the time restricted contextually
to a subset of the whole domain (the domain of the alleged ab-
3 For the discussion of the similar operation of sub-model generation in modal logic
see Patrick Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema (2001, 55ff.).
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solute semantics). For instance, imagine the conditional if all
dogs are asleep, then some dogs are asleep being uttered multiple
times, in different contexts, about different dogs. The differ-
ent dogs the utterances are about determine different models
for the utterance-tokens. If we formulate a context-sensitive se-
mantics (truth-conditions) for this sentence, we shall be able to
classify the above inference as a logical-truth (or equivalently
as a logical consequence), since it is true (or preserves truth) in
all possible (contextually given) models. These models will be
sub-models of the absolute model. Likewise, we can define log-
ical properties for any other natural language sentence deemed
a valid inference.
4. Proof-theoretic Solution. Perhaps the most minimal solution is to
rely on a syntactic way of conceiving of logicality. The proof-
theoretic system needed will depend, of course, on the job at
hand. For the purposes of Binding Economy, our implemen-
tation needs the standard first-order deductive system, as sug-
gested. Thus, within the logical computation required by Bind-
ing Economy, all we need is to see if the specific abstracted logi-
cal forms (neglecting lexical material) are instances of ∀xy(Bxy∧
x = y) `a ∀xBxx. If they are, the coreference and binding read-
ings are equivalent, and the coreference reading is grammati-
cally licensed. But if the logical forms are not instance of that
formula, their coreference and binding readings are difference,
and the binding reading is allowed. (Given that the first order
logic is sound, we automatically get the connection with the se-
mantic ways of conceiving of logical consequence and validity.)
The first three ways of sketching a model theoretic view compatible
with the absolute semantic desiderata—(1)-(3)—exploit the flexibility
of the notion of a model for natural language. This flexibility may
well reflect the flexibility of linguistic competence.
From the point of view of absolute/exclusive semantics, the syntac-
tic view of logical formality in natural language (4) is the less intru-
sive, since it does not need models in order to define logicality. This
solution was suggested by both linguistic and philosophical accounts
(see fn. 17).
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